STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET POWER PROJECTION ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000600970013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET
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Strategic Significance of Soviet
Power Projection Activities
2. In the Near East and South Asia, the Soviets currently
can politically rely on use of facilities in Afghanistan, Syria,
*The word "facilities" is used in this paper instead of "bases"
to denote the tenuous nature of most Soviet overseas staging
points. With the exception of Soviet Army barracks in Cuba, and
possibly in Syria, Soviet facilities overseas are not comparable
with the well-developed network of bases used by US forces.
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1. Throughout the last decade the Soviets have pursued a
policy of expanding and strengthening their global reach and
influence, including greater use of support facilities overseas,
more frequent naval and air presence at longer ranges, and the
pursuit of increased operational experience in distant areas.*
This expansion has been complemented by Soviet surrogate force
deployments and military aid to client states and to
revolutionary movements in politically unstable areas. While the
principal theaters of Soviet focus appear to be in the Middle
East and the Mediterranean, Soviet reach extends westward via
Cuba, where they maintain a permanent brigade base, to the
Central American mainland. It also stretches southward along
both the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean coasts of Africa.
Facilities on the Arabian Peninsula and islands of the Indian
Ocean provide sustenance on an aperiodic basis to Soviet naval
and air units
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the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and Ethiopia.
There is a possibility that they may also gain access to air and
maritime facilities in Libya. In the case of Syria they have
direct control of air defense systems, including SA-5 surface-to-
air missiles, which provide them a capability against hostile
aircraft over Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, part of Turkey, and the
Eastern Mediterranean. Strategically, this situation means the
Soviets can control the southern entrance to the Red Sea from the
PDRY and Ethiopia, and at least contest US air and naval presence
in the Eastern Mediterranean from facilities in that area. They
are not currently in a position to completely control the Straits
of Hormuz, but they could launch strikes in the area using long
range aircraft from the Soviet Union.
:3. In the Pacific, where the Soviets maintain their largest
fleet, their interest in overseas support development centers on
Vietnam, particularly the facilities at Cam Rahn and the airfield
at Da Nang. Soviet sponsorship of the Hanoi regime affords at
once a modicum of encirclement of China and a vantage point from
which operations could be undertaken along the vital
intccrnational sea lanes stretching across the Indian Ocean,
northward via the South China Sea to Japan.
4. The leverage which the Soviets realize from these as yet
modest deployments is highly significant. From a military point
of view they have acquired a number of actual and potential
staging points from which intelligence and logistical missions
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can be regularly mounted, and they have laid the foundations upon
which, with additional investment, regional offensive strike
capabilities could be built. Soviet long-range aircraft often
reconnoiter Atlantic waters from the Barents Sea to the Caribbean
and southward to Luanda, Angola. East of Africa, Soviet
transport flights stretching southward across the Arabian Sea to
the Seychelles and Mozambique are possible precursors of new
military operational routes. Of particular concern in this
developing network is the growing Soviet potential for
interfering with established air and sea lanes which US and NATO
Allies have heretofore used with impunity. Facilities in Cuba
stand immediately adjacent to US force reinforcement lanes
ler:ding from the Gulf of Mexico to Europe and international trade
routes transiting the Panama Canal. African facilities from
which the Soviets might stage are well within bomber and naval
unit striking range of shipping channels rounding the Cape of
Good Hope. Further to the east, Cam Rahn Bay is less than 900
miles from the vital strait of Malacca, easily reached by long
range air, surface or sub-surface forces. While the facilities
are modest at many of the sites, and Soviet naval or air units
are continuously present at only a few of them, these outposts
could be rapidly reinforced from the Soviet Union with sufficient
force to mount hostile operations against Western interests for a
limited period of time. No less important, and possibly more
pressing is the fact that nearly every plan for long-distance
movement of US equipment or forces must now consider rerouting
delays or the accompaniment of escorting units in periods of
crisis because of these widespread Soviet combatant forces.
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5. There are also more subtle advantages realized by the
Soviets by the magnitude and visibility of their efforts. Many
Soviet client states selected for substantial support enjoy a
measure of regional prominence from their association with a
superpower. Soviet support, usually manifested in arms
deliveries, reinforces the often swaggering confidence of some
politically radical states, particularly in their early stages of
development. This tends to encourage aggressiveness, intimidate
more moderate neighbors and create an atmosphere of crisis and
impending revolutionary change. Soviet diplomacy and covert
actions are well designed to exploit opportunities born of such
circumstances. In some cases the Soviets realize substantial
economic benefit for their efforts, primarily through sales of
arms and related goods which constitute their second largest
source of hard currency.
6. Looking ahead, there are a number of other expansive and
exploitative actions which the Soviets could take, detrimental to
Western interests, building upon their recent activity. First,
we inrr;t consider the further physical development of the
fa;;ilities (extension of runways, construction of wharfage,
additional fuel and munitions storage, etc.). They may also
choose to preposition certain war materiel for their own or
client use. Second, the Soviets probably wish to further secure
and, liberalize their landing rights and naval privileges through
more broadly drawn treaties and unde'rstand irigs with the host
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governments. Third, they could begin to experiment with the
deployment of more capable aircraft, ships and submarines,
perhaps accompanied by air defense systems and support
personnel. Fourth, we might see more frequent joint exercises
between the Soviets and the forces of the host governments,
perhaps with greater emphasis upon assumption by the host forces
of a number of the functions previously performed by the Soviets.
7. In the longer time frame, the Soviets may be tempted to
permanently station forces, perhaps equipped with surface-to-
surface and long range surface-to-air missiles at these outposts
to provide a standing threat to selected areas and traffic choke
points. Whether permanently stationed or rapidly deployed,
Soviet forces could pose a significant problem to US contingency
force deployments, especially in view of the likelihood of time
as a critical factor to ensure arrival of the force in the
threatened theater before a deteriorating situation assumed
irreversible proportions. Such circumstances might pertain if
forces of the US Central Command were to be ordered to the
Persian Gulf region in response to movements of hostile forces
into Iran, toward the Straits of Hormuz, or via Iraq toward the
Arabian Peninsula. While it is unlikely in this century that the
Soviets would be able to develop a capability for sustained
hostilities with the United States at great distance from their
hor,ieland, they may reckon that the time to be gained by delay of
US reinforcements through sharp, interdictive action would be
well worth the sacrifice of their relatively small numbers of
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forward deployed forces. US strategy in all principal theaters
is heavily dependent upon rapid reinforcement from the Western
Hemisphere, and any time lost by hostile interdiction and a
necessity to fight the way through may be critical to success.
8. In sum, while their efforts are by no means comparable
to US forward basing patterns, the Soviets do appear to be
steadily increasing their ability to delay US reinforcement of
critical theaters around the Eurasian landmass in time of
crisis. In addition, they have developed a network of widespread
outposts and areas which support their avowed goal of world
revolution. While some of the posts are of greater importance
and utility than others, in their entirety they constitute a
major challenge to planners charged with ensuring Western
security.
N1.o/i.,1I:
21 March 1.983
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