1979 AMENDMENT OF THE MILITARY BASE AGREEMENT (MBA) WITH THE PHILIPPINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000400530055-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: January 11, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2011/01/24 :CIA-RDP85M00364R000400530055-3
1979 AMENDMENT OF THE MILITARY BASE AGREEMENT
(MBA) WITH THE PHILIPPINES
Negotiating Environment. The 1978-79 review of the MBA
with the Philippines was prompted by Philippine concerns,
dating back several years, over sovereignty aspects of the
bases and by President Marcos' desire to test the strength of
the US-Philippine relationship.
General Objectives/General operating rights. Our chief
aim--which we achieved--was to preserve our unhampered use of
our military facilities. We did not seek to expand or to ac-
quire new rights. Our unhampered right of use was reaffirmed
in an exchange of notes.
Out of area transits/overflights. Our rights at Subic
and Clark were not challenged during the Indian Ocean crisis
and the inauguration of US flights fom Subic to Diego Garcia.
Philippine dependence on Middle East oil has made it sensitive,
but so far not resistant to US activities in Southwest Asia.
Quid. For the first time since the MBA went into effect
and despite our treaty relationship, we were obliged in the
1979 review to negotiate an aid package for continued use of
our facilities. While the aid package eventually negotiated
was half of that discussed several years earlier with the
Philippine government by Secretary of State Kissinger and was
restricted to a "best efforts" side letter by President Carter,
we had to exceed our negotiating limit of $400 million for
five years by $100 million. We also turned over a large por-
tion of base lands but retained use of all essential facili-
ties.
We also deflected Philippine efforts to extend the nego-
tiations into the mutual defense treaty relationship, and par-
ticularly to expand its coverage to apply to the Philippine-
claimed part of the Spratly islands, while reaffirming the
basic quality of the relationship. At the same time we were
obliged to provide some acknowledgment of the host s sover-
eignty by proclaiming the bases to be Philippine, agreeing to
the appointment of Philippine base commanders and base g arri-
sons, and permitting the Philippines to provide perimeter se-
curity. These sovereignty aspects were highly satisfying to
the Philippine government and did not detract effectively from
our unhampered use of the facilities that we retained within
the "Philippine" bases.
C'Oi~'F
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CONFIDENTIAL
SOFA. Permitting the Philippine government to provide
_perimeter security facilitated our efforts to oppose renego-
tiation of the NATO-like criminal jurisdiction arrangements.
At the same time, it has proved effective in reducing friction
between Filipinos and US personnel on the facilities.
Other. In the course of the negotiations, it was agreed
that the military commanders would work out arrangements through
which Philippine authorities would assume jurisdiction over cus-
toms, immigration, and quarantine matters subsequent to the con-
clusion of the negotiations. Talks began in 1982. The arrange-
ments agreed to on December 8, 1982 do not adversely affect our
use of the facilities.
1/11/83
9A/B8-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/01/24 :CIA-RDP85M00364R000400530055-3