COMMENTS ON EL SALVADOR ESTIMATE DRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001002130006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 7, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/09/04: CIA-RDP85M00363RO01002130006-3
SECRET
NIC #8805-83
7 December 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : Major General Edward B. Atkeson, USA
National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces
SUBJECT : Comments on El Salvador Estimate Draft (U)
1. I find the draft estimate on El Salvador interesting and thought
provoking. An essential section, "political considerations," is missing, so
it is yet a little unfair to critique the paper. Guerrilla warfare is
inherently so politically motivated and-dominated that it seems premature to
say very much.
2. Inevitably, current analyses of insurgencies make references to
parallels with our great experience in the field--Vietnam. Occasionally such
references are useful, but I do not believe that such is the case here. The
South Vietnamese Army collapsed under the guns and threats of the North
Vietnamese Army--not the V.C. El Salvadorian insurgents have no tanks,
artillery, or motorized infantry. One suggestion I would make to improve this
paper would be to delete such misleading references.
3. The paper makes much of the possibility that the insurgents might
capture and hold a "liberated" area. It is not clear whether this is an
avowed insurgent goal or a construct of our own. Either way, I suspect we
make too much of it. Unless the guerrillas are provided with much heavier
equipment and can count on rapid reinforcement of one area by another, set
piece battles over real estate would seem to be the government's--not the
insurgent's--strong suit. It is one thing to claim dominion.over
wilderness. It is quite another thing to hold towns and villages against
attack by coordinated air-ground action, including armored vehicles and
artillery.
4.. The principal difficulty I have with the paper may not be the fault
of the author at all, but may be more with the strategy for dealing with the
insurgency.- The paper leads us to believe that the government is dedicated to
eradication of a 9,000-11,000 enemy armed force with manpower resources of
only 35,000. The notion strikes me as extraordinary.
5. Unfortunately the paper does not provide an estimate of the numbers
of part-time guerrillas or of the popular support base. By historical analogy
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we might assume these to be anywhere from 27,000 to 100,000 and 70,000 to
500,000 respectively. In view of the good turn out the government was able to
achieve during the election I would tend to pick the lower figures. At any
rate, I think it is highly unlikely that the figures in the paper completely
describe the dimensions of the problem. The bottom line is that in my view
the government is going to require a much larger armed force if it is going to
pacify the country. A rough rule of thumb for dealing with insurgents is an
armed force of about five times the size of the enemy combat cadre.
6. I do not have many statistics immediately available, but the
following may be instructive:
Insurgency
Armed Government
Insurgent Armed
Strength Strength
Malaya
5,000
(1947-1960)
Greece
23,000
(1947)
Algeria
20,000
(1962)
French Indo-China
30,000
(1952)
Vietnam
230,000
(1968) (main force
All portions of this memorandum
are classified SECRET
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SECRET
140,000
182,000
500,000
140,000
1.3 million
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