YOUR QUESTIONS ON THE SWDR DESCRIBING SOVIET ACCESS TO US DATA BASES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001001580050-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: August 30, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580050-5
H MEMO TO: Deputy Director
N Central Intelligence
HROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief
Technology Transfer Assessment Center
REF : SWDR 83-527J
The attached information is in response
to your question concerning Soviet access and
use of unclassified Western data bases. We
have included copies of three recent TTAC
WDR items on the topic.
ttachments:
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580050-5
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364R001001580050-5
ar:uiNi
30 August 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
ie , Technology Transfer Assessment Center
SUBJECT Your Questions on the SWD Soviet
Access to US Data Bases
1. Soviet Bloc and Chinese access to unclassified Western
computerized S&T data bases is a problem, the magnitude of which
remains largely unknown. We are sure, however, that both nations
consider it a valuable source of information and of priority
importance to ensure continued access. In fact, we include their
2. Of concern are three categories of unclassified
information--government controlled information, commercial
proprietary information, and information openly available through
subscription. Information in the third category is generally of
a fairly basic nature and is normally available to the Communist
World through direct subscription to the various journals or
abstracting services. A need for timeliness and convenience of
access, and more importantly the ability to search out, collate
and manipulate data references dictates the computerized data
base approach to such information. If the Soviet Bloc and
Chinese users can also manage to break into controlled and
proprietary data bases through this method, they will gain access
to sensitive data concerning plans and programs and the design,
performance, and costs of military and industrial systems and
3. DoD has recently completed a contractor study concerning
this problem but they are still not sure how to deal with the
problem.
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364R001001580050-5
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364R001001580050-5
JL' VilGI I I
SUBJECT: Your Questions on the SWDR Describing Soviet
Access to US Data Bases ~'
4. There is an interagency working group charged with
addressing the problem of Soviet access to Western data bases.
The group was started by Bo'Denysyk of Commerce about a year ago,
and is now chaired by John Boidock of Commerce. The group was
originally formed to oversee the expenditure of $400K in Commerce
contractual funds for a possible Rand Corporation study
concerning access to Western data bases. With evaporation of
those funds, the sense of direction of the group seems to have
been lost. A subsequent proposed contractual effort on the
security of comput d data bases DOE at LANL is stalled for
want of fundin .
5. TTAC has been working closely with NSA and DO, both of
which are doing a good job of.collection on the problem. Through
both organizations, we are attempting to define the magnitude of
the Communist World data base access problem more accurately.
6. What remains to be addressed is the question of what to
do about the problem. For example, Lockheed's DIALOG system is
one of the most widely used commercial data bases. As of
December 1982, it had 19,000 subscribers in more than 60
countries. Major entry (i.e., Gateway) ports such as Radio
Austria offer access to networks such as TELENET, TYMNET,.
ARPANET, and EURONET, among others. From these almost any1
commercial data base, including Commerce's NTIS, can be
entered. Anyone can subscribe to Radio Austria's service
directly or through a cut-out organization. Likewise, the
Chinese, either directly, or through a cut-out organization, can
subscribe to any of the commercial services. At the moment it
appears that the greatest opportunities for denial of data base
access by the West lie in the areas of controlled or proprietary
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364R001001580050-5
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580050-5
SUBJECT: Your Questions on the SWDR Describing Soviet
Access to US Data Bases
7. In the longer run, the US Government should scrutinize
the types of information it releases through NTIS and other
information services. There really is little reason why we
release a lot of the DoD sponsored defense contract work. The
public has little need to know in many areas including those you
noted in the SWDR article. The DoD is attempting to identify
these areas. but ting another classified procedure is a slow
process.
. Chief
Technology Transfer Assessment Center
Attachments:
As stated
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001580050-5