THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR GRENADA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000601010027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/21: CIA-RDP85M00364R000601010027-8
DCI Talking Points
The Short-term Outlook for Grenada
Current Situation
With the military situation essentially under control and a
prevailing mood of cautious calm, Governor General Sir Paul
Scoon--in coordination with US Embassy and Caribbean leaders--is
attempting to restore stability and normalcy to Grenada.
--Schools and businesses are opening and commercial life is
returning to normal.
Telecommunications service is expected to be completely
restored by Friday.
St. Georges harbor should re-open today and the regional
airlines reportedly may restore flights to Grenada as
early as tomorrow.
Reporting from various sources--including observations by US
military, intelligence, and diplomatic officials--indicates that
Grenadian civilians generally have displayed an attitude of
friendly and cooperative acceptance of US forces.
-- Although there have been no reports of hostile actions
by Grenadians, an air of caution due to the trauma of
recent events is present.
US forces say that civilians continue to report on
activities of People's Revolutionary Army (PRA)
deserters, and residents have brought in abandoned
Grenadian weapons.
According to a US AID official who visited Grenada over
the weekend, representatives of the Grenadian commerical
sector'were unanimous in their support of American
action.
Preparations are underway to form an interim government in
Grenada and establish a regional peace keeping force to replace
US forces.
Scoon has reestablished the Grenadian constitution,
which was suspended after the 1979 coup by Maurice
Bishop.
The Governor General announced that he is forming a
nonpolitical interim administration to prepare for
general elections within six months.
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Political maneuvering among the Grenadian opposition--
consisting of recently released political detainees and exiles
and expatriates--has begun in preparation for the elections.
-- Members of the Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM)--who in
the past have called for the peaceful restoration of
democracy in Grenada--appear to be the main contenders
for power, but other individuals and groups may well
emerge.
It is unclear what, if any, role supporters of the New Jewel
Movement and People's Revolutionary Government will play in an
elected government.
-- Although former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, his
key radical cohorts and the Revolutionary Military
Council leaders may be imprisoned, they could--through
underground supporters--pose a potential long-term
threat.
Caribbean leftist leaders reportedly have been in touch
with a number of Bishop-appointed diplomats stationed
overseas in an effort to salvage the New Jewel Movement
and gain recognition for these diplomats as the
legitimate representatives of Grenada.
These NJM supporters will continue to lobby
internationally against recognition of the new
government.
The whereabouts of some pro-Bishop former government
members is unknown. Some may seek to participate in
elections if they are able to draw on Bishop's popular
support and establish a power base. They may try to
join with Grenadian diplomats abroad to reactivate the
party.
Security Situation
The near-term threat of organized guerrilla operations on
Grenada is minimal once U.S. forces complete mopping up on the
islands.
-- Grenada is too small for guerrilla bands to establish
secure bases, and resupply by Cuba or another foreign
patron would be difficult.
Nonetheless, U.S. forces must remain for the time being to
deter banditry and terrorist assassinations, sniping, and
bombings by Cubans and die-hard Grenadian ex-soldiers.
-- Although we are aware that the loyalty of the military
to the government was uncertain, their resistance to US
forces indicates that at least some may attempt to
foment opposition.
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Caches of arms and demolitions continue to be
discovered, and the situation encourages crimes and
settling of personal scores disquised as political acts.
The existing 300-man Caribbean forces drawn from six
neighboring states must be reinforced or replaced by a
larger force--probably from the Commonwealth nations--
before the U.S. can confidently withdraw.
Longer-term prospects are that a viable insurgency is
improbable but not impossible on Grenada.
An externally-based group, or one carefully established
in the island's populated areas, could exploit
inevitable political and economic grievances and gain
sufficient popular support to survive and expand even on
tiny Grenada.
A coup would seem more likely than a guerrilla campaign.
Economic Challenges
The most immediate economic challenges facing the new
government are the restoration of basic services and supplies,
and reconstruction activities.
US AID is working with local agencies to restore and
maintain water, cable, sanitation, and radio services.
Texaco will soon ship cooking fuel and diesel oil from
Trinidad. Food and medical supplies, according to AID,
apparently are adequate for one to two weeks
consumption.
The government will need to repair damage to roads,
water and electrical systems, and housing mainly caused
by neglect during the Bishop regime and to some degree
by the fighting. Moreover, because several hotels are
located in the Grand Anse area--the scene of heavy
military action--we suspect that the government will be
faced with the task of repairing some of these
buildings.
Grenada will obviously need external financial assistance to
accomplish these goals, and both the new government and the
private sector are likely to turn to the US. In the worse case,
Grenada might need up to $40 million through 1984 in official aid
and trade credits to keep imports at the $70 million and overcome
expected declines in tourism revenues and other capital inflows.
Cuban Intentions
Castro can be expected to offer Cuba as a haven for
Grenadian exile groups in order to try to promote their unity and
influence their actions.
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His willingness to continue to make Grenada a major
focus of Cuba's foreign policy probably will be heavly
influenced by his assessment of the reaction of the
Grenadian people to the US intervention.
If Castro's current anti-US propaganda campaign strikes a
resonant chord internationally, he may be tempted to risk Cuban-
sponsored terrorism against US installations abroad.
Castro is clearly seething over the support of some
governments in English-speaking Caribbean for the US invasion,
and he will be looking for ways to retaliate against Prime
Ministers Seaga, Charles, and Adams.
Likely steps include denigrating them in the Third World
and trying to isolate them in international
organizations where Cuba has influence.
Q w~
We do not rule,the possibility of Cuban-inspired
assasination attempts aginst one of these leaders,
especially if Castro were convinced that Cuban
deniability could be maintained.
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