STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL B. R. INMAN DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ON THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 21, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL B. R.:INMAN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE TEE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ON
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION. ACT
am 21, 1981
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Select Committee on Intelligence,
I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Freedom of Information Act's impact on the Intelligence,
Community. I have been giving considerable thought to the particularly
serious problems being experienced by the Central Intelligence and.
National Secuity Agencies under 4e FOIA. I am convinced that there
is an inherent contradiction in the appiiza.tion of a statute designed
to assure openness in Government to agencies whose work is necessarily
secret, and that the adverse consequences of this application have
caused intelligence functions to be seriously impaired without
sic.nificant counterbalancing of public benefit. Mr. Chairman, I
believe that it is time to reexamine the fundamental question of
whether it makes sense for the FOIA to be applicable to our Nation's
two most sensitive intelligence agencies.
The Freedom of Information Act was first passed in 1966.
President Johnson described the Act as stemming from the principle
that "a democracy works best when the people have all the information
that the security of the Nation permits." The declared purpose of
the Act was to broaden access to government information connected
with activity impacting upon the public, with certain exceptions in
areas in which Congress believed exemptions werewarranted in the
national interest. During the post-Watergate period of pressure for
more Openness in government, amendments to the FOIA were enacted over
President Ford's veto against a background of allegations that
Federal agencies were fr-ustrating the intent of the Act through
delaying tactics, the unreasonable assessment of fees, and the
wholesale invoking of exemptions. The Supreme Court's decision in
EPA v. Mink, however, was the key impetus for the amendments. The
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 : CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Supreme Court had ruled that an agency must examine classified documents
before invoking the FOIA exemption permitting such documents to be
withheld from disclosure, but that it was not for the courts to rule on
whether the classification itself might be unwarranted:
Prior to the 1974 amendments, the Central Intelligence Agency had
received virtually no FOIA requests, and no litigation had beet
initiated against the Agency in connection'with any denial of release
of information under the classified documents exemption. The 1974
amendments made several fundamental changes in the Act, the most notable
of which Were:
1) Reasonably segregable portions of a document not
falling under the Act's exemptions were required
to be provided to the requester; and
2) The courts were given authority to review agency
determinations that records were withholdable under
the Act. This has resulted in an increasing tendency
on the part of the courts to second-guess the judgment
of professional intelligence officers that information
is properly classified in order, for example, to
protect the identity of intelligence sources.
These amendments led to an explosion in FOIA requests directed
at the CIA, and a corresponding increase in associated litigation.
Resources and manpower devoted to FOIA matters have, of course,
increased tremendously since the mid-1970's. The CIA's latest
annual report on its administration of the Act contains the following
statistics for calendar year 1980:
-- 1212 new FOIA cases were logged during 1980.
257,420.5 actual man-hours of labor (or 144 man-years)
were devoted,to the processing of Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, Privacy Act, and mandatory classification
review requests, appeals, and litigation, as compared
with the 110 man-years of labor- devoted in 1979. More
than half of these resources were devoted to the pro-
cessing of requests for subject matters information
under the FOIA
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9.
-- Over $3 million was expended in personnel costs for
processing, appeals, and litigation related tothese
requests. About two-thirds of this amount was spent
on FOIA cases.
Mr: Chairman, the money and manpower currently being devoted
to FOIA matters could certainly be utilized more productively in
substantive intelligence pursuits, hut I want to be sure that it is
- understood that gross personnel aind resources figures, as significant
as they are, are not the most important aspects of the FOIA problem
for the intelligence agencies. Other government agencies may receive
more FOIA requests, spend more time and money, and devote more manpower
to FOIA, but they are not intellioence agencies. The problems
'besetting CIA and NSA under the Act are unique because their missions
are unique, and these problems cannot be solved by an infusion of money
or manpower to deal with FOIA requests.
The search and review of records in response to FOIA requests.
poses a special set of problems for the Central Intelligence Agency.
The CIA's records systems are an integral part of the Agency's
security system to protect sensitive intelligence information. The
need to protect intelligence sources and methods through a complex
system of compartmented and decentralized records is in direct
conflict with the concept of openness under the FOIA. Because a
primary CIA mission is to gather information, its records systems
are constructed to support that mission and thus, the search for
records in response to an FOIA request becomes uniquely difficult.
These records, which number hundreds of millions of pages, are
compartmented and segregated along operational and functional lines.
Several componentt have multiple records systems. Thus, the search
for information responsive ?to an FOIA request is a demanding and
Approved ForRelease2008/01/04 : CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
time-consuming task. A relatively simple FOIk request may require as
many as 21 Agency record systems to be searched, a difficult request
over 100. The "need to know" principle, also, meant that CIA employees
normally have access only to information necessary to perform their
assignments. Thus, in the process of searching for documents in
response to an1FOIA request, people who would otherwise never have
?
access to compartmented information necesserly see such documents.
But, Mr. Chairman, it is not the quantity of time and effort
.devoted to this process that is the ultimate concern to us. It is
rather the level of employee who must become involved in the review
process. By this I mean the types of people who must participate in
FOIA processing and the impact which this involvement has on the
ability of these intelligence officers to carry out their intelligence
collection or analytical assignments.
When we surface information in response to an FOIA request, the
documents must be carefully reviewed in order to determine which
information can be released safely and which must be withheld, in
accordance with applicable FOIA exemptions, in order to protect mat-
ters such as the security of CIA operations or the identities of
intelligence sources. In most other government agencies the review of
information for possible release under the FOIA is a routine adminis-
trative function; in the Central Intelligence Agency it can be a matter
of life or death for human sources who could be jeopardized by the
release of information in which their identities might be exposed.
In some circumstances.mere acknowledgment of the fact that CIA has any
information on a particular subject could be enough to place the source
of that information in danger.
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
It must be remembered that the primary function of the CIA is
intelligence gathering, an activity which frequently takes place in a?
hostile environment, and which must take place in secrecy. The mere
disclosure that the CIA has engaged in a particular type of activity
or acquired a particular type of information can compromise ongoing
intelligence oPerations, cause the argets of CIA's collection effOrts
to adopt countermeasures, or impair relations with foreign governments.
Agency records must .be scrutinized with great care because bits of
information which might appear innocuous on their face could possibly
reveal sensitive information if subjected to sophisticated analysis or
combined with other information available to FOIA requesters.
This review is not a task which can be entrusted to individuals
hired specifically for this purpose, as is the case with many other
government agencies whose information has no such sensitivity. The
need for careful professional judgment in the review of CIA information
surfaced in response to FOIA requests means that this review recuires
the time and attention of intelligence officers whose primary
responsibilities .involve Participation in, or management of, vital
programs of intelligence collection and analysis for the President and
out foreign policymaking establishment. Experienced operations
officers and analysts are not commodities which can be purchased on the
open market. It takes years to develop first-class intelligence
officers. Again, let me emphasize that these reviewing officers are
not FOIA professionals, they are intelligence officers who are being
diverted from their primary intelligence duties. This diversion is
impacting adversely Upon the ability of the Agency to fulfill its vital
intelligence mission.
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Mr. Chairman, efforts to fulfill our intelligence missions while
subject to the provisions of the FOIA have placed the CIA in a vicious
cycle. Intelligence information must be processed and analyzed .quickly
if the President, the Cabinet, and the Congress are to receive the
latest and most accurate assessments of foreign developments. The
need for up-to-the-minute information frequently prevents the review of
FOIA documents from taking place in keepibc: with the time requirements
of the Act. This results in the Agency being sued for failure to
comply with the Act, which, in turn, requires an even greater amount
of time and effort to be expended in the litigation process. The
defense of such suits, as well as those that are brought because of a
-denial of the information requested, Tequires the time and effort of
numerous personnel, including intelligence officers directly concerned
with the request in question. :Thus, these intelligence officers are
again diverted from their primary intelligence duties and put even
further behind in reviewing other FOIA documents. Therefore, despite
an increase in the manpower devoted to FOIA review in 1980, the
. 'backlog of unanswered requests increased by 400 cases. Mr. Chairman,
when the work of senior intelligence officers is diverted to FOIA
concerns because information must be reviewed, or because court
affidavits must be prepared under strict time constraints to justify a
delayed response or a 'previous denial of information, the ability of
our Nation to formulate an informed and successful foreign policy
suffers. This is not a healthy situation. The diversion of senior
management time and attention from primary tasks to FOIA matters,
particularly in connection with litigation; is of especially great
concern to me.
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Mr. Chairman, efforts to fulfill our intelligence missions while
subject to the provisions of the FOIA have placed the CIA in a vicious
cycle. Intelligence information must be processed and analyzed .quickly
if the President, the Cabinet, and the Congress are to receive the
latest and most accurate assessments of foreign developments. The
need for up-to-the-minute information frequently prevents the review of
FOIA documents from taking place in keepibc: with the time requirements
of the Act. This results in the Agency being sued for failure to
comply with the Act, which, in turn, requires an even greater amount
of time and effort to be expended in the litigation process. The
defense of such suits, as well as those that are brought because of a
-denial of the information requested, Tequires the time and effort of
numerous personnel, including intelligence officers directly concerned
with the request in question. :Thus, these intelligence officers are
again diverted from their primary intelligence duties and put even
further behind in reviewing other FOIA documents. Therefore, despite
an increase in the manpower devoted to FOIA review in 1980, the
. 'backlog of unanswered requests increased by 400 cases. Mr. Chairman,
when the work of senior intelligence officers is diverted to FOIA
concerns because information must be reviewed, or because court
affidavits must be prepared under strict time constraints to justify a
delayed response or a 'previous denial of information, the ability of
our Nation to formulate an informed and successful foreign policy
suffers. This is not a healthy situation. The diversion of senior
management time and attention from primary tasks to FOIA matters,
particularly in connection with litigation; is of especially great
concern to me.
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one other point which is related
to the FOIA process. The Freedom of Information Act currently contains
exemptions for classified documents and other matters that are set
forth as exempt from disclosure. These exemptions have generally been
adequate to protect sensitive national security information. But, even
with the kind bf Quality resources we devote to the review process,
human error is always a possibility. Such_:errors have in fact occurred,
resulting in the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive CIA and NSA
information. These unintentional disclosures are constant reminders of
the risk which will be present so long as these agencies are subject to
the Act. The handling of FOIA requests involving CIA and NSA informa?
tion by other agencies has also resulted in some 'serious compromises of
classified information relating to intelligence sources and methods.
Comboundng these problems are attempts by requesters to gain additional.
classified information based upon these compromises.
Mr. Chairman, the FOIA further impedes the CIA's ability to do its
job through the perception it has created overseas. While tne
perception of CIA's inability to keep secrets may be caused by leaks,
unreviewed Publications by former officials and the like, it is the
FOIA that is viewed as the symbol of this problem. Individual human
sources and foreign intelligence services are aware of the Act, and
view it as a threat to the Agency's ability to maintain the
confidentiality of its sources; and to protect the information they
provide. An intelligence agency cannot operate effectively under
such conditions. Human intelligence is as important today as it has
ever been in the history of this Nation. To obtain this intelligence
it is vital that there be confidence in the ability of the United
States Government to honor assurances of secrecy. It must be
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 : CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
remembered that many individuals who cooperate with the intelligence
efforts of the United States do so at great personal risk. Identifi-
cation as a CIA agent can ruin a career, endanger a family, or even ,
lead to imprisonment, torture, or death; We must be able to provide
human sources with absolute assurance that the fact of their cooperation
with the Unitea States will forever be kept secret and that the
information they provide will never be revealed or attributed to then.
The FOIA has raised doubts about our ability to maintain such
commitments, despite our explanations that the Act provides exemptions
which allow for the safekeeping of sensitive information. The concept
of an intelligence agency being subject to an openness in government
"law is not uniformly understood by individuals and intelligence services
abroad. It has been necessary to spend a great deal of time attempting
to convince foreign intelligence services that they should not
discontinue their liaison relationships with us because of the FOIA.
The very fact that CIA files are subject to search and review for
information which is releasable is extremely disturbing to our sources.
There have been many cases in which individuals have refused to
cooperate with us, diminished their level of cooperation with us, or
totally discontinued their relationship with our people in the field
because of fears that their identities might be revealed through an
FOIA release. What we will never know, Mr. Chairman, is how much
valuable information has been lost to the United States due to the
reluctance of potential human sources to even begin a relationship.
Mr. Chairman, I believe it is absolutely clear that the FOIA
is impairing our nation's intelligence efforts. The minimal benefit
accruing to the public from application of the FOIA to the Central _
Intelligence and National Security Agencies is simply not worth the
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
cost to the effectiveness Of these agencies. Let us ask ourselves
some basic questions about the FOIA's application to the intelligence
agencies.
First, does the application of the FOIA to CIA and NSA fulfill
the Act's fundamental purpose of giving the American people greater
access to infotmation about the workings of government which affect
their daily lives? The answer to: this quettitn is no, because our
intelligence activities are focused on the acquisition of information
abroad and its analysis for foreign policymakers.
It might be asked whether the application of the FOIA to CIA and
NSA serves a useful informing function. Again, the answer is no.
information which is released under the Act is generally extremely
fragmentary and it can often be misleading. Mr. Chairman, I would note
that certain organizations have published lists of books and articles
said to be of public interest which supposedly were based- on information
released by intelligence agencies under the FOIA. The argument is made
that these materials could not ha4e been published without the FOIA.
believe that such claims are grossly exaggerated. The FOIA has not
resulted in the revelation of fundamental information but has instead
been used to garner additional details about subject matter which was
originally either revealed by one of the intelligence agencies on its
own, or in the course of investigations such as those conducted by
the Rockefeller Commission or the Church Committee.
Mr. Chairman, one of the purposes of the Freedom of Information
Act is to provide the American public with a mechanism by which they
can know how government agencies are carrying out their functions.
This leads to another question: Isn't the FOIA needed to provide
public oversight of the intelligence agencies, in order to ensure
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9.
that the abuses and excesses of the past do not recur? Mr. Chairman,
the FOIA has never been an effective oversight mechanism for the CIA
or NSA, and the idea that it should apply to these agencies for such
purposes ought to be laid to rest once and for all. The fragmentary
information obtainable under the FOIA has not, cannot, and will not
ever remotely ,tompare in value with the congressionally established
oversight responsibility which lies with this Committee and its
Companion committee in the souse. These two committees are
specifically responsible for overseeing the funding and operations of
the various intelligence agencies. I believe that it is fair to say
that no other agencies in the Government are subject to such close
-congressional scrutiny on a permanent, ongoing basis. It is this
system of vigilant and effective congressional oversight, along with
extensive Executive branch review mechanisms, which provides the means
through which the American people are assured that the operation of
their intelligence agencies is in accordance with applicable law.
Mr. Chairman, the President has stated his determination to
enhance the Nation's intelligence capabilities, and I have pledged
to work toward achieving that goal. To do this, the CIA and NSA must
be able to focus their energies on the timely and accurate. gathering
and analysis of information in a manner which insures the secrecy of
the sources and content of that information. For the reasons I have
stated, I believe the current application -of the FOIA to the CIA and
NSA is inappropriate, that it is detrimental to the accomplishment of
intelligence missions and, that it is unjustified by its insignificant
public benefit.
Mr. Chairman, what is to be done? I want ?to make clear that I am .
firmly convinced that CIA and NSA problems under the FOIA cannot be
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
Approved For Release 2008/01/04 : CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9
substantially alleviated by. strengthening the grounds upon which infor-
mation can be withheld from public disclosure under the Act. Senator
Chafee's Bill, S. '1273, takes a different, more promising approach in
its effort to seal off certain categories of fil-es from the entire FOIA
process, including search and review. I believe that Senator Chafee's
if enacted, would have a major positive impact. But Mr.
Chairman, I also believe that .the time has tome for the Congress to
face the issue squareay and definitively, and to recognize that only
a total exclusion of records created or maintained by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency from all of the
Freedom of information Act's requirements can, by completely'
eliminating the need to search and review records in response to FOIA
requests, end the wasteful and debilitating diversion of resources
and critically needed skills, eliminate the danger of court-ordered
release of properly classified information, and regain the confidence
of human sources and foreign intelligence services.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one footnote to my testimony
before you today. ? Nothing which I have said should be construed to
indicate any lessening in our belief that individual Americans should
continue to be able to determine whether or not an .intelligence agency
holds information on them, and to obtain this information when security
considerations permit. I wish to state categorically that CIA and NSA
? would continue full compliance with the Privacy Act even if these
agencies were to be totally excluded from the FOIA.
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP85M00363R001002080006-9