SWORD AND SHIELD: ACE ATTACK OF WARSAW PACT FOLLOW-ON FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000801310018-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
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SWORD AND SHIELD:
ACE ATTACK OF
WARSAW PACT
FOLLOW-ON
FORCES
New tactical concepts for Allied Command Europe have been
much in the news in the last few months. In a comprehensive
contribution General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Command-
er Europe, presents his ideas of how, by exploiting the West's
technological lead, the Allies can best meet the threat of the numer-
ically superior Warsaw Pact forces and so improve deterrence.
A flied Command Europe (ACE)
reexamines constantly its capabil-
ity to implement the NATO deter-
rent strategy of Flexible Response. The
objective of that strategy is simple and
straightforward - to protect our freedom
through deterrence of war.
NATO has been remarkably successful
in meeting this objective in the 34 years
since it was founded, but we must not let
our record of success diminish our vigi-
lance. Translated into more specific terms,
we must keep strong the triad of forces
upon which the successful implementation
of Flexible Response rests: strategic nu-
clear, theater nuclear, and conventional
forces. In this article I will describe our
efforts to strengthen ACE's conventional
capacity. While the focus of this presenta-
tion will be limited, the reader will under-
stand that improving one leg of the triad
complements the effectiveness of the ocher
legs, thereby achieving an overall enhance-
ment of deterrence.
THE STRATEGIC
REALITIES
The ever-growing gap between the con-
ventional force capabilities of the Warsaw
Pact and NATO is a cause for serious con-
cern. Although ACE forces improve every
year,, the Warsaw Pact's unabated amassing
of military might, with disregard for the
social and economic needs of its societies,
General Bernard W. Rogers was
appointed Supreme Allied Commander
by NATO's Defence Planning Commit-
tee with effect from 1 July 1979. He was
simultaneously appointed Commander-
in-Chief United States Forces in Europe.
He has had a long and distinguished
career which included a large share of
combat experience and was previously
Chief of Staff. U.S. Army.
places greater demands on ACE's conven-
tional defenses. Our conventional forces
must be sufficiently robust to serve as
more than just a "delayed trip wire" for
escalation. __T_he problem which faces
NATO is not to seek a new strategy; Flex-
ibleRessponse is as valid today as when first
elaborated in the 1960's. Rather, we must
determine, within a reasonable 'level of
resource commitment, how best we can
strengthen our conventional orgies so they
can play the crucial role which Flexible
Response demands them. Our task, in
short, is to find the means to maintain an
effective deterrence by keeping our
strategy of Flexible Response flexible.
'.Ce n st improve our ability to look deeper and identify rapidly the location and movement of the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces. The TR- I aircraft, and
;he NATO MEW Force have already greatly enhanced our capabilities.
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concept of operations; defense at the
FEBA protects our means to conduct
attacks on the follow-on forces, and strik-
ing deep will keep the force ratios at the
FEBA manageable.
We estimate that the Warsaw Pact can
introduce fresh formations at the FEBA
about 36 hours after its offensive has begun
and additional fresh forces at similar inter-
vals thereafter. Any counteraction against
this closely scheduled employment would
have serious repercussions on Pact mobili-
zation and deployment flow. The lines of
communication (LOCs) between their
home garrisons and the main battle areas
are limited in capacity. Attacks against
critical LOCs at appropriate times would
A prudent defense concept must take
into account, inter alia, our strategic objec-
tives, the political and geographical con-
straints of the theater and the comparative
capabilities of our forces and those of the
Warsaw Pact. With deterrence as the key-
stone of our strategy, we must demon-
strate both the capacity and the will to
respond io any form of aggression in such
a manner as to make that aggression too
costly a risk. The implementation of our
strategy must balance the political and
geographical conditions found in the thea-
ter of operations with the realities of mod-
ern warfare. The increased range, accuracy
and mobility of modern wets on systems
have added deptei to the battlefield. ACE,
with limited depth to its planned defenses,
is committed firmly to the concept o "for-
ward defense" so as to yield as little of
NATO soil to an aggressor as posse e.
ACE can still achieve greater depth in its
defense by extending its conventional fires
well beyond the forward edge of the battle
area (FEBA), that is, by interdicting
enemy follow-on forces throughout the
enemy's rear to prevent them from reach-
ing and reinforcing the forward battlefield.
At a minimum, our fires must delay those
forces and disrupt their combat potential
while we are successfully holding the lead
Pact divisions.
Achieving such a conventional ability
requires that we:
? do better with the forces we currently
have, that is bring them up to the
established ACE standards for man-
ping, equipping, training,
and reinforcing;
continue with essential
lion; and
sustaining,
ensure that we exploit fully our
superior Western technology to
develop and procure the conventional
means to attack effectively the War-
saw Pact follow-on forces and to jam
their communications and blind their
radars.
WARSAW PACT FOLLOW-
ON FORCES
The Pact would enjoy a favorable
balance of conventional forces at the begin-
The United States Air Force has announced its cause major disruption of deployment
intention to buy the French-made Matra Duran- plans. Most follow-on movements would
dal runway cratering munition. depend on the East European railway sys-
ping of a conflict, but the potential
strength of NATO. grows over time.
Therefore, the Pact concept would be to
strike quickly ante deeply, caus-
ingAACE~s defenses to collapse before the
1 cful onventionTwer of NATO could
be harnessed. Seizing a significant portion
of ACE's theater nuclear systems and its
means to command and control them obvi-
ously would diminish greatly the deterrent
effect of a NATO resolve to escalate. The
Pact places paramount importance on the
initial phase of its offensive and has
organized its large and highly mobile
forces to overrun our defenses quickly and
thus deprive us of the chance to react effec-
tively.
In order to breach ACE defenses rapidly
and maintain the momentum of the offen-
sive, Warsaw Pact doctrine calls for the
commitment of forces in successive waves,
or echelons, always keeping great pressure
on the defender and seeking to mass suffi-
cient forces for a breakthrough. Pact forces
can be expected to employ highly mobile
exploitation formations at army and army
rots rout) evels. These combined-arms
torces, calla erational Maneuver
Groups ( M 's), are esigne to pene-
trate deeply into the rear of NATO's
defense in or er to seize critics o jectives,
cut lines of communications and to limit
the a i i of NATO forces to respond,
especially with our theater nuclear forces.
Thus, the term "follow-on forces", as
we use it in ACE, refers to the Pact forces
(subsequent echelons and OMG's) which
have not been committed to the initial
attack. If deterrence were to fail and the
Pact took the gave risk of attacking
NATO, success of our defense would
depend upon our ability to attack these fol-
low-on forces conventionally, thereby
ensuring that we maintain around force
ratios which permit a cohesive defense.
However, this ability to strike deeply is
not to be acquired at the expense of our
capability at the FEBA. On the contrary,
defending the FEBA and attacking the fol-
low-on forces are complementary and
mutually reinforcing facets of the ACE
tem, which is vulnerable to attacks on elec-
trical power supplies, central command
and control facilities, communication sys-
tems, computer stations, switching sta-
tions, on-and-off-loading sites, railway
beds and river crossing sites. Movement by
road is equally vulnerable to disruption
resulting from attacks on known choke
points. Logistic facilities, communications
sites, and assembly areas of combat forces
would be targets for deep strike. Because
of the highly centralized command and
control structure which tends to charac-
terize Warsaw Pact armed forces, use of
our electronic warfare assets to neutralize
or frustrate operations at any tactical com-
mand headquarters will pay dividends in
terms of confusion caused in subordinate
units.
We do not expect; the forces of the War-
saw Pact to follow a precise script which
we have written for them. We should and
do credit our potential adversary with
competence; we cannot expect him to fol-
low a rigid formula for attack, nor can we
defend according to one. But we can
reasonably expect to improve our conven-
tional defense if we can deliver accurate
conventional fire throughout the aggres-
sor's rear area. We should also note the
important role that NATO's nuclear deter-
rent plays in facilitating the attack of Pact
follow-on forces. Our nuclear threat com-
pels the Warsaw Pact to echelon its forces
as we as -raisi_ng the risk of mass in. forces
for penetration. (This, incidentally, pro-
vides one of the major tactical reasons for
NATO not to ado st a "no-first-use" pol-
icy wit re and tto c eater nut ear weapons;
there are other reasons as well.) This inter-
relationship is an excellent example of how
capable NATO forces, both conventional
and nuclear, reinforce each other to deter
war.
REQUIREMENTS FOR
NATO FORCES
Our objective in attacking Pact follow-
on forces is to prevent or reduce their
influencing the battle at the FEBA. This
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The Federal Republic of Germany's MW-1 submunition dispenser, shown here being launched from a German Air Force Tornado, is designed to attack
enemy airfields of armour formations.
can be achieved through their destruction,
disruption or delay, depending on the
location and configuration of the particular
follow-on force formation. Perhaps more
than any other NATO operational con-
cept, the effort to target and destroy the
enemy's follow-on forces requires joint
planning involving all services to achieve
the common objective. In addition,
developing the capability to stop an attack
as far forward as possible, while simultane-
ously engaging enemy forces in depth, will
require the careful exploitation of the
West's technological superiority in order
to provide the architecture necessary for
striking deep.
The ingredients of such an architecture
are:
- Real-time surveillance, target acquisi-
tion and intelligence means which are su i-
cientl precise to enable us to aunc
aitac sk a ainsc the most vu neible e l e -
m e n t s o t h e Warsaw Pact reinforcement
tow an to -assess the success o our
attacks.
- A survivable, responsive command,
control and communications system which
can transmit intelligence information and
attack decisions in a timely fashion.
- Conventional weapons systems for
attack operations which can accurately and
decisively engage targets well to the rear of
the FEBA.
Although NATO nations currently con-
tribute to each of these ingredients, we
need to improve these resources on a con-
tinuing basis.
Pace Mover radar and data link (above), seen here mounted in the bomb bay of an F-111E, is an
essential reconnaissance prerequisite for the success of attacks on the second echelon forces.
An example of a weapons delivery system whose capacity will be greatly increased by improved
warheads is the MLRS (below), produced in the United States and co-produced by a European
consortium.
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P1NTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND
FUSION
Intensive intelligence preparation is
necessary to provide a framework for suc-
Criti-
cessiu attacks-on follow-on forces.
cs information, such as the location of
choke points where units are vulnerable to
attack, lines of communication and likely
enemy assembly areas, can be derived from
map and terrain analyses and from surveil-
lance of Warsaw Pact exercises. Fixed
targets, such as bridges, tunnels and
defiles, can be easily determined. Stored
and adjusted in a data base and made avail-
able to decision-makers in time to support
the envisioned attack on follow-on forces,
this information establishes a basis for the
assessment of further intelligence informa-
tion as it is received.
Durin periods of tension or conflict,
the rapid 'identification of Pact mobile
Forces, especially t e Operational , a-
neuver Groups and their associated com-
mand support, is essential.
urrenc y, much of this inter igence infor-
mation can only be obtained from sensor
systems with limited ranges. To implement
our concept successfully we must improve
our ability to look deeper and identify
rapidly the location and movement of the
Pact follow-on forces. In this regard, the
deployment of TR-i aircraft and utiliza-
tion of our multi-national NATO. Air-
borne Early Warning Force in its air sur-
veillance role have already greatly
enhanced our capabilities. The develop-
ment of the Pave Mover radar as the target
acquisition element of the U.S. Assault
Breaker program will provide a radar which,
while operating over friendly territory, will
be able to survey areas deep in the enemy's
rear, track the ground targets and direct in-
flight course corrections to the attack mis-
siles.
As an Alliance, we must coordinate our
many national intelligence efforts. Each
nation has an important contribution to
make in the intelligence field. The larger
nations have technologically sophisticated
collection means while many of the smaller
nations have
organizations
capabilities.
well-developed intelligence
with excellent analytical
The concept of attack on follow-on forces
rewires better intelligence fusion, i.e., the
timely coordinated co ection, conversion,
and melding of data inputs from different
sources into a usable product for decision
makers. We must make our intelligence col-
lection means more effective by better task-
ing of Alliance systems and by providing
the means for rapid transmission of critical
intelligence information to achieve faster
dissemination to decentralized users. To
assist in these endeavors, ACE is bringing
into theater the latest intelligence data pro-
cessing and display equipment which is
linked to the Intelligence sources. This
equipment provides the capability to
cycle which takes raw data, interprets it,
provides it to the decision-maker and dis-
seminates the essential information to the
appropriate weapons system must be accel-
erated if we are to engage mobile targets
effectively. Also, continuous assessment of
the effects of attacks on follow-on forces
during a conflict will be a key factor in
enabling NATO forces to maintain the
coherence of the defense.
This enhanced intelligence capability will
serve a significant role beyond actual
defense. Such a system which can identify
mobile targets during a conflict will also
provide a resource to detect better the build-
up of Warsaw Pact forces before an attack.
thus giving political authorities more time
to consider the key decisions needed to per-
mit our responding. The timely communi-
cation of our resolve to respond remains a
critical factor in
the deterrence of
any
attack.
Peacetime intelligence preparation for
deep interdiction and im
proved joint and
tom ine intelligence co
llection activities
are essential elements in anablin ACE to
target the enemas o ow-on forces. A sec-
ond prerequisite to success against these
forces is to shorten the time between target
acquisition and target attack. If we are to
have a major disruptive effect by impeding a
Warsaw Pact advance, we cannot be depen-
dent upon the transmission of information
to the decision-maker and then to the
appropriate weapons system by a C3 system
which is too vulnerable and time-consum-
ing.
The ACE concept requires that the alloca-
tion of combat assets to specific tasks be
made with great precision. With pressure
from attacking first echelon units on ACE
forces at the FEBA, the attention of deci-
sion-makers will be drawn to that initial
conflict. At the time when the battle at the
FEBA is in progress, the simultaneous dedi-
cation of resources to the attack on follow-
on forces is a delicate matter of judgment,
for both the battle at the FEBA and the deep
battle must succeed. The C3 structure must
be sufficiently robust to handle all of these
critical communications.
To meet the increased demands which
attacking the follow-on forces will place on
our C' structure, we must point our efforts
toward developing systems which can
facilitate joint operations, handle and dis-
criminate among a large volume of infor-
mation and withstand the stress of battle.
The attack on follow-on forces requires an
integrated effort of air and ground forces,
for in modern warfare the distinctions bet-
ween the Services are blurred. ACE has
joint command post elements in existence
today (army group/ATAF) which will
maraoe close air support for the land battle
as well as the deep interdiction attacks on
follow-on forces with an array of land and
air-delivered weapons.
With respect to the flow of intelligent:
we_must focus our of outs on ern ab a to
increased quantity Of In Orma-
manage an
tion. We must be ab a to sort out quickly
POSSIBLE SCENARIO
The form of the Warsaw Pea (including air form) attack
NATO corroentionaily. (l? O.NC's participate eadv in the tight.
seeking to penenate NATO defense, and .lure deep into
NATO's rrar after the first echelon makes contact tsth NATO
fours on the FEBA. The second echelon front is forming in the
rear.
(2)0 ' WC's are attempting to destroy NATO's CI ,tructure and
us nudear assets. NATO forces dmultaneously utilize AU sours,
of intetigence to produce a usable targett:ng picture of the War-
saw Pita rear area.
(J) T i?o battles are fought: :he battle at the FEBA and the attack
on falowon forces. Frontlue NATO units contain '.rar,aw Pact
first echelon foxes and blunt the d-ts of the O.NG's. The attack
on followon forces has dearoyed or delayed the second < beion
front, and that success has kept manageable the force ruws it the
FEBA.
(4) The cohnrnce of the NATO defense line o r,itored. S.med-
Lnce o(fallow-.n forces continues. Agonizing decisions for ti curt
action are 'aced by the 'Sanaw Pact. to withdraw or to be roe
nt to esMate to theater nuclear ?reacons.
analyze and collate data from the various
sensors with an extensive data base and to
display it for the targeting element and the
decision-maker. It also provides the means
to transmit critical data and intelligence pro-
ducts to the appropriate users in a concise
and usable format.
Developing the capability to identify and
target mobile elements in the Warsaw Pact
rear areas is one of the most significant
intelligence challenges of t is decade. The
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? .-
ti
the wheat from the chaff, the important
from the unimportant. A primary chal-
lenge will be to establish a mechanism for
the rapid selection and transmission of
only the key and essential elements of
information to the decision-makers; cur-
rent technology will let us meet this chal-
lenge. Our C' structure must possess the
capability to adjust rapidly to the actions
of a versatile adversary and to the changing
conditions of the battlefield. The cohesion
of our defense depends upon the surviva-
bility of our C. As we acquire advanced
data systems for C', we will need secure,
anti-jam, advanced data communication
for the tactical forces and for linking ACE
communication nets to those forces.
The satellite-based NAVSTAR Global
Positioning System, with its very precise
position location and navigation support
capabilities, will provide the long-sought
common grid system for targeting enemy
forces, positioning our forces and for such
requirements as artillery surveying. It will
also greatly improve our capability to pin-
point enemy forces and targets in relation
to our weapons. This system, along with
our satellite communications systems,
exemplifies the use of space age technology
to support tactical operations.
ATTACK CAPABILITIES
The final set of requirements needed to
implement the concept of attacking follow-
on forces pertains to the weapons delivery
systems and munitions necessary to engage
those forces decisively before they can be
brought forward to join the battle. While
some conventional weapons systems which
are well adapted for follow-on forces
attack exist now in national inventories, it
will be necessary to dedicate additional
effort and resources in order to develop the
full range of assets needed to ensure suc-
cessful implementation of the concept.
The major systems available today for
deep conventional operations are manned
aircraft. Since tyre early 1970's the NATO
interdiction mission has been shared by
U.S. F-111's and U.K. Buccaneers. The
Tornado conversion program currently in
progress will not only provide additional
aircraft for this mission but will also
enhance our ability to perform under night
and adverse weather conditions.
As we expand our capabilities to strike
deep, we must achieve the most effective
match of delivery systems, munitions, and
targets. New munitions being developed
today offer great promise in making air
sorties more effective. Among the most
promising technological improvements are
munitions containing large numbers of
sub-munitions which can cover wide areas,
either to attack large formations or to deny
the area for use by Pact forces. Area denial
weapons will improve ACE's ability to
engage mobile follow-on forces. By creat-
ing barriers at fixed points, we can halt or
delay the mobile Warsaw Pact units, mak-
ing them targets which would be lucrative
even for general purpose bombs. Several
nations have development programs
underway with possible candidates to
satisfy this need. The Federal Republic of
Germany's MW-1 submunition dispenser
is designed to attack enemy airfields or
armor formations. The United States Wide
Area Anti-armor Munitions (WAAM)
program will eventually provide a similar
capability.
The ability to strike deeply against War-
saw Pact air bases is a key element in the
conventional attack on follow-on forces,
for such strikes would not only reduce
Pact air support at the FEBA, but would
also reduce the number of Pact sorties
which could be directed against NATO's
C' structure and other facilities. The
United Kingdom is developing the JP-233
runway denial weapon for this purpose,
and the United States Air Force has
announced its intention to buy the French-
made Matra Durandal runway-catering
munition. The U.S. Counterair 90 concept
for air base attack, if pursued, will add sig-
nificantly to the destruction of Pact air
bases.
However, we must not rely solely on
manned aircraft for deep strikes. The
deeper an aircraft penetrates, the greater its
exposure to enemy air defense. For this
reason, NATO nations are developing
long-range, conventional stand-off missiles
which can be air-or surface-launched. As
in the case of manned aircraft, munitions
are being developed for missile delivery
systems already fielded. The Lance missile,
deployed by several NATO nations, can
be fitted with improved conventional war-
heads. In the United States, a longer-
range, more accurate Lance missile is pres-
ently being considered as a candidate for
the Assault Breaker program, one of the
most important efforts in the development
of a technological capability to attack fol-
low-on forces. This joint United States
Army/United States Air Force project is
developing ways to attack and destroy
large Pact armored formations deep in
their own rear area. Work is proceeding in
developing very accurate precision-guided
missiles with warheads filled with termi-
nally-guided anti-armor submunitions.
Another example of a weapons delivery
system whose capability will be greatly
increased by improved warheads is the
Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
Under an agreement reached in 1979
among the United Kingdom, France, West
Germany and the United States, and sub-
sequently joined by Italy, the MLRS will
be produced in the United States and co-
produced by a consortium of companies
from the European nations. This weapon
will. be invaluable for the close-in battle at
and just beyond the FEBA. With a termi-
nally guided warhead the MLRS will
acquire a far more potent anti-armor and
precision attack capability.
We must also supress Warsaw Pact air
defenses with electronic counter measures.
Presently, the U.S. EF-111 and F-4G are
the workhorses in this effort. As we expect
the Warsaw Pact air defense to be intense,
we must now use current technology to
develop an anti-radiation warhead which
can penetrate the Pact's air defenses.
All of ACE's defensive means must be
carefully integrated co achieve appropriate
effectiveness. Fixed targets, such as
bridges, railway yards, or power stations,
can be programmed in advance for destruc-
tion by conventional guided missiles. As
these weapons succeed in creating barriers
which then cause mobile units to stack up,
other means of delivery, to include man-
ned aircraft, can engage these targets of
opportunity. These flexible means of deliv-
ery can also be redirected laterally into sec-
tors where a breakthrough is threatened or
into the path of a penetrating 0114G. The
overall effect of being able to mass fires at
long ranges will be to give our conven-
tional defense greater stability.
ENHANCING
DETERRENCE AND
DEFENCE
The concept of attacking Warsaw Pact
follow-on forces provides NATO a
reasonable prospect of being able to carry
out its strategy of Flexible Response in the
manner intended by its authors. At the
present time, primarily as a result of our
lack of sustainment (manning, ammuni-
tion, replacements for materiel losses), the
forces of ACE could nos conduct an effec-
tive direct defense against a Pact conven-
tional attack without having to resort fairly
quickly co an escalation of the conflict. We
must and can strengthen our conventional
forces so they are not a de facto trip wire
for nuclear escalation. An essential element
- but not the only one - for raising the
nuclear threshold is the ability to attack
successfully the Pact follow-on forces.
But, we must also improve our readiness
and sustainability so that our forces on the
FEBA can hold the leading attack echelon.
In addition, we must exploit our technol-
ogy for electronic warfare so that we can
attack the Pact forces in the medium of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
By combining the capability to blunt the
leading echelon with an ability to delay,
disrupt and ultimately prevent the advance
of the follow-on echelons, we can reduce
the possibility of a Pact attack by establish-
ing the credible prospect that our conven-
tional defense will succeed. Then, both our
deterrent and defensive posture will be
enhanced and the nuclear threshold raised.
Thus, improved conventional defense
helps to strengthen deterrence across the
entire spectrum of possible conflict. Under
chose conditions, we will have taken great
strides toward achieving our ultimate goal
of preserving a long-lasting peace with our
freedom intact, for this kind of resolute
deterrence can provide the Soviet Union
with added incentives to negotiate seri-
ously for balanced arms reductions and
verifiable controls which offer the best
hope for the future all of us seek.
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