LETTER TO BARRY GOLDWATER FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 24, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9 j7ff -X3
Central Intelligence Agency
OEXA 83-0651/E
2 4 1983
Honorable Barry Goldwater, Chairman
Select Committee on'.:Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for sending.me a copy of the.
Committee's report on its oversight activi-
ties during the.97th Congress.
The report has been read with interest
.here at Headquarters. I believe that-it-is
in our mutual best interests for such a.
report to be published. I commend you for
making this important information available
to the American people.
'Sincerely,
7s/ W Wi31lam J. case
'William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1- - DCI
1 -.DDCI
.1 - EXDIR
1-ERA
1 - D/OEXA
1 - DD/OEXA
1 - DC/PAD
1 - OEXA Record
1 - OEXA Chrono
LLD:RJK:aw (18 March 1983)
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
Central Intelligence Agency
The Honorable Barry Goldwater
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
OEXA 83-0651/D
Thank you for the report of your Committee's oversight activities
in the 97th Congress. The breadth and importance of the topics it
encompasses are a testimony to our continuing, constructive dialogue
that I believe is vital to the Intelligence Community.
The signing of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982
certainly stands out as one of the year's highlights. Our people saw
it as a great sign of support and recognition of their p ublic service,
and they greatly appreciated your Committee's unrelenting efforts to
bring it into being.
Those who read your report should derive considerable satisfaction
from knowing how well the Committee is serving the American people, as
well as the organizations and individuals within the Intelligence
Co.nmun i ty.
Sincerely,
ohn N. McMahon
Deputy irec or of Central Intelligence
Distribution:
Orig - Adse.
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - D/OEXA
1 - DD/OEXA
1 - DC/PAD
1 - OEXA Record
OEXA Chrono
ER
LLD:RJK`w (18 March 1983)
Rewritten O/DDCI (22 March 1983)
STAT
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
Central Intelligence Agency
wzhingron.D.c2O5O5
2 2 MAR 1983
Honorable Barry Goldwater, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for sending us a copy of your
Committee's oversight activities during the
97th Congress. I believe it is most
important to have this information in the
public record.
Sincerely,
STAT
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - EXDIRj
1 - ER
1 - D/OEXA
1 - DD/OEXA
1 - DC/PAD
1 - OEXA Record
1 - OEXA Chrono
LLD:RJK:aw (18 March 1983).
OEXA 83-0651/C
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEAGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
2 1 MAR 1983
Honorable Barry Goldwater
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your letter of 11 March 1983 forwarding the
Select Committee's report on its oversight activities during
the 97th Congress. The report reflects the great progress made
in recent years through close cooperation between the intel-
ligence committees of the Congress and the Intelligence
Community. The efforts of the Select Committee on Intelligence
under your leadership have been instrumental in producing the
revitalization of the Intelligence Community currently under
way.
The achievements of your Committee in oversight of intelli-
gence activities and in authorization of appropriations, which
for the most part must remain secret, have greatly assisted the
Intelligence Community in improving its performance. Your
Committee's legislative activities have also contributed
greatly to the success of the Intelligence Community. The
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 countered one of
the greatest threats to American intelligence capabilities,
i.e., damaging disclosures of the identities of covert agents
by misguided individuals making it their. business to ferret out..
and expose the identities of such agents. The successful
efforts of the Committee to secure passage of legislation to
improve DIA and NSA personnel management, to strengthen FBI
authority for undercover intelligence operations, to protect
the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from
violent attacks, and to enhance the administrative authorities
of the Central Intelligence Agency removed obstacles to the
effective conduct of the, mission of the Intelligence Community.
The efforts of the Committee toward securing legislation to
relieve intelligence agencies from the debilitating impact of
the Freedom of Information Act and to provide federal criminal
code protection against violent attacks on intelligence
assa
e of
d the
ro
r
n
ndwork for sec
sonne
g
.J.
u
u
i
)~
l lai
per
g p
legislation in the 98th Congress.
~:_~
6 D- 7
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
We look forward to continuing the cooperative relationship
which has been the hallmark of the intelligence oversight
process in. recent years. Please extend my compliments_to.Robin
Cleveland of your staff, whom you mentioned as the principal
author of your Committee's fine report.
an ey Sorkin
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
DANIEL PATRCO MOYtJIIW , IJ.Y., VIC$ CHAIRMAN.
JAXE DARN. UTAH t WALTER IJ, HUDOU:$TON, XV.
JONN H. CHAPEL. R.I. JOSEPH R. BIDEN. JR.. DEL.
RICHARD G. LUGAR. IND. DANIEL K INOUYE. HAWAII
MALCOLM WALLOP:R. WYO. M HENRY M. J. sE. WASP.
DDU DURENBERGE MANN. PATRICK J. LEANTAHY, 177'. ~1~ggq!!!' ;A/ /?p4~}~/ /~Q~{ J~
DAVID
HOWARD /4 BAKER. JR., TENN.. EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD. W. VA., EX OFFICIO
ROBERT R. SIMMONS. STAFF DIRECTOR
GARY J. SCHMITT. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
March 11, 1983
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400, the Senate
Select Committee. on Intelligence is charged with the
responsibility to oversee and make continuing studies of
the intelligence activities and programs of the United
States Government, and to...report to the Senate concerning
such intelligence activities and programs."
Most of the work of the Committee is, of necessity, conducted
in secret. Nonetheless,. the Committee believes that
intelligence activities should be as accountable as possible.
Therefore, the Committee has routinely published an
unclassified report of its oversight activities every two
years since its establishment in the spring of 1976.
Enclosed for your information is the most recent copy of
this report, covering the oversight activities of the Select
Committee on Intelligence during the 97th Congress (January 1,
1981 to December 31, 1982). I recommend it to you and
would welcome any comments which you might want to offer
regarding it.
arry Goildwater
~3a
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
ZonrrsIonaL Record
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 98 tj1 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1983 No. 22
Senate.
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE SENATE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
send to the desk a report on the activi-
ties of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, and I ' ask unanimous
consent to have 1,000 copies of this
report printed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senate In-
telligence Committee submits this
report of its activities covering the
period January 1, 1981, to December
31, 1982. Under the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400, the committee
has been charged with the responsibil-
ity to carry out oversight over the in-
telligence activities of the United
States. Most of the work of the com-
mittee is, of necessity, conducted in se-
crecy. Nonetheless, the committee be-
lieves that intelligence activities
should be as accountable as possible.
Therefore, we submit this public
report to the Senate in order to meet
this responsibility.
I believe this report will reflect my
view that the intelligence community
is alive and well, and getting better
every day despite the turmoil it expe-
rienced in the 1970's. This committee
was formed 7 years ago as a result of
that turmoil and, I am happy to say,
the recovery process started following
the committee's formation.
Mr. President, we are the only
nation in the world that makes the in-
telligence community accountable to
the general public. No other govern-
ment produces the kind of public
report that summarizes the activities
of its intelligence oversight. In effect,
we have made our intelligence services
the most public secret services in the
world. This action, along with the well
established budget authorization pro-
cedure, has made the American system
of legislative oversight of the intelli-
gence community unique.
The budget authorization process is
standard procedure now. No other
nation in the world does this. I? believe
it is the best ' method of accountability
there is in our Government. This
method makes it clear that- our consti-
tutional responsibilities are fulfilled,
while at the same. time maintaining
the confidentiality necessary for an ef-
fective intelligence system.
We examine in detail the budgets of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, and the in-
telligence activities of the Department
of Defense, State, and Treasury, and
of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration. This function is ? a key
aspect of effective congressional over-
sight of the intelligence community.
Through this process, we can deter-
mine if intelligence continues to be
well managed and responsive to our
needs. It gives us a * chance to-focus on.
a wide range of issues, all important to",
our national interests, such as interna-
tional trade and monetary policy, nu-
clear proliferation, energy. political
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
developments in Third World coun-
tries, international terrorism, and nar-
cotics.
Mr. President, even covert action,
the most secret and sensitive activity
of the intelligence community, comes
under the scrutiny of the Intelligence
Committee. The committee has re-
ceived detailed reports and has heard
testimony on covert action programs,
and has actively monitored the prog-
ress of those programs once launched.
Certain covert action programs have
been modified to take into account
views expressed by the, committee.
Under the provisions of Senate Reso-
lution 400, the committee has also pro-
vided briefings on some programs to
members of other committees.
In addition, the committee has been
active - in reviewing covert action
during the annual budget authoriza-
tion process. In that connection, the
committee has continued its practice
of annual review of each covert action.
line-item by line-item. Given the sensi-
tivity of information regarding covert
action, and the Presidential findings
regarding it, this report does not dis-
cuss the. details of these matters al-
though they occupied. a substantial
amount of time and attention of our
committee members.
This report shows that the commit-
tee and staff were involved in many
areas of interest to our national secu-
rity and foreign policy. For example,
we have examined whether the intelli-
gence community was effectively re-
sponding to the situation in Central
2
America. The committee also made an
inquiry into the conduct of the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence. It looked
into the serious problems of technol-
ogy transfer and it supported legisla.
tion to protect our agents' indentities
from being disclosed.
Recent years have witnessed a
growth in public awareness of the im-
portance of intelligence that is timely,
relevant, and of the highest quality.
Accurate intelligence is required for
informed decisionmaking on _ many
critical defense and foreign policy
issues, ' such as the development .of na-
tional nuclear weapons programs or
Soviet use of chemical .agents in war-
fare.
Mr. President, my firm belief has
.always been that good intelligence is
needed to protect the kind of freedom
we enjoy in our great country. I be-
lieve this report will also show that we
are getting good intelligence informa-
tion which is so vital to our survival as
a people and a Nation. I hope that this
report will also show that congression-
al oversight of intelligence activities is
effective,. and , that the American
people are better off because of it.
In concluding, I would like to thank
all of the. staff for its fine work over
the course of -the 97th Congress. As
well, I would like to thank Robin
Cleveland, a professional staff member
of the committee, who bore the major
burden of preparing this report and
coordinating its production with the
members of our committee.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 98 th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
Vol. 129
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1983
Senate
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF During may 6 years on the commit-
THE SENATE SELECT COMMIT tee, we have concentrated our efforts
TEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND on two major tasks. The first of these
RULES OF PROCEDURE was to establish effective mechanisms
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I
rise to Join the Senator from Arizona,
Senator GOLDWATER, the distinguished
chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, in submitting this report
of the committee's activities during
the 97th Congress.
As vice chairman of the select com-
mittee for those.2 years, I believe the
report accurately reflects the work
done by the committee.
The report is important because it is
an opportunity for the Senate and the
public to get- some sense of the nature
of the committee's oversight of the in-
telligence community. It is also impor-
tant in that its compilation forces tho'
committee to see where it has been
these past 2 years and, implicitly,
where it is headed.
We do well to recall the situation in
1976 when the select committee was
established. Investigations had re-
vealed that our intelligence agencies
abused their authority. In addition,
the intelligence community had expe-
rienced a 40-percent reduction in per-
sonnel in the previous decade. Yet the
world was becoming an increasingly
dangerous place as the Soviet Union'
was engaging in an unprecedented mil-
itary buildup and the Third World
presented new challenges to the inter-
es ` o the United 3'tates. No sut'pris-
ingly, questions were raised about the
ability of the CIA and its sister agen-
cies to supply the President and his
advisers the kind of information they
need to steer a prudent course for
American foreign policy.
for insuring that the intelligence com-
munity stays within the bounds of the
law and common decency. The second
was to provide the resources necessary
for rebuilding our intelligence capa-
bi,lit.ies. It is to be. hoped that the read-
ers of this report will cull from its
somewhat cryptic and nun .erous. pages
a sense that these tasks are in large
part being accomplished.
Mr. President, in 1972, I observed
that the public life of our age seems
dominated by the,.nexpected and the
unforeseen, while the task of govern-
ing seems increasingly that of impos-
ing some measure of order on this less
than cosmic chaos. I referred to the
task as one of coping-of striving or
contending on equal terms with a
measure of success. While my remarks
then concerned the practice of Gov-
ernment in general, they are entirely
applicable to the experience of the
Select, Committee on intelligence. I
think it can fairly be said that the
commitee has coped well with the
issues it has addressed. But in citing
the committee's . accomplishments,
there is no intent to' imply a sense of
complacency. -Oversight is not a static
process. We have lain only the first
blocks in the reconstruction of our in-
telligence community, not the final
edifice. We are still a young commit-
tee, and during its less than 7 years
tenure, there has been a continual
effort, to identify ways to improve our
oversight. This is the spirit in- which
the members of the committee will
continue their work in the 98th Con-
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
98TII CONGRESS
18t Session
J REPORT
l No. 98-10
REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
JANUARY 1, 1981 TO DECEMBER 31, 1982
FEBRUARY 28 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 23), 1983.-Ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
11-010 0 WASHINGTON: 1983
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Chairman
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York, Vice Chairman
JAKE GARN, Utah WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOHN H. CHAFES, Rhode Island JOSEPH R. BIDEN, in., Delaware
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
DAVID DURENBERGER, Minnesota PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT R. SIMMONS, Staff Director
GARY J. SCHMITT, Minority Staff Director
DORTHEA ROBERSON, Chief Clerk
[During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select Committee on
Intelligence was as follows : ]
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Chairman
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York, Vice Chairman
JAKE GARN, Utah WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
DAVID DURENBERGER, Minnesota PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, New Mexico
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT R. SIMMONS, Staff Director
ABRAM N. SHULSKY, Minority Staff Director
DORTHEA ROBERSON, Chief Clerk
i
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
PREFACE
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate
a report of its activities from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400, the Committee has
been charged with the responsibility to carry out overnight over the
intelligence activities of the United States. Most of the work of the
Committee is, of necessity, conducted in secrecy. Nonetheless, the
Conunittee believes that intelligence activities should be as accountable
as possible. Therefore, we submit this public report to the Senate in
order to meet this responsibility.
BARRY GoLDWATER,
Chairman.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNII-IAN,
Vice Chairman.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
CONTENTS
Page
1. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------- 1
Covert Action - - - - - -
II. Legislation and Executive Orders ________________._________________
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982______________._____
CIA Spouses Retirement Equity Act of 1982 Bill________________
DIA and NSA Personnel Management________________________
Foreign Missions Act___________________-_____________________
Protection of the DCI and DDCI________-_____________________
Protection of Intelligence Personnel___________________________
Freedom of Information Act Legislation __.____________________
Special Authority for Undercover FBI Operations--------------
Executive Order on Intelligence Activities ____________.________
Executive Order on National Security Information____________
III. Foreign Intelligence : Collection, Production and Analysis _____._____
Arms Control Monitoring ________________-____________________
Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation_____________________________
MX ICBM Basing-----------------------------------------
Middle East----------------------------------------?----------
Central America ----------------------------------------------
Falklands --------------------------------I------------------
Soviet Succession ---------------------------------------------
Chemical Warfare _________________________.__________________
Narcotics Traffic ---------------------------------------------
IV. Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism --------------------------
Technology Transfer ------------------------------------------
Counterintelligence Organization __________.-___________________
Counterintelligence Procedures ______-___-______________________
Counterintelligence Threat Assessments_______________________
Counterterrorism Threat Assessments_________________________
Counterterrorism Capabilities_________________________________
V. General Oversight------------------------------------------------
Confirmation :
William Casey--------------------------------------------
Admiral Bobby Inman___________________________________
John McMahon------------------------------------------
Inquiry on Mr. Casey----------------------------------------
Reports to Committee : Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Financial
Privacy Act, Classified Information Procedures Act__________
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act_________________.________
Journalist/Academic/Clergy Cover Arrangements______________
Wilson-Terpil Case-------------------------------------------
Defectors ---------------------------------------------------
Nazis ------------------------------------------------------
Reports requested by other Committees :
GAO Security Report____________________________________
Burt Damage Assessment________________________________
V. Budget ---------------------------------------?------------------
VI. Appendix -------------------------------------------------------
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
98TH CONGRESS SENATE J REPORT
1st Session No. 98-10
REPORT TO SENATE ON SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
Mr. GOLDWATER, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a growth in public awareness of the
importance of intelligence that is timely, relevant and of the highest
quality. Accurate intelligence is required for informed decision
making on many critical defense and foreign policy issues, such as
the development of national nuclear weapons programs or Soviet use
of chemical agents in warfare.
With the passage of the Intelligence Oversight Act,' the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, its counterpart in the House of
Representatives, and the Intelligence Community formalized a mutual
commitment to insure that this nation has the best possible intelligence
collection, analysis and production capabilities consistent with the
protection of the rights of Americans provided by the Constitution
and statutes. In brief, this Act requires that the Director of Central
Intelligence and the heads of all intelligence agencies keep the two
Congressional Intelligence Committees "fully and currently in-
formed" on all aspects of the Intelligence Community's activities and
that they respond to the Committees' requests for information. In
turn, the Committees are responsible for protecting the information
provided and for assuring that the Community is given the legislative
and budgetary direction necessary to perform its mission. Within this
' The Intelligence Oversight Act passed in the United States Senate in 1980. It sub-
sequently was incorporated into the Intelligence Authorization Act for b`Y 1981, as an
amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. (50 U.S.C. 413) The Act was patterned
after Senate Resolution 400 which had been in effect since 1976.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
framework, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Intelligence Community have established a sound and productive
working relationship.
In January, 1981, the Republican Party assumed control of the
Senate and 'Senator Barry Goldwater succeeded Senator Birch Bayh
as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan became Vice Chairman of the Committee.
Because both Senators had served on the Committee for a number of
years, the transition of leadership was orderly and successful. In a
letter to the members of the Committee, Senator Goldwater said :
... the Committee has to be non-political . . . I have al-
ways believed our major job is to oversee the intelligence
community and to do everything in our power to improve
that community... .
The public's confidence in U.S. intelligence activities is preserved
and enhanced in part through this process of Congressional oversight
of the activities of the Intelligence Community. The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence reviews the Community's programs, de-
termines their budgets, and is regularly notified of significant intel-
ligence activities at home and abroad. In discharging its constitutional
and statutory functions and preserving necessary secrecy, the Com-
mittee has sought to steer the difficult course between meaningful re-
view of executive intelligence activities and judicious treatment of
highly sensitive information.
In the area of covert action, as provided by Executive Order 12333,
Senate Resolution 400 and Title V of the National Security Act of
1947, and Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (the
Hughes-Ryan amendment as revised in 1980), the Committee has re-
ceived detailed reports and has heard testimony on covert action pro-
grains before implementation, and has actively monitored the pro-
gress of those programs once launched. Certain covert action pro-
grams have been modified to take into account views expressed by the
Committee. Under the provisions of 'Senate Resolution 400, the Com-
mittee has also provided briefings on some programs to members of
other committees with an interest in these matters.
In addition, the Committee has been active in reviewing covert
action during the annual budget authorization process. In that con-
nection, the Nmmittee has continued its practice of annual review of
each covert action line-item in the budget process. Given the sensi-
t?ivity of information regarding covert action and the Presidential
findings submitted to the Committee, this report does not discuss the
substance of these matters which occupied a substantial amount of
time and attention of Committee members.
In recent years, Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, along with other colleagues in Congress, have become in-
creasingly concerned about the systematic effort by a small group
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
of Americans, including some former intelligence agency employees,
to disclose the names of covert intelligence agents.
The names of more than 1,000 alleged CIA officers were disclosed
in two books by former CIA officer Philip Agee. Louis Wolf, the co-
editor of The Covert Action Information Bulletin to which Agee
contributes, claimed it had disclosed the names of more than 2,000 CIA
officers over a six year period.
The danger of such exposure was underscored by incidents of
violence in Greece, Jamaica and Nicaragua. Richard Welch, CIA
Station Chief in Athens, was shot and killed in front of his home
in December 1975, less than a month after he was identified in The
Athens Daily News. His name was publicly circulated earlier by a
magazine then published by Agee.
On July 4, 1980, in Kingston, Jamaica, shots were fired into the
home of an American Embassy official, Richard Kinsman, only 48
hours after editor Wolf named Kinsman and 14 other American
diplomats in Jamaica as alleged agents of the CIA. On July 7, 1980,
three days after Kinsman's home was machine-gunned and bombed,
another Embassy employee listed by Wolf apparently was targeted
but escaped without harm. In addition to the disclosure of names,
Wolf also made public the addresses, telephone numbers, automobile
license plate numbers and even the color of automobiles driven by the
Americans he cited.
On November 6, 1981, several weeks after Philip Agee had visited
Nicaragua and charged at a press conference that at least 10 CIA
agents were "hiding" in the U.S. Embassy's Political Section, four
American officials were listed as CIA agents in a pro-government
newspaper in Managua. Thereafter, all four were harassed by armed
men. Between November 6 and December 13, 1981, three women em-
ployees at the Embassy were assaulted, bound and gagged by armed
men who overpowered total guards and broke into their homes in
Managua.
Security considerations preclude confirming or denying the accuracy
of specific attempts at identifying U.S. intelligence personnel. There
have been, however, many such disclosures. The destructive effects of
these disclosures on U.S. intelligence operations have been varied and
wide-ranging. The Select Committee on Intelligence is aware of
numerous examples of such effects which cannot be addressed in a
public report..
The Committee concluded in 1980 that the United States cannot
collect human intelligence it requires unless intelligence officers are
provided effective protection and its sources of intelligence are as-
sured anonymity. The Committee found that existing espionage
statutes needed to be supplemented with specific prohibitions which
would permit more effective prosecution of persons who expose covert
intelligence identities.
Numerous proposals had previously been made for a criminal
statute to punish disclosures of the identities of agents. Senator Bent-
sen introduced intelligence protection proposals in the 94th and 95th
Congresses, but no action was taken. In 1979, Representative Boland,
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, introduced H.R.
5615, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which was cospon-
sored by other Members of that Committee. Identical provisions were
included in S. 2216. introduced on January 24, 1980, as the Intelligence
Reform Act of 1980, by Senator Moynihan and. cosponsored by Sena-
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
tors Wallop, Jackson and Chafee. Provisions similar to Senator
Bentsen's bill were included in S. 2284, introduced on February 8,
1980, as the National Intelligence Act of 1980, by Senator Huddleston
and cosponsored by Senators Mathias, Bayh, and Goldwater.
In a meeting on' May 8, 1980, the Senate Intelligence Committee
decided to pursue intelligence identities protection using S. 2216 as
the vehicle for further consideration of this issue. The Committee
held hearings on June 24 and 25 which focused specifically on intel-
ligence identities protection provisions of S. 2216. Those hearings
also considered other proposals on the subject, including S. 191 intro-
duced by Senator Bentsen on January 23, 1979, and similar provisions
of S. 2284.
On July 25, 1980, the House Committee unanimously approved
H.R. 5615, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, with amend-
ments.
The Select Committee on Intelligence met on July 29, 1980, to con-
sider S. 2216. Senator Chafee offered an amendment in the nature
of a substitute which differed from H.R. 5615, as approved by the
House Committee, on only one issue. The House Committee had ap-
proved the following standard for criminal penalties if the disclosure
of an agent's identity is made by a person who did not learn that
identity as a result of having authorized access to classified
information :
Whoever, in the course of an effort to identify and expose
covert agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, discloses, with the
intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities
of the United States, to any individual not authorized to re-
ceive classified information, any information that identifies
a covert agent knowing that the information disclosed so
identifies such covert agent and that the United States is tak-
ing affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intel-
ligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not
more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.
Based on testimony critical of the intent standard contained in the
House version, Senator Chafee proposed the following standard :
Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended
to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to be-
lieve that such activities would impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any in-
formation that identifies an individual as a covert agent to
any individual not authorized to receive classified informa-
tion. knowing that the information disclosed so identifies
such individual and that the United States is taking affirma-
tive measures to conceal such individual's classified intel-
ligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not
more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.
This language had the full support of CIA and the Justice Depart-
ment. Two amendments to Senator Chafee's substitute were adopted
i
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
unanimously by voice vote; one amendment offered by Senator Hud-
dleston added a definition of "pattern of activities," and the second
amendment by Senator Bayh provided that it shall not be an offense
under the bill for an individual to disclose information that solely
identifies himself as a covert agent. Senator Chafee's substitute, as
amended, was then adopted by a vote of 13 to 1. S. 2216, as amended
by Senator Chafee's substitute, was. approved by the Committee as
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1980, with n recommenda-
tion for favorable action.
On August 22, 1980, S. 2216, as reported by the Select Committee
on Intelligence, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The
Committee held hearings on September 5, 1980. On September 17,
1980, the Committee met to markup S. 2216, as reported by the Select
Committee, and four amendments to this bill were adopted. The Coin-
mittee reported the bill out September 24, 1980. Although proponents
of the bill made efforts to bring it to the floor, the prospect of an
extended debate resulted in delay of floor action. The effect of these
delays was that S. 2216 did not reach the floor of the Senate before
the second session of the 96th Congress came to a close on October 3,
1980.
,4fter the convening of the 97th Congress, Senator Chafee and 19
other Senators introduced the Intelligence Identities Protection Act
of 1980 (S. 391) on February 3, 1981. This bill was virtually the same
as the version of S. 2216 which was reported from the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence the year before by a vote of 13 to 1, the only
difference being the numbering of paragraphs. S. 391 was referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary where it was subsequently sent to the
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism for action. On June 24, 1981,
S. 391 was polled out of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
by a vote of 3 to 1 with 1 abstention.
On September 23, 1981, the House of Representatives voted 226 to
181 to pass an amendment to the House version proposed by Congress-
man Ashbrook adopting the Chafee language for subsection 601(c).
After several other amendments, the House passed H.R. 4 by a final
vote of 254 to 56.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered S. 391 at a busi-
ness meeting on October 6, 1981. S. 391 contained in Section 601(c)
a standard of proof requiring that disclosures of information derived
from unclassified sources identifying covert agents must be made "in
the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose
covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would
impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States." Senator Biden offered an amendment to strike this language
and insert in its place the language that was found in Section 601 (c)
of the House bill as reported from the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. This amendment passed by a vote of 9 to 8 with
Senator Heflin voting "present".
Thereafter, Senator Baucus offered an amendment to specifically
exclude from Section 603(a) the Peace Corps as a department or an
agency to be designated by the President for the purpose of providing
assistance and procedures for establishing cover for intelligence offi-
cers and employees. Senator Baucus' amendment carried by a vote of
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
11 to 7. As amended, S. 391 was ordered reported from the Committee
on the Judiciary with 17 Members voting affirmatively.
On December 16, 1981, S. 391 was taken up on the floor of the Senate,
but extended debate by Senator Bradley resulted in further postpone-
ment of action on the bill.
Following the convening of the second session of the 97th Congress,
S. 391 was once again taken up on the floor of the Senate. On Feb-
ruary 25, 1982, Senators Chafee, Biden and Goldwater engaged in
initial debate over the provisions of Subsection 601(c) which had been
the focus of much of the debate on the bill. On March 1, this debate
continued with Senators Jackson, Wallop and Leahy of the Intelli-
gence Committee adding their views.
On March 3, 1982, Senators Chafee and Durenberger of the Intelli-
gence Committee engaged in an extended colloquy which clarified
several important issues related to the legislative intent of an amend-
ment offered by Senators Chafee and Jackson restoring the language
of Subsection 601 (c) to the form originally reported out of the Senate
Intelligence Committee. Senator Durenberger concluded his remarks
by stating that "Senator Chafee's careful drafting and his participa-
tion in this colloquy will go far to insure against the sort of abuses that
some people fear will occur."
Debate on Subsection 601 (c) continued on March 16, with Senator
Huddleston adding his views. The following day, the Senate voted 55
to 39 to accept the Chafee/Jackson amendment. The effect of the
amendment was to make the Senate version of the proposed new law
conform to the House version as it was passed the previous fall. The
Chafee/Jackson amendment required proof that the disclosure of
information identifying covert agents was made in the course of a
"pattern of activities" intended to identify and expose covert agents
and "with reason to believe" that such exposure would harm U.S.
security interests. The "intent" to impair or impede U.S. intelligence
activities would no longer be an element of proof.
On March 18, 1982, the Senate rejected an amendment offered by
Senator Bradley. The bill was then passed by a vote of 90 to 6 with 3
Senators not voting.
For a period of almost ten weeks following the Senate action on
S. 391, conferees represented by the staffs of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence engaged in lengthy discussions on how to resolve the dif-
ferences between H.R. 4 and S. 391 as passed. A Conference Report
was agreed to on May 20, 1982 with an accompanying Statement of
Managers which clarified the legislative intent of the Congress. On
June 3, 1982, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982
(H.R. 4) Conference Report. passed in the House by a vote of 315
to 32 with 85 not voting. On June 10, 1982, it passed in the Senate by a
vote of 81 to 4 with 14 not voting.
On June 17, 1982, in a ceremony at CIA Headquarters in Langley,
Virginia, President Reagan signed the Intelligence Identities Pro-
tection Act into law. After praising the late Representative Ashbrook,
Senator Chafee, and other Members of Congress for their work in
promoting the legislation, the President stated, "The revelation of
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
the names of secret agents adds nothing to legitimate public debate
over intelligence policy." He went on to say that the law was carefully
written "so that it focuses only on those who would transgress the
bounds of decency-not those who would exercise the legitimate right
of dissent."
A guest at the ceremony was Christina Welch, the widow of Richard
Welch, the CIA Station Chief whose 1975 ;,laying in Athens, Greece,
sparked a Congressional outcry for legislation to prevent the exposure
of agents' identities.
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 represents the
culmination of a two and a half year effort. by Congress to legislate
against the pernicious activity of "naming .names." While much of
the legislative activity in the second session of the 97th Congress took
place outside of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the work
of Committee Members and staff played a key role in moving the bill
through Congress. Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, characterized this contribution on
the floor of the Senate on June 10, 1982, when he stated :
Mr. President, I commend my colleague on the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator John H. Chafee
of Rhode Island, for his courage and his persistence in pursu-
ing this legislation. He worked to mold it into its current
shape when the Committee reported the bill out in the sum-
mer of 1980, and he has worked long and hard in getting this
legislation through the Congress ever since. He has done a
great job for the Committee, for the Congress, and for the
Nation. I, for one, consider it the high point of my Chair-
nianship of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that
I am Chairman it the time this bill has passed the Congress
and will be signed into law. This is a great event, and I am
proud to be a part of it.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SPOUSES' RETIREMENT EQUITY ACT
OF ].982
During the winter of 1981-82, a number of CIA spouses and former
spouses and other individuals associated with the Agency, including
Mr. William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, ap-
proa,clied Senator Goldwater, Chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Senator Inouye, former chairman of the Committee,
to request that legislation be enacted to make CIA retirement benefits,
which were paid exclusively to the employee except when specified
otherwise by court divorce order, automatically available in part to
former spouses of these employees. In response to these contacts, Com-
mittee staff met with several of these individuals and also with CIA
officials, notably Mr. Stanley Sporkin, Agency General Counsel, to
discuss the concerns of CIA spouses and former sponge-,, especially
in connection with divorce. As a result of this meeting and other
actions, the CIA established a task force on spousal concerns, and
this task force subsequently prepared a report on divorce-related prob-
lems and other issues. The task force is expected to continue to meet
to address spousal and family concerns.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
Difficulties appeared to be present in the equitable distribution of
retirement benefits to former spouses and the handling of divorce-
related requests by spouses or former spouses for Agency assistance
in securing through judicial action a share of the retirement benefits
of Agency employees. These difficulties were not completely resolved
by Executive Order 12197 of 1980, which inter alia. provided that re-
tirement benefits under the CIA Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS), like Civil Service retirement benefits, would be subject
to judicial apportionment in the context of the division of marital
assets at the time of divorce. Specific problems in administer-
ing the Executive Order and equivalent Civil Service provisions
made it difficult for former spouses of CIA employes to obtain relief
both during and after divorce proceedings. These difficulties were
compounded by the overseas location of these spouses during much of
their professional life and also by the need of the Agency to retain
secrecy concerning the details of the identities and assignments of
its personnel who have operated in a clandestine capacity.
In response to these concerns, Committee staff drafted S. 2422,
which was introduced by Senator Inouye on April 22, 1982, on be-
half of himself. Chairman Goldwater, Senator Moynihan, Vice Chair-
man of the 'Select Committee, Senator Durenberger, and Senator
Huddleston. S. 2422 as introduced would have adapted the provisions
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 relevant to retirement benefits
for former spouses for insertion in the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
The Committee's hearing on S. 2422, held on May 5, 1982, was closed
due to the sensitive nature of some of the personal identities and case
histories discussed. The testimony of several CIA spouses and
former spouses was heard, as well as the testimony of high-ranking
exofficials of the CIA including Mr. Colby. The Agency was repre-
sented by General Counsel Sporkin as well as supporting staff from
the Agency's personnel division. Testimony of several former CIA
intelligence officers was also heard. The Committee also received over
seventy-five written comments for the record by Agency employees
and their current or former spouses.
In response to the comments received from ex-officials of the CIA,
spouses, former spouses and CIA representatives, and also in light
of the passage of similar provisions by the House of Representatives
in Title VI of H.R. 6068, Committee staff developed several amend-
ments to S. 2422 as introduced. On June 17, 1982, the full Commit-
tee meet under the chairmanship of Senator Inouye to markup S.
2422. Senator Bentsen asked to have his name added as a co-sponsor
of the bill. The technical amendments to the bill were adopted by
the Committee in the markup and the Chairman, without objection,
instructed Senator Inouye to submit the measure and an accompany-
ing report (Senate Report 97-484), to the floor for positive consid-
eration.
Subsequently, on June 30, 1982, the provisions of S. 2422 were
added as Title VI to S. 2487, the Senate. version of the Intelligence
Authorization bill for fiscal 1983. Its provisions were passed that
clay. On August 19. 1982, the House and Senate conferees on the In-
telligence Authorization Act filed their report. H. Rept. No. 97-
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
779, which essentially adopted the Senate version of Title VI with
a few minor revisions. The Authorization Act was passed by the Sen-
ate on September 10, and was signed by the President on September
27, 1982.
The purpose of this Act is to secure an equitable share of retire-
ment benefits for qualified spouses of Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) employees who have served a substantial period overseas. These
benefits include retirement annuities, survivor payments, and lump-
suni disbursements from the retirement fund. This Act will help assure
that the spouses of CIA officers, many of whom have made deep per-
sonal and professional sacrifices by following their intelligence of-
ficer-partners abroad in difficult service, will not be left without means
of support in their retirement if their marriages later end in divorce.
Under the Act, an individual who has been married for more than
ten years to a CIA officer, during the officer's period of creditable
service, is presumptively entitled to a pro rata share of the officer's
retirement benefits, up to fifty percent, based on the length of the
marriage during the period of service prior to divorce. The spouse is
also entitled to a similar share of the officer's survivorship benefits.
These provisions are substantially equivalent to those the Congress
adopted for Foreign Service spouses under Section 814 and related
provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, Public Law No.
96-465. Only employees and spouses who have served for more than
five years abroad together during the marriage are covered by these
amendments.
This Act not only goes a long way toward financially protecting
CIA spouses who have followed their husbands or wives abroad, but
will also help the Agency attract the best possible calibre of employee,
such as those who otherwise would have two career marriages. It
should also help to highlight publicly the difficult personal and pro-
fessional situation of our intelligence officers and their families who
serve the Nation abroad.
While providing these assurances, the Act will not necessarily alter
the outcome of divorces involving CIA officers. The entitlement of the
former spouse to a share of the retirement or survivorship payments
is fully reviewable by courts in the context of dividing marital assets
subject to apportionment by state divorce courts. The fact that the
payments to former spouses would be made automatically from the
retirement system, unless the divorce court orders otherwise, however,
will make these benefits more dependable, particularly during the time
before final judicial determination of the terms of the property
division.
DIA AND NSA PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
At the request of Senator Wallop, the Committee added a provision
to the FY 1982 Intelligence Authorization Act establishing a Senior
Executive Service (SES) in the Defense Intelligence Agency (P.L.
97-89, Title VII, December 4, 1981). The Service was inaugurated on
December 6, 1982.
Senator Wallop's original proposal would have provided authority
for the Secretary of Defense to improve DIA's personnel management
system for civilian employees not covered by the SES. This would
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
include an exemption from civil service classification requirements,
greater flexibility in fixing pay, and authority to terminate any civilian
employee if necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.
While these provisions were included in the FY 1982 Authorization
bill passed by the Senate, they were deleted in conference. They were
again reported by the Committee in the Defense Intelligence Agency
Personnel Management Act (S. 2488). The bill was passed by the Sen-
ate on May 4, 1982, but no action was taken in the House.
Both the SES provisions and S. 2488 are intended to give DIA
authority over personnel comparable to that now enjoyed by the United
States' other major intelligence agencies. The Committee has sought
to equalize authority over personnel primarily in order to enhance the
DIA's ability to compete with CIA in the field of intelligence analysis.
Having accepted the notion that the country would be best served if
top policymakers received analyses of key intelligence subjects from
more than one source, the Committee sought to equip DIA to be a more
effective, more competitive provider of analyses.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1982 also established
a Senator Cryptologic Executive Service for qualified civilians in the
National Security Agency. In addition, the Act gave NSA statutory
authority to address difficulties in the recruitment, training and reten-
tion of qualified linguists in numbers sufficient to meet both routine and
crisis needs. The Act authorized NSA, among other things, to provide
financial support to educational institutions and government training
facilities for language development programs; establish a reserve of
cryptologic linguists recruited from among former NSA personnel;
and pay the costs of training and incentives for current personnel to
improve their language skills.
FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT
During the 96th Congress, Members of the Committee helped shape
and pass an important provision of the Foreign Missions Act (22
U.S.C. 4309). Over the years, foreign governments increased limita-
tions on U.S. missions and personnel, while the United States provided
those same governments with relative freedom. The Committee felt
that the United States needed to reciprocate with a policy of stronger
oversight and regulation of activities of foreign governments and their
representatives in our country.
In this spirit, Senators Goldwater, Moynihan, Jackson, Inouye,
Durenberger, and Huddleston sponsored an amendment designed to
assure the. Foreign Missions Act would adequately protect and advance
national security interests. In a joint floor statement, these Senators
noted that "both the provisions of this Bill and its subsequent admin-
istration must affect the broad national security interests of the United
States." To this end, the amendment provided that the authorities
granted to the Secretary of State under the Act "shall be exercised in
accordance with procedures and guidelines approved by the Presi-
dent." As explained in their joint statement, it is intended that these
procedures provide for oversight by the National Security Council,
and include specific requirements for obtaining the recommendation
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
of and coordination with appropriate national security and law en-
forcement agencies on significant decisions and policy matters.
This amendment was approved unanimously by the Senate and in-
cluded in Section 212 of the Foreign Missions Act. The Foreign Mis-
sions Act was included in the State Department Authorization Act
for FY 82 and FY 83.
PROTECTION OF THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
On April 8, 1981, S. 907 was introduced in the Senate and referred
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The purpose of the bill was
to amend Sections 351 and 1751 of Title 18 of the United States Code
to provide penalties for crimes including assassination, kidnapping
and assault against Cabinet officers, Supreme Court Justices, and
Presidential staff members. On March 10, 1982, the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary reported the bill to the Senate which passed it on
May 5; 1982.
On behalf of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Schmitt
offered an amendment to include the Director and Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence among those federal officials to be protected
under the new Title 18 language. The amendment was accepted by
unanimous consent by the Senate.
The House of Representatives passed S. 907 on September 14, 1982.
The Senate amendment which included the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence was retained in the House version of
S. 907. The Senate agreed to the House version on September 22 and
the Act was signed into law by the President as Public Law 87-285
on October 6, 1982.
On May 5, 1982, Senator Biden introduced S. 2522, "a bill to protect
the safety of intelligence personnel and certain other persons." This
bill was identical to provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act
for FY 1982 that passed in the Senate in 1981, but were not agreed
to by the House. The bill established as new offenses the murder, man-
slaughter, assault, threat against, extortion or kidnapping of persons
in the U.S. under U.S. intelligence auspices or persons provided U.S.
permanent residence status in accordance with provisions in the CIA
Act of 1949. Further, the bill added to current penalties for killing or
attempting to kill officers or employees of any department or agency
in thte Intelligence Community.
In December, 1982, the section of S. 2522 increasing penalties for
crimes against employees of the Intelligence Community was in-
corporated into S. 2411, the Justice Assistance Act of 1982.
This bill was vetoed by President Reagan in January, 1983, on other
grounds.
In May, 1981, Chairman Goldwater and Senator Chafee introduced
S. 1273, a bill that, under certain circumstances, would exempt the
intelligence agencies from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
but would still permit U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens to
request information on themselves. The language of S. 1273 was
virtually the same as in Section 3 of S. 2216, introduced in the 97th
Congress by Senators Moynihan, Wallop, Jackson, Chafee and several
others not on the Committee. It was also similar to provisions for CIA
included in the National Intelligence Act of 1980 (S. 2284) introduced
in the 97th Congress by Senators Huddleston, Mathias, Bayh and
Goldwater.
In connection with this proposed legislation, the Committee held
a public hearing on July 21, 1981. The witnesses included Admiral
Inman from the CIA, General Faurer, NSA, General Larkin, PIA,
K. Prescott Lowe, American Newspaper Publishers Association,
Robert Lewis, Society of Professional Journalists, Allan Adler and
Mark Lynch, American Civil Liberties Union, Jack Maury, Associa-
tion of Former Intelligence Officers, and Samuel Gammon of the
American Historical Association.
On November 24, 1981, the Committee held a closed session to learn
from Admiral Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
how the FOIA affects our intelligence relationship with other coun-
tries. FBI Director Webster also provided the Committee with clas-
sified materials indicating the impact of FOIA on FBI counterintel-
ligence and counterterrorism investigations. No further action was
taken by the Committee on S. 1273.
The principal argument for amending the FOIA regarding the
intelligence agencies is the effect of the Act in discouraging individ-
uals, organizations and other countries from providing information
and cooperating in other matters with the United States' intelligence
agencies. Additional, but less important arguments address the high
cost, in money and personnel, of carrying out the Act and the likely
utilization of the Act by hostile foreign intelligence services.
The principal argument for retaining the present provisions of the
Act is that the statutory exemptions for classified information and
material relating to intelligence sources and methods adequately pro-
tect national security interests, and that the interest in public informa-
tion outweighs any effect such requests might have on the intelligence
agencies.
Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information, signed
on April 6, 1982, affected FOIA cases by changing some classifica-
tion criteria. This led Senator Durenberger, on April 28, 1982, to
introduce S. 2452, which would amend the Freedom of Information
Act in two ways. Section 3 would amend the (b) (1) exemption for
classified information by requiring both that such information meet
the "identifiable damage to national security" standard and that a
"balancing" test be made by executive branch decision-makers that
the need to protect the information outweighs the public interest in
disclosure. Section 2 would amend the (a) (4) (B) language on de
novo review by limiting a district court's review of the "balancing"
test to ascertaining that the test was in fact made. Senators Moynihan,
Leahy, Biden, Huddleston and Roth cosponsored this legislation,
which was referred to the Judiciary Committee.
No legislative action was taken on either S. 1273 or S. 2452 in the
97th Congress.
I
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 . Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
In 1981 the Select Committee reported legislation to provide cer-
tain administrative authority needed for the use of undercover op-
erations by the FBI to collect foreign intelligence and foreign counter-
intelligence. Previously, similar authority for both FBI law enforce-
ment operations and collection of foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence had been provided in annual Justice Department
authorization bills and continuing resolutions. The purpose of the
1981 legislation was to give the FBI permanent authority for the col-
lection of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence and to
modify certain requirements that are inappropriate in this field. In
general, the FBI would have been authorized to lease or purchase
property, enter into contracts, establish proprietaries, use proceeds
therefrom to offset expenses, and deposit funds in banks in a manner
that concealed the FBI's identity or role.
As permanent legislation, this measure would have eliminated the
need for annual re-enactment of authority. The Select Committee
determined that the types of activities engaged in by the FBI in this
area should be based on specific, permanent legal authority to enhance
the effectiveness of its collection of foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence. The proposal also would have eliminated specific
statutory requirements for written certifications by the FBI Director
and the Attorney General that each action was necessary for the con-
duct of an undercover operation. The Select Committee concluded
that such requirements were unnecessarily rigid for activities in the
foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence field and that the
Attorney General should have the discretion to establish appropriate
certification and review procedures in consultation with the FBI
Director.
The Select Committee's recommendations were based on the con-
tinuing review of FBI foreign intelligence and foreign counterintel-
ligence collection activities that the Committee conducts through
the intelligence budget authorization process and other oversight
practice. The legislation was reported on May 6, 1981, as section 509
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982 (Senate
Report No. 97-57). This bill was referred sequentially to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, which voted to delete section 509 on the
grounds that the subject could be better dealt with in the Department
of Justice Authorization Act or other legislation. (Senate Report
No. 97-1.48, July 9, 1981) .
In February 1982, the special provisions for FBI undercover opera-
tions that were previously contained in the Justice Department au-
thorization bills lapsed; and the FBI advised the Select Committee
that their absence imposed substantial costs in the use of undercover
operations for foreign counterintelligence purposes. These provisions
were reinstituted in the continuing resolution for Fiscal Year 1983
passed in December 1982, but' they will expire at the end of the fiscal
year unless reenacted.
The final report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Law En-
forcement Undercover Activities of the Department of Justice, issued
in December 1982, recommended enactment of permanent legislation
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
for FBI undercover operations comparable to the measure reported
by this Committee. The Select Committee to Study Undercover Ac-
tivities was assisted in its work by this Committee. Chairman Gold-
water, at the request of Senators Mathias and Huddleston, approved
the provision of staff and equipment in support of the inquiry into
law enforcement undercover operations. As indicated by this Com-
mittee's action in 1981 and the unanimous report of the Select Com-
mittee to Study Undercover Activities, permanent legislative author-
ity for FBI undercover operations should receive serious consideration.
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Early in 1981, the Reagan Administration made known its intention
to replace Executive Order 12036 on Intelligence Activities with its
own Executive Order. During the confirmation hearings on William
Casey for the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and
on Admiral Bobby R. Inman for the position of Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI), the issue of a new Executive Order on
Intelligence Activities was raised. Director Casey made a commitment
at his confirmation hearing, when questioned by Senator Huddleston,
to consult on this matter with the Committee. Admiral Inman reaf-
firmed that commitment later, after a draft order became public and
the Committee met with Inman to discuss the status of the draft and
the arrangements for consultation. A later draft was provided to the
Committee by Director Casey in May but was withdrawn for further
consideration within the Executive Branch shortly thereafter.
The Administration forwarded copies of the final draft of the Execu-
tive Order to the Committee on September 23, 1981. As part of the
consultative process, the Committee agreed to review the proposed
Order and to forward its comments, observations, and suggestions to
the Administration in an expeditious manner.
The Committee understands that the promulgation of an Executive
Order is solely the prerogative of the President. However, within the
oversight responsibilities of the Committee and due to the important
and highly sensitive nature of intelligence activities and the turmoil
within the Intelligence Community during much of the 1970s, it was
believed that the best interests of the Community would be served by
cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches of gov-
ernment. The consultative process on this Executive Order took place
in that spirit.
Upon receipt of the proposed new Executive Order, Senator Gold-
water, Chairman of the Select Committee, requested Senator Schmitt,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation and the Rights of Amer-
icans, to conduct a review. Senator Schmitt and Senator Leahy, Vice
Chairman of the Subcommittee, held three meetings in early and mid-
October with representatives of the Intelligence Community.
The first meeting took place on October 1, 1981, at which time
Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
Stanley Sporkin, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and Admiral E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., Deputy Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, met with Committee Members. The Subcom-
mittee held its second meeting with General Richard G. Stilwell,
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Britt Snider,
Director of Counterintelligence and Security Policy, on October 5,
1981. On October 15, 1981, Richard Willard, Counsel to the Attorney
General for Intelligence Policy, and Edward O'Malley, Assistant
Director for the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, met with the Subcommittee. Each of the three sessions pro-
vided representatives of the Intelligence Community an opportunity
to present their views as well as answer questions posed by Committee
Members.
The recorded meetings and written correspondence between the
Committee and Intelligence Community agencies has provided the
Committee and Congress with a history of the intent of the provisions
of the Executive Order. This history will assist the Committee in
fulfilling its oversight responsibilities.
In addition to the consultative meetings held by the Subcommittee,
individual Members of the Committee met with and discussed the
proposed Order with representatives of the Intelligence Community
and the Administration.
The Subcommittee drafted a proposed Report and submitted it to
the full Committee on October 27, 1981. The full Committee reviewed
the Subcommittee's draft Report and on October 30, 1981, submitted
its Report to Dr. Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The Report contained four observations
about the draft Executive Order and the consultative process and
seven recommendations about the Executive Order. The Report was
submitted by the Committee as a consensus Committee Report.
Whilea consensus Committee Report was submitted to the Admin-
istration, various members of the Committee had additional areas of
concern and interest which were not addressed in the Committee
Report. The Committee decided that it would prove helpful to the
Administration if each Member of the Committee were given an
opportunity to express his individual concerns as part of the Report.
For this reason, an Additional Views section was added to the Report.
Eleven Committee Members, individually or in groups, submitted
additional views addressing various aspects of the proposed Executive
Order.
On December 4, 1981, the President signed Executive Order 12333
on United States Intelligence Activities. On the same date, the Com-
mittee was briefed by the Administration on the changes which had
been made to the draft Executive Order before its promulgation which
resulted from consultation with the Committee.
The Committee concluded that its involvement prior to the pro-
mulgation of the Order, rather than after its promulgation, was use-
ful to the Committee and the Administration.
Following the promulgation of E.O. 12333, the Community sub-
mitted implementing guidelines for the Committee to review one week
prior to their effective date. In addition. the Committee has asked the
Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, in con-
sultation with the Committee, to establish mechanisms or procedures
for continued internal and Committee oversight of implementation
of the new Executive Order.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
L8
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Executive Order 12065 on National Security Information was
signed by President Carter on June 28, 1978. By 1980, the Carter
Administration had begun a review of E.O. 12065. One reason for
the review was the 1979 General Accounting Office (GAO) recommen-
dation that systematic review be abolished. GAO had concluded that
"systematic review" of classified information provide only marginal
benefit at great expense.
The Reagan Administration continued the review of E.O. 12065
in light of the Carter Administration review and its own views con-
cerning classification. That review involved the various departments
and agencies of the Executive Branch and committees of the Congress.
The Administration forwarded copies of their proposed Executive
Order to the Committee on February 4. 1982, for the Committee's re-
view and comments. The Committee drew upon the experience of con-
sultation with the Administration which took place an the Executive
Order on Intelligence Activities in 1981. As part of the consultative
process, the Committee agreed to review the proposed Order and to
forward its comments, observations, and suggestions to the Adminis-
tration in an expeditious manner.
Upon receipt of the proposed Executive Order on National Security,
Senator Schmitt, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation and
the Rights of Americans, and Senator Leahy, Vice Chairman, held
a meeting on February 24, 1982, with representatives of the Executive
Branch involved in the drafting of the proposed Order.
The briefing was attended by Steven Garfinkel, Director, Informa-
tion Security Oversight Office of the General Services Administration;
Ernest Mayerfield, Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency; and Arthur Van Cook, Director of Information Security,
Department of Defense. The Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) coordinated the drafting of the Executive Order and pre-
sented the Administration's position on the draft Order. Representa-
tives of the CIA and the Department of Defense were requested to
attend to comment on the sections of the draft which were important
to their functions.
In addition to the consultative meeting held by the Subcommittee,
written responses were provided to questions for the record, and rep-
resentatives of ISOO and DOD met with Committee staff. The
recorded meeting and written correspondence between the Commit-
tee and the Administration provides the Committee and Congress
with a history of the intent of the provisions of this Executive Order.
This history will assist the Committee in fulfilling its oversight re-
sponsibilities.
The Subcommittee proposed a draft Report to the full Committee
which was discussed and amended to reflect a consensus view of the
Committee. The Report contained five observations about the proposed
Executive Order and the consultative process and nine recommenda-
tions for the Executive Order. The Report also contained the additional
views of four Members of the Committee whose concerns and views
were not included in the Consensus Report.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
1;7
The Report was forwarded to William P. Clark, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and Steven Garfinkel, Director
of the Information Security Oversight Office of the General Services
Administration on March 9, 1982. The Executive Order was signed
April 6,1982.
III. INTELLIGENCE : COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION
The Committee seeks to assure that American policymnakers receive
the highest quality of intelligence possible in a timely fashion, and a
full appraisal of where there are differences of opinion on a given
topic among analysts throughout the Intelligence Community.
The Subcommittee on Analysis and Production chaired by Senator
Lugar, has held hearings, has met with representatives of the Intelli-
gence Community, and has begun a dialogue with the CIA's Direc-
torate of Intelligence (DDI) regarding the quality of the U.S. intelli-
gence product. With the cooperation of the DDI, the Subcommittee
has instituted a procedure in which questions raised by current intelli-
gence products are forwarded, on an informal basis, to the community
for clarification or explanation. Such an exchange is useful both to
analysts in offering objective responses to their work and to the Com-
mittee as it seeks insight into the quality of analysis and production.
In addition to oversight of the quality of assessments produced by
the Intelligence Community, the Committee is also a major consumer
of intelligence analysis. The Committee is the recipient of a large
volume of finished intelligence which enables the Members to keep
apprised of developments relevant to the work of the Senate. The
Committee has also been called upon periodically to provide the Sen-
ate with independent evaluations of intelligence data relevant to im-
portant policy decisions. The oversight and information-gathering
functions of the Committee are often intertwined. For example, in
1979 the Committee reported to the Senate on U.S. capabilities to
monitor compliance with the limitations set by the proposed SALT II
Treaty. Since that time, the Committee continued to oversee the
adequacy of the Intelligence Community's capabilities to monitor
Soviet military activities relevant to several arms control agreements,
and has been kept abreast of intelligence on Soviet compliance with
these accords.
In the past two years, the Committee has continued to receive an in-
creasing volume of finished intelligence assessments and briefings. The
Committee has had briefings on a wide range of topics including the
situation in Central America. The Iran-Iraq war, Soviet involvement
in Afghanistan, the Lebanon crisis, development in Poland, East-West
technology transfer, the Falklands crisis, developments in Soviet
military capabilities and a number of other topics. These briefings are
useful not only for the information they convey, but also in giving
Committee Members opportunities for closer contact with analysts.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
18
ARMS CONTROL MONITORING
The Select Committee receives periodic reports from the Intelli-
gence Community on Soviet military activities relevant to various
arms limitation agreements. Pursuant to its obligations under S. Res.
400 (94th Congress), the Committee has continued to report to other
relevant Committees on those developments. In the past two years, the
Committee staff has prepared classified reports and memoranda on
Soviet military activities relevant to the SALT I Interim Agreement,
the ABM Treaty, the Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Geneva
Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Biological Weapons Con-
vention. .
In 1982, the Committee has received several briefings on the
progress of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the
negotiations on the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces
in Europe (INF). The Committee also held a hearing with an inter-
agency group of intelligence officials on U.S. capabilities to monitor
existing and prospective strategic arms limitations. The Committee is
attempting to develop a detailed understanding of all facets of these
negotiations by developing a record that will be used by the Senate in
considering any agreement that is achieved and upon which the
Committee can draw upon if it is asked to assess U.S. capabilities to
monitor such accords.
Tracking the global spread of nuclear materials and technology,
particularly those aspects with military applications, remains a cen-
tral concern of American foreign policy. For the past several years,
the Committee has reviewed the Intelligence Community's collection
and analytic activities devoted to monitoring the international nuclear
trade and foreign nuclear power and weapons programs in order to
ensure that policymakers are being provided with the best possible
data on these critical questions.
In the past two years, the Committee has continued to meet with
analysts and collection managers throughout the Community to en-
sure that adequate resources are being devoted to these problems.
Through its budget authorization actions, the Committee has been a
strong supporter of improvements in nuclear intelligence collection
programs. The Committee has also been briefed on several occasions
on developments in the nuclear programs of a number of states that
may have an interest in fabricating nuclear weapons.
On December 8. 1982. the Committee had two detailed briefings on
intelligence assessments relevant to projections of the survivability of
the MX ICBM in the closely-spaced basing (CSB) mode. Officials
from the Intelligence Community and from the Defense Nuclear
Agency provided the Committee with detailed insights into topics such
a,s: Soviet capabilities to develop countermeasures that would defeat
the CSB concept; likely Soviet military political reactions to CSB
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 .. Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
deployment; the methodology for developing estimates of ICBM
silos hardness; and a number of others.
The Committee has also agreed in principle to analyze intelligence
issues relating to whatever MX ICBM basing mode is selected. It may
also prepare a report, requested by Senator Robert C. Byrd, which
will review intelligence judgments on Soviet reactions to AIX deploy-
ment in the CSB mode.
The Middle East continued to occupy a major share of the Coin-
mittee's attention throughout the period of this report. Events in that
region involved important American political, economic and military
interests, requiring a significant effort by all components of the U.S.
intelligence community. The Committee sought to ensure that intel-
ligence resources were being used to maximum advantage and that
senior policymakers were receiving timely, objective intelligence
information and assessments of the highest quality. To exercise over-
sight of intelligence coverage of the Middle East, the Committee
received numerous briefings by the Intelligence Community, con-
ducted several hearings, and commissioned staff studies and reports
on key issues. The Committee held hearings on the question of Iraq's
nuclear activities, the Israeli attack on the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research
Center in Baghdad in June 1981, the political and military situation
in Lebanon, especially from the summer of 1981 on, culminating in
the Israel's entry into that country in June 1982.
The Committee also carefully examined the proposed sale of sophis-
ticated Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and F-15
aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In this connection, the Committee conducted
a study of the intelligence implications of this controversial transfer
and a classified staff report was prepared in the fall of that year. The
Committee also received briefings on issues concerning several key
countries in the area.
Finally, in the fall of 1981 the Committee received a briefing on
the information obtained by the Intelligence Community that was the
basis for taking extraordinary precautions to protect the President
and other high officials from a possible terrorist attack inspired by
Libya. Members were satisfied that these were reasonable grounds for
taking this possibility seriously. In the course of reviewing this situa-
tion, the Committee received detailed intelligence on Libyan involve-
ment in international terrorism directed not only at U.S. officials but
also against foreign leaders.
In 1981, as U.S. policymakers' attention focused on the develop-
ments in Central America, the Committee sought to address intel-
ligence issues on the region. A staff working group was established
to review the available intelligence on such subjects as the composition
of guerilla forces, the nature of external support to insurgents, and
internal political and economic developments. The working group
also assessed U.S. abilities to monitor such conditions. CIA Director
William Casey and other representatives of the Intelligence Com-
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
20
munit.y briefed members of the Committee on a regular basis and staff
have provided additional updat'es to all interested members.
The Committee also reviewed such questions as whether the In-
telligence Community had effectively responded to the situation in
Central America by redirecting and expanding its available resources
and whether the intelligence collected adequately supported the com-
nnuiity's various analytical assessments concerning the region.
The Committee has followed the politico-military situation in the
South Atlantic in order to keep abreast of developments there and
assess related U.S. intelligence capabilities, including the ability of
the Intelligence Community to react to rapid developments in dis-
tant areas. The Committee was briefed on intelligence issues related
to the Falklands crisis and staff received and assessed relevant intel-
ligence products.
The Committee staff prepared a classified report on the performance
of the Intelligence Community in providing senior U.S. decisionmak-
ers with warning of the potential for conflicf between Argentina and
the United Kingdom. The goal of this undertaking was to explore what
larger implications this case might have for the indications and warn-
ing capabilities of the Intelligence Community. This report was
shared with CIA's internal production evaluation group which con-
ducted a broader review of the overall activities of the Community
during the crisis. While the findings of the Committe's inquiry are
classified, mechanisms for continuing this type of constructive inter
action have been established.
At Senator Moynihan's request, the Committee held hearings on
September 28 and 29, 1982, on leadership succession in the Soviet
Union. A closed session with CIA Soviet experts was followed by an.
open hearing with four senior Soviet scholars from outside the gov-
ernment. These hearings explored the nature of past Soviet leader-
ship changes, the type of power struggle likely to ensue in the post-
Brezlinev era, and the backgrounds and policy inclinations of the
leading contenders for leadership positions. A declassified transcript
of the session with the CIA was published along with the record of
the public hearing and a statement by Senator Moynihan.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
The Committee has held hearings on intelligence regarding the use
of chemical and biological weapons by the Soviet Union or by Soviet
supported regimes in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. These sessions
and subsequent staff investigations focused not only on the substance
of the issue but also on past collection, analysis, and dissemination of
finished products.
Of particular concern to the Committee were the issues of whether
the Intelligence Community had identified the use of these weapons
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
in a timely manner; had assisted the government in the collection
and analysis of evidence; and had evaluated information indicating
Soviet, non-compliance with relevant agreements.
Intelligence on illicit international drug trafficking can make a sig-
nificant contribution to the United States Government's efforts to con-
trol the flow of that traffic before it reaches our national borders.
Although the Drug Enforcement Administration has the lead law
enforcement role against illicit drug trafficking, virtually all agencies
within the intelligence community have parts to play in the overall
U.S. Government effort. The Select Committee over the past several
years has regularly followed the performance of the intelligence com-
munity against the illicit international drug trafficking target and
examined particular issues of special concern. In part, this is accom-
plislied by the Committee's review of quarterly, monthly, and weekly
reports prepared by DEA.
At the request of Senator Biden, the Committee held a closed hear-
ing on July 14, 1982, on U.S. foreign intelligence activities directed
against illicit international drug traffic. The Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and
the Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration
testified. Several months of interviews on the part of the Committee
staff with relevant officials throughout the federal government and
close review of the documentary intelligence products and policies
preceded this hearing.
The hearing began with a general overview of the illicit drug traffic
intelligence collection and analysis activities of the intelligence com-
munities. It then addressed in greater depth certain problems and pos-
sibilities for improvement in intelligence collection and analysis. It
examined provisions of Executive Order 12333, relevant statutes, and
agency implementing guidelines that govern the conduct of U.S. for-
eign intelligence activities against illicit drug traffic and the use that
can properly be made of the intelligence in law enforcement opera-
tions. Finally, the hearing examined in some detail issues in the coordi-
nation of and cooperation among the intelligence agencies against the
illicit drug target.
This hearing and the record of the intelligence community's histor-
ical efffforts in this field helped the Committee discern steps that the
intelligence community could take to improve collection and analysis
of intelligence on the foreign aspects of illicit drug traffic. On
August 20, 1982, the Vice Chairman wrote to the President and the
Director of Central Intelligence urging them to dedicate more intelli-
gence resources to this problem. In response to concerns of the
Committee, the Intelligence Community has made some changes in
organization and priorities and has undertaken a review to develop a
long range plan to remedy deficiencies in intelligence capabilities in
this area.
It is the Committee's intention, as stated at its July 14th hearing,
to continue to examine closely U.S. illicit drug intelligence activities.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
As part of this continuing effort, in November 1982 Chairman Gold-
water assigned a Committee staff member to travel with an officer of
the Intelligence Community Staff to review and assess U.S. illicit
drug intelligence collection activities in most of the major heroin
source and transit countries.
IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM
The Select Committee has given high priority to an assessment of
U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and the threats posed by the in-
telligence services of foreign powers in this country and abroad. The
FBI has principal responsibility for counterintelligence activities
within the United States, while the CIA is in charge of counterin-
telligence activities overseas. The counterintelligence components of
the Department of Defense also play a key role in protecting against
hostile intelligence threats to the military services worldwide. Through
the annual budget authorization process and other oversight practices,
the Select Committee has sought to evaluate the performance of the
Intelligence Community in identifying hostile intelligence threats
and in taking measures to protect against those threats. The Select
Committee has also looked into related physical, personnel, document,
and communications security programs that are an integral part of
the Government's countermeasures against hostile foreign intelligence
activities.
The problem of technology transfer was examined in detail during
closed hearings and staff inquiries. At the request of the Select Com-
mittee, the Director of Central Intelligence undertook a comprehensive
review of the adequacy of Intelligence Community programs for deal-
ing with the loss of valuable technology to the Soviet bloc. The DCI
submitted a report to the Committee that identified weaknesses in these
programs and made specific proposals for improving foreign intelli-
gence collection and analysis, counterintelligence, and interagency
coordination with respect to technology transfer. At Senator Jackson's
request, the Committee assigned a staff working group to conduct an
independent inquiry into key aspects of the problem. Numerous inter-
views, briefings, and meetings were held at all the pertinent compo-
nents of the Intelligence Community; and written assessments of
particular subjects were prepared by the relevant agencies. Through
the staff working group, the Select Committee cooperated with the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Government Affairs, which held a series of important public hearings
in 1982 on the technology transfer problem. The Select Committee
assisted the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in preparing
for its hearings and in developing its report. The CIA submitted to
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations a declassified report
on "Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology" in April 1982, and
the Select Committee provided an independent classified-staff study
which examined certain aspects of the problem in detail.
The report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on
"Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9 I
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
Soviet Bloc Nations" 2 represents an outstanding example of coopera-
tion between the Intelligence Community and the Congress on a mat-
ter of significant concern. The Select Committee devoted its efforts to
ensuring that this report would be based on sound intelligence informa-
tion, consistent with the need to protect intelligence sources and
methods. In its oversight capacity, the Select Committee monitored the
steps taken by the Intelligence Community to respond to the problems
identified in the report and to improve foreign intelligence and coun-
terintelligence programs regarding technology transfer.
tf,
The Select Committee gave special attention to the division of
responsibility for counterintelligence among several agencies. Due in
part to the statutory ban against CIA exercising "law enforcement
powers or internal security functions," 3 there are limits on the CIA's
authority for counterintelligence within the United States. At times
in the past, coordination between FBI and CIA has been inadequate;
and no decision mechanism existed for establishing national counter-
intelligence policy to protect the United States against the total for-
eign intelligence threat by means of the full range of countermeasures.
Perhaps more important, no one agency was responsible for making a
comprehensive assessment of all aspects of the hostile intelligence
threat.
At the request of Senators Wallop and Chafee, the Select Committee
asked Director William Casey and FBI Director William Webster to
present their views on the need for improvements in the management
and direction of the national counterintelligence program. They testi-
fied before the Budget Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Wallop,
and before the Subcommittee on Collection and Foreign Operations,
chaired by Senator Chafee, with regard to proposals for establishing a
better system to assess the overall threat and develop national policies
for more effective countermeasures. After these hearings, the Select
Committee was informed of the organizational changes adopted to
address these issues. A small interagency counterintelligence staff
drawn from the FBI, CIA, and Defense Department was set up in
the Intelligence Community Staff to make regular overall assessments
of threats and U.S. countermeasures.4
In 1982 a Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence was established
l'nder the National Security Council with two working interagency
groups for counterintelligence and countermeasures. The Interagency
Group for Counterintelligence, chaired by FBI Director Webster, it
responsible for developing policy recommendations for counterespio-
nage and for countering hostile covert action (what the KGB calls
"active measures"). The Interagency Group for Countermeasures,
chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is responsible for other
national countermeasures policies for dealing with technical intelli-
gence threats and protective security programs. This structure re-
2 Senate Report No. 97-664.
3 Section 102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)].
4 This staff was originally established in 1978 to meet the needs of the NSC's Special Co-
ordination Committee for 'Counterintelligence under Executive Order 12036. Until 1981 it
was assigned to the Office of the DCI.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 I
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
placed the NSC's Special Coordination Committee for Counterintel-
ligence, created in 1978 by Executive Order 12036. The Select Comirit-
tee has been kept informed of the issues being addressed by these in-
teragency groups.
Restraints on U.S. counterintelligence adopted to protect the rights
of U.S. persons are matters of continuing interest to the Committee.
In the process of consultation with the Executive Branch leading up
to the issuance of executive Order 12333 in December 1981, the Select
Committee examined in detail various proposals to modify the stand-
ards and procedures for counterintelligence investigations of U.S.
persons. The Select Committee was also informed before implementa-
tion of the procedures for such investigations promulgated under the
new Executive Order. The Select Committee has sought to determine
whether the Intelligence Community is exercising its authority effec-
tively against serious foreign threats to U.S. security and whether
there are adequate safeguards to prevent misuse of that authority. To
examine these questions, information has been obtained from the
operating elements of the Intelligence Community, from the General
Counsels' Offices, and from the Attorney General's Counsel for In-
telligence Policy.
The Select Committee periodically receives Intelligence Community
assessments of the threats to this country from hostile intelligence
services. These assessments include both interagency products and
publications of particular agencies. A special, comprehensive long-
range assessment of threats and countermeasures prepared for the
National Security Council in mid-1982 was promptly submitted to the
Select Committee and has provided a basis for evaluating both re-
source and policy issues in the counterintelligence field. Classified.
interagency and FBI publications on hostile intelligence covert
actions have described the development of agents of influence, the use
of forgeries and other disinformation efforts, the control of "front"
organizations, and similar operations directed against the United
States and its allies. The. Select Committee has been kept informed of
the efforts of Soviet intelligence officers, other Soviet agents, and
Soviet-controlled organizations to influence the political process in
the United States and abroad.
In certain cases, representatives of particular agencies have briefed
the Select Committee on security and counterintelligence problems,
including the damage caused by unauthorized disclosures of classified
information. The Committee received briefings on the damage result-
ing from the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by Air
Force Lieutenant Cooke and on the steps taken by the Air Force
to improve procedures for handling such cases where, assurances are
made to potential espionage defendants in exchange for counterintel-
ligence information. In 1982, a. senior FBI official expressed concern
publicly about the adequacy of certain aspects of security in Con-
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
gressional offices. At Senator Huddleston's request, the Select Com-
mittee received a full briefing from the FBI on the continuing pattern
of hostile intell igence targeting and recruitment efforts against Mem-
bers of Congress and their staffs. Based on the Select Committee's
inquiry into the activities of Soviet bloc intelligence officers on Capi-
tol Hill, the Chairman and Vice Chairman made recommendations to
the Senate leadership for improved security awareness in Senate
offices. These recommendations included better security guidance of
Senate staff who handle classified information, briefings for Members
and key staff on hostile intelligence operations directed against the
Congress, and improved procedures for reporting contacts with rep-
resentatives and visitors from Communist countries.
Overlapping both counterintelligence and foreign intelligence is
the problem of possible Soviet deception of our intelligence system.
The Select' Conunitte has looked into allegations that U.S. intelligence
has been deceived with regard to Soviet missile accuracy. It is clear
that the Soviets are engaged in efforts to deceive U.S.uintelligence,
and the Select Committee's inquiry stressed the importance of greater
attention to cross-checking diverse sources as a means of detecting
Soviet deception efforts.
Finally, the Select Committee has examined the growing threat. to
U.S. security interests posed by the clandestine intelligence gathering
activities of foreign officials and agents in the United States. The num-
ber of Communist country officials has increased significantly in recent
years. The threat is compounded by the documented use of so-called
"illegals", foreign agents who pose as U.S. citizens or resident aliens
and operate without any overt contacts with foreign officials. Statistics
on the presence of known or suspect intelligence officers of Communist
countries in the U.S. have been provided by the FBI. The Select Com-
mittee has also examined the evidence of Soviet use of facilities in
the U.S. to intercept private communications. To strengthen the ca-
pabilities of U.S. counterintelligence and reduce these threats, the
Select Committee has authorized additional funds for the FBI, has
stressed the importance of reciprocity in diplomatic arrangements,
and has explored additional ways to combat hostile intelligence efforts
more effectively.
The Committee has maintained continuing oversight with regard
to the activities of the Intelligence Community in the field of interna-
tional terrorism, as well as FBI investigations of domestic terrorism.
While international and domestic terrorism are treated separately
under current laws and Executive orders, some aspects are closely
related insofar as an effective counterterrorism program is concerned.
The agencies in the Intelligence Community that produce intel-
ligence studies and reports on international terrorism regularly pro-
vide the Committee information on terrorist incidents and assessments
of terrorism threats throughout the world. This intelligence is vital
for planning protective measures for Americans serving abroad in
civil and military positions. It is also essential in preparing for any
operations that might be needed to save the lives of Americans in
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
26
extraordinary situations. Intelligence on foreign terrorism contributes
directly to the assessments for national policymakers of political sta-
bility in particular regions of the world, as well as the impact on U.S.
interests of foreign support for international terrorism. Studies of
the experience of other countries in combatting terrorism and the ef-
fectiveness of various counterterrorism policies help in developing
countermeasures for the U.S. and its allies. Intellgience appraisals re-
garding the capabilities and objectives of international terrorist groups
add to the understanding of the threat, and formulations of foreign
policy initiatives to undermine their support. Long-range projections
of the prospects for terrorism in the 1980s provide the perspective
needed to set priorities for resource allocation both inside and outside
the Intelligence Community. All these types of intelligence products
have been provided to the Committee for its use in reviewing the qual-
ity of U.S. counterterrorism intelligence collection and analysis.
The Committee has also requested and received additional informa-
tion on areas of special interest. In 1981, the CIA provided comments
requested by the Committee on the book, The Terror Network, by
Claire Sterling. Officials, of agencies involved in preparing a Special
National Intelligence Estimate on "'Soviet Support for International
Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence" responded to questions about
the basis for various analytical judgments and observations. Informa-
tion was also sought and obtained regarding terrorism in Central
America as part of the Committee's overall examination of U.S. intel-
li ence capabilities in that region.
FBI officials testified before the Committee or briefed the Com-
mittee regarding terrorism threats and investigation on four oc-
casions. Senior FBI executives testified on the activities of interna-
tional and domestic terrorists within the United States in 1981 and
as part of the Budget Subcommittee's hearings on counterintelligence
and terrorism programs in 1981 and 1982. Director Webster briefed
the Committee on the Nyack, New York, bank robbery committed in
May 1981 by persons associated with the "Weather Underground"
and other violent groups. Director Webster provided the FBI's assess-
ment of the intelligence significance of the massive amount of in-
formation obtained in the course of the FBI's investigation in this
case. In view of Director Webster's statement at this briefing- identify-
ing Puerto Rican terrorist groups are posing the most serious domestic
threat, members of the staff received follow-up briefings on the FBI's
investigations of such groups, the resource constraints on the FBI's
involvement in Puerto Rican terrorism.
For the purpose of monitoring the Intelligence Community's per-
formance in this area, the committee formed a staff working group
on terrorism in 1981. Members of that working group were also as-
signed to assist the Budget Subcommittee in its consideration of coun-
terterrorism programs. Working group members reviewed publica-
tions on terrorism and met with government officials and outside ex-
perts familiar with counterterrorism problems. To review FBI coun-
terterrorism capabilities within the United States, members of the
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
working group visited FBI field offices in Miami, Florida; Chicago,
Illinois; and San Juan, Puerto Rico. In November 1982, Chairman
Goldwater instructed a Professional Staff Member of the Committee
to travel to Italy to study terrorism and counterterrorism methods in
that country.
CIA and Defense Department officials also testified or briefed the
Committee with respect to the counterterrorism intelligence capabil-
ities of the Intelligence Community. CIA Director Casey and Deputy
Director for Operations John Stein reported on CIA efforts during
the Budget Subcommittee hearings. General Eugene Tighe, Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, presented a special analysis of
the terrorist threat at the Budget Subcommittee hearings in 1981;
and General Richard Stilwell, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, testified on military counterintelligence efforts against ter-
rorist threats abroad. All the agencies responded to detailed ques-
tions submitted for the record. 'Committee members placed special
emphasis on. the need to assure adequate intelligence support for any
military operations that might be needed to save lives of American
victims of a terrorist action.
Because of the Committee's concern about the effectiveness of U.S.
counterterrorism intelligence capabilities, members of the staff work-
ing group examined the guidelines and procedures approved by the
Attorney General for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence
and the conduct of domestic security and terrorism investigations.
These guidelines and procedures apply only to activities conducted
within the United States or regarding United States persons (citizens,
resident aliens, and groups substantially composed of citizens or resi-
dent aliens). The standards approved by the Attorney General do not
apply to counterterrorism intelligence activities with regard to foreign
nationals abroad. The Committee's examination of procedures adopted
pursuant to Executive Order 12036, issued by President Carter in 1978,
suggested that much of the complex language could be streamlined to
facilitate necessary and legitimate counterterrorism investigations.
This review of procedures contributed to the Committee's assessment
of proposals for what eventually became Executive Order 12333, issued
by President Reagan in December 1981.
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY TO BE DCI
Three presidential nominations were referred to the Committee
during the time covered by this report. On January 13,1981, William J.
Casey appeared before the Committee as the nominee for the posi-
tion of Director of Central Intelligence. During the hearing Mr. Casey
affirmed, "I intend to comply fully with the spirit and the letter of the
Intelligence Oversight Act. I intend to provide the Committee with the
information it believes it needs for oversight purposes. ." In addi-
tion, during the hearing, Mr. Casey addressed a wide variety of issues
including guidelines for the use of clerical, academic or journalist
cover, the quality of analysis and related problems of attracting and
retaining highly qualified analysts, technology transfer, the protection
of agents' identities, FOIA, covert action and leaks.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 i
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
On January 13, 1982, the Committee voted to approve Mr. Casey's
nomination by a vote of 14-0-1. The Senate confirmed Mr. Casey on
January 27,1981, by a vote of 95-0.
On February 3, 1981, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman appeared before
the Committee as the President's nominee for the position of Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. With twenty-one years of service
in the field of intelligence, Admiral Inman had most recently served
as the Director of the National Security Agency. In his confirmation
hearing, Admiral Inman reconfirmed his commitment "to keep the
committees fully and completely informed."' Admiral Inman iden-
tified manpower shortages, in particular the need for skilled analysts,
as the primary problem facing the CIA. In addition, Admiral Inman
reviewed issues such as the Intelligence Community's past perform-
ance in assessing the Soviet military threat, counterintelligence, the
organization of the intelligence community, the shortage of linguists,
and the quality of the community's analytic products.
Admiral Inman's nomination was approved unanimously by the
Committee. The Senate confirmed his nomination on February 5, 1981,
by a vote of 94-0.
On May 26, 1982, the Committee met in closed session to consider
the nomination of John N. McMahon for the position of Deputy Di-
rector of Central Intelligence. The following day the Committee con-
ducted a public hearing.
Mr. McMahon had served in the CIA for thirty-one years, most
recently as the Executive Director for the CIA. During the hearing,
Mr. McMahon stated :
I think the American people deserve [oversight], but more
importantly, the agencies deserve it. I, for one, as an individ-
ual who has had to testify before the oversight committees,
drew a great deal of comfort knowing that I was sharing with
them, with the representatives of the American people, our
programs and what we were up to, and that comfort was
derived not only from the beauty that exists in that coexist-
ence between the two branches, but more importantly, it was
a protection. It was a protection to me as an individual and
it was a protection to the institutions to know that Congress
was a joint partner in these programs.
I feel that oversight is a vital part of our existence in the
intelligence world and welcome it, and . . . [I] will abide
by the instructions to keep the Congress fully and currently
informed.
In addition to the issue of oversight, Mr. McMahon considered
questions on the Community's budget resources, U.S. strategic mon-
itoring capabilities, competitive analysis, coordination on counterin-
telligence and the FOIA. In the closed session, Mr. McMahon agreed
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 ? Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
to inform the Committee immediately whenever the CIA used its new
authority under E.O. 12333 to collect foreign intelligence concerning
U.S. persons by clandestine means within the U.S.
The Committee unanimously approved Mr. McMahon's nomina-
tion. The Senate unanimously endorsed the nomination on June 9,
1981.
INQUIRY CONCERNING WILLIAM J. CASEY
From July through November, 1981, the Committee made an in-
quiry into certain conduct by Mr. William J. Casey while and prior
to becoming Director of Central Intelligence. Questions arose con-
cerning, among other things, Mr. Casey's appointment of Mr. Max
Hugel, a businessman, to sensitive positions in the Central Intelligence
Agency; his role in business transactions that led to some lawsuits
against him; and his failure to sufficiently respond to the Committee's
questionnaire form for nominees and to a similar Office of Govern-
ment Ethics (OGE) form.
On December 1, 1981, by a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee issued a
report of its inquiry which concluded that "no basis has been found
for concluding that Mr. Casey is unfit to hold office as ... [DCI]."
(See Senate Report No. 97-285.) The report noted that Mr. Casey had
accepted "full responsibility" for the appointment of Mr. Hugel as
Deputy Director for Operations and had volunteered that it was a
mistake, a judgment in which the Committee concurred.
As to the civil litigation in which Mr. Casey was a defendant, no
basis was found for any moral culpability.
It was found that Mr. Casey omitted a "large amount" of informa-
tion requested by the Committee's and OGE's questionnaire forms.
The Committee expressed concern that "this pattern suggests an in-
sufficient appreciation of the obligation to provide complete and accu-
rate information to the oversight Committees of Congress." In this
connection, during the Committee's inquiry, Mr. Casey amended the
forms to furnish all information required. He continues to be sub-
ject to annual financial reporting requirements and the Ethics in
Government Act. In May, 1982, Mr. Casey filed his 1981 report. In
addition to listing his financial holdings and transactions, the report
prevent investments which might inadvertently violate ethics regu-
lations. The Director of OGE certified that Mr. Casey's report dis-
closed no conflict of interest under applicable ethics laws and regula-
tions.
One of the facts Mr. Casey had omitted in his nominee questionnaire
form was that, as a private attorney in 1976, he had represented the
Republic of Indonesia before the Treasury Department in a matter
involving foreign tax credits. This client relationship raised a ques-
tion as to whether Mr. Casey should have registered under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA). However, the Committee report
noted that "this question was not resolved by the Committee because
it is a technical one involving whether there was an attempt to in-
fluence or persuade agency officials and, if so, whether an exemption
applied because his representation was in the course of an established
agency proceeding." For this reason, a copy of the Committee's report
was sent to the Department of Justice, which administers FARA.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
The Justice Department conducted.a preliminary investigation pur-
suant to the Special Prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act (28 U.S.C. 592) and reported the results on April. 7, 1982.
The Attorney General's report concluded that "there is insufficient
evidence to support a criminal investigation" and that the matter is
"so unsubstantiated that no further investigation is warranted .. .
and that no Special Prosecutor should be appointed...."
Charged with providing "vigilant legislative oversight over the in-
telligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities
are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States,"
the Committee receives and reviews reports, mandated by legislation,
from various agencies and departments of the government.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, for example, contains
a national security provision under which a corporation can be re-
lieved of the requirements for accuracy in corporate books and records
with respect to particular classified matters relating to the national
security in which it may be involved, provided that in each instance
the corporation is especially exempted from liability under the Act
by means of a written directive issued by the Federal agency responsi-
ble for the national security matter in question. These directives must
be reviewed annually and, in addition, the appropriate agency head
must transmit a summary of matters coverad by all exemption direc-
tives in force at any time during the previous year to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
The report submitted by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence
in 1982 summarized those new exemption directives that.were issued
and renewals of exemptions issued in the previous year, thereby satis-
fying the CIA's statutory obligation under the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.
The Right to Financial Privacy Act requires that the Committee
be advised of the number of requests made by the FBI for financial
records in connection with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
activities. The Committee received and reviewed such reports in 1981
and 1982.
The Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 requires the
Attorney General to report semiannually to the Committee all cases
in which ,a decision not to prosecute a violation of Federal law has been
made for reasons of national security pursuant to Section 12 (a) of the
Act. These reports were received in a timely fashion and reviewed by
the Committee.
Under Section 108 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, the Attorney General is required, on a semiannual basis, to
inform the Committee of all electronic surveillance conducted under
the Act. These written reports are supplemented by additional informa-
tion provided at periodic meetings with Committee staff and represent-
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85MOO364ROO0500650019-9
atives of the Attorney General and the agencies involved in FISA
electronic surveillance. Designated senior staff have also been specif-
ically briefed on the procedures utilized by the relevant agencies to
carry out the Act.
Section 108 (b) of the Act requires this Committee to report to the
Senate annually for the first five years after the Act's effective date
regarding its implementation. The Committee submitted its third
and fourth annual reports during the 97th Congress (S. Rep. Nos.
97-280 and 97-691).
In each of the first three years the Act has been in effect, the Ex-
ecutive Branch proposed amendments. None was enacted and in 1982
the request for amendments was not renewed. The Committee, in con-
sultation with the Department of Justice and principal agencies that
conduct surveillance under the Act, has continued to assess the need
for such amendments. In the next Congress, which will cover the fifth
and final vea.r for the Committee reporting to the Senate regarding
implementation of the Act, the Committee expects to have hearings on
the need for any changes to the Act or to the implementing proce-
dures. Until these hearings are completed, the Committee has recom-
mended that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act continue in
effect without amendment.
INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH JOURNALISTS, ACADEMICIANS
AND CLERICS
In recent years, concern has been expressed by some Members of the
Committee and the public that the independence of American jour-
nalists, academics, and clerics might be compromised if they were to
become involved in clandestine intelligence operations. In the 97th
Congress, the Committee continued its oversight of intelligence agency
relationships with these professions, which has included obtaining
reports on agency policies and practices. In this connection, the In-
telligence Community strictly controls arrangements with newsmen,
universities and their employees, and clerics. Of particular importance
are the CIA-'s regulations which bar secret relationships with clerics
and prohibit such relationships with members of U.S. media organiza-
tions except upon waiver by the Director of Central Intelligence. In
addition, arrangements with U.S. academic institutions may be entered
into only so long as senior management officials are made aware of
CIA's sponsorship. Similarly, operational use of staff or faculty may
not be made unless they are aware of CIA's involvement. These restric-
tions do not bar voluntary provision of information to the intelligence
agencies by journalists, academics or clerics. There has been no change
in these regulations since 1978.
THE WILSON/TERPIL AFFAIR
The activities of former CIA employees Edward Wilson and Frank
Terpil have been a matter of concern to the Committee from the
time of the earliest. revelations of their misconduct in 1976. The Com-
mittee has kept abreast of the various investigations and prosecutions
in an effort to identify what, if any, legislation or administrative
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85MOO364ROO0500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
measures might be needed to prevent or deter more effectively the type
of conduct involved in this case. As part of this work, the Committee
held a closed hearing on April 22, 1977, in which it heard from the
DCI, the CIA Inspector General and representatives of the Justice
Department. On October 1, 1981, the Committee received an update.
In addition, the Committee's staff has been in continual contact with
government officials involved in ongoing investigations and prosecu-
tions. The Committee will continue to monitor these proceedings as
one of its general oversight activities.
On March 17, 1982, a jury in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria,
Virginia, found Wilson guilty on 7 of 8 counts of an. indictment
charging him with violations of government export laws. In this
case, the government successfully invoked the Classified Information
Procedures Act of 1980 to obtain a court ruling that classified in-
formation Wilson sought to introduce at trial was irrelevant to the
charges. The Act permits the government to obtain pre-trial rulings
on the admissibility of classified information to avoid the risk of un-
controlled compromise of intelligence sources and methods during a
trial. This statute was a direct outgrowth of a study by the Senate
Intelligence Committee in 1978. (See Committee Print titled, "Na-
tional Security Secrets and the Administration of Justice," A Report
of the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure of the Senate Select
Committee on Tntelligence.)
The Wilson-Terpil case has also afforded the Committee the occa-
sion to consider the effectiveness of our nation's laws concerning con-
duct by former intelligence agency officials and assistance by Ameri-
cans to international terrorist activities. It is expected that the Com-
mittee and the Congress as a whole will be giving these questions in-
creasing attention in the next Congress as ongoing legal proceedings
and investigations come closer to conclusion.
Defections of Communist Bloc diplomatic, intelligence and mili-
tary personnel provide a valuable source of information on a broad
range of activities directed against the security of the United States
and its allies. The Central Intelligence Agency conducts a program
for the reception, debriefing and resettlement of defectors, and its
successful operation is an essential. element in encouraging potential
defectors. Thus there is a substantial national interest in a well-con-
ducted defector program. For this reason, the Committee has reviewed
the defector resettlement program closely to ensure that this program
is operating as it should be.
In the spring of 1981, information came to the Committee's atten-
tion directly and through the press of discontent among certain defec-
tors, principally relating to the CIA's assistance in helping defectors
integrate into American life after completion of extensive debriefing.
Therefore, the Committee determined that a careful review of Agency
practices and procedures, as well as investigation of specific cases in-
volving dissatisfied individuals, was necessary. The Committee formed
a staff working group and began a close and sustained examination
of the defector program. The working group received full cooperation
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
from the Central Intelligence Agency and other involved elements
of the Intelligence Community, and prepared a staff report in March,
1982.
The staff working group was primarily concerned about two issues :
whether the Central Intelligence. Agency was causing discontent
among a significant portion of defectors by offering unsustainable
assurances of assistance prior to debriefing and failing to delivery fully
afterwards; and the extent to which Agency performance might be re-
flected in reducing the ranks of potential defectors. In examining spe-
cific cases of defector dissatisfaction, the working group's larger aim
was to determine whether the Agency was adhering to established
guidelines regarding levels and types of assistance, and whether
changes in Agency practices might be advisable.
As a first order finding, the staff working group concluded that
dissatisfied defectors prepared to make complaints to the Committee,
employ legal assistance, contact the press or, in extreme cases, rede-
feet, constitute a minute fraction of the total. This is evidence that,
taken as a whole, the defector program is functioning effectively.
In pursuit of its larger objectives, the working group recommended
certain changes in CIA procedures and practices with respect to agree-
ment on levels, types and duration of resettlement assistance prior to
debriefing of defectors in order to avoid complaints and misunder-
standings, afterward. A number of these recommendations have been
adopted and others kept under study for possible future implemen-
tation.
ALLEGED ASSISTANCE TO THE ENTRY OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS INTO THE
UNITED STATES
In 1978 the General Accounting Office completed an investigation,
requested by the Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, of allegations of a
conspiracy to obstruct investigations and prosecutions of alleged Nazi
war criminals residing in the United States unlawfully. The GAO
reported that available evidence did not support these allegations. Sub-
sequently, an Office of Special Investigations was established in the
Department of Justice to devote greater resources and attention to
such investigations and prosecutions that had previously been the
responsibility of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A
lawyer who served in the Office of Special Investigations until 1981
charged publicly after his departure that agencies of the United
States government improperly brought Nazi war criminals into this
country following World War II and had withheld information from
the GAO and the Justice Department. At the request of the Vice
Chairman, Senator Moynihan, and Senator Leahy, the Select Commit-
tee staff initiated an inquiry regarding these allegations insofar as they
pertained to agencies in the Intelligence Community.
It was not the purpose of this inquiry to duplicate other investiga-
tions. In May, 1982, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
requested that the Attorney General investigate this matter to deter-
mine whether any violations of federal law had occurred. He also
requested that the Comptroller General reopen the earlier investiga-
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
tion conducted by the GAO in 1978. The Select Committee staff con-
sulted with staff of the House Judiciary Committee and reviewed
pertinent materials in that Committee's possession. Staff also met with
officials of the Department of Justice and the GAO to discuss their
respective investigations. At the Select Committee's request, CIA
Director Casey provided materials bearing on this matter, including a
written report and other information needed by the Committee to
understand and assess pertinent issues.
The former Justice Department lawyer who made the allegations
volunteered additional materials to the Select Committee and met with
staff to explain his position. This information was taken into account
in the further conduct of the staff inquiry. Inasmuch as the Justice
Department and GAO investigations continued through the end of
1982, the staff also continued to follow developments and pursue cer-
tain lines of inquiry that are not within the scope of these separate
investigations, including the administration of the special authority
granted under the CIA Act of 1949 which allows the DCT to designate
annually up to one hundred persons for admission to the U.S.
On February 3, 1982, Senator Roth, Chairman of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs and a member of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, requested the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in-
vestigate an allegation of security breaches at the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO). Senator Roth's concern was based on news
articles which described attempts by a Soviet official to obtain classi-
fied GAO reports.
Because an investigation of possible intelligence related security
breaches at the GAO more appropriately falls under the jurisdiction
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence than the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Senator Goldwater, Chairman of the Intelli-
gence Committee, agreed to Senator Roth's request and asked the staff
to look into the allegations which were made. The staff interviewed
officials at GAO, FBI, and CIA, and reviewed files pertinent to the
case. In addition, the Senate Intelligence Committee's Security Officer
examined the security and document control systems at GAO.
All agencies contacted during the staff investigation cooperated
fully with the Committee. On June 29, 1982, Senator Goldwater sent
a. copy of the staff report to Senator Roth. The report was placed in
the Congressional Record on September 24, 1982. Among other things,
the staff concluded the following :
No information was found to support the allegations: (1)
that the Soviet officer in question succeeded in acquiring
classified reports from GAO. that the Soviets had a penetra-
tion in the GAO; or (2) that security arrangements at GAO
did or do not adequately protect classified material.
In a September 15, 1982, hearing before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Mr. Richard Burt, nominated to be Assistant Secre-
tary of State for European Affairs, was questioned about an article he
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
wrote which had appeared in the New York Times on June 29, 1979.
Certain members of the Foreign Relations Committee expressed con-
cern that the article may have disclosed sensitive national security
information.
On September 16, 1982, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Mem-
bers of the Foreign Relations Committee wrote to the Chairman and
Vice Chairman of the Select Committee requesting "an assessment
of any effect upon U.S. intelligence gathering of the disclosure of
possibly sensitive national security information to a person who did
not possess a security clearance, Mr. Richard Burt." In response to
this request, a staff working group was established. The Committee
prepared and delivered a classified report on September 28, 1982, to
the Foreign Relations Committee.
The annual budget authorization process is one of the principal
means the Committee uses to fulfill its oversight responsibilities.
Authorization provides the access and leverage necessary for the Com-
mittee to influence the scope and long-term direction of the U.S. in-
telligence effort, ensuring that appropriate measures for accountabil-
ity exist.
Budget authorization enables the Committee to exercise a positive
influence over the Intelligence Community by identifying and
strengthening areas where greater capability is needed. On an annual
basis, the Committee conducts a series of detailed evaluations of all
activities included in the National. Foreign Intelligence Program. This
involves a range of inquiry which extends from the determination of
how well the intelligence discipline is responding to the needs of
senior policymaking officials to assessments of the intelligence pro-
grams conducted by the Department of Defense to support military
commanders.
As in previous years, the schedule of work necessary to produce the
budget authorization was demanding. During 1982, the process in-
volved :
A comprehensive review of 17 volumes of budget justification
material which totaled more than 2500 pages of detail;
Approximately 25 hours of hearings during which substan-
tive testimony was received from the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, the, resource managers of the components of the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), and senior-level
Department of Defense officials; and
Formulation and review of the written responses to several
hundred questions-for-the-record which were drawn from the
budget justification material and the testimony of witnesses.
During the period covered by the report, the Committee began to
conduct a number of its budget hearings on a functional basis, to
examine programs throughout the Community which involve similar
agency missions; for example, intelligence collection, analysis and
production, and foreign counterintelligence. This revised approach
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
to the authorization process proved beneficial. A detailed understand-
ing of the relationships among many disparate programs was obtained
and particular strengths and weaknesses in these activities were iden-
tified.
An understanding of the threat posed to the security of the U.S.
and its allies is crucial if allocation of resources for intelligence pur-
poses is to be effective. In that regard, the Committee sees no lessening
in the world-wide threat from our competition with our principal ad-
versaries, and developments in the Third World will continue to chal-
lenge U.S. world-wide interests. Prior to the Fiscal Year 1980 author-
ization, complex budgeting procedures and the absence of a long-range
capabilities plan seriously impaired the Intelligence Community's
ability to acquire and introduce the advanced systems necessary to
adequately counter the threat. Since 1979, the Committee's budget au-
thorization process has consistently generated recommendations which
emphasize substantial investment in substantive areas which have the
greatest potential for overcoming community-wide deficiencies in
strategic collection, processing and production, including :
Introduction of a new generation technical collection system;
Modernization of the world-wide intelligence support structure,
to include major expansions to the analytic workforce and the re-
placement of obsolete processing and production support systems;
Expansion of Human Intelligence source collection abroad; and
Improvements to U.S. capabilities for countering foreign es-
pionage, and for dealing with the threats posed by international
terrorism.
These recommendations support the Committee's goal of providing
the needed amount of resources to recapitalize the U.S. intelligence
system.
Intelligence is the first line of defense and it must be capable of effec-
tively responding to a broad range of policymaking problems and mili-
tary needs that are likely to emerge in the decade ahead. From a budg-
etary viewpoint, the Committee is becoming more satisfied that the
Intelligence Community is responsive to these needs. Despite progress
made to revitalize the intelligence discipline, however, the Commit-
tee has identified a number of areas which require continued attention
by the DCI and intelligence program managers.
As in previous years, and as an integral part of the authorization
process, the full Committee continued to exhaustively review all covert
action projects. This was accomplished on a case-by-case basis. As a
result of a formal vote by the Members of the Committee on each
project, the authorization for several projects was modified or changed
in scope.
The Committee does not publicly disclose the details of its budgetary
recommendations because of the classified nature of intelligence activi-
ties. Each year, a classified report is prepared which fully discloses the
scope and intent of these recommendations to include the specific
amount of resources authorized. Under S. Res. 400, 94th Congress, the
Committee has an obligation to ensure all Members of the Senate are
provided with the information necessary to make informed judgments
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 ? Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
on the annual intelligence authorization. Subject to the provisions of
the resolution, the Committee makes its classified report available to
each Member of the Senate. Copies of the classified report are also
provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees, and to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Through the budget authorization process, the Committee is able to
address problems faced by departments and agencies within the Intelli-
gence Community which require specific statutory authority. In addi-
tion to legislation mentioned in Section I fcr the 1981-82 period, the
Committee sponsored the following legislative initiatives :
For Fiscal Year 1982, the Intelligence Authorization Act per-
mitted the Director of Central Intelligence to designate person-
nel to carry firearms to the extent necessary for the performance.
of CIA's authorized functions. In the United States, this authority
is limited to the protection of classified material, firearm train-
ing, the protection of property and installations, and the protec-
tion of certain individuals;
The name, initials or seal of the CIA, NSA, and DIA are
prevented from being used for commercial purposes, or in a man-
ner that conveys the impression such use is approved, endorsed,
or authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency without the
written permission of the Director.
The Committee completed a number of activities related to the
budget authorization. These included visits to various intelligence col-
lection sites nationwide and around the world to obtain first-hand
knowledge of operational effectiveness, the review and approval of
requests to reprogram resources, notification of requests to the Office
of Management and Budget for fund release from the CIA's Con-
tingency Reserve, and actions on supplemental budget requests and
budget amendments.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
APPENDIX
1. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES-JANUARY 1, 1981 To
DECEMBER 31, 1982
A. Total Number of Meetings, Hearings and Briefings: 133.
B. Bills and Resolutions : Total 10.
1. S. Res. 54 Authorizing expenditures by the Select Committee on
Intelligence.
2. S. Res. 128 Waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974 with respect to consideration of title IV of S. 1127, which
authorizes supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1981 for in-
telligence activities of the United States.
3. S. Res. 25 Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select
Committee on Intelligence for the procurement of consultants.
4. S. Res. 310 Authorizing expenditures by the 'Select Committee
on Intelligence.
5. S. Res. 384 Waiving section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974: with respect to consideration of title IV of S. 2487, which
authorize supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1982 for in-
telligence activities of the United States.
6. S. 1127 To authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1982 for
intelligence activities of the United States Government, the Intel-
ligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System, and to provide certain personnel management
authorities for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and for other pur-
poses.
7. S. 1273 To amend the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
and for other purposes.
8. S. 2422 To provide for equitable sharing by the spouses of
qualifying Central Intelligence Agency officers in benefits paid by
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System.
9. 'S. 2487 To authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1983 for
intelligence activities of the United States Government for the In-
telligence Community Staff, and for the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
10. S. 2488 To strengthen and improve the management of civilian
personnel within the Defense Intelligence Agency.
II. PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, JANUARY 1, 1981 TO
DECEMBER 31, 1982
1. Hearing on the nomination of William J. Casey, January 13,
1981.
(89)
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
2. Hearing on the nomination of Admiral B. R. Inman, February 3,
1981.
3. Rules of Procedure for the Select Committee on Intelligence
(Committtee Print) Amended February 27,1981.
4. Senate Report 97-57 on S. 1127, Authorizing appropriations for
FY 1982 for intelligence Activities of the United States Government,
the Intelligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency Re-
tirement and Disability System, and to provide certain personnel man-
agement authorities for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and for other
purposes.
5. Hearing on Intelligence Reform Act of 1981, July 21, 1981.
6. Senate Report 97-193, Report to the Senate covering the period
January 1, 1979 to December 31,1980.
7. Senate Report 97-203 on S. Res. 225, Additional Funds for Select
Committee on Intelligence.
8. Senate Report 97-280, Implementation of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978-1980-1981.
9. Senate Report 97-285, Report of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on the Casey Inquiry.
10. Senate Report 97-379 on S. 2487 Authorizing appropriations
for Fiscal Year 1.983 for Intelligence Activities of the United States
Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS), and for
other purposes.
11. Senate Report 97-380 on S. 2488, Defense Intelligence Agency
Personnel Management Improvement Act of 1981.
12. Senate Report 97-484 on S. 2422 Central Intelligence Agency
Spouses Retirement Equity Act of 1981.
13. Hearing on the nomination of John N. McMahon, May 26 &
27, 1982.
14. Hearings on Soviet Succession, September 28 & 29, 1982.
15. Senate Report 97-691, Implementartion of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978-1981-1982.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
BARRY GOL.DWATER. ARIZ.. CHAIRMAN
D?NiFI. ? rTP?CK MOYNIHAN, N.Y., VICE CHAIRMAN
JAKE DARN, UTAH WALTER D. HUODLESTON, KY.
JOHN H. CHAFES. R.I. JOSEPH R. RIDEN. JR., DEL.
RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND. DANIEL K, INOUYE. HAWAII
MALCOLM WALLOP. WYO. HENRY M. JACKSON. WASH.
DAVID DURENBERGER. MI NN. PATRICK J. LEANY. VT.
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL. LLOYD EENTSEN. TEX.
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
HOWARD H. BAKER. JR.. TENN.. EX OFFICIO
ROSEWY C. RYRD. W. VA., EX OFFICIO
ROSERT R. SIMMONS. STAFF DIRECTOR
GARY J. SCHMTR. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
`Z Cnlfeb .Sfatez Zenafe
83 -1.3.7 F2
March 11, 1983
The Honorable John N. McMahon
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence is charged with the
responsibility "to oversee and make continuing studies of
the intelligence activities and programs of the United
States Government, and to...report to the Senate concerning
such intelligence activities and programs."
Most of the work of the Committee is, of necessity, conducted
in secret. Nonetheless, the Committee believes that
intelligence activities should be as accountable as possible.
Therefore, the Committee has routinely published an
unclassified report of its oversight activities every two
years since its establishment in the spring of 1976.
Enclosed for your information is the most recent copy of
this report, covering the oversight activities of the Select
Committee on Intelligence during the 97th Congress (January 1,
1981 to December 31, 1982). I recommend it to you and
would welcome any comments which you might want to offer
regarding it.
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
XECUTIVE. SECRETARIA
Routing Slip
''-ACTION
?'i;'-INFO_'
-`=DATE
. INITIAL
"1
DCt.
x ;~~
~~ ,x
..A
v 41
'l t
EXDIR'::
, r a
4
D/ICS '
5
DDI>
6
DDA:-
7
DDD '
r .E K+v
8
DDS&T'
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/EEO
14
D/Pers
15
D/0EA
16
C/PAD/OEA
.17
SA/IA
18
AO/DCI
19
C/IPD/OIS
20
21
22
STAT
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
JAXE DARN. UTAH
JOHN H. CHAFES, R.1.
RICHARD O. LUGAR. IND.
MALCOLM WALLOP. WYO.
DAVID DURENBERGER. MINN.
WILLIAM V. ROTH. JR.. DEL.
WILLIAM S. COHEN. MAINE
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON. KY.
JOSEPH R. BIOEN. JR., DEL.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
PATRICK J. LEAHY. VT.
LLOYD BENTSEN. TEX.
HOWARD N. BAKER. JR.. TENN.. EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD. W. VA.. EX OFFICIO
ROBERT R. SIMMONS. STAFF DIRECTOR
GARY J. SCHMITT. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
March 11, 1983
~ CnYf ea , c f es ,~enaf e
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
Executive Director.
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington,.D.C. 20505
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence is charged with the
responsibility "to oversee and make continuing studies of
the intelligence 'activities and programs of the United
States Government, and to...report to the Senate concerning
such intelligence activities and programs."
Most of the work of the Committee is, of necessity, conducted
in secret. Nonetheless, the Committee believes that
intelligence activities should be as accountable as possible.
Therefore,-the Committee has routinely published an
unclassified report of its oversight activities every two
.years.since its establishment in the spring of .1.976.
Enclosed for your information is the most recent copy of
this report,. covering the oversight activities of the.Selec.t
.Committee on Intelligence during the 97th-Congress (January 1.,
1981 to December 31, 1982). 'I recommend it,to you and
would welcome any comments which you might want to offer
regarding it.
6
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
7
STAT
STAT
 United States
of America
Approved For. Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 98 . CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, ;1983
telligence -community accountable to
the general public. No other govern-
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE SENATE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr.. President, I
.send to the desk a report on the activi-
ties of the Senate :Select Committee
on Intelligence, and I ' ask unanimous
,consent to . have 1,000 copies:: of this
report printed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senate In-
telligence Committee submits this
report of its activities covering the
.period January 1, 1981, to December.
3.1, 1982. Under the provisions of
..Senate Resolution 400, the committee
has .been charged with the responsibil-
ity to carry out oversight over the in-
activities of the United .
States. Most of the work of the com-
mittee is, of necessity, conducted in se-
crecy.. Nonetheless, the committee.be-
lieves that intelligence - activities
'should be ' as accountable as possible.
Therefore, we submit this public
report to the Senate in order .to: meet
this responsibility. .
I believe this report will :reflect: my
-view...that the intelligence ?community
is alive and well, and getting better
every day despite the turmoil.. it expe-
rienced in the 1970's. This committee.
was formed 7 years.ago as a .result.tlyof:
that turmoil and, I am happy :to ,,sa,y,.
.the recovery process started :folovring.
the committee's formation.
Mr. . 'President, we are the .only
:nation,in :lthe ,:world rthat :des the --in-
anent produces the kind of public
report that summarizes the activities
of its intelligence oversight. In effect,
we have made our intelligence services
the most public secret services in the
world. This action, along with.the well
established budget authorization pro-
cedure, has made the American-system
.of legislative oversight of the intelii-
:gence community unique.
The budget. authorization process is
stahdard procedure now. No. other
1 nation in the world does this. I' believe
it is the best method of accountability
there Is . in our Government. This
method makes it clear that- our cor;sti-
tutional responsibilities are fulfilled,
while at. the same.-.- time maintaining
.the confidentiaiiity:necessary.for,.anref,~
:feetive intelligence system.
We examine in detail the budgets ; df
,the Central Intelligence Agency, the.
IN.ational:Security Agency, .and the id:-
telioence activities of the Department. .
of Defense, State, and Treasury, and
of the Federal .,Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and the,-Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministr tion.. ' This 1function.:is a key
aspect ,.of ,effects? e ?congresslonal over- .
.:sight.:?of tthe intelligence eo Unity...
Through. this :process, we can .deter-
: xe Al .intelligence .continues ,to be.
well managed x d .responsive to our
wnee ;It fe.- us a;cha.nce .to focu
r y"
a wide:: e ,o iss es,.:a?l important .t .
our: ngtiorkal interests, such, as ':interna.-
;tional trade and :rr onetary :policy, nu
clear proliferation; energy.,Political
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
2
developments in Third World coun- America. The committee also made an
tries, international terrorism, and nar- inquiry into the conduct of the Direc-
cotics. tor of Central Intelligence. It looked
Mr. President, even covert action, into the serious problems of technol-
the most secret and sensitive activity ogy transfer and it supported legisla-
of the intelligence community, comes tion to protect our agents' .indentities
under the scrutiny of the Intelligence from being disclosed.
Committee: The committee has re- Recent years have witnessed a
ceived detailed reports and has heard growth in public awareness of the im-
testimony on covert action programs, portance of intelligence that is timely,
and has actively monitored the prog- relevant, and of the highest quality.
ress of those programs once launched. Accurate intelligence is required for
Certain covert action programs have : informed decisionmaking on. many
been ' modified to take into account' critical defense and foreign policy
views expressed by the. committee. issues, such as the development.of na-
Under the provisions of Senate Reso- tional nuclear weapons programs or
lution 400, the committee has also pro- Soviet use of chemical .agents in war-
vided briefings on some programs to fare.'
members of other committees. Mr. President, my firm belief has
In addition, the committee has been always been that good intelligence is
active - In reviewing covert action needed to protect the kind of freedom
during the annual budget authoriza- we enjoy in our great country. I be-
tion process. In that connection, the ; lieve this report will also show that we
committee has continued its practice are getting good intelligence informa-
of annual review of each covert action tion which is so vital to our survival as
line-item by line-item. Given the sensi- a people and a Nation. I hope that this
tivity of information regarding covert report will also show that congression-
action, and the Presidential 'findings al oversight of intelligence activities is
regarding it, this report does not dis- effective,. and ' that the American
cuss the. details of these matters al- people are better off because of it.
though they occupied. a substantial In concluding, I would like to thank
amount of time and attention of our all of the. staff for its fine work over
committee members. the course of -the 97th Congress. As
This report shows that the commit- well, I would like to thank Robin
tee and staff were involved in many Cleveland, a professional staff member
areas of interest to our national secu- of the committee, who bore the major
rity and foreign policy. For example,. burden of preparing this- report and
we have examined whether the intelli- coordinating its production with the
gence community was effectively re- members of our committee.
sponding to the situation in Central
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
 Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9
,Or
United States 00tb 1-1-Ii.Ti-111cCC V DCT CFCCi(1N
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1983
Senate
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF During may ,6 years on the commit-
THE SENATE SELECT COMMIT-, tee, we have concentrated our efforts
TEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND on two major tasks. The first of these
RULES OF PROCEDURE was to establish effective mechanisms
for insuring that the intelligence com-
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I munity stays within the bounds of the
rise to join the Senator from Arizona, law and common decency. The second
Senator GOLDWA?ER, the distinguished w4s to provide the resources necessary
chairman of the Select Committee on for rebuilding our intelligence capa-
Intelligence, in submitting this report bilities. It is to be hoped that the read-
of the committee's activities during ers of this report will cull from its
the 97th Congress. somewhat cryptic and numerous pages
As vice chairman of the select com- a sense that these tasks are in large
mittee for those.2 years, I believe the part being accomplished.
report accurately reflects- the work Mr. President, in 1972, I observed
done by the committee. that the public life of our age seems
The report is important because it is dominated by the unexpected and the
an opportunity , for the Senate and the unforeseen, while the task of govern-
public to get some sense of the nature ing seems increasingly that of impos-
of the committee's oversight of the in- ing some measure of order on this less
telligence community. It is also impor- than cosmic chaos. I referred to the
tant in that its compilation forces thd task as one of coping-of striving or
committee to see where it has been contending on equal terms with a
these past 2 years and, implicitly, measure of success. While my remarks
where it is headed. then concerned the practice of Gov-
We do well to recall the situation.in ernment in general, they are entirely
1976 when the select committee was applicable to the experience of the
established. Investigations had re- Select Committee on Intelligence. I
vealed that our intelligence agencies think it can fairly be said that the
abused their authority. In addition,, commitee has coped well with the
the intelligence community had expe- issues it has addressed. But in citing
rienced a 40-percent reduction in per- the committees accomplishments,
sonnel in the previous decade. Yet the there is. no intent to imply a sense of
world was becoming an increasingly complacency. Oversight is not a static
dangerous place as the Soviet Union process. We have lain only the first
was engaging in an unprecedented mil- blocks in the reconstruction of our in-
itary buildup and the Third World telligence community, not the final
presented new challenges to the inter- edifice. We are still a young commit-
ests of the United States. Not surpris- tee, and during its-less than 7 years
ingly, questions were raised about the tenure, there has been a continual
.ability of the CIA and its sister agen- effort to identify ways to improve our
cies to supply the President -and his oversight. This is the spirit in- which
advisers the kind of information they the members of the committee will
need to steer a prudent course for continue their work in the 98th Con-
American foreign policy. gross. _._~:... _
Approved For Release 2008/02/08: CIA-RDP85M00364R000500650019-9