CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510026-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: July 29, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For Release 2011/01/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510026-7
BRIEFING PAPER UUilt IUL
CENTRAL AMERICA
The United States and Mexico share a concern over reducing
the level of violence in Central America, but differ over how
this might be accomplished. The Mexicans have often favored
left-wipg or revolutionary groups and consider themselves, with
considerable justification, to have played a key role in the
success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. The
Mexicans argue that stepped-up pressure on the Sandinistas will
drive them toward further totalitarian excesses. The Mexicans
also have called for power-sharing negotiations to resolve the
conflict in El Salvador.
Mexico's preferred approach has been to encourage direct
negotiations between the rebels in El Salvador and the
government, and between Nicaragua and Honduras. Such an
approach has been a key element in their participation in the
Contadora process. Mexico's preference for direct negotiations
has often favored Nicaragua. Foreign Secretary Sepulveda has
been particularly concerned that the current level of violence
between Nicaragua and Honduras will lead to war unless the
conflict is quickly resolved. He has been very critical of
U.S. naval deployment off the Nicaraguan coast. We, of course,
prefer a comprehensive approach to regional violence, one which
would involve democratization and which would encompass the
basic principles enunciated in the San Jose Declaration. The
Mexicans deny that there is significant Nicaraguan support of
the Salvadoran rebels.
During Secretary Shultz` visit to Mexico City on
April 18-19, each side outlined its respective policy toward
Central America. Although there was no meeting of the minds,
the Mexicans made it clear that they remained concerned with
the impact of regional violence on their national interests and
that they were amenable to accommodation of U.S. and Mexican
policies toward the region. More recently, in the Cancun
Declaration issued by the Contadora Four in mid-July, Mexico
joined in the strongest statement yet by the Four in support of
democratic institutions. The Cancun Declaration also
enumerated a number of principles of international relations
which bear strong resemblance to the San Jose principles. It
was, therefore, more supportive of a multilateral approach to
resolving regional conflict than were-previous Contadora
statements. Nevertheless, the Mexicans continue to be
supportive of the Nicaraguan outlook within the Contadora forum.
It is'too soon to tell whether President de la Madrid's
signing of the Cancun Declaration represents.an evolution in
Mexican policy toward Central America. It is also too soon to
tell whether the Contadora effort will succeed in reducing
DECL:OADR
Approved For Release 2011/01/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510026-7
 Approved For Release 2011/01/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510026-7
CONFIDENTIAL
regional conflict, although prospects are limited given the
magnitude of the problem. In any case, Mexico's-policy toward
the area is likely to continue to be driven by the feeling that
social and economic problems, rather than outside interference,
lie at.-the root of the region's instability and that these
problems can best be addressed by revolutionary regimes. The
t4exicans also believe that their own revolutionary credentials,
as well as their timely support for the Sandinistas., enhance
their rapport with revolutionary groups or regimes and give
them the possibility of guiding revolutionary change in a way
that does not. threaten Mexican, interests.
July 29, 1983
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2011/01/24: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510026-7