SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND CIVIL DISTURBANCE ACTIVITIES 9 NOVEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001302230019-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 9, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIASS'J.CDA 219-023;
AND CIVIL DISTURBLNCE ACTIVITIES
9 November 1983
Si}:f% OF
SIGNIFICANT UNCONVE TIONAL WARFARE
~?, R (U).
G!,! E':1L A: Kr,-NS TO NIXrT U.S. DJr S C"
(S/NF/NC/W;;/CRCGP;) in DIASS.''W'CDA 214-33 reported alleged plans to car
bomb the U.S. and/or Israeli embassies. Ir DIASSUkti'CDA 21;-83 we reported a Rebel
Arimed 'Forces (FAR) strafing attack of the residence of U.S. Ambassador to
Guatemala, Frederick Chapin. New reporting now indicates that the. FAR have
determined that the security at the_ U.S. Embassy and the residence of the
ambassador is too. tight . to arrange for the proper placement of a car bomb.
Reportedly, the FAR have, as a result, decided to launch a rocket-grenade (RPG-2)
attack against the ambassador's vehicle. Further,. they have described their
planned action as a "Christmas present." ~ccordino to the report., the rocket has
a lread_y been purchased with money given tz the FAR by the Guatemalan Co=--;;n.ist
Party (PGT/0). The PGT/O money allegedly comes from the ransom paid to them by
the, family of kidnapped newspaper general manager, Pedro Julio Garcia (see
DIASS111VWCDAs 198-83, 200-83, 203-83, and 202-83). The report also indicates that
.the FAR strafing attack on the ambassador's residence was mounted so as to
observe the security of the em assador s residence. Reportedly, occupants of
one car fired on the residence while the second car parked nearby to sae t-je
-reaction of the security guards.
(S/NF/NC/WN) Comment: Allegedly, the purpose of the originally planned car'
bombings was to protest U.S./Israeli suppirt for governments opposed to -leftist
terrorists/guerrillas in Central America. The recent events in Grenada have,
undoubtedly, exacerbated these anti-U.S. feelings among terrorists/leftists.
Thus, PGT-0 and FAR cooperation is not surprising. However, in DIASSUW'CDA 214-
83's report,on_the car bombing plans, military leaders of the FAR were reported
to have regarded security at the embassy as too tight to afford a reasonable.
chance of success. The above reporting which indicates the strafing attack on
the ambassador's residence was to observe security does not logically "track" as
the action of a group contemplating an assassination since the strafing incident
can only lead to greater security efforts. Thus, while we believe the FAR is
capable of planning and attempting an assassination by either a car bombing or
P.PG-2 type attack, their pre-operational surveillance of security is, to say the
least, indiscreet.
PERU: ATTEMPTED BOMBING AT MARINE SECURIT GUARD RESIDENCE (U)
(C) According to embassy reporting, 't-.e residence of U.S. 'Marines in -Lima
was targeted on Sunday, 5 November 1983. The reports indicate that a Marine ;,ho
was departing the residence noticed two cntainers, one with a fuse, placed at
the front door of the residence and a fressly painted slogan in large block
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DIASSUW'CDA 221-03
TE LA: THREAT UPDATE TO U.S. A! ASSADOR AND U.S. EMBASSY (U)
(SJ;NF/NC/'WN/OR) In. DIASSUJ'WCDA 214-83 we reported on an alleged car bomb plot
.
against the U.S. E..bassy and/or the Israeli Embassy in the near future
p ortedly, the terrorists had acquired the necessary explosives, and a stolen
car for the or Brat ion; however, it ,:as sported that the military l:aders c+f t terrorist or9ar+izotion involved considered security at these embassies as .too
tight to .allow for adequately placing the bomb to afford a reasonable chance of
success. In DIASSUWCDA 217-83 we reported a Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) strafing
attack on the residence of U.S.. Ambassador to Guatemala, Frederick Chapin. In
DIASSL'WCDA 219-83 we reported that as a result of the FAR's previous analyses of
security around the U.S. Embassy and the reaction of the strafing attack of the
security guards at Ambassador Chapin's home, FAR had concluded that a rocket-
grenade (RPG-2) attack against the Ambassadror's vehicle ?would be the modus
operandi to be utilized. Reportedly, the RPG-2 had already been acquired and
the attack was being described as a "Christmas present." New reporting from a
generally reliable source now indicates that as a result of the 4 No:a,-ber 1983
strafing attack and observation of security reaction thereto, the FAR and the
Guatemalan Co munist Party (PGT-0) under direction of the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Union (URNG), have decided that an assassination attempt directly,
against the Ambassador can be successfuly undertaken some time in December 1983.
Reportedly, "several" RSPs have been acquired to be employed against the
Ambassador's vehicle at some, as yet undetermined point in the city.
reportedly, the FAR group believes security agents at. the Ambassador's ho.r,e :;re
caught in a timely and effective manner. Further, the URNG reportedly remains
firmly committed to planting a car bomb at the U.S. Embassy. Allegedly, because
of their evaluation of the reaction during the attack on the Ambassador's
residence, the FAR and the PGT-O believe that a car bomb can be successfully
planted at the U.S. Embassy and that a successful attempt against the U.S.
Ambassador also can be carried out. Finally, a report of 10 November 1983
indicates that an Organization of the People In Arms (ORFA) commando unit in
Guatemala City is targeting the U.S. Defense Attache assigned to the U.S.
Embassy. . According to this information a group of 12 ORPA commandos who
recently completed training in Cuba. were in Guatemala City to carry out the
attack on the attache.. Of these 12 terrorists, four have already been killed in
firefights with Guatemalan security officials, but the remaining eight are-still
at large and continue to have the mission of attacking the attache.
(S/NF/NC/WN/OR) Comment: As we indicated in DIASSUWCDA 219-83, the FAR is
capable of planning and attempting an assassination by either a car bomb or P,RG-
2 attack. However, we continue to believe that the "logic" being applied to
this operation by. the FAR and PGT-O is in our. view specious. For example,
initially these groups believed security around the embassy was too tight to
allow for a reasonable chance of success utilizing a car bomb. Now, as a result
of the strafing incident, they have concluded that both an RPG-2 attack against
the Ambassador's vehicle and a car bomb incident against the embassy are
feasible. -We fail to see how security at the residence relates to the security
surrounding a vehicle en route or at the embassy. Further, the strafing
incident appears to be the telegraphing, of a blow -aimed at an allegedly
earmarked target. In this regard, the targeting and other obvious activitses%at
the Ambassador's residence may have been a. smokescreen for the actual t_rg=t,
t J. -
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the Defense Attache, or possibly some other potential taroets. The ir,-G1. -_r=
of the URNG, an umbrella organization for terrorist/leftist ele::.=nts
Guatemala, is also a new and interesting development. The new reporting ,n ;_i
indicates ORPA involvement in an operation targeting an attache is serials,
interesting, and consistent with the above information. Both 1150A.9 PGT-0 and
FAR come under the URNG, both ORPA and FAR have worked together in the past, and
the URNS has strong Cuban connections. While we believe that all of the above
reporting is a clear-cut indicator that something is amiss in Guatemala; we also
believe that the indicators, i.e., the strafing of the ~.5assador's residence
and the apparent flimsy logic already alluded to are too obvious. A threat
definitely has been identified to the ambassador, the, embassy and the attache,
but security at other potential targets should not be overlooked. In short, we
believe a clear cut threat exists to all U.S. military and diplc:T.atic personnel
-in Guatemala and we would recommend. a long term upgrade of all security
resources afforded to some.
PERU: VIOLENCE MARKS ELECTIONS (U)
(U) As expected,Sendero Luminoso (SL) (Shining Path) terrorists launched a
series of attacks in Lima and in the Andes Highlands in an effort to disrupt the
13 Hove giber elections. The attacks began on 11 November in Lira r; _n a series
of apparently coordinated bombings resulted in property damage and two minor
injuries. A brief power failure resulted in several suburban districts. Among
he buildings targeted included the Honduran Embassy in Lima, which received
serious d_=rage to the ground and first floor from three bombs. Although minor
explosions occurred near the U.S. Ambassador's residence, an unconfirmed report
states that police defused a bomb which was apparently thrown at the residence
but failed to detonate. On 12 November the' SL reportedly was responsible for
hurling at least six bombs into the offices of the right-wing Popular Christian
"Party in the affluent Miraflores suburb. The bombs blew apart the building's
doors and balcony, resulting in the death of two guards and the critical
wounding of another. Simultaneously, SL terrorists machine-gunned and dynamited
two offices of the government's Popular Action Party in the Lima suburbs. One
guard was killed and several reported wounded in the attack. The above attacks
came despite heavy patrols by Army,. Navy and Air Force units in most.major
cities.
(U) Turnout for the municipal election was termed normal Sunday as heavy
..police and military security was evident. While SL had reportedly threatened to
kill people who voted, the turnout was apparently normal since voting is
r,andatcry in Peru. Strict new regulations impose heavy penalties on people who
do not vote. '
(C) 'In other possibly related developments, the Peruvian embassy in
V+ashington, D.C. reported receiving a bomb threat on 10 November. Peruvian
.officials are apparently concerned for their safety here based on that action
and the upcoming visit by Prime t;inister Schwalb to Washington to attend the
-14 Nov;:-.bar General assembly meeting of the Organization of American States. As
a. result, cer;eral security in the vicinity of Peruvian -acilities in Washington
will be st_pp d up during Schwalb'svisit.
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T e BR T, _r also co plained about the tight security around `ne .sy9 h
ham,pared their surveillance. y
(S/NF/WN) Comment: Security at the embassy has been increased sir,_e the 24
October intervention in Grenada. The embassy notes teat there is evida,nce that
the ambassador's residence was under surveillance in rid-October prior to the
Grenada intervention. Two known leftists were arrested in the vicinity of the
am5assador's home, questioned by police, and subsequently released. The re:,ort
of BR involve,-ant it surveillance of the embassy is somewhat surprising given
she success of s nr1 y forces during the past year.
TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. 1`"SSr.DOR ALLEGEDLY 7F1 ._. YED
S%NF /.N C/WN/ORCJN~
(S/'NF/NC/W'N/ORCON) According to recent reporting there has been a tempo: ary
standdown, as of mid-November, on the planning activities of terrorists a:-ainst
the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. Embassy. . The delay was caused apparently by
the temporary departure from Guatemala City of a Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
commandante who is charged with planning and conducting the operation. The FAR
.is in league for the operation with terrorists of the Guatemalan Labor
(Co.-Munist) Party (PGT-0). Planning for the operation is expected to resume
:Then the FAR co~:.andante returns to Guatemala City in the near future.
(S/!t'F/NC/WN/ORCON) Since 2 November, we have noted a variety of threats or
attacks against U.S. persons or property (see DIASSU14CDAs 214-83, 217-83, 219-
.83, and 221-83 for more detailed earlier reports). These have ranced from an
al?aged car bomb attack plot against either the U.S. or Israeli E%,bassies, a
threat. to kill the U.S. Defense Attache, to a strafing run on the U.S.
Ambassador's home. While some of the reported scenarios sear to lack logic, we
,nevertheless believe the threat is and will remain very genuine through at least
December.
GREECE: UPDATE TO ASSASSINATION OF U.S. NAVAL OFFICER (U)
(U) On 18 November, Athens newspapers published the proclamation issued by
the 17 November organization, which has claimed responsibility for the murder of
Captain George Tsantes and his driver (see DIASSUWCDAs 225-83, 223-83, 222-83).
The lengthy proclamation, . covering seven typewritten pages, included the
following.:
Captain Tsantes was "executed" in order to strike at JUS",AGG, which along
with other U.S.. military in Greece, is alleged to constitute "an occupation,
terrorist force." - ------. ---------- _.------
The 17 November organization is resuming "violent revolution" after a
tr:o-year period .in which it had waited to see the results of . the present
!.Government. In their view the socialist government has failed to carry out the.
'U.S.. base closings and social reforms promised before the 1981 elections.
A large amount of the proclamation is devoted to criticizing the Creek
.press for supporting the present government, and threatens to take action
,acainst those .who are
_-judged to slander the organization by wronsflly
attributing actions to it 'or distorting its words and acts.
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PUERTO RICO: POSSIBLE TERRORIST S'JRVEILLkrrCE OF U.S. N VY CA T;
FACILITIES U)
(C) Late reporting indicates that Puerto Rican terrorists may have recently
attempted surveillance activities of remotely located U.S. Navy communications
Facilities. According to the report, on 27 October 1983 a contract euard at the
VLF transmitter site, Acuada, PR stopped a man attempting to gain access to she
Reportedly, the man identified himself as a "lir. Buiriford" (nf i) and
Stated that he represented the "N t ior;al Oceanographic Of f i_" which was do ing g a
.
survey of the area. The ran indicated that as part of the survey he was to
photograph the iguada site. The man also indicated that he was. a close personal
friend of the CO, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads and . it was alright for him to
photograph.. The guard, hot.-.,ever, did not allow access and the man departed. In
.another possible surveillance attempt on 28 October 1983, a reservist (nfi)
entering Camp Santiago, Salinas, PR reported to a guard that he had just seen a
,man With a telephoto lens photographing a cornnunication site located on Camp
Santiago. The guard notified the site manager who responsed but saw no one..
(C/NF) Comment:' Puerto Rican terrorist groups have employed, in the past,
pre-operational. surveillance techniques such as photography and sketching. We
note that the dates of the reported potential surveillance attempts occurred
after the commencement of U.S. actions in Grenada which suggests that this
activity could be part of a response to events in Grenada. N'ote;:orthy also, and
possibly related, is the recent LAW attack in San Juan against a U.S. Government
,.building (see DIASSUWCOAs 212-83-and 213-83). In that attack, the Puerto Rican
radical -group "Los Machetoros" (EPA) claimed responsibility. While it is
impossible to confirm, at this point, that the "surveillance" attempts described
above were in fact accomplished by a terrorist group, we do note that tarcets
such. as these remotely located facilities at Aguada and Camp . Salinas are
preferred by such groups. because of their remoteness and, generally, minimum
auard- coverage. We note . also that the Camp Salinas site is alleged to be a
"Mystic Star" antenna field (White house Communications). An attack against
such a target could be expected to attract considerable media attention -another
consideration in target selection. . Finally, the LAW attack against the FBI
office was the first demonstration of a "stand-off" attack capability by Puerto
Rican terrorists. In light of this newly demonstrated capability and the
surveillance of t two facilities, a new security review of both facilities
and potentials arising firing positions may be prudent. . .
-~A',RTINIQUE: B0"3ING ATTACK (U)
(U) Late reporting indicates that an apparent time-delayed bomb exploded at
.about 0230 hours, 1 November 1983 on the ground floor of a building that houses
,,the U.S. Consulate General in Fort de France. The bomb exploded in an area of
1'the building occupied by the Chase Manhattan Bank. There was no apparent dar,age
to the Consulate General offices although minor structural damage occurred to
the bank's transformer room. Additionally, some windows were broken on the
first and second floors of the building. Reportedly, there were no personal
.injuries resulting from the blast. - Police said they received a letter claiming
responsibility for the attack from the General Conference of Martinique .Labor.
The letter, addressed to ?Presioent'HReagan, demanded the 'ir:;,ediate withdrawal "of
U.S. co-5at forces on Grenada.
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