BACKGROUND PAPER: CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: July 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
ER:
Please file in your files. DCI
refers to this as Central America
Compendium of Evidence It was
authored by Constantine Menges,
NIO/PPT,in May (then NIO/LA).
Debbie
28 July 83
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
BACKGROUND PAPER: CENTRAL AMERICA
(BOX OR ITALICIZED PREFACE)
Preface
On May 13, 1983,'the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a
report which it concluded that "the Sandinistas have
stepped up their support for insurgents in Honduras" and
that Cuban and Nicaraguan aid for insurgents constitutes
"a clear picture of active promotion for 'for, revolution
without frontiers' throughout Central America by Cuban
and Nicaragua." The committee also reiterated its.-
earlier finding that. the guerrillas in El Salvador "are
well trained, well equipped with modern weapons and
supplies, and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for
command and control and for logistical support. The
intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the
Committee is convincing."
The summary of Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Soviet activities
in Central America included in this background paper
supports the conclusions of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. It is being issued in the
interest of contributing to a better public understanding
of the history of developments in the region.
This background paper does not attempt to analyze
social and economic conditions in the Central American.
countries. Rather, it describes how politically
motivated violence is being used to exploit the demands
for more democracy, social justice, and economic develop-
ment in Central America in order to bring extreme leftist
groups to power.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
Introduction
Today, far more than at any time in the past, extreme leftist
forces in Central America are supported by an extensive foreign
intelligence and training apparatus, modern military equipment and
a large and sophisticated propaganda network. With Soviet bloc
support, Cuba is using contacts nurtured over more than 20 years to
provide political and military training, plus material and
propaganda support, to many violent groups in a number of Central
American countries. The immediate goals are to consolidate control
of the Sandinista Directorate in Nicaragua and to overthrow the
Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. Honduras and Costa Rica
also have been targeted (see Map ;1).
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
Mexico and Central America: A Global Perspective
MAP U.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
I. Nicaragua
When Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, he set the pattern"
which, 20 years later, the Sandinistas are repeating in Nicaragua.
Castro established a dual government. An inner core of trusted
guerrillas controlled and built the instruments of power (the army,
the secret police, "revolutionary tribunals," and new masse
organizations), while his democratic allies were kept busy in
formal institutions such as the Council of State and government
ministries. This tactic helped him consolidate power and
neutralize his democratic allies until they could no longer unite
against him. Many of these allies later were executed or
imprisoned, or left the country.
In Nicaragua, the democratic opposition to Somoza established a
"broad opposition front" in coalition with the Sandinistas, who
assured their democratic allies (as Castro had done. in 1957-59) of
their commitment to democratic elections "after Somoza." The
presence of noncommunist elements in the Sandinista-led "broad
coalition" served to deceive many Western governments about the
true character of the Sandinista Directorate. As in Cuba, two
decades earlier, this broad coalition provided a political network
that could be used by the extreme left to mislead Western opinion
and governments, while obtaining financial support from the West.
On June 23, 1979 the OAS gave provisional recognition to the
anti-Somoza forces, contingent upon the establishment of a
democractic political system including free political parties, free
.elections, free trade unions, religious freedom and an independent
media. On July 12, 1979, during the final bargaining leading to
Somoza's departure, the Sandinistas sent a written promise to the
OAS that they would hold free elections and guarantee democratic
freedoms. The Sandinistas have yet to.implement this promise.
During this period, Cuba provided about 500 tons of weapons and
other.military supplies directly to the Sandinista units. Cuba
also trained and deployed an "Internationalist Brigade," whose
personnel fought with the Sandinistas. And on July 18, 1979,
Julian Lopez Diaz, a leading Cuban covert action operative, flew to
Managua from Costa Rica, where he had been the Sandinistas' key
adviser. He became, and remains, the Cuban Ambassador.
After their victory, the Sandinistas followed Castro's example
and established a dual governing structure. The inner core was
headed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
nine-person Directorate, which immediately moved with Cuban help to
establish a new army, an internal security apparatus and a variety
of controlled organizations: neighborhood "defense committees,"
trade unions, professional organizations and media organs. The
Sandinistas also came to dominate the nominally independent
executive branch: the Junta, the quasi-legislative Council of
State, and most government ministries.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
The Sandinistas encouraged their democratic allies to
participate in these executive branch institutions, both to use the
skills of their allies and their international credibility.. This
helped obtain more than $1,.6 billion in Western aid from July 1979,
to the end of 1982. The United States., along with other
democracies, immediately recognized the new government. During the
first 18 months of the regime, the United States provided more than
$118 million in direct aid and endorsed more than $220 million in
Inter-American Development. Bank credits.
Repression of the democratic political parties, trade unions,
and media began within weeks of Somoza's departure. In August and
September 1979, the Sandinistas launched a campaign against the
social democratic and Christian Democratic trade unions and their
national federations, and tried to consolidate organized labor in
two Sandinista-controlled groupings. A conference of Sandinista
leaders in late September 1979 produced a specific plan for
consolidating power. It stated that the democratic groups were to
be "isolated" and brought under Sandinista control and that "while
political parties must be permitted to exist" because of "interna-
tional opinion," the Sandinistas would "work within them to get
them to support the revolution."
Finally, in August 1980, the Sandinistas declared publicly that
elections would not be held until 1985. Even then, these are not
to be "bourgeois elections" but rather will serve only to "ratify."
the revolution.
As a further measure of internal repression, in December 1981
the Sandinistas began destroying more than 40 villages of the
Protestant, English-speaking Indians in northeastern Nicaragua.
About 15,000 escaped into Honduras and the remainder were either
killed by the FSLN or forceably relocated to detention camps or
from their homes.' (Photos 1, 2, and 3 provide photographic
evidence of the destruction of these villages.) of this cruel
activity is undeniable.
This campaign has served to consolidate power in the hands of
the Sandinistas; genuinely democratic groups-and ethnic minorities
have been excluded from real political influence. Although.. some
are permitted to survive under surveillance and pressure, political
control -is held only by the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista
directorate.
V,'-.thina week- after the Sandinistas' takeover; Cuba had some 100.
mil` tart' and security personnel in Nicaragua. Three months later,
by October 1979, this figure had increased to 200.. Today,
Nicaragua "hosts" 7,000 to 8,000 Cubans., including 1,500 to 2,000
military and security advisers, and many high-level Sandinistas
have counterpart Cuban advisers. Cubans have trained virtually all
Nicaraguan recruits in the General Directorate of Sandinista State
Security, the new State police organization responsible for
maintaining Sandinista, control over the populace.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
z
Li
z
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0 .
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
FZZ
! i .'
w~ _"Y,v.~~~?4y_ e~~..,. a:--y~ ~F +; r_f~:~G,?_ ~~_ -
~.t ~ =fit ?=.x-r.?..~.?c ?u~.w.+ __i K".~.r~ ~~+.i __...\.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
4
The Sandinista military buildup also began immediately.
Somoza's National Guard numbered about 9,000 before 1977, and 15,00
at the height of the fighting. The Sandinistas have increased
their military forces to some 25,000 regular troops on active duty,
with another 50,000 in active reserve and militia forces. In
addition, they have added 36 new military bases and Soviet bloc
weaponry, including 45-50 'tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile
rocket-launchers and helicopters. Airfields are being constructed
or improved which could service military jet aircraft.
For example, construction of a new dual runway airfield at Punta
Huete, near Managua, is proceeding at an extremely rapid pace.
About 800 meters of the estimated 3,600 meter main runway have been
completed and work has begun-'.on a parallel runway-taxiway; large,
square area is being leveled for a probable parking apron. The
location of Punta Huete strongly suggests that the new airfield,
when completed, will be Nicaragua's main military airbase as well
as the largest military airfield in Central America. This
conclusion is based on: the relatively isolated location near Lake
Managua (7 miles northwest of Managua); the estimated length of the
runway, as well as the fact it will have a dual runway-taxiway
(which could support a volume of air traffic exceeding current
levels at Sandino International Airport); and the use of concrete
paving (see Photo W.
II. Castro's Strategy
Fidel Castro brings to his renewed and expanded political-
military activism in Central America his own personal experience in
achieving power in Cuba, seeking to export revolution in the
Western Hemisphere, particularly during the 1960s, .as well as
nearly two decades of'highly effective collaboration with the
Soviet KGB and Soviet military. He also has cultivated close ties
with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Libya and
pro-Soviet factions in Africa and the Middle East in support of
terrorism and subversion. Castro has a method of operation with
the following principal components:
-- Unification of the extreme left;
-- Establishment of a "broad coalition"--led'by the extreme
left but including some noncommunist opposition
elements--which makes direct or ambiguous promises of a
"broad based" government after victory;
-- Use of the "broad coalition" and systematic propaganda and
political action techniques in order to obtain noncommunist
international support and isolate the target governments
from Western political and material help;
-- Provision of Soviet bloc, Cuban, and other anti-Western
military. support as an incentive for extreme left unity.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 -
{'.t H ? co
co
t-i
w
?r4
E-4
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
"'R~ =~-a.,..?~:-r _ ~~.F~~ ~ ~: ~-(:.1i'~'*~'7r=~ -~qi~~ Y~ -irv -r?iosv.~ :.
$.:.ay~..- .r
z~i
&NZ
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85MOO364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
This approach proved successful in Nicaragua. It was then
turned against El Salvador in late 1979. Similar efforts have been
made in Guatemala since 1980, accompanied by stepped-up covert
activities against Honduras and Costa Rica starting in 1981 and
1982. The rapid expansion of these violent techniques in Central
America is illustrated by the fact that while the total armed
strength of the extreme left in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
and Costa Rica was estimated at about 1,450 in 1978; by. 198.1. it was
nearly 8,000.
III. El Salvador
Soon a.ftet defeating' Somo-Za, -the ..Sandinistas- began training.
guerrillas from El Salvador and other Central American countries.
This was the beginning of a steadily expanding partnership between
Cuba and the Sandinistas in exporting subversion in the region--a
partnership that has.included the establishment in Nicaragua of
numerous guerrilla training. camps, the transportation of tons of.
weapons and the establishment on Nicaraguan territory of guerrilla
command and control facilities along with a variety of propaganda
and covert activities...
In December 1979, to overcome differences over.tactics Castro
hosted the leaders of the leftist terrorist groups and the
Salvadoran Communist Party in Havana. This meeting produced
agreement to form a coordinating committee as was announced.
publicly in January 1980. It was also at this meeting that Castro
reportedly outlined his strategy: El Salvador and Guatemala would
be ".next," with Honduras to be. used as a corridor for the transit
of guerrillas and arms.
Three small noncommunist groups in El Salvador formed the
"Democratic Front" in April 1980. Shortly thereafter, the
Marxist-Leninist leaders and the noncommunist leaders of the
"Democratic Front" formed the "Revolutionary Democratic Front"
(FDR), thereby establishing the "broad coalition" which has been
used to give the impression that the guerrillas are democratic and
not Marxist-led. In 'June 1980, a meeting in - Cuba united-the
military and political components of the extreme left under a
"United. Revolutionary Directorate" (DRU). In November 1980, a
military alliance of the five insurgent factions, the Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), was created. Chart F1 depicts the
evolution of this organizational framework.
"he DRU became the command structure for the Marxist-Leninist
organizations and also the directing authority.over the "Democratic
Front," for which representatives of three small noncommunist
groups often act as spokesmen. The result was an unequal coalition
in which the Marxist-Leninist groups controlled the armed units,
weapons, intelligence, and covert support from the Soviet bloc/
Cuba, while the.non-Marxist-Leninist element provided a useful
facade for maintaining international respectability.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
IN
L:]
C
O O~
co
?-4 a
c
cr%
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
Having achieved the unified command for the extreme left, a
communist-led "broad coalition," and some noncommunist interna-
tional support, Cuba moved to increase the military strength of the
Salvadoran guerrillas with full but discreet support from the
Soviets. In April 198.0, Salvadoran guerrilla- leaders met in the
Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City with representatives of Cuba, the
USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland and Vietnam. In June and July
1980, the Salvadoran communist leaders went to Moscow and then with
Soviet endorsement visited East Germany, Bulgaria, Vietnam and
Ethiopia--all of which promised them military and other support.
The commitment of weapons was estimated at about 800 tons.
The Cuban/Soviet bloc military supply operation used Western
weapons (some from Vietnam) for "cover" and covertly shipped some
200 tons of weapons through Cuba and Nicaragua to arm the
Salvadoran guerrillas for their intense but unsuccessful "final
offensive" in January.1981.
Although the offensive failed, it led President Carter to
authorize U.S. military aid for arms, ammunition and equipment for
the first time since 1977 to "support the Salvadoran government in
its struggle against left-wing terrorism supported.covertly with
arms, ammunition, training and political and military advice by
Cuba and other communist nations."
Throughout 1981, Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet bloc aided in
rebuilding, rearming and improving the Salvadoran guerrilla forces,
.which expanded their operations in the fall. By 1982, the
Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas had about 4,000 to 6,000 full-time
fighters and an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 part-time activists who
provided logistical and political support as well as combat
services. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua evolved into an
extremely. sophisticated command-and-control center--more elaborate
in fact, than that used by the Sandinistas against Somoza.
Guerrilla planning and operations are guided from this head-
quarters, where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers are involved in
command and control. The guidance flows to guerrilla units widely
spread throughout El Salvador. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua
also coordinates propaganda and logistical support for the
insurgents, including food, medicines, clothing,-money and--most
importantly--weapons and ammunition.
Although some guerrilla actions take place as targets of
opportunity appear, the headquarters in Nicaragua decides on most
locations to be attacked and coordinates supply deliveries. The
guerrillas themselves have centralized their control procedures.
For example, on March 14, 1982, the FMLN clandestine Radio
Venceremos, then located near the Salvadoran border, broadcast a
message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging them "to maintain their
fighting spirit 24 hours a day to carry out the missions ordered bye
the FMLN general command (emphasis supplied)." The murder and
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
alleged suicide leaders of El Salvador's largest guerrilla group
(the FPL) residing in Managua in April 1983 provided dramatic
evidence. of the guerrillas' base in. Nicaragua.
After El Salvador scheduled free elections.for a Constituent
Assembly for March 28, 1982, the Salvadoran Government invited the
social democrats (MNR) and the communist-front UDN, both of which
support.the FMLN, to compete openly in those elections,. This offer
was rejected and the top priority ofthe guerrillas became the
disruption or prevention of.these elections. In December 1981,
after meetings in Havana with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, Fidel
Castro directed that external supplies of arms to FMLN units be
stepped up to launch a offensive to disrupt the elections.
During the first 3 months of 1982, arms shipments into El
Salvador surged. Cuban-Nicaraguan arms flowed through Honduras
into El Salvador by sea, air, and overland routes. In February,
for example, Salvadoran guerrilla groups picked up a large shipment
on the Salvadoran coast, near Usulutan, after the shipment arrived
by sea from Nicaragua.
In addition to vitally needed ammunition, these supply
operations included greater quantities of more sophisticated heavy
weapons. Deliveries in 1982 included M-60 machineguns, M-79
grenade-launchers and M-72 antitank weapons, significantly
increasing the guerrillas' firepower. One guerrilla unit received
several thousand sticks of TNT and detonators from Nicaragua (only
five sticks are need to blow up an electrical pylon). Individual
units also regularly received tens of thousands of dollars for
routine purchases of supplies on commercial markets and for
payments (including bribes) to enable the clandestine pipeline to
function. On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican judicial Police
announced the discovery in San Josea sizable cache of arms,.
explosives, uniforms, passports . documents,-false immigration stamps
from more than 30 countries,'and vehicles with hidden
compartments--all connected-with arms.smuggling through Costa Rican
territory, and Nicaragua or via third countries, to the Salvadoran
guerrillas. Map #2 displays the known major infiltration routes
for arms being illicitly infiltrated into El' Salvador.
With this support, thousands of Salvadoran guerrillas attempted
to prevent the March 1982 election by destroying public buses,
blocking highways and attacking villages,'towns, and voting places.
Nonetheless, in with several hundred election observers from
democratic countries and about 700 foreign journalists as
witnesses, the people of El Salvador repudiated the extreme left by
voting in overwhelming numbers. More than 80% of the eligible
voters participated. .
Following their obvious repudiation in the elections, the FMLN
leaders reacted as they had after their failed 1981 "final
offensive." They consulted with Nicaraguan and Cuban officials to-..'
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
0 0
cs
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
plan strategy and to obtain more and better military and communica-
tions equipment for their forces. For the next 6 months,.they
continued terrorist harrassment and economic sabotage. in
mid-October 1982, they used their expanded capabilities to begina
new series of military attacks. By early 1983 the guerrillas had
controlled about a dozen towns for more than?2 months, and their
morale clearly had recovered--in part due to the continued. Cuban,
Nicaraguan and Soviet bloc support, which enabled them to sustain
:operations despite their rejection by the Salvadoran people.
During 1982, guerrilla operations resulted in about 2,500 govern-
ment forces wounded and 1,300 killed. These intensified attacks
have continued through the first 5 months of 1983.
Although Castro has often denied responsibility for shipping
weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas, German Social Democrat leader
Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski stated publicly in 1981 that Castro had
admitted the Cuban role. Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez confirmed Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas in
interviews given in the fall of 1981. In an article published in
the Toronto Globe and Mail on February 12, 1982, a reporter
interviewed a Salvadoran guerrilla trainee who described courses
for Salvadoran guerrillas in demolition and intelligence
operations, taught by Cubans, and attended by the Salvadorans at
that time.
A guerrilla leader told a San Diego Union reporter (March 1,
1981) in El Salvador that "the Salvadoran guerrillas have a
permanent commission in Nicaragua overseeing the smuggling of
weapons from that country to here." He also said there have been
Cuban advisers in the Province of Morazan, and that even Vietnamese
advisers had made trips to guerrilla camps in El Salvador.
The use of Papalonal airfield is an example of the smuggling of
weapons from Nicaragua to guerrillas in. El Salvador. Papalonal is
a commercially underdeveloped area 23 miles north of Managua. The
airfield is accessible only-by dirt roads. In late July 1980, the
airfield was an argricultural dirt airstrip approximately 800
meters long, but by early 1981 the strip had been lengthened by 50
percent to approximately 1,200 meters. Hangars were constructed to
stockpile arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. C-47 flights from
the airbase were confirmed by photographic evidence and
unidentified aircraft were frequently sighted in El Salvador.
Several pilots who regularly flew the route into El Salvador have
been identified in Nicaragua. This particular route has been
closed down, but air infiltration over new routes continues to this
day.
In addition to the air infiltration routes, the Salvadoran
guerrillas make extensive. use of sea and overland infiltration
routes through Honduras and Guatemala from Nicaragua. Photo #5
taken in May 1983, in San Salvador, demonstrates that the
guerrillas use sophisticated vehicular concealment devices to
confound detection by local authorities.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
Details of Cuban/Nicaraguan support have been provided by two
high-level FMLN leaders captured in mid-1982. One of them-, known
as "Alejandro Montenegro," was seized on August 22, 1982, in
conjunction with a raid on an FMLN safehouse in Honduras.
Montenegro's importance is underscored by the fact that the
September 1982 taking of 108 civilian hostages in San Pedro Sula,
Honduras, was essentially an attempt by a leftist Honduran
terrorist group (with close ties to the Salvadoran insurgents) to
secure his release. The hostage seizure failed because Montenegro
had already. been transferred to Salvadoran military authorities.
Montenegro provided some significant information:
-- He said that the Cubans played a major role in training
those who conducted the successful January 27, 1982, raid
on the Salvadoran air base at Ilopango, which damaged or
destroyed a dozen aircraft.
-- Montenegro himself directed the attack, leading an
eight-man team that had received 5 months of special
infiltration and sabotage training in Cuba.
He said that he personally had attended two high-level
meetings with Cuban officials. in 1981--one in Havana and
the other in Managua--to review the situation in El
Salvador and obtain strategic advice.
-- One of the guerrillas captured with Montenegro made five
trips to Managua in 1982.to pick up arms for the
insurgents, using a truck modified by the Sandinistas to
carry concealed weapons.
The Sandinistas have three repair shops for such vehicle
modifications under the direction of a special section at
the Nicaraguan Ministry-'of Defense. Vehicles similarly
modified are shown in'Photo n5.
Montenegro also confirmed that Nicaragua remains the primary
source of insurgent weapons and ammunition, although he added that
the guerrillas do capture some weapons and ammunition frbm the
Salvadoran military.
The other captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez Arriola,
admitted attending a platoon leaders' course in Cuba in July 1979.
He said that:
WIN.
Hundreds of Salvadoran guerrillas have received military
training in Cuba;
Cubans give special courses for combatants, commanders,
staff officers, and intelligence officials;
He had attended an insurgent strategy meeting in Havana
June 1981, at which Castro himself appeared.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
Lopez Arriola also revealed.that the Sandinistas control weapons.
delivered from Vietnam to Nicaragua for the Salvador insurgents and
that the guerrillas must ask for permission to draw on the
supplies. He added that the Sandinistas give the insurgents an
extensive base of operations in and around Managua and provide a
school for their children..
IV. Guatemala
.In Guatemala, although there was increased guerrilla activity in
the months proceeding the elctions, this violence failed to disrupt
the national elections of March 7, 1982. A widespread, but
unconfirmed, perception of extensive electoral fraud by the
government together with pervasive and excessive led to a junior
officer coup on March 23, 1982. The new President, General Efrain
Rios Montt, who had been on inactive duty for four years, acted
quickly.
He disbanded various semi-official groups that had taken part in
violence against opposition leaders and offered amnesty for
guerrillas who surrendered before the end of June 1982. (The
Guatemalan Government has since renewed this offer and it is
currently in force. From that point on, the Guatemalan Government
implemented an intensive counter-insurgency program. This included
the establishment and arming of village self-defense forces in the
Indian highlands, and the start of programs to provide medical,
food and economic assistance.
In April and July 1981, Guatemalan security forces captured
large caches of guerrilla weapons at safehouses in Guatemalan City.
Traces made on the serial numbers of U.S.-manufactured weapons
revealed that 17 of the M.16/AR-15 rifles found had been shipped to
American units in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Several vehicles captured at the safehouses bore recent customs
markings from Nicaragua.
During 1982, both Cuba and the Soviet Union increased their
efforts to bring about a firmly unified guerrilla command in
Guatemala. On February 9, 1982, a Guatemalan guerrilla leader
called a press conference in Havana to proclaim the unity of the
four principal Guatemalan guerrilla groups. The Cubans and the
Soviet bloc have continued to provide military training and support
.to various factions of the Guatemalan insurgency.
V. Honduras
The new democratic government of Honduras--inaugurated in
January 1982--increased its cooperation with the United States and
neighbors in the region to neutralize the threat posed by the large
military buildup in Nicaragua as well as by the guerrillas in the
region. Having failed in 1981 to persuade Honduras to be neutral
by promising that Cuba and Nicaragua would "spare Honduras" from
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
the terrorism affecting El Salvador and Guatemala, Cuba now seeks
to intimidate Honduras and its leaders into passivity through acts
of terrorism. By doing so, the Cubans hope to dominate a major
obstacle to arms shipments to El Salvador and thus to increase the
chance that the Salvadoran guerrillas can succeed.
Cuba and Nicaragua have worked actively to keep-the Honduran
Government from cooperating with El Salvador's efforts to prevent
the transit of guerrilla supplies. Increased Cuban /Nicaraguan
training and support have been provided to the Honduran extreme
left, and Havana has stepped up efforts to promote unity among the
Honduran leftist groups as part of a campaign to destabilize the
Honduran Government. Examples of extreme leftist actions in
Honduras during 1981 included. the following:
-- In early January 1981, Honduran police caught six persons
unloading weapons from a truck enroute from-Nicaragua. The
six identified themselves as members of the International
Support Commission of the Salvadoran Popular'Liberation
Forces, a part of the FMLN. They had in their possession a
large number of altered and forged Honduran, Costa Rican,
and Salvadoran passports and other identity documents. One
truck contained more than 100 M-16/AR-15 automatic rifles,
50 81mm.mortar rounds, about 100,000 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunition, machinegun belts, field packs, and first-aid
kits. More than 50 of the M-16 rifles were traced to U.S.
units assigned to Vietnam in 1968-69.
-- In April 1981, Honduran authorities intercepted a tractor-
trailer that had entered Honduras from Nicaragua at the
Guasule crossing. Ammunition and propaganda materials were
hidden inside the walls of the trailer. The same arms
t ffickers'operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Honduras,
with a false floor and special basement for storing
weapons.
The link between Cuba/Nicaragua and the regional infrastructure
behind the expanded guerrilla 'activity is evident from 'information
obtained following a raid late in 1981 by the Honduran police on a
safehouse for the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras.
This organization was described in the pro-government Nicaraguan
newspaper El Nuevo Diario, by "Octavio," one of its founders, as a
political-military organization formed as part of the "increasing
reg'bnalization of the Central American conflict." The raid
occurred on November 27, 1981, in Tegucilgalpa. Following a
gunfight the Honduran police captured several members of this
group. This cell included a Honduran, a Uruguayan, and several
Nicaraguans. The captured terrorists told Honduran authorities
that the Nicaraguan Government had provided them with funds for
travel expenses, as well as explosives.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
Captured documents and statements by detained guerrillas further
indicated that the group.was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation
of high-level Sandinista leaders. The group's chief of operations
resided in Managua. Members of the group received military
training in Nicaragua and Cuba. The documents included classroom
notebooks from a 1-year training course held'in Cuba in 1980.
Other captured documents revealed that guerrillas at one safehouse
were responsible for transporting arms and ammunition into Honduras
from Esteli, Nicaragua..
Our information shows that Nicaraguan agents and Salvadoran
extreme left groups have played a leading role in the Honduran
operation:
The Salvadoran guerrillas have links with almost all
Honduran terrorist groups and assist them in subversive
planning, training, and operations.
The December 1982, kidnapping of Honduran President Suazo's
daughter in Guatemala was the work of..a Guatemalan
Marxist-Leninist guerrilla faction.
Discussions reportedly were held in mid-1982 among the
Cubans, Sandinistas and Salvadoran insurgents about
terrorist activities against the Honduran Government.
Captured Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists have admitted
that explosives used in bombing attacks in the Honduran
capital were obtained in Nicaragua.
IV. Costa Rica
Costa Rica has a long democratic tradition and the highest
standard of living and social services in Central America. In 1978
and 1979, some Costa Rican government officials cooperated in the
supply of military equipment to the Sandinistas. In May 1982, Luis
Alberto Monge, a social democrat strongly opposed by both the
extreme right and left, was inaugurated as President.
Because his government has attempted to stop the continued use
of its territory. for the supply of weapons to the region's Marxist-
Leninist guerrrillas, Cuba and Nicaragua also have made Costa Rica
a target for subversion. During 1982, for example:
Cuba funded a new leftist. political party designed to unify
various leftist elements and attract broader popular
support;
The Cubans and Sandinistas provided weapons and training
for Costa Rican leftist terrorists;
Since the beginning of 1982, several guerrilla arms caches-.."
and safehouses have been discovered in Costa Rica.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
In March 1982, the.Costa Rican Judicial Police discovered a
.large arms cache in a house in San Jose. Among the nine
people arrested there were Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an
Argentine, a Chilean, and a Costa Rican. Costa Rican
police so far have seized 13 vehicles designed for arms
smuggling and more than 170 weapons,' including machineguns,
TNT, fragmentation grenades, a grenade-launcher, ammunition
and 500 combat uniforms.
Nicaragua has instigated terrorist actions in Costa Rica,
leading to increased tensions between the two countries.
Although the Sandinistas denied complicity, the July 3,
1982, bombing of the Honduran airlines office in San Jose
took place at Nicaragua's direction, according to a
Colombian M-19 member arrested by Costa Rican authorities
on July 14,.1982.
The captured terrorist also stated that the July 3, bombing
was part of a broader Nicaraguan plan that included
sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies, and other terrorist
acts designed to`discredit Costa Rica internationally.
In November 1982, Salvadoran guerrillas attempted to kidnap
a Japanese businessman in San Jose. The attempt was
stopped.by the Costa Rican authorities. More than 20 other
Salvadoran extreme leftist cells continue to work inside.
Costa Rica to destabilize the government.
VII. Soviet and Cuban Propaganda Activities
Beginning in early 1980, the Soviet.bloc and Cuba complemented
their subversive activities in Central America by launching'a
worldwide propaganda and -disinformation campaign. Initially the
campaign focused on U.S. policy toward El Salvador, in an effort to
block U.S. aid, although it also dealt with U.S. involvement in
Guatemala and Honduras. The campaign was intended to expose an
allegedly U.S.-sponsored plot, "discovered" by Cuban intelligence,
to invade El Salvador using the armies of Honduras and Guatemala
with assistance from*Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia. This "plot"
was characterized as a last ditch effort by the U.S. President to
transform the situation in El Salvador in favor of government
forces prior to the U.S. elections in November 1980.
Captured documents* indicate that the FMLN has coordinated the
FDR"s international activities (in the United States, Canada, and
Europe) from Mexico City. The Soviets in Mexico City are also in
contact with the Salvadoran guerrillas. Logistics and interna-
tional relations policy, however, are handled in Havana. The Cuban
press agency, Prensa Latina, provides international communications
.for the FDR and its representatives abroad.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
14
The Soviets and Cubans met in June 1980 with several Salvadoran
insurgent leaders in Havana to establish a strategy for an
international political campaign on El Salvador. Evidence from
captured guerrilla documents indicates that the strategy -includes:
--
Propaganda:
Spokesmen should emphasize that the Salvadoran
"revolution"
oppresssion
represents the people and is fighting against
and for freedom from outside intervention. The
United States seeks direct military intervention in El
Salvador to keep the "junta" in power..
--
International Support: Representatives should gain
recognition and support for the insurgents from a broad
range of international organizations and political and
regional groups.
U.S. Initiatives: Representatives should strengthen ties
with sympathetic American organizations and seek support
from American politicians.
-- Public Posture: From the outset, representatives should
call for a dialogue to seek resolution of the conflict.
"The policy of a dialogue is a tactical maneuver to broaden
our alliances, while at the same time splitting up and
isolating the enemy." Representatives should take up the
banner of peace, and maintain that they seek only lasting
peace and justice.
-- Humanitarian Organizations: The Salvadoran insurgents
should establish a front organization to funnel aid and
money from humanitarian organizations.
A comparison of the strategy laid out in guerrilla documents
with actual events, shows that the 'Soviets, the Cubans and the
Salvadoran guerrilla leadership in Nicaragua have followed it
closely. During the past three years, they have engaged in various
overt and covert activities* designed to influence public opinion in
Western Europe, Latin America, Canada and the United States.
Soviet propaganda has been aimed at discrediting U.S., policy in
El Salvador, and widespread use has been made of disinformation to
substantiate the message. Moscow also has employed its interna-
tional fronts, such as the World Peace Council and the World
Federation of Trade Unions, in support of the propaganda campaign.
'ommunist parties in Europe, Latin America, Canada and Australia
have participated in the propaganda campaign and helped organize
demonstrations. Their publications have continuously printed
articles on El Salvador and contributed to disinformation circulat-
ing about the situation in that country. For instance, the
Communist Party of Spain, in its maganzine Mundo Oberro Semanal,
amid pictures of blood-covered bodies., accused the United States of.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
encircling El Salvador with the aid of Honduras and Guatemala, of
sending tanks and helicopters "piloted by Yankees," of invading El
Salvador;. and of murdering Salvadoran Archbishop Romero.
Meanwhile, the FDR-FMLN, with Soviet and Cuban support, has
directed the establishment of "Solidarity Committees" throughout
Europe and Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These serve as
propaganda outlets and conduits for contributions to the
guerrillas. These committees also have helped plan-, in conjunction
with Communist parties and local leftist groups, many of the
demonstrations that have taken place in support of the Salvadoran
guerrillas. The timing and location of the demonstrations, such as
those held worldwide after the failure of the January 1981 FMLN
"final offensive" and those to protest the March 1982 Salvadoran
elections, show, that they resulted from a well-coordinated effort.
VIII. Extent of Outside Support
Since the Sandinista victory in July 1979, both Cuba and
Nicaragua have steadily increased the size and quality of their
"Revolutionary" military forces. The Soviets have played a major
role in this militarization of the region.
Soviet military deliveries to Cuba increased dramatically in
1979 to an average of more than 65,000 tons by 1981. They
apparently remain at this level today.
The Soviet bloc, with Cuban support, has been assisting
Nicaragua's large military buildup which includes weapons, military
equipment, airfields, military bases and extensive military
training.
-- In February 1982;,a Soviet ship delivered about 270
military trucks to the port of Corinto, bringing the total
Soviet bloc truck inventory in Nicaragua to more than 800.
-- In April 1982, an Algerian merchant ship delivered four
Soviet heavy tank ferries, one small patrol boat, and 12
BM-21 mobile multiple-rocket-launchers. These had been
delivered previously to Algeria by Soviet ships and stored
on the docks.
The tank ferries provide the Sandinista army with an
offensive water-crossing capability, while the mobile
rocket-launchers gave them a mass firepower weapon
unmatched in the region.
In mid-1982, the Sandinistas completed a new garrison for
their Soviet T-54/55 tank battalion just outside of
Managua. They also completed two new infantry battalion
garrisons near Managua and have begun work on another major.
military installation south.of the capital.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0 '
As is evident from photos 46-8, all of these military
installations have a common layout similar to Cuban
garrisons designed and constructed with Cuban assistance.
It is noteworthy that Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro
visited Nicaragua in mid-1982 with a"high-level military
delegation, ostensibly to offer aid for flood damage. It
was announced later that 2,000 Cuban construction workers
were being sent to Nicaragua. Since then,-we have detected
a spurt in military construction activity has been
detected.
In November 1982, a Soviet bloc ship delivered an
additional group of 25 T-54/55 tanks, bringing the total to
about 50. The delivery followed a visit by Sandinista
Directorate member, Daniel Ortega., to Moscow earlier in the
year. To enhance the mobility of Sandinista. ground forces,
the Soviets have delivered MI-8 helicopters. AN-2 aircraft
and armored personnel carriers also have been provided.
During early December 1982, eight new 122mm howitzers were
delivered, supplementing the twelve 152mm guns delivered in
1981.
-- Finally, in late December 1982, the first delivery was made
of sophisticated Soviet electronic gear--a high frequency/
direction-finder intercept facility of a type seen .
previously in Cuba. This type of equipment is able to
intercept signals from throughout Central America and would
be especially useful in pinpointing Honduran military
communication sites.
-- The Cubans also have constructed a strategic road between
Puerto Cabezas and the-interior. This road facilitates the
movement of troops and military supplies to the troubled
northeast border area.
In Nicaragua, in addition to the 15,000 to 2,000 military and
security advisers there are about 50 Soviet military and 100
economic advisers. About 25 of the Soviet personnel are "assisting
the security services, and the others are attached to the
Nicaraguan general staff and the headquarters of various military
services. By mid-1982, they had concluded military agreements with
Nicaragua estimated to be worth at least $125 million.
Where are also about 35 military and 200 economic advisers from
East European countries in Nicaragua. Most are East Germans, but
some Bulgarians, Czechoslovakians, Poles and Hungarians are also
present. The East Germans are most active in the Nicaraguan
internal security organizations.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
PHOTO 46
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
As many. as 50. Libyan and PLO advisers have been active in
Nicarauga. The Libyan advisers have been engaged mostly in
servicing the Polish-built MI-2 light helicopters they provided the
Nicaraguans. Last May, the Libyans also provided the Sandinistas
with four small Italian aircraft useful in counter-insurgency
operations.
In April 1983, Brazil detained four Libyan aircraft transporting
large' quantities of weapons to Nicaragua, including two jet
aircraft. This event, and a high-level delegation to Managua in
May, underscores Libyan leader Qadhafi's commitment to the Central
American struggle (see photos-#9 and. 10). (Salvadoran guerrilla
leader Cayetano Carpio returned to Nicaragua-from Libya immediately
before his April 12 purported suicide in'Managua.)
PLO leader Yasir Arafat agreed to provide military equipment to
.Nicar.agua, including arms.and aircraft, when he was in Managua on
July 22, 1980. The PLO has trained selected Salvadorans in the
Near East and in Nicaragua.. Arafat affirmed to a group of
Palestinian journalists in Beirut on January 11, 1982, that "there
are Palestinian revolutionaries with the revolutionaries in El
Salvador..." About 30 PLO personnel are providing pilot training
and.aircraft maintenance in Nicaragua'.
This level of outside support adds up to far more than merely
marginal assistance for, essentially indigenous guerrilla activity.
It is large-scale intervention in the political affairs of the
nations directly concerned, for the clear purpose of bringing to
power governments on the Cuban model.
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0
LIBYAN ARMS AIRCRAFT IN }3KAGJL
PHOTOS i9 and 10
Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R001302200034-0