"REFLECTIONS ON GRENADA" REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE KENNETH W. DAM DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS CONFERENCE LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

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W3275P 1830 2 November
"REFLECTIONS ON GRENADA"
REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE KENNETH W. DAM
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS CONFERENCE
Louisville, Kentucky
November 4, 1983
Mr. Chairman:
I am pleased to be here. My theme, of course, is
Grenada -- the origins and results of the United States
participation in the collective effort.
But I will also try to place the events of the past 3
weeks in the larger context of United States objectives
and policy in that entire retion which we have come to
call the Caribbean Basin.
In the specific instance of Grenada two basic
objectives motivated the President's decision last week to
act jointly with Barbados and Jamaica in response to the
urgent and formal request from the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States. They were:
to protect the lives of U.S. citizens; and
to help Grenada re-establish governmental institutions
which would restore order, protect human rights, and
maintain peace and stability.
These goals are consistent with U.S. objectives
throughout the area -- or the world for that matter. But
it is the specific setting which helps to define just what
responsible action by the United States should be.
This corner of the Caribbean is a singular setting:
Prime Minister Charles of Dominica recently described the
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countries involved in terms of QUOTE kith and kin UNQUOTE.
Reuben Harris, the Education Minister of Antigua and
Barbuda, was more specific when he spoke last week at a
UNESCO conference in Paris. He noted that these nations
QUOTE enjoy an economic community, a common currency, joint
diplomatic representation and responsibility for...common
defence and security UNQUOTE. Minister Harris talked of
QUOTE partners in an interlocking relationship....a
homogeneous society tied by strong links of blood UNQUOTE.
And he pointed out that these nations QUOTE pooled
individual sovereignties in a joint relationship under the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States UNQUOTE.
In making the key decisions early last week, President
Reagan and the rest of us were very much aware of this
singularity. It was the critical background against which
action could be taken with confidence in the face of
violence and uncertainty. It captioned the words of people
like Mrs. Charles and her eastern Caribbean colleagues with
the assurance that the United States was -- and is --
listening to the right people.
This is an important consideration in understanding
what happened, and why, and what it all means elsewhere.
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Because there is one thing which.must be said about how the
United States relates to our neighbors to the South today:
When they talk, we do listen.
[Political Collapse in Grenada]
Collective action was brought about by ten days of
brutality and instability without precedent in the
English-speaking Caribbean.
,The collapse of governmental institutions in Grenada
began the evening of October 12 with an attempt by Deputy
Prime Minister Bernard Coard to force out Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop. Bishop, who had seized power in 1979, had
established close relations with Cuba and the Soviet
Union. According to minutes of the party Central
Committee, however, he was considered a QUOTE bourgeois
deviationist UNQUOTE by the Coard faction for moving too
slowly to consolidate a QUOTE Leninist UNQUOTE
restructuring of Grenadian society.
After Bishop was taken into custody in the middle of
the night October 14, the power struggle became openly
violent on October 19. Troops opened fire on Bishop
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supporters who had freed him from house arrest. Bishop,
several cabinet ministers and union leaders were taken
away, then executed. Education Minister Jacqueline Creft
was apparently beaten to death.
In the wake of these murders, the People's
Revolutionary Army announced the dissolution of the
government and the formation of a 16-member Revolutionary
Military Council (RMC). Army Commander General Hudson
Austin was declared the nominal head, but it was never
clear that Austin or any coherent group was in fact in
charge. The RMC, in fact, never purported to be a
government. No one knew when -- or how -- governmental
authority would be reinstituted.
This climate of uncertainty and fear deepened late! on
October 19 with imposition of a 24-hour curfew; the RMC
announced that anyone found outside would be shot on
sight.
[Caribbean Reaction]
The murders and breakdown of governmental order
shocked, repelled and alarmed leaders throughout the
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Reaction was particularly strong within Grenada's
unique immediate community. Without exception, the leaders
of the Eastern Caribbean condemned the murders and
expressed their sympathy for the people of Grenada.
Leaders in the wider Caribbean were equally outraged.
Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados said Bishop and his
fellow ministers had been killed by QUOTE disgusting
murderers UNQUOTE who had committed the QUOTE most vicious
act to disfigure the West Indies since the days of slavery
UNQUOTE.
Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica expressed
revulsion at QUOTE the intensity of the barbarity UNQUOTE
and broke diplomatic relations with Grenada. The Jamaican
opposition party (People's National Party, the PNP), headed
by former Prime Minister Michael Manley, on October 20
severed all relations with Grenada's New Jewel Movement,
recommended its expulsion from the Socialist International,
and declared that the RMC had no right to speak for the
Grenadian people.
[The Decision to Act]
Sometimes action is necessary to keep a bad situation
Caribbean.
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from getting worse. This was such a time.
The disintegration of political authority in Grenada
had created a dynamic that made further violence likely and
that spread uncertainty and fear. To wait would have meant
that those who on October 19 murdered much of the
Government of Grenada, and who had since been unable to
form a government, would have either driven the island into
further chaos or turned it into an armed fortress. In
either event, the threat to U.S. citizens and to the peace
of the Eastern Caribbean would have increased. Inaction
would have made a hostage situation more likely, and
increased the costs in lives of any subsequent rescue
operation.
On October 23, the heads of state of CARICOM (the
overall Caribbean Community), meeting in emergency session,
suspended Grenada's membership in the organization.
At the same time, the OECS decided to assist the people
of Grenada and to request U.S. help in doing so. In its
formal request for U.S. assistance, the OECS cited:
- QUOTE the current anarchic conditions, the serious
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violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred
and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and
security of the region created by the vacuum of authority
in Grenada. UNQUOTE.
The OECS request also noted:
- QUOTE that military forces and supplies are likely to be
shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the
regime and that the country can be used as a staging post
for, acts of aggression against its members; and
- QUOTE that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is
already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond
the internal needs of that country UNQUOTE.
We had of course also been following events with
increasing concern. As is well known, the growing
Cuban/Soviet presence on Grenada had led the United States
to have serious disagreements with the Bishop regime.
Nonetheless, Bishop's visit to the United States in June,
1983 (when Judge Clark and I-met with him) had led us to
hope that Grenada would adopt a more moderate course.
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What became our overriding concern, however -- as
events unfolded -- was not Grenada's political system.
Rather, it was the safety of U.S. citizens in the midst of
growing anarchy that the countries of the Caribbean also
saw as a direct threat.
Some 1,000 U.S. citizens, mainly students, elderly
retirees and missionaries, made up the largest community of
foreigners on Grenada. Our concern for their welfare was
heightened by the murders, the curfew, and the difficulty
of getting accurate information. And in the absence of a
functioning government, credible assurances of their
well-being and future prospects were impossible to obtain.
After carefully considering these developments, and
reviewing all aspects of the OECS request, President Reagan
concluded that to wait passively would entail great
risks. Before acting, however, the President sent a
special emissary, Ambassador Frank McNeil, to consult with
regional leaders. On October 23, Ambassador McNeil met in
Barbados with OECS representative Prime Minister Eugenia
Charles of Dominica, Prime Minister Adams of Barbados and
Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica.
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.Ambassador McNeil found these Caribbean leaders
unanimous -- I repeat, unanimous -- in their conviction
that the deteriorating conditions on Grenada were a threat
to. the entire region that required immediate and forceful
action. They strongly reiterated their appeal for U.S.
assistance, and insisted that the situation did not bear
the possibility of watchful waiting.
[Legal Authority for Action]
_U.S. actions have been based on three legal grounds:
First, as these events were taking place, we were
informed, on October 24, by Prime Minister Adams of
Barbados that Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon had used a
confidential channel to transmit an appeal for action by
the OECS and other regional states to restore order on the
island. The Governor-General has confirmed this invitation
to take action since the arrival of the joint security
force. This invitation, to which we were unable to refer
to publicly until the Governor-General's safety had been
assured, was an important element -- legally as well as
politically -- in our collective decision to help Grenada-:
The legal authorities of the Governor-General were the sole
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remaining source of governmental legitimacy on the island
in the wake of the tragic events I have described. We and
the OECS countries accorded his appeal exceptional moral
and legal weight. The invitation of lawful governmental
authority constitutes a recognized basis under
international law for foreign states to provide requested
assistance;
Second, the OECS determined to take action under the
1981 Treaty establishing that organization. That treaty
contains a number of provisions, in Articles 3, 4 and 8,
which deal with local as well as external threats to peace
and security. Both the OAS Charter, in Articles 22 and 28,
and the UN Charter, in Article 52, recognize the competence
of regional security bodies in ensuring regional peace and
stability. Article 22 of the OAS Charter in particular
makes clear that action pursuant to a special security
treaty in force does not constitute intervention or use of
force otherwise prohibited by Articles 18 or 20 of that
Charter. In taking lawful collective action, the OECS
countries were entitled to call upon friendly states for
appropriate assistance, and it was lawful for the United
States, Jamaica and Barbados to respond to this request.-
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Third, U.S. action to secures and evacuate endangered
U.S. citizens on the island was undertaken in accordance
with well-established principles of international law
regarding the protection of one's nationals. That the
circumstances warranted this action has been amply
documented by the returning students themselves. There is
absolutely no requirement of international law that
compelled the U.S. to await further deterioration of the
situation that would have jeopardized a successful
operation. Nor was the United States required to await
actual violence against U.S. citizens before rescuing them
from the anarchic and threatening conditions the students
have described.
Some are asking how this U.S. action can be
distinguished from acts of intervention by our Soviet
adversaries. Let me say that the distinctions are clear.
The U.S. participated in a genuine collective effort -- the
record makes clear the initiative of the Caribbean
countries in proposing and defending this action. This
action was justified by an existing treaty and by the
express invitation of the Governor-General. Our concern
for the safety of our citizens was genuine. The factual --
circumstances on Grenada were exceptional, and
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unprecedented in the Caribbean Legion -- a collapse of law,
order and governmental institutions. Our objectives are
precise and limited -- to evacuate foreign nationals and to
cooperate in the restoration of order; they do not
encompass the imposition on the Grenadians of any
particular form of government. Grenadians are now free to
determine their institutions for themselves. Finally,, we
have made it clear that we will withdraw as soon as:
circumstances permit, and in any event immediately upon the
request of the Grenadian authorities.
Those who do not see -- or do not choose to see --
these signal distinctions have failed to analyze the
facts. We have not made, and do not seek to make, any
broad new precedent for international action; we think the
justification for our actions is narrow, and well within
accepted concepts of international law.
[Results]
The results of the collective peace-keeping operation
have been significant.
First, 17 flights have safely evacuated at their
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request 599 Americans and 121 foreigners. Their accounts
of conditions in Grenada and praise for their rescuers
speak for themselves. The respected Grenadian journalist
Alister Hughes evidently spoke for the vast majority of
people in Grenada, Grenadians and foreigners alike, when he
said of the Caribbean peace force:
QUOTE Thank God they
came. If someone had not come in and done something, I
hesitate to say what the situation in Grenada would be now
UNQUOTE.
,Second, the Governor-General has thanked us for our
assistance as a QUOTE positive and decisive step forward in
the restoration not only of peace and order but also of
full sovereignty UNQUOTE.
The OECS is working with the Governor-General and
prominent Grenadians to establish a provisional government
capable of restoring functioning institutions and
permitting early elections. I repeat all governments
participating in this collective action will withdraw their
forces just as soon as circumstances permit.
This brings me to a third result, which was something-
of a bonus. As I mentioned earlier, the United States had
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been concerned -- well before tfie series of unique events
which brought about the Caribbean Peace Force collective
action -- that Grenada could be used as a staging area for
subversion of nearby countries, for interdiction of
shipping lanes, and for transit of troops and supplies from
Cuba to Africa and from Eastern Europe and Libya to Central
America.
When the Caribbean Peace Force entred Grenada, the
chief resistance they encountered came from Cuban forces
deployed around the airport, the medical school where a
large number of US citizens were studying, the Governor
General's houe, a Cuban military encampment at Calivigny,
and several other forts and strategic points.
We now know that the Soviets, Cubans and North Koreans
had a military relationship with Grenada which led to
signed agreements to donate amounts of military equipment
without precedent for a population of 110,000. $37.8
million in artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, armored
personnel carriers, small arms, and abundant ammunition
were to be furnished to an island touted by its suppliers
as a tourist haven. The signed secret agreements also
called for 40 Cuban military advisors -- 27 on a QUOTE
permanent UNQUOTE basis, the others for QUOTE short periods
UNQUOTE.
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An October 1980 treaty with the USSR called for the
provision gratis of, among other things, 1,500 7.62 mm
carbines, 1,000 7.62 mm submachine guns, and 18
anti-aircraft mounts. The agreement called for Grenadian
military personnel to be trained in the USSR at Soviet
expense.
Moscow tried to keep the arrangements secret by
obliging the Grenadians to treat it as secret, routing
their supplies through Cuba and delaying the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Grenada until 18 months after
entering into the military supply relationship.
The fact that Moscow was willing to provide military
equipment and training free-of-charge is unusual for most
of its third world arms deals. It is one indication of the
importance the USSR attached to the toehold Grenada
afforded in the eastern Caribbean.
What has been found in Grenada -- secret military
fortifications, extensive arms caches, and communications
facilities all controlled by non-Grenadians -- dramatizes--
just how important it is that Grenada have governing
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institutions responsible to its own people.
Ladies and gentlemen, that is precisely what Grenada's
neighbors -- and the United States -- had in mind in
launching our joint rescue operation.
(Broader Lessons)
Eleven days have passed since the combined U.S.-
Caribbean peace force landed in Grenada to protect lives
and.restore order. That is not enough time to make
definitive historical judgments.
But it is not too early to begin to reflect on the
meaning of what happened.
Perhaps the basic lesson is that in a dangerous world,
the measured and lawful measured use of force is at times
necessary to keep the peace.
We are commited to peace. In the best of all possible
worlds, solving problems through peaceful negotiations is
the only way disputes should be settled.
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But some nations and groups consider violence and
terror as normal modes of behavior. Witness the downing of
Korean Airlines flight 007, the murder of nearly 300
Amerilcan and French soldiers in Beirut, the New Jewel
Movement's use of murder to resolve its internal disputes.
In the world like this, the U.S. must be prepared, even
if only when absolutely necessary, to respond to a crisis
with considered, effective and lawful force.
A second lesson is that collective security
arrangements do work: that they are a way for smaller
countries to protect themselves through joint action and,
if necessary, requesting the support of other friendly
countries.
Thirdly, Grenada is a clear warning to regimes that
abandon democratic procedures and isolate themselves from
their own people.
A few weeks ago, many believed that Cuba was only
"helping" Grenada to build tourist facilities.
On the basis of what we have discovered, what leader
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can from now on rest easily at night knowing of a massive
Cuban presence in his country?
. The Nicaraguan government has already made the reverse
case: that Grenada was a "trial run" for the United States.
That they believe the Grenada shoe fits is very
revealing about the Sandinistas. But it says little about
U.S. policy. Our own policy is to attempt to resolve
conflict in Central America through a combination of
negotiations, economic assistance, support for democracy,
and a military shield.
Our policy -- and that of every central American
country except Nicaragua -- is to resolve problems without
the use of force.
There are, of course, lessons which Nicaragua's
leaders should perhaps draw from events in Grenada.
Grenada demonstrates the importance of pluralistic
institutions in resolving policy differences. In the
absence of such institutions;. differences tend
instinctively to be resolved by violence.
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The Sandinistas might also draw some conclusions about
their behavior toward other countries. Nicaragua's
willingness to negotiate seriously, to reduce its
dependence.on military power, and, most importantly, to
stop belligerent behavior towards its neighbors are an
obvious path to peace. Our commitments to the security of
Nicaragua's democratic neighbors are every bit as strong
as our commitment to the neighbors of Grenada.
My own feeling is that the most important lesson of
Grenada is that we must find more creative ways to foster
democratic development and regional cohesion so as reduce
the likelihood of being forced to choose between military
action or allowing small dictatorial cliques to threaten
their own and other peoples, including U.S. citizens.
Finally, what happened, what was said, and what was
discovered all confirm the wisdom of the policy precept I
mentioned earlier: that of listening to what the people
on the block are saying about their own neighborhood
and then acting accordingly. What Mrs. Charles and the
others told us while the crisis was building proved to be
accurate; they faithfully reflected the feelings, the
concerns and hopes of their kin in Grenada -- and, may.I
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add, of the U.S. citizens there"as well. I believe the
American people have also sensed that their government has
done well in this regard.
It may be that this pattern of 'listening' to the
right people will be the enduring link between these
events in the eastern Caribbean and the rest of the
region. The Caribbean Basin Initiative -- that innovative
effort on the part of the United States to help countries
develop the basis for sustained growth -- was largely the
result of listening to what Latin and Caribbean economists
have been telling us for years about their preference for
QUOTE trade not aid UNQUOTE.
And, in Central America, the largely untold story is
how the United States is quietly supporting the Contadora
-- initiated, pursued, and organized by a group of Latin
American nations -- process of dialogue in the interests
of settling the conflicts there before they reach a crisis
stage.
[A FINAL WORD - GOVERNMENT AND PRESS RELATIONS]
I cannot conclude before this audience without
touching on the need to restore, on both sides, mutual
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respect and trust between press and government.
To minimize the potential loss of lives and maximize
the chances of success, both the preparations for the
multinational peace force and our final decision to
participate had to be protected by an unusual degree of
secrecy.
I believe the need for secrecy and its limited
objectives are gradually becoming clearer as the full
implications of our own and Eastern Caribbean fears come
to light, as order is restored, and as the Grenadians
reenter the democratic family that has for so long been
the strength of the Caribbean.
But a great deal of the concern about restrictions on
the press in the Grenada operation is legitimate.
Let me start with a factual footnote. On October
24(?), a small group of journalists bravely attempted to
enter Grenada by boat. They were incommunicado for a
period of days. Their editors called the State
Department, the Pentagon and the White House asking-that
U.S. resources be diverted to search for them.
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I can understand why these reporters wanted to go to
Grenada. I can also understand why their editors went to
such lengths to ensure their safety after they appeared to
be in trouble.
But in all honesty, isn't it apparent that when we are
trying to rescue 1000 Americans, we do not want an
additional 200 or so, roaming around? Because of the
secrecy of the operation. And especially because they
might force us to "divert resources" to help them out of a
scrape?
Clearly, we ought to find a better way to resolve this
real conflict of objectives than the one we found this
time. But it may require a little give on"both sides.
If the press would accept restrictions on their
movements -- never on what they write -- in the actual
zones of battle (which in the early hours was the entire
island of Grenada) -- it might be easier to accommodate
their legitimate and important desire to serve the public
by covering all the news.
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at1,r/4SHFA)'C RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Pal 5` AGE NO. CLASSIFICATION
Luigi Einaudi ARA/PPC
UNCLASSIFIED _ 22
((fficer name) (Of/;x symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
.,Deputy Secretary Dam's 11/4 AP Speech - For Clearance
...,.
,-.
-
-
-
1'0_ (l`u'vl;c_y) DELIVER TO:
NSC
DOD
Mr. Menges, Mr. North
Mr. Sanchez (DOD/ISA)
Extension Room No.
V 35,5 Q
695-2729 2E939
225X1
INFORMATION F-1 PEfl REQUEST
s/S officer:
C0MMI'll T r _1
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