CRITICAL COUNTRIES AND THE PIWG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000500800002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 21, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
December 21, 1980
DAVID NEWSOM, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT
FRANK CARLUCCI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Critical. Countries and the PIWG . (C)
I derive great satisfaction from thinking over the work
accomplished by the Political Intelligence Working Group,
and am pleased. to hear that it will continue on, in. the next
administration. -: -I believe that the approach we took to the
difficult problems vie dealt with was the correct one. We
remained small, private, informal, non-bureaucratic, and
effective... (.C)
The contributions you both made, always in an atmosphere of
frankness and professionalism, did much to move us forward
in some: intractable:--areas. (C)
It was a pleasure 'working with you on the PIWG_ Dr. Brzezinski
joins me in expressing thanks for all that you have done.
(U)
S4 I r Tr.~..~vrw"v/r xrmw~t ~'r
CONFIDENTIAL
Review on December 17, 1986
David Aaron
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
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Documents forwarded to Roy Godson for Mr. Casey:
12/30/80 Two copies of: E.O. 12036, Implementing Procedures for 12036,
E.O. 11905, and P.L. 96-450
1/5/81 Ltr dtd 5 January w/enclosures: NFAC 0.13-81 (Critical Issues),
Transftion Issue Paper "The.CZA Executive Committee.(.EXCOM) and
Other Internal Management Devices," and Long-Range Planning
papers on Third World, Our Traditional Allies, and China and
Sino-Soyi'et Relations, FOIA and Privacy Act, and Communications
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CELN 1 nAL ILN I CLL IIsl r %..C ALtLVI.I I
29 December 1980
NOTE FOR: Roy Godson
FROM SA/DDCI
SUBJECT : Request for Documents.
Attached, in response to your request
this morning, are two, copies of Publi,c.Law
9.6-450, E.O. 12036, Implementing Procedures
for E.O. - 120.36, and E.O.- 11905.
You will note that the classified
implementing procedures have been
separated from the rest of the package,
which is unclassified.
Please sign and return the attached
document. receipt,
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5 January 1981
Mr. William J. Casey
Office of the President-Elect
Washington, D.C. 20270
Dear Bill:
This is in response to your December 29 letter to me. Thank you for the
kind words about your meeting with Bruce Clarke and Dick Lehman. 25X1
I' have met with John Bross and Ed Hennelly and asked Bruce and the Senior
Review Panel to provide whatever support and information is necessary for them
to complete the assignment you gave them. (U)
of my personal staff is working closely with Roy Godson to 75X1
are also providing all necessary clearances and support for Lionel Olmer. 25X1
I am pleased that you found the final report of the Transition Team useful.
We tried our best ly supportive to them within legal, executive, and
security bounds. 25X1
Concerning your list of additional items that would be useful to you, I
have the following comments.:
(1) Enclosed is a- briefing paper listing-key intelligence issues
which are likely to require attention in the first 90 days of the new
Administration (Tab A). This, of course, is a preliminary and brief list.
The DCI. and I can talk to you about each in more depth. In addition,
we can arrange special briefings on any of the listed subjects before
20 January. After 20 January, I suggest you schedule early in-depth
briefings on each issue.'
(2) I am enclosing (Tab C) a few of the more valuable long-range
planning papers that I mentioned to you. They include foreign policy
issue papers on The Third World, Our Traditional Allies, and China and
Sino-Soviet Relations, and the key management problems of Communications
and FOIA and the Privacy Act. I will send two lengthier but important
long-range papers to you later on Intelligence Collection and Covert
Action.
assure he also is fully supported by all appropriate CIA ottices, parzicuiarty
the Legislative Counsel, to help you prepare for the confirmation hearings. We
DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL
WHEN SEPARATE FROM
ENCLOSURES
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W. Z. -L.3 '~:a 3
(3) In answer to your question on briefings that Congress may
expect from the DCI, briefly, we expect none before 20 January. After
the inauguration, we expect a heavy briefing load, including the annual
worldwide wrap-up by the DCI or his representatives and numerous briefings
of various committees and individual members on current issues such as
Central America, Afghanistan, Poland, Iran-Iraq, Southeast Asia, covert
action activities, world energy supplies, and the Soviet grain embargo.
As appropriate, I will also provide briefing papers on various subjects
that may help you focus on other major problem areas or help you understand
how the system works. One such paper, on the CIA Execu Committee and
Other Internal Management Devices, is enclosed (Tab B). eve ~o~
Enclosures:
As stated
Sincerely,
`Frank C. Carlucci
Acting Director
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
NFAC #013-81
2 January 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI-designate
SUBJECT : Critical Issues Likely to Face the New Administration
During Its Initial Weeks
ThA memotandum had boon d ec tLond . Section A dea 6 with
dome genetat eon Lde&a ,iovia, i..ncZuding the que,4 i.on ob "tezti.ng"
the new Adm.Liv 4tnatt.on. Section B d.idcu, 4ed 6pec Jii. dhont-
tetm ctitica.2 .L44aed. Section C .tAeat6 v-Leiua ob boteLgn LnteZ-
#igence benv..cee, and Section D US Lnte.P.P genee and watnLng
eapabAVLLe o in broad tetuna. A d epana to memorandum &%om the
Cottec do n Tad h i.ng Stab b dea2a with they a in mote detait.
A. In General:
1. Numerous critical international issues will almost certainly re-
quire NSC or Presidential attention during the initial weeks of the new
Administration. Except as outlined below, however, most of them would
arise whether or not there were a new Administration in Washington.
2. It is the unanimous judgment of the NIC, NFAC, and the Intel-
ligence Community representatives that the USSR will not deliberately
confront the new Administration -- at least during its earliest weeks --
with some dramatic test or aggressive military move, although as noted
below it may move for other reasons in Poland. The past practice of the
USSR at the outset of new US Administrations has been to preserve its own
equities, to await US initiatives, and then to test the US at a later
time -- depending on how the initial period has affected Soviet estimates
of the new Administration. Meanwhile, the Soviets will of course be
"testing" the new Administration in numerous non-crisis ways. Of par-
ticular note in these respects will be Soviet efforts to seek to clarify
US intentions with respect to arms control, European security, and the
grain embargo; and US determination with respect to Iran-Iraq-Gulf
questions.
3. More generally, the primary interest of the USSR and most other
governments during January-March will be to assess the new Administration
on issues of prime importance to them. They will generally exercise care
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not to foreclose options and opportunities -- at least until they have
taken the measure of the new Administration and determined the degree to
which its policies appear likely to accord with their particular interests.
4. Of the countless issues which will be pressing for NSC and Presi-
dential attention, this memorandum concentrates on those likely to confront
the Administration's policymakers from the outset or within a very few weeks.
These specific issues are discussed below, in Paragraphs 6-21. There are,
of course, many other prime issues which are and will be on-going in their
character and demands on decisionmaking.
5. Such problems -- insistent but not necessarily posing critical
choices between January-March -- include the US' overall approach to:
(a) The USSR and arms control;
(b) The many cracks in US-Western European relation-
ships, and the problems of strengthening NATO's cohesion
and capabilities;
(c) Economic summitry, including the North-South mini-
Summit to which Mexico and Canada will soon be inviting the
US;
(d) The deteriorating stability and economic status of
key LDC's;
(e) US military and economic problems with respect to
Japan;
(f) China and its role in US strategic thinking and
balancing;
(g) Nuclear proliferation; and,
(h) Arms transfers.
B. Specific Critical Issues likely to arise which may demand
NSC-Presidential decisionmaking, January-March.
6. The hostages in Iran.* The behavior of the Iranians will continue
to be a wild card. The passions, pride, and domestic factionalism affecting
the Iranians, added to the pressures and vicissitudes of the war with Iraq,
and -- behind the braggadocio -- a great fear of extreme US action of some
kind, will almost certainly continue to produce rapid twists and turns on
the Iranian side. Unless the hostage question has been settled by 20 January,
*y(. e envs.i Live, complex izzue L being tAeated in depth by CIA in a d pec La e
.a.tudy being tead.ied bon you and the new AdnLriL6t&at-Lon.
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the new US Administration could be faced by any of a spectrum of actions,
ranging from sudden reasonableness to severe steps such as trying hostages
for espionage or physically harming them.
7. The Iran-Iraq war. A number of critical issues could suddenly
arise from his nnow-stalemated contest. If the Iranians come to feel that
they are up against the wall, they might strike out at non-Iraqi targets
across the Gulf, attempt to mine portions of the Gulf, or take other des-
perate actions which might enlarge or greatly complicate the war. War
weariness in Iraq may lead to the assassination of Saddam Hussein or to a
coup against him. Within Iran, such stability as exists could suddenly
give way through assassinations or coup attempts, with consequent tempta-
tion for the USSR rapidly to exploit the situation.*
8. The possibility of an oil crisis brought on by extreme Iranian
action. Oil market prospects are highly uncertain because of the Iran-
Iraq war. The two countries recently have been exporting enough oil, given
high stock levels, to keep the market fairly stable. But key export facil-
ities are extremely vulnerable to military action. Iran with its back to
the wall could stop all oil shipments out of the Persian Gulf. If oil
exports fall, or stocks are reduced to the point that panic buying begins,
prices would easily reach $50 a barrel by spring. In the extreme case,
severe world-wide shortages would develop.
9. Poland. While the Soviets have apparently been persuaded to give
the Kania regime time to begin getting its house in order, the Poles are
still living on borrowed time. The Soviets remain militarily prepared to
intervene on short notice -- and with little warning. The internal situ-
ation in Poland has not been at fever pitch for nearly a month and, in the
absence of a serious provocation by Solidarity (and further concessions by
Kania), we do not expect a Soviet military move into Poland. The situation
in the country remains very unstable, though, and any combination of events --
food riots, new strikes, interference with lines of communication, further
disintegration of party control or unity, etc. -- could trigger coercive
measures and major crisis. A formal Special National Intelligence Estimate
on Poland is in preparation and should be out by late January. In the
meantime, definitive US intelligence on Soviet and Eastern European military
moves will continue to be constrained by cloudy weather conditions.
10. Allied Responses re Poland. Should Soviet/Warsaw Pact interven-
tion in Poland occur, one of the chief challenges facing the US would be
that of coordinating US actions with the responses of the Allies. So far
they have generally shared US views on the Polish question, but a Soviet
invasion of Poland would almost certainly evoke wide differences of view
among the Western Europeans on specific means of responding to the Soviet
intervention, and in some instances perhaps strong disinclination to follow
US leads.
*Soviet optiorLo I & t.Lve .to Loan and I/ca.q arse examined in Spec.La.2 Na i.onae
InteLUgence Ebt mate 11-34/36.2-80, 24 DecembeA 80.
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11. Afghanistan. The Soviets continue to face a prolonged and dif-
ficult military operation in Afghanistan. The level of insurgency appears
to be on the increase again, and the Soviets may be hard pressed to main-
tain their existing control over the major population centers and lines
of communications. While we do not expect a major Soviet troop increase
in the next few months, pressures to alleviate the military situation are
likely to intensify. Renewed cross border strikes by Soviet or Afghan
aircraft against guerrilla sanctuaries could occur, possibly leading to
Pakistani appeals to the new Administration for material and/or political
support.
12. The PRC's Deng Xiaoping will be seeking to clarify US intentions
toward Beijing and Taipei. And, because of the delicate and complicated
realignments he is attempting to orchestrate at this moment within
China, Deng will be extremely sensitive to developments in US policy toward
China within the US such as, for example, US arms sales to Taiwan.
13. ROK President Chun Doo-hwan will continue to seek to determine
whether the new US Administration is as concerned as was its predecessor
over human rights issues in South Korea -- including the possible execution
of opposition leader Kim Tae-chung -- and how this relates to Washington's
concern for the ROK's security. It cannot be excluded that Chun will
nonetheless suddenly execute Kim, and confront the new US Administration
with a question of response.
14. In El Salvador both the extreme left and the extreme right will
almost certainly step up their efforts to depose the present center-right
government and to increase their leverage by the time the new US Admini-
stration takes office, if not sooner. There is a good chance that the
extreme left will receive sharply increased international support from Cuba
and Nicaragua and will be in a much stronger position to challenge the
military.
15. Horn of Africa/Ogaden. The tide is beginning to turn more
clearly there in Ethiopia's favor, and against Somali President Siad.
His domestic position may weaken greatly because he has not been able to
gain more forthcoming US assistance, and elements of the Somali officer
corps may try to move against him. Thus, the new US Administration
might well be faced with a sudden threat to US military access rights in
Somalia.
16. Libya under Qaddhafi remains a major international trouble-maker.
Qaddhafi may follow his success in Chad with new initiatives against
Tunisia, Sudan, or any of several West African states. Of more immediate
importance, a Libyan attack on a US reconnaissance aircraft over the
Mediterranean might occur at any time.
17. Namibia.* There is a good chance that the Geneva Conference
on Namibia which convenes 7 January) may collapse, with a subsequent
expansion of guerrilla war in Namibia, a possible African-backed call
for UN sanctions against South Africa, and a further complicating of US
policy options.
*See NFAC Memon.a.ndum, "Namibia: Sta tu4 o J the S e tttement Pnoce4.6, " o6
30 December 1980..-
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18. In Israel, a vote of no confidence against the government, or
the sudden death of Prime Minister Begin (who is in poor health) could
quickly lead to significant changes in the Israeli negotiating stance
toward Camp David questions; possibly to new diplomatic initiatives by
Israel, Egypt or (perhaps) the USSR; and to a need for the US.to shift
diplomatic gears rapidly.
19. A major crisis could abruptly reappear among Israel, Syria, and
Jordan occasioned by events in Lebanon, including that of dramatic Israel
military action there. Such a crisis could have serious implications for
peace efforts re Israel-Syria, Syria-Jordan hostilities, US decision-
making with respect to the Palestinian question, Syrian-Iraqi relations,
or the possible further complicating of the Iran-Iraq war.
20. Major crisis could return in the Indochina area occasioned by
sustained, large-scale Vietnamese strikes against Democratic Kampuchean
sanctuaries in Thailand, undertaken in an effort to bring Kampuchea under
more effective military control. The significance for US decisionmaking
would likely transcend Vietnamese-Thai hostilities: the principal compli-
cation would be Chinese re-invasion of Vietnam -- with accompanying
great pressures on the Soviets to defend their interests in Vietnam.
21. Possible disruptive Cuban initiatives. Castro's initial overall
stance will probably be essentially defensive except in El Salvador. But
he might choose to undertake sudden initiatives such as close security ties
to the USSR, greatly increasing Cuban assistance to the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua, reviving the refugee exodus, or making threatening sounds
with respect to Guantanamo.
D. US Intelligence Capabilities
23=. US intelligence capabilities are best when hard evidence is avail-
able and where our resources are concentrated most heavily. Technical in-
telligence is relatively unambiguous; human source data (clandestine or
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overt) is often subject to differing interpretations. Imagery provides
voluminous and relatively clear-cut evidence on military capabilities
and some economic topics. Communications intelligence may be either very
hard or extremely ambiguous; it generally is more clear-cut on military
and economic topics than political ones. Overt sources normally can be
trusted more on economic and biographic topics than political'and mili-
tary ones, although that varies widely with the political makeup of the
country in question.
24. Generally speaking, clandestine source data creates the most dif-
ficult problems of interpretation. Some is documentary and very solid.
Much is ambiguous or contradictory, and almost all must be considered as
possible disinformation. The Community is seldom willing to accept clan-
destinely acquired information on critical topics unless some confirmation
is available from technical sources.
25. As a result, we continue to be strongest on military capabilities
of major powers, good on many key economic questions, and least confident
when trying to predict short-term decisions of political leaders, especially
in closed societies. We can provide good general warning of major develop-
ments in the world and good detailed support to crisis management on most
subjects in most places. But there will doubtless continue to be occasions
when intelligence cannot predict the timing of a new crisis. We can usually
warn that conditions are right in Country X for a coup, but predictions of
a particular coup, assassination, or terrorist act in the unstable arena of
world politics are largely a function of intelligence access to the secret
deliberations of a small group of actors, which we often may not get.
26. Most of our collection and analytic problems are not susceptible
to quick fixes. They depend on additional resources, better cover, more
intensive training, and developing solutions to technical problems. These
involve significant lead times.
All portions of this memo
are classified SECRET
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SUBJECT: Critical Issues Likely to Face the New Administration During
Its Initial Weeks (NFAC 013-81)
C/NIC:RL:lm (2 Jan 81.)
Distribution:
1\ DCI-designate
ER
- DD/NFA I
1 - Acting DD/NFAC
1 - AS/NFAC
1-
- Each NIO
- D/OSR
- D/OER
- D/OSWR
- D/OGSR
- D/OPA
- C/NIC Chrono
- Transition File
- NFAC Registry
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 iIVILIIOAL UJL V11LI
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5 January 1981
TRANSITION ISSUE PAPER
SUBJECT The CIA Executive Committee (EXCOM) and Other Internal Manage-
ment Devices
BACKGROUND: During the early 1980s incoming DCIs and DDCIs soon realized
that the Agency consisted of four isolated Directorates, some-
times referred to as "individual fiefdoms." As more and more
policy and management issues began to transcend Directorate
and functional boundaries, the need for a more collegial manage-
ment approach was perceived. The Management Committee, consisting
of the line Deputies and eventually chaired by one of them, was
an early attempt in this direction. This was succeeded in 1976
by the Executive Advisory Group (EAG) with an Executive charter
to run the Agency on a day-to-day basis and a general charge
from the new DCI to "bring CIA together." The EAG made some
headway in creating a constructive problem-solving environment
for senior Agency managers although it was not used as a major
policy decision tool nor did it manage daily business.
In early 1979, the current DCI and DDCI decided to improve and
revitalize the Agency's top policymaking/decision system. EAG
was transformed into the Agency Executive Committee (EXCOM),
chaired by the DCI/DDCI, and charged not just as an advisory
group but with decisionmaking powers on top Agency-wide policy
issues. Its objectives are to facilitate a shared understanding
among top Agency executives of major policy issues and encourage
Agency-wide solutions; assist the DCI and DDCI in establishing
policies affecting the Agency's mission and functions and its
relationship to the Intelligence Community and the rest of
Government; act as the Agency's long-range planning mechanism
for major, long-term interdirectorate activities; review proposals
for new major Agency programs and significant changes to existing
programs, provide guidance on priority clandestine collection
projects, and periodically review progress.on actions it has
initiated.
CURRENT
STATUS Since 1979 the Executive Committee, meeting on the average of
once a week (every Wednesday at 1500 hours) has become a vital,
integral part of the Agency's management process. Focusing on
inter-directorate long-term issues, the Committee has reviewed
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more than two dozen difficult Agency-level issues resulting
in DCI/DDCI decisions or guidance. Examples include reforming
the personnel management system, creating the Senior Intelli-
gence Service, developing legislative strategy, developing an
information handling strategy, reviewing and revising annual
program and budget decisions, and initiating an Agency-wide,
long-range planning process. The Committee's success to date
has been attributed to DCI/DDCI commitment to an action oriented
forum to support their decisionmaking; a limited membership
that encourages frank constructive decisions; thorough staff
work in advance of meetings to provide an effective basis for
discussions; and careful selection of topics to avoid those
which can be treated in other forums.
The Committee is supported by a small staff (three people)
that prepares agendas and minutes; drafts terms of reference
and assists Agency components responsible for developing.
policy papers, long-range plans, and other proposals for the
Committee; tracks progress on Committee actions; and analyzes
issues and reviews proposals as assigned by the Chairman. The
majority of the issue and decision papers are prepared either
by the responsible lead office or by ad hoc interdirectorate
teams. The DDCI ordinarily chairs EXCOM although the DCI fre-
quently attends on key issues up for decision. The DDCI uses
his Special Assistant to directly supervise EXCOM Staff and
oversee management of EXCOM business.
CURRENT
ISSUE Immediate DCI-designate concern will be whether he wants to
continue the EXCOM decision system and how he wants to manage
the three-person EXCOM Staff.
OTHER INTERNAL
MANAGEMENT
DEVICES
The DCI/DDCI, additionally, utilize the following management
tools to help manage the Agency:
Mornin Staff'Mbeting of key Agency and Intelligence Community
RMS and CTS) staff on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at 9:00 A.M.,
chaired by DDCI. Brief (usually one-half hour or less), succinct,
to focus on overnight/current activities both to alert the
DCI/DDCI and to provide quick assignments or guidance to staff.
CIA Goals Program. Quarterly meetings of the four directorate
eads and their major office/division chiefs with the DDCI to
review and discuss the six or seven major goals of the directorate.
2
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Serves both to keep the DDCI updated on major on-going
directorate activities and to provide guidance to the next
two levels below the DCI/DDCI. Process consists of DDCI
quarterly guidance and brief one- or two-page issue papers
including status, problems, and milestones prepared by
directorates. Process is managed out of the DDCI office
by the DDCI's Special Assistant.
Senior Intelligence Service Advance Work Plans. Starting
in the fall of 1979, the DCI/DDCI for the first time in this
Agency's history, prepared SIS AWPs consisting of a statement
of.key objectives for the four directorate heads, the heads
of RMS and CTS and the key DCI/DDCI Special Assistants. These
objectives were then reviewed periodically in a number of ways.
The DDCI reviewed directorate quarterly objectives in the
goals process mentioned above, the seven independent office
heads prepared quarterly progress reports which were reviewed
and commented on by the DCI/DDCI. At mid-year, the DCI/DDCI
met privately with each of the deputy directors to review
progress towards their AWPs, and, at the end of the third
quarter, the deputy directors were asked to write a three-
quarter report of progress for the DCI/DDCI.
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
7 January 1981
THROUGH : Dr. Roy Godson
Attached is an additional issue paper
focusing on Critical Issues from the
intelligence collection viewpoint, prepared
.by D/DCI/CT It k part of the
response, to your letter request to the
DDCI on this subject. NFAC responses
and other documents on long-range planning
were sent to you by the DDCI after
Monday's meeting between you.
TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)
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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
12 January 1981
NOTE FOR: John Bross
THROUGH : Sam Watson.
FROM
Attached is an advance copy of
Directorate and Senior Staff Briefing
Papers showing intended near-term objectives
and areas of anticipated decision requirements
in February-April 1981.
Attachment:
Copy 3 .
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7 January 19810
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
NOTE FOR: Sam Watson
In response to your request, attached
is a copy of DCID No. 1/2 and its attachment.
Please return them to me when you no longer
need them.
Attachment:
DCID No. 1/2 w/attachment.
cc: ER
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CENTRAL 1N 1$LL1ls Ll\l G tiv~i~ a f ., - ?
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
7 January 1981
NOTE FOR: Sam Watson
John Bross
Ed Hennelly
FYI, attached is a copy of the
Executive Committee Long-Range,. Planning
Summary, given to DCI-Designate Casey
(along with supporting studies) by the
DDCI on Monday.
FROM
Approved For Release 2008/02/14: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500800002-2