2 U.S. PEACE-KEEPERS INJURED BY MINE IN SINAI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001202720027-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: January 18, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP85M00363R001202720027-3
TUESDAY MORNING, 18 JANUARY 1983
WASHINGTON POST 18 JANUARY 1983 Pg. 11
fteepers Injured by Mine in Sinai
TEL AVIV, Jan. 17 (AP)-Two
American soldiers were wounded, one
seriously, by a mine explosion in the
Sinai Peninsula today, the multina-
tional peace-keeping force announced.
The Americans were believed to be
the first casualties suffered by the 11-
nation, 2,600-man force since it began
policing the eastern Sinai last April
after Israel returned the final portion,
of the desert peninsula to Egypt.
NITZE'S ROLE.. ,Cont.
was willing to explore .... (Its was
turned down flatly by the Soviet
Union in September."
Last weekend the story was revived
by some officials who cited this inci-
dent as a cause for last week's firing
of Rostow as director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Those officials said Rostow had been
aware of Nitze's informal negotiations
and initially defended him when
White House national security affairs
adviser William P. Clark wanted to
discipline him.
However, most government offi.
aisle, including Reagan, have main.
tamed that Rostow's firing stemmed
from personal and managerial differ.
ences rather than the Nitze incident.
According to informed sources,
Nitze and Kvitsinsky, two experi-
enced negotiators, reached an extraor-
dinary agreement between themselves
last July on a new "package" approach
to the negotiations on limiting nuclear
missiles in Europe, which appeared to
them to have bogged down after two
rounds of discussion.
The package, these sources said, in-
cluded the following elements.
? The Soviets would freeze the
number of their intermediate-range
SS20 nuclear missiles based in the
Far East and reduce the member of
SS20, in central anat. western Russia
that are aimed at western European
to gets.
? The United States would not de-
ploy the Pershing II, the missile the
Soviets most feared because it could
hit Soviet territory within eight.
minutes after launch from planned
base, in West Germany. The United
States also would limit. the numht-r or
In Washington, the Army identified
the two wounded men as 1st Lt. Rich-
arc! N. Fincher, 2:i, of Waxhaw. N.C.,
who was listed in critical condition,
and Ptc. Albert R. Brown, 18, of
Springfield, Mass., in stable condition.
The multinational force's Tel Aviv
office denied an Israel radio report
that a third soldier was killed by the
mine explosion. The radio report said
a helicopter took the two wounded
men to Yoseftal Hospital in Eilat.
The Pentagon said the wounded
men were from the 1st Battalion,
502nd Infantry of the 101st Airborne
Division, based at Fort Campbell, Ky.
The office orthe multinational force
gave no details of the explosion but
said it was investigating. Israel radio
said it occurred at the southern tip of
Sinai, near the town of Ophira which
Israel built during its occupation of the
peninsula and ceded to Egypt when its
forces withdrew nine months ago.
ground-launched cruise missiles sta-
tioned in Europe, depending on the
number of Soviet European-based
SS2Os.
No number was set, but the United
States would be left with more war-
heads and fewer launchers because an
SS20 carries three nuclear warheads
while a cruise missile launcher will
fire four separate nuclear missiles.
? There would he limitations on
the number of nuclear-capable air-
.craft in Europe with the goal of
equalizing numbers for both the
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries,
and particularly American and Soviet
planes.
This package strayed considerably
from the initial negotiating positions
put forward by the two countries.
The original Soviet position called
for a reduction in NATO and Warsaw
Pact nuclear systems, both aircraft
and ground and %;1b-launched mis-
siles, to 300 by 1990. This would pre-
vent the United States from deploy-
ing either the Pershing It or cruise
missiles force it to reduce the number
of its nuclear-capable aircraft.
The U.5. position .was to negotiate
only about missiles and t , pursue a
"zero option." under which -he United
States wunhl not deploy : ny of the
planned 1113 Pershing or 164 cruise
missiles if the Soviets agreed to de-
stroy not only their roughly 300 older
S54 and S55 missiles but also all of
their 300 new. deployed SS Os.
The U.S. and Soviet negotiators,
4uurces N,r'd, irits-i to narrow the wide
;.tp betwi'en the two posit !tlls l)y eti-
talllishutg it h'g'cal iranlewnrk for mis-
?ilcs and 11onurers without ett.ing spe-
cific naunher.
h'or example. the.So:iet?; wanted to
~.?ba~1a t;race! purl F'-. nch nuclear
missile systems within the American
totals, while the United States wanted
to eliminate all SS20s in the Soviet
arsenal, even those stationed in the
Far East and targeted on China.
The Nitze-Kvitsinsky approach,
one source said, was to freeze the
number of 8820s in the Far East and
appear to equate them to the British
and French systems. That left the
opportunity to reach some parity be-
tween U.S. and Soviet missile war-
:heads in the European area. -
In Q y' after.Nitze's initiative be-
came known in Washington, some
Reagan administration officials ar-
gued that the arms control expert had
exceeded his authority and should be
reprimanded. He was not. But when
Nitze, 76, returned to Geneva in Sep-
tember for the third round of nego-
tiations, his instructions sharply lim-
ited his authority to engage in such
exploratory discussions.
fie felt so tied by his instructions
that he used Hart one des as an in.
-
termediary with Kvitiinsky to explore
hints of a new Soviet negotiating po-
sition. As the three lunched together,
the two negotiators posed questions
and offered answers to each other
through Hart. who later, said he
"served as a hollow log".
Although he cabled the informal
new Soviet positions to Washington,
Nitze was not given any authority to
follow them up, according to sources.
Much of the Soviet proposal since
made public by Andropov appears to
have roots in the Nitze-ICvitsinsky
discussions last summer, including
separate limits for missiles and air-
craft, rough parity on numbers of mis-
sile warheads rather than launchers,
and the destruction of some S,,;-2)0 ?.
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Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP85M00363R001202720027-3