NIE ON PROBABLE SOVIET RESPONSE TO INF DEPLOYMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000200280013-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 28, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/06/06: CIA-RDP85M00364R000200280013-9
OF-URL I
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. DC 20310
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OP
28 July 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: NIE on Probable Soviet Response to INF Deployments (S)
ARMY review completed.
1. (S) Because I will not be at the NFIB discussion and
because I find this NIE a difficult one, I want to share a few
thoughts about it directly with you.
2. (S) Unlike almost all other issues on the USSR, I have no
clear and comfortable feelings about where to come down, that
is, how to estimate probable Soviet behavior. Many of the
assertions in the draft strike me as wild guesses with very
little to support them. There, however, is a structure to the
INF deployments and possible Soviet reactions which I would
like to spell out because it is not clear in the draft text.
3. (S) No one wants to give SS-20s in Cuba more'-than a very
low probability, but they are the only really "analogous"
measure against U.S. territory. The Soviets have no history of
military deployments for only political purposes. They always
consider first the "military operationality" of deployments and
fold that into the political context. Therefore, SSBNs, ALCMs,
SLCMs, etc., do not seem highly plausible. To get the political
effect from submarines off our coast, they would have to be
visible; if they are visible, they are vulnerable, losing their
military worth. SS-20s in Cuba do not have this problem.
4. (S) The 1962 understanding with the USSR is highly ambi-
guous. I reviewed the record at the White House in 1978/1979 to
learn this in detail. Moreover, U.S. behavior in response to
the SSBN visits in 1970/71, MIG-23 deployments in 1978, and the
Soviet brigade flap in 1979 all tended to erode what is left of
that understanding. Finally, the Soviets, I believe, have said
to us in some channels that P-II in Europe would invalidate the
1962 understanding which in Moscow's view included our removal
of IRBMs from Turkey.
5. (S) Suppose Moscow does deploy SS-20s to Cuba and we
discover them. If we ask them to remove those missiles,
Andropov can say that he would truly like to do so, but the U.S.
must first remove the P-IIs. He can then go public, telling the
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DAMI-ZA 28 July 1983
SUBJECT: NIE on Probable Soviet Response to INF Deployments (S)
Europeans that he would like to remove the SS-20s in exchange
for P-IIs. At that point it is no longer a U.S.-Soviet affair.
European governments are at once involved in the bargaining.
Would they stand tough with us? I wonder. They could easily
plead for a "peaceful" settlement by mutual withdrawals. Or
they could tell us to accept the SS-20s because Europe is
already living under the SS-20.threat. Why can't the U.S. do so
as well? Either reaction is undesirable for the U.S.
6. (S) The intelligence analysts tend to believe that the U.S.
public would not tolerate SS-20s in Cuba, that the matter is too
volatile for the Soviets to risk it. Is that really true?
Would Congress be of one mind? How would the NYT and The
Washington Post react? The Freeze Movement leadership? This is
not 1962, and we cannot assume a similar consensus. Nor is
there reason to believe that the Soviets do not understand this.
7. (S) Nor is the military force balance the same as 1962. I
doubt that the President would really want to risk escalation to
see who would blink first in light of the present strategic
balance. This shift in the correlation of military forces tends
to be overlooked in the NIE.
8. (S) Most disturbing for me is to consider the implications
of such a crisis. If the U.S. tries to force a removal of
SS-20s and fails, the consequences would be dramatic, a. strate-
gic turning point in the postwar period. Our credibility in
Europe would be nil. Could NATO survive? If we were to accept
the SS-20 deployment in order to follow through on INF (which
would be the only prudent course of action in light of the mili-
tary balance), the political implications would be equally dra-
matic. And if we got the removal of SS-20s by removing; P-IIs
from Europe, we would have given Moscow the final say in any
future NATO military force building, an awful precedent: to
establish.
9. (S) I cannot bring myself to put a high probability on
Soviet SS-20 deployment to Cuba, but as I think through the
payoffs it might hold for Andropov, I cannot dismiss it. nearly
so easily as the NIE does. In fact, I become very deeply
disturbed by the prospects. It is difficult to believe that the
Soviet General Staff and the Politburo have not worked out the
logic to their options in this regard. True, the risks may look
high to them, but the payoffs would be very high. At the same
time, I can't rule out no Soviet response (Khrushchev backed off
big threats in 1958 and 1961) although it looks unlikely.
Finally, Moscow may be able to alter the context of the threat
of a response with a new INF proposal in September.
(CrrtnrT
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?DAMI-ZA 28 July 1983
SUBJECT: NIE on Probable Soviet Response to INF Deployments (S)
10. (S) In sum, even if we judge the probability very low, it
seems that the logic to the SS-20 option is so serious that the
policy community should be encouraged to give it the greatest
contingency planning attention.
W.tm. z cd)rv-'~
WILLIAM E. ODOM
Major General, USA
ACofS for Intelligence
SECRET
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