STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET POWER PROJECTION ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001001570034-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Strategic Significance of Soviet
Power Projection Activities
1. Throughout the last decade the Soviets have pursued a
policy of expanding and strengthening their global reach and
influence, including greater use of support facilities overseas,
more frequent naval and air presence at longer ranges, and the
.pursuit of increased operational experience in distant areas.*
This expansion has been complemented by Soviet surrogate force
deployments and military aid to client states and to
revolutionary movements in politically unstable areas. While the
principal theaters of Soviet focus appear to be in the Middle
East and the Mediterranean, Soviet. reach extends westward via
Cuba, where they maintain a permanent brigade base, to the
Central American mainland. It also stretches southward along
both the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean coasts of Africa.
Facilities on the Arabian Peninsula and islands of the Indian
Ocean provide sustenance on an aperiodic basis to Soviet naval
and air units.
2. In the Near East .and South Asia, the Soviets currently
can politically rely on use of facilities in Afghanistan, Syria,
*The word "facilities" is used in this paper instead of "bases"
to denote the tenuous nature of most Soviet overseas staging
points. With the exception of Soviet Army barracks in Cuba, and
possibly in Syria, Soviet facilities overseas are not comparable
with the well-developed network of bases used by US forces.
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the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and Ethiopia.
There is a possibility that they may also gain access to air and
maritime facilities in Libya. In the case of Syria they have
direct control of air defense systems, including SA-5 surface-to-
air missiles, which provide them a capability against hostile
aircraft over Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, part of Turkey, and the'
Eastern Mediterranean. Strategically, this situation means the
Soviets can control the southern entrance to the Red Sea from the
PDRY and Ethiopia, and at least contest US air and naval presence
in the Eastern Mediterranean from facilities in that .area. They
are not currently in a position to completely control the Straits
of Hormuz, but they could launch strikes in the area using long
range aircraft from the Soviet Union.
3. In the Pacific, where the Soviets maintain their largest.
fleet, their interest in overseas support development centers on
Vietnam; particularly the facilities at Cam Rahn and the airfield
at Da Nang. Soviet sponsorship of the Hanoi regime affords at
once a modicum of encirclement of China and a vantage point from
which operations could be undertaken along the vital
international sea lanes stretching across the Indian Ocean,
northward via the South China Sea to Japan.
4. The leverage which the Soviets realize from these as yet
modest deployments is highly significant. From a military point
of view they have acquired a number of actual. and potential
staging points from which intelligence and logistical missions
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can be regularly mounted, and they have laid the foundations upon
which, with additional investment, regional offensive strike
capabilities could be built. Soviet long-range aircraft often
reconnoiter Atlantic waters from the Barents Sea to the Caribbean
and southward to Luanda, Angola. East of Africa, Soviet
transport flights stretching southward. across the Arabian Sea to
the Seychelles and Mozambique are possible precursors of new
military operational routes..
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8. In sum, while their efforts are by no means comparable
to US forward basing patterns, the Soviets do appear to be
steadily increasing their ability to delay US reinforcement of
critical theaters around the Eurasian landmass in time of
crisis. In addition, they have developed a network of widespread
outposts and areas which support their avowed goal of world
revolution. While some of the posts are of greater importance
and utility than others, in their entirety they constitute a
major challenge to planners charged with ensuring Western
security.
CIO/GPF
21 D~Iarch 198
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