PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590003-0
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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JLti1%L I 1 I
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington.ac20s0s
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
30 October 1983
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA
I. Key Judgments and Exploitation Considerations
We must emphasize that this paper is preliminary because thorough
exploitations of documents, interrogation of prisoners and defectors, a
technical examination of the Point Salines airfield and its facilities, and a
careful inventory of weapons must be finished before we can reach final
conclusions. Available intelligence and documents exploited to date establish
that:
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-- The Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea had embarked on major
military assistance programs to Grenada.
-- The Soviet Union and North Korea signed agreements with Grenada
committing themselves to the delivery of some $37.8 million worth of
military equipment including artillery and small arms, anti-aircraft
armament, and armored personnel carriers.
-- This also involved the dispatch of some 40 Cuban military advisors,
a commitment to send smaller numbers of Soviet military advisors (and
perhaps some North Koreans) and the military and security of
Grenadian personnel in the USSR. 25X1
The military equipment and the advisory presence appear intended to
bolster Grenadian defenses.- In view of Bishop's expressed concerns about a
possible invasion, it is reasonable to believe that the captured arms stocks
inventoried to date were intended to ensure internal security and to defend
Grenada against attack -- particularly in view of apparent plans d the
size of the Grenadian armed forces. 25X1
We are aware of statements by US personnel in Grenada that the quantities
and types of weapons in Grenada are beyond what would have been considered
necessary for Grenada's defense. Some of the arms may have been intended for
use as a stockpile from which arms could be transshipped to revolutionary
governments elsewhere in the eastern Caribbean. Similarly, some arms
could have been prepositioned for contingency use by Cuban forces, but
specific confirmation of either of these potential uses is lackiina in the
documents exploited to date.
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The use of identifiable Soviet arms to support guerrilla movements would
be uncharacteristic. For example, insurgents in El Salvador are not supplied
with Soviet-made weaponry. Moreover, we doubt that the weapons found in
Grenada were stockpiled for use in an invasion of neighboring island states
hprantp Nha and Arpnarla wntil 7 e deterred by anticipated US responses.
to Cuba. State/INR believes that the total Cuban presence may well be higher
-- in the range of 800 to 1,000. As of 30 October, US forces in Grenada had
reported 659 Cubans had been captured, and about 60 had died in combat.
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If it turns out, however, that the quantities of weapons are considerably
in excess of those enumerated in the bilateral military assistance agreements
with the USSR and North Korea, then we must consider that some o.-' the arms
stocks in Grenada were intended for use elsewhere in the region.
The CIA, DIA, and NSA now estimate that the Cuban presence in Grenada
probably never exceeeded 800 and that fewer than this number will be returned
Statements that one thousand or more Cubans were in Grenada and that
three to five hundred Cubans have fled into the hills to continue the fight
are not supported by the available evidence. A report that the Cubans.
intended to transfer as many as 6,800 Cuban personnel to Grenada in an effort
to take control of the island was a misinterpretation of a captured document
that referred to efforts to expand the Grenadian army and militia to a force
of 6,800.
Recent events in Grenada suggest several conclusions regarding our
assessment of the situation in Central America, and especially in Nicaragua:
-- There may well have been more arms deliveries to Nicaragua than we
have observed: Estimates of arms delivered usually tend to be
conservative because they are based on only a limited ability to
monitor such shipments.
-- Similarly, the Grenadian experience underscores the importance of
viewing most estimates regarding the number of Cuban military and
civilian personnel overseas as rough approximations due to the dearth
of hard intelligence and Cuba's ability to reduce or augment such
force levels substantially in only a short period of time.
-- Many of the estimated 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban civilian personnel in
Nicaragua -- and especially the 2,000 construction workers -- should
be counted as potentially well-trained and disciplined combatants.
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-- Despite their domestic economic problems, the Soviets, Cubans, and
other Soviet allies are prepared to make a substantial financial
commitment to provide military equipment and training to defend their
investments in client states such as Grenada and Nicaragua. In the
wake of recent developments in Grenada, the commitment of additional
military personnel, weapons, and equipment to Nicaragua and Cuba
would not be unexpected, but the introduction t
aircraft to Nicaragua is considered unlikely.
II. Captured Documents
. The recent acquisition of documents captured in Grenada reveals the
existence of secret military agreements between the Grenadian Government and
the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Cuba. These treaties make clear that about
one and a half years after the takeover by Maurice Bishop's New Jewel
Movement, the Soviet Union and its allies demonstrated their commitment to
solidifying a Marxist-Leninist regime in Grenada by playing a major --
although largely clandestine -- role in equipping and training the Grenadian
armed forces. The weapons promised by the Soviet-aligned countries presumably
were primarily destined for the Grenadian army and militia.
Three separate military agreements between Grenada and the Soviet Union
detail Soviet commitments to provide gratis nearly $25.8 million in military
equipment between 1980 and 1985. During a visit by Maurice Bishop to North
Korea in April 1983, he signed a military assistance agreement calling for
Pyongyang to provide Grenada $12 million in weapons and ammunition in 1983 and
in 1984. An undated agreement between Cuba and Grenada concerning military
training obligated the Castro government to provide 27 "permanent specialists"
and 12 to 13 specialists for short periods through the end of 1984.
The USSR began its military relationship with Grenada in October 1980
when,Soviet officials met with Grenadian Army Commander Hudson Austin in
Havana to sign an agreement calling for $5.85 million in military deliveries
to Grenada. The treaty, labeled Top Secret, specified that the Soviets hoped
to "strengthen the independence of Grenada" and that deliveries would be made
by sea to Cuba, with the onward transfer of equipment to be arranged by
Grenada and the Castro government. The promised equipment consisted of
artillery and small arms, anti-aircraft armament, ammunition, communications
gear, and vehicles. It included specific items such as 1,500 7.62 millimeter
carbines, 1,000 7.62 millimeter sub-machine guns, and 18 ZU-23 anti-aircraft
mounts. The agreement called for Grenadian military personnel to be trained
in the use of the new equipment in the USSR at Soviet expense.
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In February 1981 a protocol to the original Soviet-Grenadian military
agreement was signed in Havana obligating the USSR to provide equipment worth
some $6.65 million. Among the most noteworthy items were eight BTR-60 armored
personnel carriers and two BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance and patrol
vehicles. By July 1982, the date of the third Soviet/Grenadian military
agreement, Moscow promised additional military deliveries worth $13.4 million
over the period 1982 to 1985. Major items included 50 additional armored
personnel carriers, anti-tank guns,and anti-tank grenade launchers. 25X1
Like the Soviet treaties, the secret North Korean military agreement with
Grenada, signed in Pyongyang in April 1983, stressed the need to strengthen
the defense of Grenada. Major items to be provided by North Korea in 1983 and
1984 included 1,000 7.62 millimeter automatic rifles, 50 RPG-7 grenade
launchers, 6,000 uniforms, and two boats for Grenada's Coast Guard.
III. Captured Weapons and Equipment
The reports of weapons captured in Grenada are preliminary, listing types
of arms but incomplete on numbers. (See TAB A.) Most of the equipment
recovered is for infantry; no field artillery or tanks were cited. Virtually
all arms inventoried to date are of Communist manufacture, although two
British-manufactured Bren machine guns and some Marlin 30-30 rifles have been
noted. The quantities and types are consistent with those listed in the
bilateral military agreements. The types of larger weapons captured are
consistent with those the Intelligence Community had reported to be in Grenada
prior to hostilities. (See TAB B.) There was never a definitive listing for
small arms believed to be on the island. 25X1
IV. Estimates of Cuban Personnel
On 28 October the Cuban Government announced the presence of 784 Cubans
in Grenada, providing a detailed enumeration of their functions.
As of 30 October 1983, US forces in Grenada had report~Uthat
been captured and about 60 more were killed in combat.
Intelligence Community analysts estimate that the actual number of Cubans
likely to be identified for repatriation to Cuba will probably range around
750 because:
-- Some Cubans will elect not to return to Cuba.
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-- Castro may have ordered others to stay behind to harass the
multinational forces on the island or to perform acts of sabotage or
other intelligence functions.* 25X1
*State/INR accepts the premise of this estimate but notes that the number
repatriated may well be higher.
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Intelligence Community analysts do not totally exclude the possibility
that hundreds more Cubans may still be operating in the hills given the
fluidity of the tactical situation. Earlier assertions that the Cuban
presence numbered 1,000 or more probably reflect:
-- The acceptance at face value of claims by two captured Cubans that
there were 1,100 Cubans on the island.
-- The tendency of US forces to be surprised by the military
effectiveness of the Cuban construction workers, leading to inflated
estimates of their numbers. -
The discrepancy in the 26 October Intelligence Community estimate of 400
to 500 Cubans in Grenada and current higher estimates of Cuban personnel
(see TAB D) can be attributed to some combination of the following factors:
-- Lack of information on the number and scope of technical assistance
programs resulting in a slightly lower estimate of the number of
Cuban advisors.
-- Lack of information on the extent of the military assistance
programs. Instead of the 10-12 estimated Cuban military advisors,
more than 40 were identified.
-- Our assumption that an equal number of construction workers probably
were rotated back to Cuba after approximately 200 additional workers
were dispatched to Grenada last January.
-- The possible arrival of a replacement group of construction personnel
aboard the Vietnam Heroico in early October. The sudden crisis could
have caused the Cubans to keep the workers that were supposed to be
replaced on the island until the situation improved.
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 The less likely, but possible, clandestine infiltration in October of
several hundred additional Cuban personnel -- now identified as
construction personnel, but possibly regular forces or Ministry of
Interior personnel -- aboard either the Cuban merchant/training ship,
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the Vietnam Heroico; a Cuban chartered Panamanian vessel, the
Kranaos; or a Cuban bulk cargo carrier.*
We have received at least two reports of troops and materiels being off-
loaded at St. Georges, but none have been confirmed. It is highly unlikely
that a substantial number of Cuban, personnel were airlifted into Grenada
undetected during the last month.
V. Cuban Intentions"
Since Maurice Bishop and his followers overthrew the regime of
Eric Gairy in March 1979, Grenada has served as a focal point for efforts by
the Cubans to expand their influence in the eastern Caribbean. Havana had
taken the lead in trying to make the island a showcase of Cuban-aided
development policy, and it trained in Cuba over 500 members of Grenada's
security forces as well as providing substantial amounts of military
equipment.
Intelligence reports show that military shipments to Grenada via Cuba had
increased substantially since mid-1982. A large shipment of military
equipment was delivered clandestinely to Grenada in late August 1982 which
probably included several BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and some anti-
aircraft batteries.
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Other intelligence reporting has noted that Grenada:
-- Served as a intelligence collection center and clearing house for
contact with regional leftists.
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*The Vietnam Heroico can carry between 240 and 1,500 personnel, depending upon how
much cargo it is carrying. We know that the ship loaded sugar, 500 tons of cement,
and other cargo in Mariel harbor before departing Cuba for Grenada on 1 October.
The cargo manifest and destination were declared on 29 August, and it took one month
to complete the loading. We believe that the declared cargo was delivered. We do
not know what the Kranaos was carrying or where it came from. It has been in
St. Georges since about 12 October. Other ships have been noted in St. Georges, but
we do not know their history. 25X1
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**For a chronology of Cuban statements and actions in Grenada from 7 to
30 October 1983 see TAB F.
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-- Was a major propaganda distribution center for Cuba (in part by
utilizing a 75-kilowatt radio transmitter that began operations in
early 1982).
Served as a training center for leftists.
-- Could be a future refueling point for Cuban military transport
flights to Africa when the Point Salines airport opened as scheduled
in March 1984.
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-- Could provide a staging base for the rapid deployment of Cuban troops
to other countries in the region such as Suriname and Guyana.
Castro was personally close to Maurice Bishop and strongly supported his
regime. Havana probably was aware of the frictions between Bishop and Coard
before Bishop's trip to Eastern Europe, but seems to have expected that such
differences could be smoothed over. The event which apparently precipitated
Coard's power play was Bishop's rejection of Coard's proposal to assume the
senior party post, with Bishop becoming the head of state. The Cubans would
have preferred that Bishop remain in full control, but probably would have
acquiesced to a power-sharing arrangement if circumstances so dictated.
Havana, in fact, may have been planning to send a delegation to St. Georges to
help negotiate a suitable compromise after Bishop was placed under house
arrest, but the mission probably was aborted by the news of Bishop's
execution. On balance, the evidence points strongly against an interpretation
that the Cubans helped engineer Bishop's downfall. This was underscored by
Havana's public reaction to the news of Bishop's execution and their cautious
treatment of the new government in subsequent days.
Castro almost certainly interpreted the US decision to deploy a naval
task force to Grenada as a sign an invasion was seriously being contemplated,
if not underway. He apparently responded by dispatching Colonel Tortola Comas
to Grenada on Monday, 24 October, to organize the resistance. Shortly
thereafter, Cub military re instructed to improve
their defenses.
Castro's instructions that same day to Cuban personnel on the island to
resist an invasion probably were motivated by the belief that to do otherwise
would deliver the wrong signal to Washington and thereby tempt the United
States to intervene militarily in Nicaragua. A decision not to resist would
also have unnerved the Sandinista regime which is depending on Havana to help
defend it from external attack. In addition, a meek surrender would have
badly damaged Castro's credibility as a world revolutionar leader by ivin
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The USSR apparently wanted to consolidate a Marxist regime in Grenada as
a model and a source of influence over other east Caribbean countries. We
have had reports that it was channelling some money through Grenada to leftist
groups on nearby islands. Its willingness to provide free weapons to Grenada
contrasts sharply with its usual policy of expecting eventual payment from its
Third-World recipients, indicating the value Moscow placed on having a toehold
in the region. We believe Soviet interest in usin the Point Saline airfield
for naval reconnaissance was marginal at best. 25X1
VI. Soviet Intentions*
Moscow seems to have preferred a low profile in Grenada. The purpose of
this would have been to deflect criticism and avoid alarming nearby countries
over Soviet involvement, instead using the regionally more acceptable Cubans
fora leading role. The secret military agreements' provision for Soviet
weapons to be delivered to Cuba and transshipped from there show a desire to
disguise a Soviet role. So does the delay by Moscow in establishing an
embassy in Grenada until a Year and a half after agreeing to supply it. with
weapons.
We lack any evidence that the USSR was behind the dispute within the
Grenadian leadership that led to Bishop's death.
-- Nonetheless, the Soviets were aware of the extreme economic
difficulties into which Grenada was falling, and they might have
feared that their own unwillingness to provide significant economic
aid could weaken Grenada's orientation toward the USSR and Cuba.
-- Both Moscow and Havana might have been concerned by Bishop's efforts
to improve relations with the United States last summer. but we
cannot establish a Soviet role in Bishop's demise.
The events in Grenada, and the related expulsion of the Cuban Ambassador
from Suriname, are likely to affect Soviet thinking about the Caribbean-
Central American region in several ways:
-- Moscow will intensify its efforts to build up Caribbean Communist and
other far left parties by supplying funds and advice. The goal will
remain a long-term hope of Communists' benefitting from economic
problems, overpopulation, and other strains with continued Soviet
advice to consolidate their own parties and build solid bases of
public support.
-- The USSR will continue and probably increase efforts militarily to
harden Cuba against possible US attack.
*For a chronology of Soviet statements and actions in Grenada from
7 September 1979 to 27 October 1983 see TAB G.
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-- Moscow will continue to enhance the ability of the Sandinistas to
defend their regime, but it will seek to avoid a major public role
by, for instance, not sending identifiable Soviet military personnel
or shipping major weapons directly on Soviet ships.
-- The Soviets will be more careful about an armed confrontation with
the United States in the region as a result of the US's willingness
to use force in Grenada. The Soviets still are not likely to
authorize Cuban shipments to Nicaragua of high performance jet
fighters, and they will reinforce their admonitions to Cuba against
undertaking actions that m' ht lead to a Cuban confrontation with the
United States. 25X1
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