SOVIET BLOC AND CUBAN ACTIVITY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001002360003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 5, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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5 January 1983
SOVIET BLOC AND CUBAN ACTIVITY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this briefing is to provide you with a
comprehensive review of Soviet and Cuban efforts to increase
their strength and influence in Central America and the Caribbean
over the past few years. Some of the details may already be
familiar to you,, but we hope this overview will help put them
into a clearer perspective.
BACKGROUND
By way of background, both the Soviet Union and Cuba began
to see new opportunities to extend their influence in the region
in mid-1979, when the Sandinistas suddenly came to power in
Nicaragua. The Sandinistas made little secret of their anti-
Americanism, their intention to eventually convert Nicaragua to a
Marxist state, and their support for the spread of revolution
throughout the region. Although many of the Sandinistas were
little known in Moscow, the core of the leadership had close ties
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to Havana, and Cuban aid had been instrumental in bringing them
to power.
As early as 1978, Fidel Castro saw the chance that the
Sandinista revolt against Somoza could succeed, and he was
subsequently responsible for unifying its three main factions
into a broad front group able to attract considerable popular and
international support. During the final offensive push, Cuba--
helping plan Sandinista military strategy--provided
weaponry, trained and transported combatants to join the battle,
and even sentE]military advisers to accompany the Sandinistas 25X1
into Managua.
Cuba thus saw Nicaragua as an important foothold in the
American continent and the key to spreading subversion and
insurrection further north, where conditions in El Salvador and
Guatemala were considered especially ripe for revolution. At the
first anniversary celebration of the Sandinista victory in
Managua in July 1980, Fidel Castro noted prophetically that
Central America was. like a volcano ready to explode.
.Meanwhile, the Soviets began to increasingly embrace the
Cuban view that revolution could succeed in the area if
adequately guided and supported. In a March 1980 article, a
Soviet political theorist noted that a political-military front
group like the Sandinistas' could replace the orthodox Communist
parties as the revolutionary vanguard. But while the Soviet
Union agreed with Cuban goals, it saw the need to move cautiously
and covertly for fear of provoking a strong US reaction. There
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is little doubt, however, about the increased Soviet and Cuban
harmony of interests and cooperation in the region over the past
few years.
-- Since early 1980, Moscow has provided or assisted in the
provision of large amounts of military supplies not only
to Cuba and Nicaragua, but also to Salvadoran insurgent
forces and other Central American subversive groups.
-- Moscow has used its close relationship and influence with
Algeria, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and the PLO, among others, to
obtain additional support for the revolutionaries.
-- The Soviets also have been aiding Cuban efforts to spread
subversion through the formation of broad revolutionary
front groups designed to attract increased popular and
international support while using them for Moscow's own
interests.
-- In addition, the Soviet Union has undertaken a massive
propoganda and disinformation campaign, using all its
Bloc and international assets, in an attempt to influence
public opinion against US policy in Central America.
-- Finally, the Soviets have assisted Salvadoran insurgent
efforts to obtain international recognition and support
from a variety of international organizations, including
the UN, the OAS, the Non-aligned Movement, and the
Socialist International.
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THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
Soviet military aid to Cuba since 1980 has reached levels
not seen since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (see chart # 1).
The major purpose behind the buildup, as Castro himself has
openly admitted in a recent speech on the anniversary of the
founding of the Cuban Revolutionary Army, is to build up Cuban
defenses for the inevitable US reaction to Havana's "alleged"
support for regional insurgencies. As a result of this aid, Cuba
now has a massive armed force of some 220,000 to 260,000 regular
and reserve troops, including one of the largest and best
equipped air forces in Latin America.
The Soviet aid has included:
-- Enough small arms to equip a newly raised territorial
militia of over 500,000 people.
-- New MI-24 attack helicopters and additional MIG-21 and
MIG-23 jet fighters to strengthen the Cuban Air Force
-- New SA-6 and additional SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to
improve Cuban air defenses.
-- A new frigate and two amphibious landing craft, along
with an additional submarine and more missile patrol
boats, to strengthen the Cuban Navy.
-- More tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery for the Cuban
ground forces.
This table summarizes the major weapons deliveries since 1980 as
well as current equipment inventories (see table # 1).
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In addition to improving Cuba's defensive capability, the
arms deliveries have improved Cuban capabilities to project its
military power throughout the Caribbean Basin.
-- The MIG-23s have sufficient combat radius to reach key
targets in the Caribbean from Cuban bases (see map).
-- The Cubans have two quick reaction forces with a total of
2,200 troops capable of being airlifted anywhere in the
region on short notice.
-- The two new amphibious landing craft can each carry 180
troops or six armored vehicles to areas with limited port
facilities
The Cubans are proud of -their improved armed forces, and
they did not hesitate to show off their firepower to impress
foreign visitors
There is every likelihood that this Cuban military buildup
will continue.
-- At the same anniversary celebration, Castro stated that
he had obtained in two years the great majority of
weapons originally scheduled for five, but added that he
could get still more weapons from Moscow if necessary.
Castro added that the Cuban armed forces were also paying
special attention to improving their contingents in Angola and
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Ethiopia, as well as their military missions in other countries.
-- This table illustrates our current estimates of Cuban
military and civilian advisory personnel overseas (see
table # 2).
-- In addition to some 40,000 troops in Africa, the most
important Cuban military mission is the 1,500 to 2,000
advisers in Nicaragua.
NICARAGUA
After the Sandinista takeover in July 1979, the Cubans moved
quickly to help the junta consolidate its power base, reduce
domestic opposition, and build a military force which is now the
largest in the region. Cuban advisers began arriving in Managua
even before the Somoza downfall was complete.
By
early 1980, Soviet Bloc weapons began arriving in large
quantities, and Nicaraguan personnel were leaving for military
training in Cuba and Eastern Europe.
Like the Cubans, the Sandinistas have publicly maintained
that their arms buildup is purely for defensive purposes. But
also like the Cubans, they expect that their covert support for
regional revolutionaries will inevitably produce a strong
reaction, particularly from their northern neighbors. Since
early 1982, the defense buildup also has been motivated by
increasing anti-Sandinista insurgent activity along the Honduran
border and the alleged fear of a US-backed invasion.
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We now estimate that the Sandinistas can call on an armed
force of some 75,000 men, including regular forces and reserve
and militia units. This force clearly overshadows that of
Honduras, with only 15,000 men, and Costa Rica, which has no
armed forces. To house this force, Nicaragua has continued to
construct new military installations, completing nearly 40 since
1979.
Early in 1982, the Intelligence Community provided a
photographic briefing that illustrated this buildup. We would
like to show you additional photographs that demostrate how the
buildup has continued.
-- In mid-1982, the Sandinistas completed a new garrison for
their Soviet T-54/55 tank battalion just outside of
Managua
-- They also completed two new infantry battalion garrisons
near Managua
-- In addition, they have begun work on another major
installation south of the capital
All of the installations have a common layout similar to
Cuban garrisons, and there is little doubt that they are being
designed and constructed with Cuban assistance.
-- It is interesting to note that Cuban 1st Vice-President
Raul Castro visited Nicaragua in mid-1982 with a high
level military delegation, ostensibly to offer aid for
flood damage.
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-- It was subsequently announced that 2,000 Cuban
construction workers were being sent to Nicaragua, and
since then we have detected a spurt in military
construction activity.
The Cubans have also constructed a major strategic road
between Puerto Cabezas and the interior
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-- The road facilitates the movement of troops and military
supplies to the troubled northeast border area.
New weaponry for the armed forces also continued to arrive
during 1982.
-- In February, a Soviet ship delivered about 270 military
trucks to the port of Corinto bringing the 25X1
total Soviet Bloc truck inventory in Nicaragua to over
800.
-- In April, an Algerian merchant ship delivered four Soviet
heavy tank ferries, one small patrol boat, and 12 BM-21
multiple rocket launchers. These had previously been
delivered to Algeria by Soviet ships and stored on the
docks
-- The tank ferries provide the Sandinista Army with an
offensive water crossing capability, while the BM-21s
give them a mass firepower weapon unmatched in the
region.
Then in November, a Bulgarian ship delivered another 25 T-
54/55 tanks The delivery followed a visit by 25X1
Sandinista junta leader Daniel Ortega to Moscow earlier in the
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year, and the Soviets may have decided to use a Bulgarian
connection to provide the weaponry.
-- in early December 1982, we discovered that eight new
122mm howitzers had also been delivered, supplementing 12
152mm guns delivered in 1981.
In addition to the Soviets,
as many as 500 East Germans, Bulgarians, Czechoslovakians,
Hungarians, Palestinians, and Vietnamese are in Nicaragua.
-- Many are active in military as well as civilian aid
projects.
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-- The East Germans are providing technical and security
experts. The Bulgarians and Poles are providing pilot
training
-- The Vietnamese are providing arms aid and presumably
counterinsurgency advise.
Libya also became a regular source of arms to Nicaragua in
-- In May, a Libyan C-130 delivered four small Italian
trainer aircraft to Managua. These are useful in a
counterinsurgency role.
-- Since then, they also have delivered three or four
Polish-built MI-2 light helicopters
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supplement two French Alouettes and an additional Soviet
MI-8 helicopter which also arrived last year.
Meanwhile, construction activity continues at various
Nicaraguan airfields to upgrade their capability to support jet
fighter operations.
-- Improvements are underway at Sandino, Puerto Cabezas, and
Montelimar airfields
-- New runways are under construction at Bluefields on the
east coast, at La Rosita in the northeast, and at Punto
Huete just north of Managua
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We still expect Cuba to deliver MIG-21s to Nicaragua when
the proper moment arrives--perhaps when they can be justified by
a Honduran threat.
This map shows the combat radius of MIG-21s from various
Nicaraguan airfields. (see map)
-- As you can see, the aircraft have enough range to reach
key targets throughout the region.
In addition to the military buildup, the Sandinistas have
continued their efforts to consolidate their political control
and weaken their domestic opposition.
-- Supreme political power remains in the hands of the nine
member National Directorate of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN), who are all Marxist-Leninists.
-- The FSLN is the only political party permitted to operate
freely, and it dominates the quasi-legislative Council of
State.
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-- Mass organizations have been established for the purpose
of popular mobilization and indoctrination. These
include, in addition to the militia, neighborhood
Sandinista Defense Committees, labor unions, and youth
organizations.
-- The Sandinistas have exploited the great expansion of
health care and education, in which the Cubans play a
dominant role, for propaganda purposes and for political
indoctrination.
Political repression has been particularly severe since
March 1982, when a state of emergency was declared.
-- The independent news media have been heavily censored.
-- Opposition political organizations are prohibited from
assembling.
-- Labor unions are prohibited from striking.
-- Opposition political leaders have been arrested or driven
into exile.
The Catholic Church, particularly the Archbishop of Managua,
has come under attack because of opposition to regime policies.
-- Sandinista mobs have interfered with Church functions.
-- Members of the clergy have been detained by the security
forces, and one was roughed up by Sandinista supporters.
-- The regime has tried to dictate the educational
curriculum in Catholic schools.
-- The "popular church," composed of Catholics sympathetic
to the regime, has been encouraged by the Sandinistas as
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part of their intention to undermine the traditional
church hierarchy.
-- Members of the clergy in government, including foreign
Minister D'Escoto, have ignored the Archbishop's
expressed desire that they leave their government posts.
Meanwhile, the Sandinistas have begun to move toward the
promised elections in 1985, by which they hope to legitimize the
regime and consolidate their control.
-- While Managua has made great efforts to convince the
international community that the effort will be a
democratic one, the Sandinistas make little attempt to
conceal the fact that they do not intend to relinquish
power.
Before we leave Nicaragua, I would like to discuss briefly
what the Sandinistas are doing to the population along the
Honduran border.
--[in early 1982 the Sandinistas forceably
removed the entire Miskito population from border
villages in Zelaya Department, placing some 8,000 in
government camps and driving over 10,000 refugees into
Honduras
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The crash of a heavily loaded Soviet MI-8 helicopter in
Jinotega Department in December 1982, which killed 75 Indian
children, revealed the fact that a similar forced evacuation was
underway in that area.
-- Havana and Managua have tried to place the blame
for the crash on Honduras and the US
-- Nicaraguan Interior Minister Borge admitted in a late
December 1982 press interview that repression of the
Miskito Indians was a necessary action resulting from
previous regime "blunders."
EL SALVADOR
Bolstered by the continued growth of the Nicaraguan armed
forces, the Cubans and Sandinistas have continued their covert
support of the Salvadoran insurgency. The insurgent command
center has remained in Managua despite US protests
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Meanwhile, the Soviets and Cubans have continued their
efforts to promote the Salvadoran Democratic Revolutionary Front
(FDR). The FDR is designed to unite Marxist revolutionaries with
more moderate leftist groups and thereby attract increased
popular and international support. The FDR is dominated by the
radicals, however, and through them Moscow and Havana hope to
subvert the revolution for their own purposes.
-- The FDR, which includes the Salvadoran Communist Party
(PCES), was established in Havana in April 1980 at Soviet
and Cuban direction.
-- The insurgent military front, or FMLN, which also
includes the PCES, was set up in Havana in 1980 at
Castro's urging.
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-- It was PCES leader Shafik Handal who traveled to Moscow
in June 1980 to get Soviet support in obtaining weapons
and other aid.
The trip resulted in promises of weapons, training, or
financial assistance from Vietnam, East Germany, Czechoslavakia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ethiopia.
Since then, while generally supporting the entire
revolutionary front, Moscow has given the PCES influence much
greater than its numbers would warrant by funneling much of the
assistance to the insurgents through it.
-- The ultimate intention is to ensure that Soviet- and
Cuban- dominated factions of the revolutionary alliance
are in the best position to influence it should it
succeed.
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GUATEMALA
Turning briefly to Guatemala, the Cubans and Nicaraguans
also continue to be active in supporting the leftist insurgency
in that country. With Soviet support, they have increased their
efforts to form a viable insurgent alliance which they can
ultimately control for their own purposes.
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HONDURAS
In Honduras, we have already touched on the close links
between the Salvadoran insurgents and Honduran radical leftist
groups, as well as their desire to step up terrorism in an effort
to intimidate the Suazo government and force it to modify its
pro-US stance.
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Nonetheless, the Honduran leftists have generally failed to
coalesce into a radical alliance, and Salvadoran and Guatemala
insurgent groups have taken a leading role in fomenting terrorist
incidents.
-- The recent kidnapping of Honduran President Suazo's
daughter in Guatemala apparently was the work of a
Guatemalan guerrilla faction.
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COSTA RICA
The Cubans and Nicaraguans also have been active in
spreading subversion to Costa Rica. This process has accelerated
over the past year because they are especially upset with the
pro-US policies of President Monge.
Nicaragua has stepped up its terrorist actions in Costa
Rica, leading to increased tensions between the two countries.
-- The Sandinistas have denied complicity in the 3 July 1982
bombing of the Honduran airlines office in San Jose,
despite the confession of the captured perpetrator.
-- The terrorist stated the action was part of a general
Nicaraguan plan which included sabotage, kidnappings,
bank robberies, and other terrorist acts designed to
discredit Costa Rica internationally.
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GRENADA
In addition to Central America, the Soviets and Cubans have
been active in supporting leftist radicals in other countries in
the region. Grenada has become the major focal point of their
activities in the eastern Caribbean ever since Prime Minister
Bishop seized power in March 1979.
-- Bishop has openly alluded to his willingness to allow
Soviet and Cuban military use of a huge new airport being
constructed at Point Salines with Cuban assistance F--~ 25X1
-- The runway is already capable of handling MIG-21 and MIG-
23 jet fighters, as well as AN-26 transports (see map).
-- Cuba could therefore use Grenada as a staging area for
rapid deployment of troops to support leftist regimes in
the region.
The Cubans have also constructed a military base on the
island near the new airport.
-- The installation can house an infantry battalion, and we
have recently seen Soviet BTR-60 armored personnel
carriers there
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In addition to this military aid, Bishop visited the Soviet
Union, East Germany, and Bulgaria in 1982, presumably to secure
more economic and security assistance.
-- Libya has also been active in Grenada, and now has an
embassy there.
SURINAME
Another trouble spot in the eastern Caribbean is Suriname,
where leftist Army Commander Bouterse recently suppressed all
political opposition. Bouterse has tried to keep secret his ties
to Cuba, but there is little doubt that Cuban influence in
Suriname will continue to increase.
Bouterse has also formed a new People's Militia, presumably
based on the Cuban model, and has secured Cuban training for his
bodyguards.
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SOVIET AND CUBAN PROPAGANDA AND COVERT ACTIONS
Now let us turn to Soviet and Cuban propaganda actions.
Beginning in early 1980, the Soviet Union, assisted by Cuba,
launched a massive propaganda and disinformation campaign
designed to complement its subversive activities in Central
America. Initially at least, the campaign focused on US policy
toward El Salvador, although the campaign also dealt to a lesser
degree with US involvement in Guatemala and Honduras.
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During the past three years, all three parties have engaged
in various overt and covert activities designed to influence
public opinion in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, and the
US. These activities or mechanisms include the following:
-- overt propaganda,
-- overt diplomatic activities to gain recognition for the
insurgents in international organizations,
-- fabrication of forgeries,
-- use of front groups,
-- covert placement of media items, and
-- staging of demonstrations and protests on El Salvador.
Soviet propaganda themes have been aimed at discrediting US
policy in El Salvador, and widespread use has been made of
forgeries and disinformation to substantiate the message. For
example:
-- A bogus NSC dissent.paper on El Salvador and Central
America was used in the fall of 1980 to charge that the
United States was intervening covertly in El Salvador.
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-- A January 1981 article in Izvestiya explained that the US
was preparing to implement a military plan which
"provides for physical elimination of many thousands of
Salvadorans."
Moscow also employed its large international front groups
such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade
Unions in support of the propaganda campaign.
Meanwhile, the Salvadoran insurgent directorate, with the
support of Havana and Moscow, has directed the establishment of
Solidarity Committees throughout Europe, in Canada and even in
Australia and New Zealand. These serve as propaganda outlets and
conduits for aid contributions.
-- These committees have also helped plan, in conjunction
with Communist parties and local leftist groups, many of
the demonstrations that have taken place throughout
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Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
in support of the Salvadoran revolutionaries.
-- The pattern of dates and places of the demonstrations,
such as the world-wide ones held to protest the 28 March
1982 Salvadoran elections, shows that they were the
result of a well-coordinated effort.
Captured documents also indicate that the Salvadoran
insurgent directorate intends to seek recognition of its
political front in international organizations.
-- The organizations specifically targetted for a diplomatic
effort are the United Nations, the OAS, the Non-Aligned
Movement, the European Parliament, and the Council of
Europe.
-- The greatest success the insurgents have had so far in
achieving recognition is the French-Mexican declaration
of September 1981. However, the declaration was
subsequently repudiated throughout the Western Hemisphere
as interference in Salvadoran internal affairs.
SUMMARY
I know this has been a long briefing, but I hope it has been
a useful one. The Soviets and Cubans are exploiting
opportunities presented by existing political unrest and economic
hardship to spread revolution and subversion throughout the
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Caribbean Basin. They are using Nicaragua-as their primary base,
and are attempting to reverse the trend toward democratic
government by almost all the countries of the region.
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SOVIET DELIVERIES OF MILITARY GOODS TO CUBA
Identified
Military
Deliveries
YEAR SHIPS
1962 125
1965 5
1970 8
1975 8
1976 13
1977 10
1978 12
1979 12
1980 14
1981 24
1982** 11
Military-
Associated
Deliveries
** January through October-only.
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optimum combat Radii of MIG-23s and MIG-21s
United State
rMiami
Radio Marti
AVANA
Potenti'extent of deyti a interference
from gh-power direct nal antenna .
mis-zI
ID MIG Base (Cuba) or Potential Base (Nicaragua)
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tIC?z3
Atlantic
Ocean
ribbean Sea
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SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA:
SELECTED WEAPONS
Current
Ground 1980 1981 1982 Total
T-54/55/62 Medium Tanks 30 10 -- 315
BTR-60/BMP Armored Vehicles 50 35 -- 215
57/100mm Anti-tank Guns 50 115 -- 440
122/152mm SP Field Artillery -- 10 -- 10
Air/Air Defense
MIG-21 Fighters 20 25 35 235
MIG-23 Fighters -- 5 20 40
AN-26 Transports -- 5 -- 25
MI-24 Attack Helicopters -- -- 12 12
SA-2 SAMs -- 45 -- 745
SA-6 SAMs -- 20 -- 20
SA-9 SAMs -- -- 3 3
Navy
Koni-class Frigate
F-class Submarines
OSA-i1.Missile Attack Boats
Polnocny Medium Landing Ships
2 4 13
2 2
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Country
Angola
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Congo
Libya
South Yemen
Nicaragua
Grenada
Mili
tary
Civilian
25,000-
30,000
4,500
11,
000
1,000
1,0
00
1,000
100-200
3,200
50
0
150
1,500-
2,000
3,500-4,000*
10-
15
600
* Does not include 2,000 teachers on leave in Cuba
Total
29,500-34,500
12,000
2,000
600-700
3,200
650
5,000-6,000*
610-615
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002360003-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002360003-1
Lago de
Managua
MANAGUA
I Quebadita
(un construction)
KNometem
4
El
Ivador
~O
Gobo de
Fonseca
50
Kllometere
Nicaraguan Military Installations
Military
,C Ode o'e Mste9
_ -ica
CostaR
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002360003-1
Military Regi
Mo.telimet
? Major military base
Fighter airfield
under construction
e Armored battalion
Caribbean
Sea
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002360003-1
Central American Arms Routes
Mexico
Seaborne arms route
Overland arms route
Airborne arms route
Airstrip
GUATEMALA*
North Pacific
Ocean
Nicaragua
MANAGUA
SAN
* OSE
osta Rica
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002360003-1
Mexico
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002360003-1
Optimum High-Altitude Combat Radii of Cuban
MIG-1 7, MIG-21, and MIG-23 Fighter Aircraft From Grenada
3The Bahamas
.Colomb
Bermuda
(U.K.)
MIG-17=245 nm
MIG-21=300 nm
MIG-23=375 nm
Atlantic Ocean
British Virgin is.
(U K.): w~....t
/ e10u (Fr.)
~Domin
01 Martinique
(Fr.) d5t. Lucia
St. Vincent and
the Grenadines. bBarbsd
Brazil
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002360003-1
 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002360003-1
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. Cy #1
DCI - 7E12
2
DDCI - 7E12
3
ED/DCI - 7E12
4
SA/DCI/IA - 7E12
5
DDI - 7E44
6
ADDI - 7E44
7
NIO/LA - 7E48
8
NIC/AG - 2E49
9
C/DDO/IAD
10
C/DDO/LA
11-12
D/ALA
14
C/MCD
14
DC/MCD
15
C/CA
16
C/CC
17-23
CA ANALYSTS
24
DIVISION FILE
25
BRANCH FILE
DDI/ALA
~5 Jan 83)
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002360003-1