CUBAN ARMED FORCES AND THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210041-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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Special
Weport No. 103
Cuban Armed Forces and
the Soviet Military Presence
August 1982
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Since 1975, the U.S.S.R. has under-
taken a major modernization of all
branches of the Cuban military, trans-
forming it from a home defense force in-
to the best equipped military establish-
ment in Latin America and one possess-
ing significant offensive capabilities.
Equipment delivered to the ground
forces has enhanced both their mobility
and firepower. The Air Force, with
some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet
fighters, now is probably the best
equipped in Latin America. The Navy
has acquired two torpedo attack sub-
marines and a Koni-class frigate, which
will be able to sustain operations
throughout the Caribbean Basin and will
enable Castro to project power well be-
yond Cuba's shores.
As a result of this modernization
program and Cuba's combat experience
in Angola and Ethiopia, the Castro
regime possesses a substantial regional
intervention ca
abilit
Havana has in
y.
p
Summary
creased its airborne-trained forces to a
Cuba has by far the most formidable and level of some 3,000-4,000 troops and
largest military force in the Caribbean also has improved its airlift and sealift
Basin with the exception of the United capability. Although modest by Western
States. In all of Latin America, only standards, this capability is impressive
Brazil-with a population more than 12 in the Central American and Caribbean
times that of Cuba-has a larger mili- context. It would be employed most
tary establishment. Increasing Soviet- effectively in aiding a regional ally
Cuban military ties and the improve- against an external invasion or in sup-
ment of the Cuban Armed Forces have pressing internal conflict.
enabled Cuba to assume a far more in- Cuba does not have the ability to
fluential world role than its size and re- conduct an outright invasion of another
sources would otherwise dictate. country in the region except for the
Caribbean microstates. Nor does Havana
possess sufficient amphibious assault
landing craft or aircraft capable of
transporting heavy equipment.
Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy,
to be complete, would have to devote
special attention to the challenge Cuba
presents to U.S. interests, especially in
the Third World. Cuba has developed an
extraordinary capacity to influence
events in such diverse regions as sub-
Saharan Africa and Central America in
spite of serious economic problems at
home. Its ability to project power far out
of proportion to its size is directly
related to its association with the Soviet
Union and the Soviet support for the
development of its military machine.
This study is being issued in the in-
terests of contributing to better public
understanding of the nature of Cuba's
massive military buildup and how it
contributes to Castro's ability to
challenge orderly. political and economic
development in this hemisphere and
elsewhere.
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On occasion Cuba has been reckless
in using its capabilities,. The most, recent
example occurred on May 10, 1980,
when Cuban Air Force fighters, in broad
daylight, attacked nd'sank a'clearly
atrol vessel inside
marked Bahamian patrol'
Bahamian territorial waters, killing four
crewmembers. The following day, Cuban
MiGs buzzed a populated island belong-
ing to The Bahamas, and a Cuban heli-
copter carrying Cuban troops landed on
the island in pursuit of the surviving
crew members.
The Cuban Military
Since the mid-1970s, when Cuba inter-
vened in Angola on a large scale and the
Soviet Union began to modernize Cuba's
Armed Forces, the Cuban military has
evolved from a predominantly home de-
fense force into a formidable power
relative to its Latin American neighbors.
The cost of Soviet arms delivered to
Castro since 1960 exceeds $2.5 billion.
These arms deliveries, plus the annual
$3 billion economic subsidy, are tied to
Cuba's ongoing military and political role
Relative Military Strength
For Selected Caribbean Countries
Percentage of Population in Armed Forces
2.5
Cuba's Armed Forces total more
than 225,000 personnel -200,0atn''Ariny,
1.5,000 Air Force and Air Defen$q; and,,
10,000 Navy-including those on active
duty either in Cuba or overseas and
those belonging to the ready reserves,
which are subject to immediate mobiliza-
tion. With a population of just under 10
million, Cuba has the largest military
force in the Caribbean Basin and the
second largest in Latin America after
Brazil, with a' population of more than
120 million. More than 2010 of the Cuban
population belongs to the active-duty
military and ready reserves, compared
with an average of less than 0.4010 in
other countries in the Caribbean Basin.
In addition, Cuba's large paramilitary
organizations and reserves would be
available to provide internal support to
the military.
The quantitative and qualitative
upgrading of the armed forces and their
recent combat experience in Africa give
the Cuban military definite advantages
over its Latin American neighbors. Cuba
is the only country in Latin America to
have undertaken a major overseas mili-
For Selected Latin American Countries
Cuba
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Population
People in
Military
% of
Population
(thousands)
(thousands)
in Military
9,800
227.0
2.32
28,000
185.5
.66
5,500
26.6
.48
124,780
272.6
.22
11,180
92.0
.82
27,310
70.0
.26
8,250
38.8
.47
3,270
16.0
.49
18,075
130.0
,72
2,945
29.7
1.01
16,459
40.8
.25
5,835
22.5
.39
7,200
15.1
.21
3,900
11.2
.29
69,000
119.5
.17
Source: Military Balance, 1981-1982.
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"ivJa~e~a
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abroad in supp.9rt of Soviet obje'ctives'.
The recent, deliveries of, Soviet military
equipment to Cuba are the'latest in a
surl;e of deliveries over the past year,
ii ce January 1981, So6et merchant
ships have'delivered some 66,000`tons of
military equipment, compared with the
previous 10-year annual average of
15,000 tons. These weapons represent
the most significant Soviet military up-
ply effort to Cuba since a record 250,000
tons was shipped in 1962. There are
several reasons for this increase:
? The beginning of a new 5-year up-
grading and replacement cycle;
? Additional arms to equip the new
territorial militia, which Cuba now
claims to be 500,000 strong but which it
expects to reach 1 million;
? Increasing stockpiles, much of
which is passed to regional supporters;
and
? A convincing demonstration of
Moscow's continuing support for the
Havana regime.
In addition to major weapons
systems, large quantities of ammunition,
small arms, spares, and support equip-
ment probably were delivered.
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tary effort since World War II, giving
oth Army and Air Force personnel re-
nt combat experience in operating
any of the weapons in their inven-
tories. About 70% of Cuban troops who
have served in Africa have been reserv-
ists. Reservists generally spend about 45
days per year on active duty and can be
integrated quickly into the armed forces.
Cuba's civilian enterprises, such as
Cubana Airlines and the merchant
marine, have been used effectively in
support of military operations. Havana
has dedicated significant resources to
modernize and professionalize its armed
forces and to maintain a well-prepared
reserve. Cuba has demonstrated that,
when supported logistically by the Soviet
Union, it has both the capability and the
will to deploy large numbers of troops
and can be expected to do so whenever
the Castro government believes it to be
in Cuba's best interest.
Equipment delivered to the Army
since the mid-1970s, including T-62
tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles,
BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles,
antitank guns, towed field guns, BM-21
multiple rocket launchers, and
ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft
guns, have begun to alleviate earlier de-
ciencies in Cuba's mechanized capabili
y and to provide increased firepower. In
addition to its qualitative advantage, the
Cuban Army has an overwhelming
numerical superiority in weapons over
its Latin American neighbors.
The Cuban Air Force is one of the
largest and probably the best equipped
in Latin America. Its inventory includes
some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet
fighters, with two squadrons of FLOG-
GERs (the exact model of the second
squadron recently delivered is not yet
determined). The MiG-23s have the
range to reach portions of the south-
eastern United States, most of Central
America, and most Caribbean nations.
On a round-trip mission, however,
Cuban-based aircraft would be capable
of conducting only limited air engage-
ments in Central America. If based on
Central American soil-a feasible option
given the closeness of Cuban-Nicaraguan
relations-Cuba's fighter aircraft could
be effectively employed in either a
ground-attack or air-superiority role. A
similar arrangement would be possible in
Grenada once Cuban workers complete
the construction of an airfield with a
9,000-foot runway there. If the MiG-23s
or ere to stage from Nicaragua and
U.S.S.R. Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba
20
10
M3
10
110
110
10
110
10
] 15
7 ""1
20
20
20
20
20
66`
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Grenada, their combat radius would be
expanded to include all of Central
America, including the northern tier of
South America.
Cuban defenses have been strength-
ened by the additions of mobile SA-6
launchers and related radars for air
defense, SA-2 transporters, SA-2
missile canisters, new early warning and
height-finding radar stations, and elec-
tronic warfare vans.
The Cuban Navy, with a strength of
about 10,000 personnel, remains essen-
tially a defensive force. However, its
two recently acquired Foxtrot-class sub-
marines and single Koni-class frigate,
once fully integrated into the operational
force, will be able to sustain operations
through the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of
Mexico and, to a limited extent, the
Atlantic Ocean.' The primary vessels for
carrying out the Navy's defensive mis-
sions are Osa- and Komar-class missile
attack boats, whose range can extend
well into the Caribbean. They are armed
with SS-N-2 STYX ship-to-ship
'The Koni has an operating range of
2,000 nautical miles without refueling or re-
plenishment. The Foxtrots have a range of
9,000 nautical miles at 7 knots per hour and a
patrol duration of 70 days.
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missiles. Cuba has received, in addition,
Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boats,
Yevgenya-class inshore minesweepers,
and a Sonya-class minesweeper. Al-
though not equipped for sustained
operations away from its main bases,
the Cuban Navy could conduct limited
interdiction missions in the Caribbean.
Cuba also has a 3,000-man coast guard
organization.
By Western standards, Cuba's capa-
bility to intervene in a hostile environ-
ment using its indigenous transport
equipment is modest, but it is consider-
ably more formidable in the Central
American context. As in 1975, when a
single battalion of Cuban airborne troops
airlifted to Luanda, Angola, at a critical
moment and played a role far out of pro-
portion to its size, a battle-tested Cuban
force interjected quickly into a combat
situation in Central America could prove
to be decisive. Moreover, since the
Angolan experience, Havana has in-
creased the training of airborne forces,
which now consist of a special troops
contingent and a landing and assault
brigade, and has improved its air and
sealift capacity. Introduction of sophisti-
cated Soviet weapons geared toward
mobility and offensive missions has im-
proved Cuban ability to conduct military
operations off the island.
Cuba still lacks sufficient transport
aircraft capable of supporting long-
range, large-scale troop movements and
would have to turn to the Soviets to
achieve such a capability. Cuba is able to
transport large numbers of troops and
supplies within'the Caribbean, however,
using its military" and civilian aircraft.
Since 1975, the Cuban commerical air
fleet has acquired seven IL-62 long-
range jet transport aircraft and some
TU-154 medium-to-long-range transport
aircraft,. each capable of carrying
150-200 combat-equipped troops. By
comparison, Cuba conducted the 1975
airlift to Luanda with only five medium-
range aircraft, each having a maximum
capacity of 100 troops.
Cuba has recently acquired the
AN-26 short-range transport. The most
effective use of this aircraft from Cuban
bases would be in transporting troops or
supplies to a friendly country, but it is
capable, with full payload, of airdrop-
ping troops on portions of Florida and
Belize; Jamaica, Haiti, and The
Bahamas; and most of the Dominican
Republic. If based in Nicaragua, the
AN-26s could reach virtually all of Cen-
tral America in either a transport or air-
drop role. In addition, more than 30
smaller military and civilian transport
planes, including those used in Angola,
could be used to fly troops and muni-
tions to Central America.
The Soviet military deliveries also
could improve Cuban ability to conduct
military operations abroad. In
Angola, for example, the mobile SA-6
surface-to-air missile system operated by
the Cubans could provide a valuable
complement to other less effective air
defense systems. The new equipment
would enable Havana to continue
assistance to Nicaragua. The MiG-23
and MiG-21 fighters probably would be
most effective in aiding the Sandinista
regime. Deployment of a few dozen
MiGs would not seriously reduce Cuba's
defenses, an"1 Cuban-piloted MiGs would
enable Nicaragua to counter virtually
any threat from within the region.
]:n early 1982 Cuba. also received
some Mi-24 HIND-D helicopters, the
first assaut helicopters in Cuba's inven-
tory which also includes the Mi-8 HIP.
The Mi-24- armed with a 57mm can-
non, minigun, and rocket pods and
carrying a combat squad- will provide
Cuba with improved offensive capability.
Cuba's ability to mount an amphibi-
ous assault is constrained both by the
small number of naval infantry and by a
dearth of suitable landing craft. Cuba
would, however, be capable of transport-
ing large numbers of troops and sup-
plies- using ships belonging to the mer-
chant marine and the navy- to ports
secured by friendly forces, if the United
States did not become involved.
Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations
Cuba's several paramilitary organiza-
?
tions involve hundreds of thousands of
civilian personnel during peacetime and
would be available to support the
military during times of crisis. Although
these groups would he far less combat
capable than any segment of the mili-
tary, they do provide the civilian popula-
tion with at least rudimentary military
training and discipline. Their primary
orientation is internal security and local
defense.
The extent to which the military is
involved in the civilian sector is further
indicated by its activity within the eco-
nomic sphere. In addition to uniformed
personnel, the Ministry of the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces (MINFAR)
employs more than 30,000 civilian
workers in factories-and repair facilities
in Cuba and in building roads and air-
fields in Africa. Many of them are em-
ployees of MINFAR's Central Director-
ate for Housing and Construction which,
in addition to military construction,
builds housing and apartment complexes
for military and civilian personnel of
both MINFAR and the Ministry of the
Interior. The Youth Labor Army also
Strength and Missions of Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations
Organization Subordination Strength
Youth Labor MINFAR 100,000
Army (Ministry of the
Revolutionary
Armed Forces
Civil Defense MINFAR
Force
at present; still
forming
MININT (Ministry 3,000 full-time, plus
of the Interior) unknown number of
civilian auxiliaries
Border Guard
Troops
Department of
State Security
Civic action force, receiving little
military training in peacetime.
One wartime mission would be
to operate and protect the
railroads.
"Military" units would assist in
providing local defense; non-
military would provide first aid
and disaster relief.
Responsible for public order in
peacetime; could help provide
rear area security during war-
time.
Counterintelligence and preven-
tion of counter-revolutionary ac-
tivities.
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contributes to economic development by
engaging in agricultural, industrial, con
truction, transportation, and other proj-
ects.
The Soviet Presence
The Soviet military presence in Cuba in-
cludes a ground forces brigade of about
2,600 men, a military advisory group of
2,000, and an intelligence-collection
facility. There also are 6,000-8,000
Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba. Military
deployments to Cuba consist of periodic
visits by Soviet naval reconnaissance air-
craft and task groups.
Soviet ground forces have been in
Cuba since shortly before the 1962
missile crisis. Located near Havana, the
ground forces brigade consists of one
tank and three motorized rifle battalions
as well as various combat and support
units. Likely missions include providing
a small symbolic Soviet commitment to
Castro-implying a readiness to defend
Cuba-and probably providing security
for Soviet personnel and key Soviet
facilities, particularly for the Soviets'
large intelligence-collection facility. The
brigade almost certainly would not have
a role as an intervention force, although
it is capable of tactical defense and
offensive operations in Cuba. Unlike
units such as airborne divisions, it is not
structured for rapid deployment, and no
transport aircraft able to carry its
armed vehicles and heavy equipment are
stationed in Cuba.
Total Number (Estimated)
Military
Civilian
Angola
20,000-25,000
6,000
Ethiopia
11,000-13,000
600
Nicaragua
2,000
4,000
South Yemen
200-300
100
Grenada
30
300
The Soviet military advisory group
provides technical advice in support of
weapons such as the MiGs, surface-to-air
missiles, and the FOXTROT submarines;
some also are attached to Cuban ground
units. The Soviets' intelligence-collection
facility-their largest outside the
U.S.S.R.-monitors U.S. military and
civilian communications.
Since the naval ship visit program
began in 1969, 21 Soviet naval task
groups have deployed to the Caribbean,
virtually all of them visiting Cuban
ports. The most recent visit occurred in
April and May 1981 and included the
first by a Kara-class cruiser-the largest
Soviet combatant ever to have visited
the island. Soviet intelligence-collection
ships operating off the east coast of the
United States regularly call at Cuba, as
do hydrographic research and space-
support ships operating in the region. In
addition, the Soviet Navy maintains a
salvage and rescue ship in Havana for
emergency operations.
Since 1975, Soviet TU-95 Bear D re-
connaissance aircraft have deployed
periodically to Cuba. Typically, these air-
craft are deployed in pairs and stay in
Cuba for several weeks at a time. The
flights traditionally have been associated
with U.S., NATO, and Soviet exercises;
the transit of U.S. ships to and from the
Mediterranean; and periods of increased
international tension.
The Soviets apparently sent a con-
siderable number of pilots to augment
Cuba's air defense during two periods-
early 1976 and during 1978-when
Cuban pilots were sent to Angola and
Ethiopia. They filled in for the Cuban
pilots deployed abroad and provided the
Cuban Air Force with sufficient person-
nel to perform its primary mission of air
defense of the island.
Threat to Hemispheric Strategic
Defense
Cuban miltary ties with the Soviet
Union, the Soviet presence in Cuba, a
large Soviet intelligence-collection facili-
ty, and the periodic Soviet air and naval
presence pose not inconsiderable mili-
tary threats to U.S. security interests in
the hemisphere. Because of Cuba's prox-
imity to vital sea lanes, the Soviets or
Cubans in wartime could attempt to in-
terdict the movement of troops, sup-
plies, and raw materials in the Gulf of
Mexico and Caribbean Sea and could
strike key facilities in the area. U
Published by the United States Department
of State - Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication - Editorial
Division - Washington, D.C. - August 1982
Editors: Norman Howard and Colleen
Sussman - This material is in the public do-
main and may be reproduced without permis-
sion; citation of this source is appreciated.
?
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