USE OF INTELLIGENCE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000601470032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: June 17, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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17 JUN 1903
MI 4201-83/1
MEMORANIX!4 FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Use of Intelligence for Public Diplomacy
REEVE': DCI memo dtd 7 June 83, same subject
Your 7 June memorandum raises two issues-what could be done to get more
intelligence information into the public domain in order to increase public
support for national security policies, and how to make the distinction
between classified and unclassified information more readily apparent to busy
readers. Both are classic questions that arise with some frequency; the first
has generated a substantial literature (See Tab A). Both issues deserve
consideraton and discussion involving you, the DDCI, and thg'`'four DDs. What
follows is, therefore, intended as the basis for such a discussion.
Distinguishing Classifed Information
Distinguishing between classified and unclassified information is the
simpler issue. We can do so in current intelligence publications, and have
done so in the past, by using different typefaces. We could also underscore
the difference in both the PDB and NID by citation of media sources where
appropriate. We would need to reverse the decision made by Admiral-Inman-that-
all material in the NIDcarry a minimum classification-of..Confidential. And
this probably would force us to cTrop the distiricti between reporting and
analysis, since a format that tried to make three distinctions-unclassified
reporting, classified reporting, and analytic judgment-would be very
cumbersome. We could also make the distinction in many formal papers by
sorting information into classified and unclassified paragraphs. And we could
consider paragraph classification of DO reporting, which would have the effect
of making more DO reporting available at lower classification levels. Or we
could try to alleviate Secretary Shultz's problem alone by annotating his copy
of the PDB to highlight the classified information that needs protection-for
example by underlining such information in red.
DCI
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 SUBJECT: Use of Intelligence for Public Diplomacy
All of these devices are ways to reduce the problem, not eliminate it.
The basic difficulty is that busy readers are inundated by information from
many sources we do not control. We know of at least one instance in which
Secretary Shultz thought he had seen information in the newspaper when in fact
he had read it in the INR summary. We can try to flag classified information
for them more clearly, and perhaps we could get all intelligence agencies to
use a common format. But readers still have to take the time and trouble to
concentrate on the distinction and remember it. Moreover, such distinctions
distract attention from the substantive message.
There is another theoretical possibility-putting out intelligence
publications that do not contain unclassified information but this is
impractical. We have to use unclassified information to put the secret
information in context and to cover the full range of issues that confront
policymakers. Moreover, the media often prove to be the fastest sources of
information. And information often moves from one category to another-data
gleaned fran intelligence subsequently appears in the press, and information
initially seen in the media gains credibility when confirmed by secret
sources.
Release of Information
The question of releasing more intelligence information is much more
complicated, since there are a variety of ways it might be done and each has
different implications for both policymakers and intelligence professionals.
The possibilities range from freer release of more individual bits of
intelligence information to the release of unclassified analytic papers on
particular subjects-with a number of variants in between; they are discussed
below. All involve resource costs and other trade-offs. Those who argue for
release of more intelligence see potential benefits for the formulation and
pursuit of US national security policy. As professional intelligence
officers, however, we must be concerned with the impact on our ability to do
our jobs. The central fact is that systematic release by CIA of intelligence
information undermines our very reason for existence. CIA involvement in a
program explicitly intended to influence US public opinion raises serious
questions of legality, as well as propriety.
This is not to say that no intelligence information can ever be
released. Material has been released since time immemorial, and no single
decision to release information is likely to destroy us as an institution.
But a politically motivated pattern will.
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SUBJECT: Use of Intelligence for Public Diplomacy
1. Release of More Raw Intelligence
We presently entertain requests for release of specific pieces of
intelligence information on a case by case basis. It is obviously possible to
release more, if a policy decision to that effect is made, but not without
risks. And the benefits in terms of increased public support for national
security policy are by no means certain. In general, the more the source of
information is protected, the less convincing the information is likely to be.
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SU&T,k7CT: Use of Intelligence for Public Diplomacy
Our experience with using intelligence information to prove that
events are occurring is, in any case, poor. There have been successes, of
course, such as the missiles in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
2. Compilation of Unclassified Information
We already compile a substantial amount of unclassified info tion
and release it,
We could do more that might be useful to policymakers
dealing with the public-for example, compilations of the public speeches and
writings of foreign leaders. This would, of course, absorb some resources.
And it likely would generate criticism cn Capitol Hill, where the use of CIA
resources to do unclassified research has been questioned in the past. Other
organizations, such as the State Department and the Congressional Research
Service, can also do this sort of research-with or without help from us
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4. Downgrading Classified Analytic Papers
As you are aware, we were releasing a substantial number of
unclassified analytic papers, often based on classified studies, until July
1981, when you decided that the guidelines should be tightened. Direct
release of CIA papers other than periodicals dropped off sharply-fran over 60
per year in 1978 and 1979 to 25 in 1982 and only 8 in the first five months of
this year. The arguments for and against such papers were detailed at that
time in a study reproduced at Tab D. We clearly could go back to publishing
unclassified analytic papers. Costs would be relatively low, as long as the
topics were subjects we would be analyzing in any case. Our past experience
has been, however, that sanitized papers seldom prove convincing on
contentious issues. Indeed they often prove counterproductive, because they
generate accusations that the release is politically motivated. They also
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SUBJECT: Use of Intelligence for Public Diplomacy
create potential foreign policy problems. The difficulties can, however, be
reduced by establishing clear criteria for sanitizaticn and release and
applying them evenhandedly, whether or not the material in question supports
specific policy goals.
6. General Considerations
Any alternative that involves release of information that was
legitimately classified in the first place generates further dilemmas.
We are in no position to judge the potential benefits to US national
security policy that might accrue from public release of more intelligence
information. On any particular substantive issue, that will depend on how
convincing the intelligence information is; such decisions must, in any event,
be made by our elected leaders. Considering the potential costs to
intelligence operations of the various alternatives, however, we believe the
following generalizations are valid:
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SUB3ECT: Use of Intelligence for Public Diplomacy
- Our current procedures, under which we respond on an ad hoc basis
to specific requests for release of intelligence information and
But they are cumbersome. If more and faster release is desired,
we can devote additional resources to the effort, at some cost to
our collection and analysis efforts. We can also consider
paragraph classification of DO reporting, which would facilitate
more rapid release.
If we know in advance that periodic release of information on
particular topics is desired, we can accumulate and sanitize the
material as it arrives and make it available on a more timely
basis. We can also do more systematic compilation of
unclassified information.
Relaxation of recent restrictions on public distribution by CIA
of unclassified versions of analytic papers would involve
relatively small resource ousts and would have some benefits for
us. But it has substantial potential for adverse publicity. It
probably would enhance public understanding cn.-some issues, such
as Soviet defense expenditures. But it probably would not have a
decisive impact on highly contentious issues.
John H.
Attachments:
A - Selected Studies
B -
C-
D - NFAC 2918-81
Robert M. Gat
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