OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001001570027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 18, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/05/19: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001570027-2
SECRET
18 April 1983
Operational Support for Future Unconventional Warfare
From an operations perspective, there are serious impediments to
establishing underground networks in peacetime for contingency usage in time
of war. While not necessarily overwhelming, these problems do suggest caution
in making preparations for irregular warfare contingent on progress in this
area. Specifically:
-- Operations personnel are charged with establishing
professional, high level unilateral penetrations in denied areas.
This task consumes currently available resources.
-- The recruitment of clandestine underground "networks" is inherently
insecure and highly susceptible to host country penetration -
particulary in sophisticated counterintelligence environments such
as Eastern Europe.
-- While the risk to life of indigenous collaborators is worth it in
wartime, this point is more debatable in peacetime unless the
operation is of demonstrable high value.
-- Inherently insecure operations tend to heighten concerns of the
host governments about our operations, with resultant impact on the
security of other agents.
Political backing in the USG for such activity, some of which will
be compromised, comes and goes. Operators have found that
willingness to sustain a political repercussion to compromised
activity by one policy group is rapidly disavowed by succeeding
policymakers actually faced with the event. Among other things,,
careers suffer.
Recruitment of this type of agent network sends an extremely
militant message to the target government, and we must be certain
that war preparation is that desired message.
From the basic operator's point of view, the career pay off is not
high. There is little intelligence flow of value.
Approved For Release 2008/05/19: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001570027-2
 Approved For Release 2008/05/19: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001570027-2
SECRET
The above negative considerations can, of course, be overcome by high
level sustained policy decisions. Short of that, however, the following is
immediately possible:
-- Tasking of current unilateral agents for identification of nodes of
opposition and related data.
-- Relevant operational personality target studies short of actual
recruitment. Some recruitment activity with these operations in
mind.
-- Related propaganda operations designed to intensify opposition
thinking in the target country.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/05/19: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01001570027-2