FACT SHEET ON CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000902060041-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 24, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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yr % W L.
SYSTEM II
90652
May 24, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director, Central Intelligence
T
Attached at Tab A is a revised Fact Sheet on the situation in
Central America. This document represents considerable work by our
staffs over the last four days to produce an up-to-date summary of
the situation. As you will note, it has been re-casted to support
the report of the HPSCI last week.
The Defense Department is prepared to prin~~ and publish this
document as a joint State/DOD releasepGarednesday, May 25, 1983.
Would you please review Tab A and indicate your concurrence by :00
p.m., Tuesday, May 24, 1983. Absent a call to the contrary, we
will plan to make distribution at a joint State/DOD press briefing
on Wednesday, May 25, 1983.
William P. Clark
Attachment
dab A - Fact Sheet: Central America: Situation Report
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CENTRAL AMERICA: A SITUATION REPORT
(BOX OR ITALICIZED PREFACE)
Preface
On May 13 the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued its
committee report in which it concluded that "the
Sandinistas have stepped up their support for insurgents
in Honduras" and further concluded that Cuban and
Nicaraguan aid for insurgents "constitute a clear picture
of active promotion for 'revolution without frontiers'
throughout Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua." The
committee also reiterated its earlier finding regarding
the guerrillas in El Salvador that. they "are well trained,
well equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely
on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control
and for logistical support. The intelligence supporting
these judgments provided to the Committee is convincing."
This summary of Cuban, Nicaraguan, and'Soviet
activities in Central America contains recently declassi-
fied evidence and materials supports the conclusions of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It
is being issued in the interest of contributing to a
better public understanding of developments in the
region. It refers only to activities that are publicly
known or can be. revealed without jeopardizing-intelli-
gence sources or methods.
This report does not attempt to analyze social and
economic conditions in the Central American countries.
Rather, it describes how politically motivated violence
is being used to exploit the demands for more democracy,
social justice, and economic development in Central
America in order to bring extreme leftist groups to
power.
Introduction
Today, far more than at any time in the past, extreme leftist
forces in Central America are supported by an extensive foreign
intelligence and training apparatus, modern military equipment, and
a large and sophisticated propaganda network. With Soviet bloc
support, Cuba is using contacts nurtured over more than 20 years to
pro``ide political and military training, plus material and
propaganda support, to many violent groups in a number of Central
American countries. The immediate goals are to consolidate control
of the Sandinista Directorate in Nicaragua and, with their help, to
overthrow the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. Honduras
and Costa Rica also have been targeted (see Map W.
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Mexico and Central America: A Global Perspective
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I. Nicaragua _
When Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, he set the pattern
which, 20 years later, the Sandinistas are repeating in Nicaragua.
Castro established a dual government. An inner core of trusted
guerrillas controlled and built the instruments of power (the army,
the secret police, "revolutionary tribunals," and new mass
organizations), while his democratic allies were kept busy in
formal institutions such as the Council of State and government
ministries. This deception helped him gain power and neutralize
his democratic allies until they could no longer unite against him.
Many of these allies later were executed, imprisoned, or left the
country.
In Nicaragua, the genuinely democratic opposition to Somoza
established a "broad opposition front" in coalition with the
Sandinistas, who assured their democratic allies (as Castro had in
1957-59) of. their commitment to democratic elections "after
Somoza." The noncommunist international endorsement of the
Sandinista-led "broad coalition" served to deceive many Western
governments about the true character of the Sandinista Directorate.
It isolated Somoza from virtually all international economic and
military resources as the military struggle reached its peak in
June and July 1979. It also helped to create an important
political coalition which opposed the June 1979 U.S. proposal for
an OAS peacekeeping force that would have supervised free elections
after Somoza's defeat. As in Cuba, decades earlier, it provided a
political network that could be used by the extreme left for
continued deception of Western opinion and governments, while
obtaining financial support from the West. On June 23, 1979 the
OAS gave provisional recognition to the anti-Somoza forces,
contingent upon the establishment of a democractic political system
including free political parties, free elections, free trade
unions, religious freedom, and an independent media. On July 12,
1979, during the final bargaining leading to Somoza's departure,
the Sandinistas sent a written promise to the OAS that they would
hold free elections and guarantee democratic freedoms. The
Sandinistas have yet to implement this promise.
During this period, Cuba provided about 500 tons of weapons and
other military supplies to the Sandinista units directly. Cuba
also trained and deployed an "Internationalist Brigade," whose
personnel fought with the Sandinistas. And on July 18, 1979,
Julian Lopez Diaz, a leading Cuban covert action operative, flew to
Managua from Costa Rica, where he had been the Sandinistas' key
adviser. He became, and remains, the Cuban Ambassador.
After their victory, the Sandinistas followed Castro's example
and established a dual governing structure. The inner core was
headed by the FSLN nine-person Directorate, which immediately moved
with Cuban help to establish a new army, an internal security
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apparatus, and a variety of controlled organizations: neighborhood
"defense committees," trade unions, professional organizations, and
media organs. The Sandinistas also dominated the nominally
independent executive branch: the Junta, the quasi-legislative
Council of State, and most government ministries.
The Sandinistas encouraged their democratic allies to
participate in these executive branch institutions, both to use
their skills and their international credibility. This helped
obtain more than $1.6 billion in Western aid from July 1979 to the
end of 1982. The United States, along with other democracies,
immediately recognized the new government. During the first 18
months of the regime, the United States provided more than $118
million in direct aid and endorsed more than $220 million in
Inter-American Development Bank credits.
Disguised but systematic repression of the democratic political
parties, trade unions, and media began within weeks of Somoza's
departure. In August and September 1979, the Sandinistas launched
a campaign against the social democratic and Christian Democratic
trade unions and their national federations, and tried to
consolidate organized labor in two Sandinista-controlled groupings.
A conference of Sandinista leaders in late September 1979 produced
a specific plan for consolidating power. It stated that the
democratic groups were to be "isolated" and brought under
Sandinista control and that "while political parties must be
permitted to exist" because of "international opinion," the
,Sandinistas would "work within them to get them to support the
revolution."
Finally, in August 1980, the Sandinistas declared publicly that
elections would not be held until 1985. Even then, these will not
be "bougeois elections" but rather, will serve to "ratify" the
revolution.
As a further indication of internal repression, in December
1981, the Sandinistas began destroying more than 40 villages of the
Protestant, English-speaking Indians in Northeastern Nicaragua.
About 15,000 escaped into Honduras and the remainder were either
killed by the FSLN or forceably relocated to detention camps or
from their homes. The photographic evidence (photos 1, 2, and 3)
of this cruel activity is undeniable.
This campaign has largely succeeded; genuinely democratic groups
and ethnic minorities have been excluded from real political
influence and suppressed. Although some are being permitted to
survive under constant surveillance and pressure, the control by
the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista directorate is incontestable.
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NICARAGUAN DETENTION CAMP FUK KLLUUP I cD INDIANS
SUMUBILA, NICARAGUA
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DESTROYED VILLAGE
?RAYA PURA, NICARAGUA
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DESTROYED VILLAGE
PALO YUMPA, NICARAGUA
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Within a_week after the Sandinistas, takeover, Cuba had some 100
military and security personnel in Nicaragua. Three months later,-
by October 1979, this figure had increased to 200. Today,
Nicaragua "hosts" 7,000 to 8,000 Cubans, including 1,500 to 2,000
military and security advisers, and many high-level Sandinistas
have counterpart Cuban advisers. Cubans have trained virtually all
Nicaraguan recruits in the General Directorate of Sandinista State
Security, the new secret police responsible for internal control.
Since this force is crucial to maintaining Sandinista control over
the populace, many of the police are trained in Cuba.
The Sandinista military'buildup also began immediately.
Somoza's National Guard numbered about 9,000 before 1979, and 15,00
at the height of the fighting. The Sandinistas have increased
their military forces to some 25,000 regular troops, with another
50,000 in active reserve and militia forces. In addition, they
have added 40 new military bases and a powerful array of Soviet
bloc weaponry, including medium tanks, armored personnel carriers,
mobile rocket-launchers, and helicopters. Preparations are being
made for combat jet aircraft.
For example, construction of a new dual runway airfield at-Punta
Huete, near Managua is proceeding at-an extremely rapid pace.'
About 800 meters of the estimated 3,600 meter main runway-have been
completed and work begun on a parallel runway-taxiway and large,
square area being leveled for a probable parking apron
(see photo 4).
The project is the largest airfield construction underway in
Central America and is probably being conducted with Cuban
technical assistance. The location of Punta Huete strongly
suggests that the new airfield, when completed, will be Nicaragua's
main military airbase as well as the longest military airfield in
Central America. This suggestion is based on: the relatively
isolated location across Lake Managua (about 12-km northwest of
Managua); the estimated length of the runway, as well as the fact
it will have a dual runway-taxiway (which could support a volume of
air traffic exceeding current levels at nearby Sandino
International Airport); and the use of concrete. paving.
II. Castro's Strategy
Fidel Castro brings to his renewed and expanded political-
military activism in Central America his own personal experience in
Cuba, his efforts to export revolution in the Western Hemisphere
(particularly during the 1960s), as well as nearly a decade of
highly effective collaboration with the Soviet KGB and Soviet
military. He also has cultivated close ties with the PLO and Libya
in support of terrorism, subversion, and pro-Soviet factions in
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Africa and the Middle East. Castro has evolved a method of
operation with the following principal components:
A. Unification of the extreme left;
B. Establishment of a "broad coalition"--led by the extreme
left but including some noncommunist opposition elements--which
makes direct or ambiguous promises of a."broad based" government
after victory;
-C. Use of the "broad coalition" and systematic propaganda/
political action techniques in order to obtain noncommunist
international support and isolate the target governments from
Western political and material help;
D. Provision of Soviet bloc/Cuban/other anti-Western military
support as an incentive for extreme left unity.
This approach proved successful in Nicaragua. It was then
turned against El Salvador in late 1979. Similar efforts have been
made in Guatemala since 1980, accompanied by stepped-up covert
activities against Honduras and Costa Rica in 1981 and 1982. The
rapid expansion of these violent techniques in Central America is
illustrated by the fact that while the total armed strength of the
extreme left in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,ra_nd Costa Rica
was estimated at about 1,450 in 1978, it increased to 3,000 in
1979, 5,500 in 1980, and 7,600 in 1981. At the same time,
.estimated arms flows to these guerrilla forces increased.from
negligible amounts in 1978 to hundreds of tons.
III. El Salvador
Soon after defeating Somoza, the Sandinistas began training
guerrillas from El Salvador and other Central American countries.
This was the beginning of a steadily expanding partnership. between
Cuba and the Sandinistas in exporting subversion in the region--a
partnership that has included the establishment in Nicaragua of
numerous guerrilla training camps, the transportation of tons of
weapons, and the establishment on Nicaraguan territory of guerrilla
command and control facilities along with a variety of propaganda
and covert activities.
In December 1979, to overcome differences over the tactics
needed for a communist victory, Castro summoned the leaders of the
leftist terrorist groups and the Salvadoran Communist Party to
Havana for a unity meeting. This produced agreement to form a
coordinating committee, which was announced publicly in January
1980. It was also at this meeting that Castro reportedly outlined
his strategy: El Salvador and Guatemala would be "next," with
Honduras to be used as a corridor for the transit of guerrillas and
arms.
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Three small noncommunist groups in El Salvador formed the
"Democratic front" in April 1980. Shortly thereafter, the
Marxist-Leninist leaders and the noncommunist leaders of the
"Democratic front" formed the "Revolutionary Democratic Front"_
(FDR), thereby establishing the "broad coalition" which has been
used to give the impression that the guerrillas are democratic and
not Marxist-led. In May 1980, a meeting in Cuba united the
military and political components of the extreme left under a
"United Revoluationary Directorate" (DRU). In November 1980, a
military alliance of the five insurgent factions, the Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), was created. Chart #1 depicts the
evolution of this organizational framework.
The FMLN/FDR became the command structure for the Marxist-
Leninist organizations and also the directing authority over the
"Democratic front," for which representatives of three small
noncommunist groups often act as spokesmen. The result was an
unequal coalition in which the Marxist-Leninist groups
controlled the armed units, weapons, intelligence, and covert
support from the Soviet bloc/Cuba, while the non-Marxist-Leninist
element provided a useful facade for maintaining international
respectability.
Having achieved the unified command for the extreme left, a
communist-led "broad coalition," and some noncommunist interna-.
tional support, Cuba moved to increase the military strength of the
Salvadoran guerrillas with full but discreet support from the
Soviet bloc. In April 1980, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders met in
the Hungarian Embasy in Mexico City with representatives of Cuba,
the USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, and Vietnam. In June and
July 1980, the Salvadoran communist leaders went to Moscow and then
with Soviet endorsement visited East Germany, Bulgaria, Vietnam,
and Ethiopia--all of which promised him military and other support.
The commitment of weapons was estimated at about 800 tons.
Between late 1979 and early 1981, the Salvadoran guerrilla force
expanded from. about 2,000 to 4,500. The Cuban/Soviet bloc military
supply operation used Western weapons (some from Vietnam) for
"cover" and covertly shipped some 200 tons of weapons through Cuba
and Nicaragua to arm the Salvadoran guerrillas for their intense
but unsuccessful "final offensive" in January 1981.
Although the offensive failed,. it led President Carter to
authorize spending U.S. military aid for the first time since 1977
to "support the Salvadoran government in its struggle against
left-wing terrorism supported covertly with arms, ammunition,
training and political and military advice by Cuba and other
communist nations."
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932/Communist led insurrection
fails
Havana
1979/Unity Meeting in H
called by Castro
lay 1980/Unity Meeting
in Nicaragua
. Marxist-Leninist Non-Marxist-Leninist
1970 % FPL*
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1925 PCES (Communist Party. of MNR
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1972
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1975
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MLP '
Jan 1980
Mar 1980
n,
. I
MPSC
Apr 1980
May 1980
Nov 1980 (FMLN) *
~an. 1981 / FMLN/DRU "Final
Offensive" Fails (Estimated 4,000-6,000 full time
guerrillas plus an equal number
of Activists)
(Estimated 200-4C
unarmed party
members)
Legend:
_______Faction which left the Communist P
Front Organization
Umbrella Organization
Violent Extreme Left Group or
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Throughout 1981, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet bloc aided in
rebuilding, rearming, and improving the Salvadoran guerrilla
forces, which expanded their combat and terrrorist operations in
the fall. By 1982, the Salvadoran'FMLN guerrillas had about 5,500
to 9,500 full-time fighters and an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 .
part-time activists who provided logistical and political support
as well as combat services. The FMLN headquarters in Nicaragua
evolved into an extremely sophisticated command-and-control
center--more elaborate in fact, than that used by the Sandinistas
against Somoza. Guerrilla planning and operations are guided from
this headquarters, where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers are involved
in command and control. The guidance flows to guerrilla units
widely spread throughout El Salvador. The FMLN headquarters in
Nicaragua also coordinates propaganda and logistical support for
the insurgents, including food, medicines, clothing, money
and--most importantly--weapons and ammunition. -
Although some spontaneous guerrilla actions take place as
targets of opportunity appear, the headquarters in Nicaragua
.decides on most locations to be attacked and coordinates supply
deliveries. The guerrillas themselves have centralized their
control procedures. For example, on March 14, 1982, the FMLN-
clandestine Radio Venceremos, then located near the Salvadoran
border, broadcast a message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging
them "to maintain their fighting spirit 24 hours-aday to carry out
the missions ordered by the FMLN general command (emphasis
supplied)." The alleged suicide of the number one and two leaders
of El Salvador's largest guerrilla group (the FPL) in their homes
in Managua in April 1983 provided more clear evidence' of the
guerrillas' base in Nicaragua.
After El Salvador scheduled free elections for a Constituent
Assembly for March 28, 1982, the Salvadoran Government invited the
social democrats (MNR) and the communist-front UDN, both of which
support the FMLN, to compete openly in those elections. This offer
was rejected and the top priority of Cuba, Nicaragua, and the
guerrillas became the disruption or prevention of these elections.
In December 1981, after meetings in Havana with Salvadoran
guerrilla leaders, Fidel Castro directed that external supplies of
arms to FMLN units be stepped up to make possible an offensive to
disrupt any chance for a peaceful vote.
During the first 3 months of 1982, arms shipments into El
Salvador surged. Cuban-Nicaraguan arms flowed through Honduras
into El Salvador by sea, air, and overland routes. In February,
for example, Salvadoran guerrilla groups picked up a large shipment
on the Salvadoran coast, near Usulutan, after the shipment arrived
by sea from Nicaragua.
In addition to vitally needed ammunition, these supply
operations included greater quantities of more sophisticated heavy
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weapons. Deliveries in 1982 included M-60 machineguns, M-79
grenade-launchers, and M-72 antitank weapons, thus significantly
increasing the guerrillas' firepower. One guerrilla unit received
several thousand sticks of TNT and-detonators from Nicaragua (only
five sticks are need to blow up an electrical pylon). Individual
units also regularly received tens of thousands of dollars for
routine purchases of nonlethal supplies on commercial markets and
for payments (including bribes) to enable the clandestine pipeline
to function. On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police
announced the discovery of a house in San Jose, with a sizable
cache of arms, explosives, uniforms, passports documents, false
immigration stamps from more than 30 countries, and vehicles with
hidden compartments--all connected with arms smuggling through
Costa Rican territory, diverted from Nicaragua or via third
countries, to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Map #2 displays the known
major infiltration routes for arms being illicitly infiltrated into
El Salvador.
With this support, thousands of Salvadoran guerrillas attempted
to prevent the March 1982 election by destroying public buses,
blocking highways, and attacking villages, towns, and voting
places. Nonetheless, in the presence of several hundred election
observers from democratic countries and about 700-foreign
journalists, the people of El Salvador repudiated the extreme left
by voting in overwhelming numbers. More than 80% of the eligible
voters participated. %`
Following their obvious repudiation in the elections, the FMLN
leaders reacted as they had after their failed 1981 "final
offensive." They consulted in Nicaragua and Cuba to plan strategy
and to obtain more and better military and communications equipment
for their forces. For the next 6 months, they continued terrorist
harrassment and economic sabotage. In mid-October 1982, they used
their expanded capabilities to begin a new series of military
attacks. By early 1983, the guerrillas had controlled about a
dozen towns for more than 2 months, and their morale clearly had
recovered--in part due to the continued Cuban, Nicaraguan, and
Soviet bloc support, which enabled them to sustain operations
despite their rejection by the Salvadoran people. During 1982,
guerrilla operations resulted in about 2,500 government forces
wounded and 1,300 killed. These intensified attacks have continued
through the first 5 months of 1983.
Although Castro has often denied responsibility for shipping
weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas, German Social Democrat leader
Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski stated publicly in 1981 that Castro had
admitted the Cuban role. Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez confirmed Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas in
interviews given in the fall of 1981. In an article published in
the Toronto Globe and Mail on February 12, 1982, a reporter
interviewed a Salvadoran guerrilla trainee. The trainee described
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Seaborne arms route
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courses for-Salvadoran guerrillas in demolition and intelligence
operations, taught by Cubans, and attended by the Salvadorans at
that time.
A guerrilla leader told the San Diego (March 1, 1981) in El
Salvador that "the Salvadoran guerrillas have a permanent
commission in Nicaragua overseeing the smuggling of weapons from
that country to here." He also said there have been Cuban advisers
in the Province of Morazan, and that even Vietnamese advisers had
made trips to guerrilla camps in El Salvador.
Papalonal airfield is one example of the smuggling of weapons
from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El Salvador. Papalonal is a
commercially underdeveloped area 23 miles north of Managua. The
airfield is accessible only by.dirt roads. In late July 1980, the
airfield was an argricultural dirt airstrip approximately 800
meters long, but by early 1981 the strip had been lengthened by 50
percent to approximately 1,200, meters. Hangars were constructed to
stockpile arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. C-47.flights from
the airbase, confirmed by photographic evidence, correspondend with
sightings in El Salvador. Several pilots who regularly flew the
route into El Salvador have been identified in Nicaragua. This
particular route has been closed down, but air infiltration over
new routes continues to this day.
In addition to the air infiltration routes, the"Salvadoran
guerrillas make extensive use of sea and overland infiltration
routes through Honduras and Guatemala from Nicaragua. Photo #5
taken in May 1983, in San Salvador, demonstrates that the
guerrillas use sophisticated vehicular concealment devices to
confound detection by local authorities.
Details of Cuban/Nicaraguan support have been provided by two
high-level FMLN leaders captured in mid-1982. One of them, alias
"Alejandro Montenegro," was seized on August 22, 1982, in conjunc-
tion with a raid on an FMLN safehouse in Honduras. Montenegro's
importance is underscored by the fact that the September 1982
taking of 108 civilian hostages in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, was
essentially an attempt by a leftist Honduran terrorist group (with
close ties to the Salvadoran insurgents) to secure his release. The
hostage seizure, which Cuba evidently helped plan, failed because
Montenegro had already been transferred to Salvadoran military
authorities. Montenegro provided some significant information:
He said that the Cubans played a major role in training
those who conducted the successful January 27, 1982, raid
on the Salvadoran air base at Ilopango, which damaged or
destroyed a dozen aircraft.
Montenegro himself directed the attack, leading an
eight-man-team that had received 5 months of special
infiltration and sabotage training in Cuba.
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He-said that he personally had attended two high-level
meetings with Cuban officials in 1981--one in-Havana and -
the other in Managua--to review the situation in El
Salvador and obtain strategic advice.
One of the guerrillas captured with-Montenegro made five
trips to Managua in 1982 to pick up arms for the
insurgents, using a truck modified by the Sandinistas to
carry concealed weapons.
The Sandinistas have three repair shops for such vehicle
modifications under the direction of a special section at
the Ministry of Defense. Vehicles similarly modified are
shown in Photo #5.
Montenegro also confirmed that Nicaragua remains the primary
source of insurgent weapons and ammunition, although he added that
the guerrillas do capture some weapons and ammunition from the
Salvadoran military.
The other captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez Arriola,
admitted attending a platoon leaders' course in Cuba in July 1979.
He said that: -
-- Hundreds of Salvadoran guerrillas have received military
training in Cuba;
Cubans give special courses for combatants, commanders,
staff officers,. and intelligence officials;
-- He had attended an insurgent strategy meeting in Havana in
June 1981, at which Castro himself appeared.
Lopez Arriola also revealed that the Sandinistas control weapons
delivered from Vietnam to Nicaragua for the Salvador insurgents and
that the guerrillas must ask for permission to draw on the
supplies. He" added that the Sandinistas give the insurgents an
extensive base of operations in and around Managua and provide a
school for their children. -
IV. Guatemala
In Guatemala, the guerrillas tried and failed to disrupt the
national elections of March 7, 1982. However, widespread percep-
tions of extensive electoral fraud by the government led to a
military-civilian coup on March 23, 1982. The new President,
retired General Efrain Rios Montt, acted quickly.
He disbanded various semi-official groups that had cooperated
with the far right in violence against opposition leaders and
offered amnesty for guerrillas who surrendered before the end of
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June 1982. From that point on, the Guatemalan Government
implemented an intensive counter-insurgency program. This included
the establishment and arming of village self-defense-forces in the
Indian highlands, and started supporting Civic Action programs
consisting of medical, food, acid economic assistance.
In April and July 1981, Guatemalan security forces captured
large caches of guerrilla weapons.at safehouses in Guatemalan City.
Traces made on the serial numbers of U.S.-manufactured weapons
revealed that 17 of the M-16/AR-15 rifles found had been shipped to
American units in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s and
left behind. Several vehicles captured at the safehouses bore
recent customs markings frorrtNicaragua.
During 1982, both Cuba and the Soviet Union increased their
efforts to bring about a firmly unified guerrilla command in
Guatemala. On February 9, 1982, a Guatemalan guerrilla leader
called a press conference in Havana to proclaim the unity of the
four principal Guatemalan guerrilla groups. The Cubans and the
Soviet bloc have continued to provide military training and support
to various factions of the Guatemalan insurgency.
V. Honduras ?
The new democratic government of Honduras--inaugurated in
January 1982--increased its cooperation with the United States and
neighbors in the region to neutralize the threat posed by the
buildup in Nicaragua as well as by the communist guerrillas in the
region. Having failed in 1981 to persuade Honduras to be neutral
by promising that Cuba and Nicaragua would "spare Honduras" from
the terrorism affecting El Salvador and Guatemala, Cuba now seeks
to intimidate Honduras and its leaders into passivity through acts
of terrorism. By doing so, the Cubans hope to increase the chance
that the Salvadoran guerrillas can succeed.
Cuba and Nicaragua have worked actively to keep the Honduran
Government from cooperating with El Salvador's efforts to prevent
the transit of guerrilla supplies. Increased Cuban/Nicaraguan
training and support have been provided to the Honduran extreme
left, and Havana has stepped up efforts to promote unity among the
Honduran leftist groups as part of a campaign to destabilize the
Honduran Government. Examples of extreme leftist actions in
HonQ.uras during 1981 included the. following:
In early January 1981, Honduran police caught six persons
unloading weapons from a truck enroute from Nicaragua. The
six identified themselves as members of the International
Support Commission of the Salvadoran Popular Liberation
Forces, a part of the FMLN. They had in their possession a
large number of altered and forged Honduran, Costa Rican,
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and-Salvadoran passports and other identity documents. One
truck contained more than 100 M-16/AR-15 automatic rifles,"
50 81mm mortar rounds, about 100,000 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunition, machinegun belts, field packs, and first-aid
kits. More than 50 of the M-16 rifles were traced to U.S.
units assigned to Vietnam in 1968-69.
-- In April 1981, Honduran authorities intercepted a tractor--
trailer that had entered Honduras from Nicaragua at the
Guasule crossing. Ammunition and propaganda materials were
hidden inside the walls of the trailer. The same arms
traffickers operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Honduras,
with a false floor and special basement for storing
weapons.
The link between Cuba/Nicaragua and the regional infrastructure
behind the expanded guerrilla activity is evident from information
obtained following a raid late in 1981 by the Honduran police on a
safehouse for the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras.
This organization was described in the pro-government Nicaraguan
newspaper El Nuevo Diario, by "Octavio," one of its founders, as a
political-military organization formed as part of the "increasing
regionalization of the Central American conflict."., the raid
occurred on November 27, 1981, in Tegucilgalpa. Following a
gunfight the Honduran police ultimately captured several members of
this group. This FMLN cell included a Honduran, a Uruguayan, and
several Nicaraguans. The captured terrorists told Honduran
authorities that the Nicaraguan Government had provided them with
funds for travel expenses, as well as explosives.
Captured documents and statements by detained guerrillas further
indicated that the group-was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation
of high-level Sandinista leaders. .The group's chief of operations
resided in Managua. Members of the group received military
training in Nicaragua and Cuba. The documents included classroom
notebooks from a 1-year training course held in Cuba in 1980.
Other captured documents revealed that guerrillas at one safehouse
were responsible for transporting arms and ammunition into Honduras
from Esteli, Nicaragua.
Our information shows that Nicaraguan agents and Salvadoran
extreme left groups have played a leading role in the Honduran
operation:
The Salvadoran guerrillas have links with almost all
Honduran terrorist groups and assist them in subversive
planning, training, and operations.
The December 1982, kidnapping of Honduran President Suazo'
daughter in Guatemala apparently was the work of a s
Guatemalan Marxist-Leninist guerrilla faction with ties to
Havana and Managua.
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-- Discussions reportedly were held in mid-1982 among the
Cubans, Sandinistas, and Salvadoran insurgents about
terrorist activities against the Honduran Government.
-- Captured Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists have admitted
that explosives used in bombing attacks in the Honduran
capital are obtained in Nicaragua.
IV. Costa Rica
Costa Rica has a long democratic tradition and the highest
standard of living and social services in Central America. In 1978
and 1979, its leaders cooperated with the supply of military
equipment to the Sandinistas and permitted the Sandinistas and
other leftist groups to live there in peaceful exile. In May 1982,
Luis Alberto Monge, a social democrat strongly opposed by both the
extreme right and left, was inaugurated as President.
Because Costa Rica has attempted to stop the continued use of
its territory for the supply of weapons to the region's Marxist-
Leninist guerrrillas, Cuba and Nicaragua also have made Costa-Rica
a target for subversion. During 1982, for example:
-- Cuba funded a new leftist political party designed to unify
various leftist elements and attract broader popular
support;
The Cubans and Sandinistas provided weapons and training
for Costa Rican leftist terrorists;
Nicaragua has instigated terrorist actions in Costa Rica,
leading to increased tensions between the two countries.
Although the Sandinistas denied complicity, the July 3,
1982, bombing of the Honduran airlines office in San Jose
took place at Nicaragua's'direction, according to a
Colombian M-19 member arrested by Costa Rican authorities
on July 14, 1982.
The captured terrorist also stated that the July 3, bombing
was part of a broader Nicaraguan plan that included
sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies, and other terrorist
acts designed to discredit Costa Rica internationally.
In November 1982, Salvadoran guerrillas attempted to kidnap
a Japanese businessman in San Jose. The attempt was
stopped by the Costa Rican authorities. More than 20 other
Salvadoran extreme leftist cells continue to work inside
Costa Rica to destabilize the government.
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-- Since the beginning of 1982, several guerrilla arms caches
and safehouses have been uncovered in Costa Rica. Some
arms may be for use by radical groups inside Costa Rica, as
well as for shipment to guerrilla movements in El Salvador.
-- As previously noted, in March 1982,-the Costa Rican
Judicial Police discovered a large arms cache in a house in
San Jose. Among the nine people arrested there were
Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an Argentine, a Chilean, and a
Costa Rican. Costa Rican police so far have seized 13
vehicles designed for arms smuggling. Police have
confiscated more than 170 weapons including machineguns,
TNT, fragmentation grenades, a grenade-launcher,
ammunition, and 500 combat uniforms.
Havana continues to have many hopeful signs in Latin America.
In Suriname, Cuban and Grenadan contacts and influence had been
growing since the spring. Oswaldo Cardenas Junquera, the Cuban
covert action official who had been involved with the New Jewel
Movement well before it took power in Grenada, was assigned to
Suriname as Ambassador in October 1982. In December, the military
dictator Bouterse executed 15 leaders of democratic trade unions,
political parties, university groups, and the media, bringing his
movement into the Cuban orbit.
VII. Soviet and Cuban Propaganda Activities
Beginning in early 1980, the'Soviet bloc and Cuba complemented
their subversive activities in Central America by launching a
massive propaganda and disinformation campaign. Initially the
campaign focused on U.S. policy toward El Salvador, in an effort to
block U.S. aid, although-it also dealt with U.S. involvement in
Guatemala and Honduras. The campaign was intended to expose an
allegedly U.S.-sponsored plot, "discovered" by Cuban intelligence,
to invade El Salvador using the armies of Honduras and Guatemala
with assistance from Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia. This "plot"
was characterized as a last ditch effort by the U.S. President to
transform the situation in El Salvador in favor of government
forces prior to the U.S. elections in November 1980.
Captured documents indicate that the FMLN has coordinated the
FDR's international activities (in the United States, Canada, and
Europe) from Mexico City. The Soviets in Mexico City are also in
contact with the Salvadoran guerrillas. Logistics and interna-
tional relations policy, however, are handled in Havana. The Cuban
press agency, Prensa Latina, provides international communications
for the FDR and its representatives abroad.
The Soviets and Cubans held a key meeting in June 1980 with
several Salvadoran insurgent leaders in Havana to establish a
strategy for an international political campaign on El Salvador.
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Evidence from guerrilla documents indicates that the strategy
includes:
Propaganda: Spokesmen should emphasize that the Salvadoran
"revolution" represents the people and is fighting against
oppresssion and for freedom from outside intervention. The
United States seeks direct military intervention in El
Salvador to keep the "junta" in power.
-- International Support: Representatives should gain
recognition and support for the insurgents from a broad
range of international organizations and political and
regional groups.
-- U.S. Initiatives: Representatives should strengthen ties
with sympathetic American organizations and seek support
from American politicians.
-- Public Posture: From the outset, representatives should
call for a dialogue to seek resolution of the conflict.
"The policy of a dialogue is a tactical maneuver to broaden
our alliances, while at the same time splitting up and
isolating the enemy." Representatives should take up- the
banner of peace, and maintain that they seek only-lasting
peace and justice.
-- Humanitarian Organizations: The Salvadoran insurgents
should establish a front organization to funnel aid and
money from humanitarian organizations.
A comparison of the strategy, laid out in guerrilla documents,
with actual events shows that the Soviets, the Cubans, and the
Salvadoran guerrilla leadership in Nicaragua have followed it
closely. During the past three years, they have engaged in various
overt and covert activities designed to influence public opinion in
Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, and the United States.
These activities include: overt propaganda, overt diplomatic
activities to. gain recognition for the "revolution" in interna-
tional organizations, circulation of forgeries,_use of front
groups, covert placement of media items, and staging of demon-
strations and protests on El Salvador.
Soviet propaganda has been aimed at discrediting U.S. policy in
El Salvador, and widespread use has been made of forgeries and
disformation to substantiate the message. Moscow also has
employed its large international fronts, such as the World Peace
Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, in support of the
propaganda campaign. A World Peace Council-sponsored "Solidarity
on El Salvador" meeting took place in April 1981, in Ecuador. The
conference was sponsored jointly by the Latin American Association
for Human Rights, the Socialist International, and the Permanent
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Conference of Latin American Political Parties. The World Peace
Council played a discreet role, perhaps because it is so widely
known as a Soviet front.
Communist parties in Europe, Latin America, Canada, and
Australia participated in the propaganda campaign and helped
organize demonstrations. Their publications have continuously
printed articles on El Salvador and contributed to the misinforma-
tion circulating about the situation in that country. F,or
instance, the Communist Party of Spain, in its magazine Mundo
Obrero Semanal, amid pictures of blood-covered bodies, accused the
United States of encircling El Salvador with the aid of Honduras
and Guatemala, of sending tanks and helicopters "piloted by
Yankees," of invading El Salvador, and of murdering Salvadoran
Archbishop Romero.
Meanwhile, the FDR-FMLN, with Soviet and Cuban support, has
directed the establishment of "Solidarity Committees" throughout
Europe, in Canada, and even in Australia and New Zealand. These
serve as propaganda outlets and conduits for aid contributions to
the guerrillas. These committees also have helped plan, in
conjunction with Communist-parties and local leftist groups, many
of the demonstrations that have taken place in support of the.
Salvadoran guerrillas. The timing and location of the demonstra-
tions, such as those held worldwide after the failure of the
January 1981 FMLN "final offensive" and those to...pxotest the March
1982 Salvadoran elections, show that they resulted from a well
coordinated effort.
VIII. Extent of Outside Support
Since the Sandinista victory in July 1979, both Cuba and
Nicaragua have steadily increased the size and quality of their
"Revolutionary" military forces. The Soviet complicity in this
militarization of the region is undeniable.
Soviet military deliveris to Cuba increased dramatically in 1979
to an average of more than 65,000 tons by 1981. They apparently
remain at this level today.
At the same time, the Soviet bloc, with Cuba support, has been
assisting Nicaragua's huge military buildup including weapons,
military equipment, over 40 new facilities, and extensive training:
-- In February, a Soviet ship delivered about 270 military
trucks to the port of Corinto, bringing the total Soviet
bloc truck inventory in Nicaragua to more than 800.
-- In April, an Algerian merchant ship delivered four Soviet
heavy tank ferries, one small patrol boat, and 12 BM-21
mobile multiple-rocket-launchers. These had been delivered
previously to Algeria by Soviet ships and stored on the
docks.
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The-tank ferries provide the Sandinista army with an
offensive water-crossing capability, while the mobile
rocket-launchers gave them a mass firepower weapon
unmatched in the region.
In mid-1982, the Sandinistas completed a new garrison for
their Soviet T-54155 tank battalion just outside of
Managua.
They also completed two new infantry battalion garrisons
near Managua.
In addition, they have begun work on another major military
installation south of the capital.
As is evident from photos #6-8, all of these military
installations have a common layout similar to Cuban
garrisons, and there is little doubt that they are being
designed and constructed with Cuban assistance.
It is noteworthy that Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro
visited Nicaragua in mid-1982 with a high-level military
delegation, ostensibly to offer aid for flood damage. It
was announced later that 2,000 Cuban constructions workers
were being sent to Nicaragua. Since then,"we have detected
a spurt in military construction activity.
Then in November 1982, a Soviet bloc ship delivered an
additional group of 25 T-54/55 tanks, bringing the total to
about 50. The delivery followed a visit by Sandinista
Directorate member, Daniel Ortega, to Moscow earlier in the
year. To enhance the mobility of Sandinista ground forces,
the Soviets have delivered MI-8 helicopters. AN-2 aircraft
and armored personnel carriers also have been provided.
In early December 1982, we learned that eight new 122 mm
howitzers also had been delivered, supplementing the 12 15,2
mm guns delivered in 1981.
Finally, in late December 1982, we detected the first
delivery of sophisticated Soviet electronic gear--a high
frequency/direction-finder intercept facility of a type
seen previously in Cuba. This equipment should be able to
intercept signals from throughout Central America and. would
be especially useful in pinpointing Honduran military
communication sites.
The Cubans also have constructed a major strategic road
between Puerto Cabezas and the interior. This road
facilitates the movement of troops and military supplies to
the troubled northeast border area.
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CUBAN-STYLE
SPECIAL TROOPS TRAINING FACILITY
LAKE MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
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TEMPORARY ARMOR STORAGE AREA
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
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SOVIET/EAST GERMAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT
DIRIAMBA, NICARAGUA
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The Sandinistas can now call on an,active military force of some
25,000 and reserve and militia forces numbering some 50,000. This-
force clearly overshadows that of Honduras, with only 15,000 men,
and Costa Rica, which has no armed forces.
In Nicaragua, there are about 50 Soviet military and 100
economic advisers. About"25 Soviet personnel reportedly are
assisting the security services, and others are attached to the
Nicaraguan general staff and the headquarters of various military
services. Through 1982, they have concluded military agreements
with Nicaragua estimated to be worth at least $125 million.
There are also about 35 military and 200 economic advisers from
East European countries in Nicaragua. Most are East Germans,
although some Bulgarians, Czechoslovakians, Poles, and Hungarians
may be present. The East Germans are most active-in the Nicaraguan
internal security organizations, but reportedly have also provided
some truck technicians and possibly some communications personnel.
In April 1983, Brazil detained four Libyan aircraft transporting
large quantities of weapons to Nicaragua, including some jet
aircraft. This event, and a high-level delegation to Managua-in
May, reveals Libyan leader Qadhafi's commitment to the Central
American struggle (see photos #9 and 10). (Salvadoran guerrilla
leader Cayetano Carpio returned to Nicaragua from-'Libya immediately
before his April 12 puported suicide in Managua.)
As many of as 50 Libyan and PLO advisers have been active in
Nicarauga. The Libyan advisers have been engaged mostly in
servicing the Polish-built MI-2 light helicopters they provided the
Nicaraguans. Last May, the Libyans also provided the Sandinistas
with four small Italian aircraft useful in counter-insurgency
operations. Libya also has been active in Grenada, where it now
has an embassy. It reportedly is providing funds to radical
leftists in the Caribbean region and is encouraging Grenada to
spread its "revolution."
PLO leader Yasir Arafat promised military equipment to
Nicaragua, including arms and aircraft, in Managua on July 22,
1980. The PLO has trained selected Salvadorans in the Near East
and in Nicaragua. Arafat affirmed to a group of Palestian
journalists in Beirut on January 11, 1982, that "there are
Palestinian revolutionaries with the revolutionaries in El
SalV.ador..." PLO personnel are providing pilot training in
Nicaragua and reportedly flying combat aircraft.
Vietnamese support for the Salvadoran guerrillas was confirmed
by author William Shawcross when he traveled to Vietnam (New York
Review of Books, September 24, 1981.) Shawcross asked whether
Vietnam had been distributing any of the vast stockpile of weapons
left by the Americans. Vietnamese Col. Bui Tin acknowledged that
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LIBYAN ARMS AIRCRAFT IN BRAZIL
PHOTOS #9 and 10 .
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it had: "It is not fair to say the U.S. can help the-Junta but we-
cannot help our friends. We do our best to support revolutionary
movements in the world."
This level of outside support adds up to far more than merely
marginal assistance for essentially indigenous guerrilla activity.
It is large-scale intervention in the political affairs of the
nations directly concerned, for the'clear purpose of bringing to
power governments on the Cuban model.
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