COMMENTS ON DEVELOPMENTS OF CONCERN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000601440098-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: January 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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JCI,RC I Ul.l
PFIAB Notes
12 Jan 83
Comments on Developments of Concern
Andropov
An overriding one is ife with Andropov--reflected in one way or another
in most other areas.
Clear that intend to be active
--pursuing initiatives in variety of directions
--has political and 'ropaganda skills that one would expect a man
to develop in directing KGB over 15 years
--have to expect imaginative and unexpected thrusts.
Probably would like to attack the economic problem, already giving signs
of establishing himself as Mr. Clean by attacking corruption--close allegiances
appear to be with Defense Minister Ustinov, a , and
Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Single most significant fact seems to me to be that Andropov emerges
at a time which places in his lap an opportunity which may be fleeting to
take huge strides on to major Soviet objectives, i.e., separating the US from
Europe and diverting the US by enhancing the Cuban threat on its soft underbelly.
The INF opportunity is a big one and it must be exploited during the year
1983.
The Soviets don't want the Pershings in Europe because they can reach
Soviet missile sites and command centers with only 6-8 minutes warning.
This capability would destroy many years of careful preparation to respond
to any first-strike attempt by launch on warning--it would also completely
change the way the Soviets would have to fight a war in Europe by requiring
them to go after NATO missile sites immediately.
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SLUR El
Along with this, they see the great reluctance of the European countries
to deploy--they read public opinion polls showing increasing resistance--
there are plans for huge demonstrations of public resistance--this creates
an opportunity for a political as well as military victory.
So Andropov has to work hard to seize this opportunity until any doubt
about deployment is eliminated.
Creates huge dilemma for us--if we don't make an offer, that will be
trumped as a failure to negotiate and therefore a reason for the Europeans
to renege on deployment. If we do make an offer, it will be used to get a
moratorium to give negotiations a further chance and to renegotiate where a
reduced number of weapons should be deployed.
Caribbean
In the Caribbean, the increased supplies come into Salvador.
New shipments of Vietnam weapons reported today via Cuba and Nicaragua
from the government general's clash indicating intensified internal political
conflict.
Cuban base in Grenada strengthened, Cuban influence and vulnerability
of the 16 black sergeants now running Suriname create threat of
Cuban domination of eastern Caribbean with foothold on South American continent.
In Managua, over the weekend there was a demonstration of 200-300 people
against the government which is unexpected and remarkable.
Mexico, with 24,000 Guatemalan refugees on its border, with insurgents
and supplies moving across the border, is in a precarious position, certainly
financially and possibly politically developing throughout the country.
SEFRET
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Middle East
In the Middle East,
to give Hussein the backing he needs to enter negotiations with Israelis.
Begin and Sharon drag their feet on withdrawing from Lebanon, partially
with good security reasons, partially to get delay on peace process as they
advertise to bring new people into West Bank settlements to hamper Hussein's
effort to get himself in a position to take the risk of joining the peace
process.
Still have some 30,000 Syrians--15,000 Palestinian fighters and 15,000
Israelis in Lebanon--while the writ of Gemayel's government is pretty much
confined to the Beirut area.
Meanwhile, the Soviets work to reenter the Middle East
--building two SA-5 sites in Syria
--moving equipment from Syrian port to the sites.
ransport planes in
northern Israel and over Lebanon to protect against Israeli pre-emptive
strikes and SA-6s being deployed in area of SA-5 sites.
Israeli pre-emptive strike will be much more difficult when the SA-5
should become operational. A-4ew hundred wi11 have .a_c,Qmeo Syri a
SA-5s are to be operational. Although this decision was probably made under
Brezhnev, we see this as Andropov's first attempt to renew the Soviet position
in the Middle East.
_ ~.,.%
Iran (DU
Preparing another attack on Iraq. Iraq probably will continue to hold
for a while but Iran appears to be betting that in the long term superiority
in numbers and intensified subversive activity into Iraq will turn the tide.
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JLVI\L 1
Government exiles made up of Shia Iraqis ready to project subversive activity
into Iraq. Long-term threat continues to be Iranian projection of Shia
subversives into Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia--also, Soviet subversives
into Iran. Even the Khomeini government worries about its ability to control
Soviet subversion.
Khomeini's government also showing concern about Soviets and neighboring
Afghanistan. Over million Afghan refugees in Iran, in addition to 2 1/2 million
refugees in Pakistan.
Despite stories about Andropov's position to send troops into Aghanistan
and the possible value of withdrawal and rapproachement with China, we're
skeptical about Soviet withdrawal. Geopolitical position--500 miles closer
to Straits of Hormuz and improved position to move on Iran or Baluchistan
is too valuable. Subversive activities into Baluchistan continue as to
strengthen and improved airports and other facilities in Western Afghanistan
continues.
China/USSR
China and USSR continue dialogue. Both have good reason to improve
relations but stronger reasons to be wary of each other. Soviets can reduce
troops on Chinese border but military will resist significant reductions.
Soviets unlikely to give up Afghanistan and Vietnam positions. Vietnamese
increasing pressure on Cambodia resistance.
Africa
In Africa, Libyan increased support of insurgents in northern Chad and
train and send additional insurgents into southern Chad from Central African
Republic and Benin. Habre's government having great difficulty handling
this
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JGI.RC 1
In Western Sahara, Polisario strength reduced but continue to tie up
100,000 Moroccan troops with heavy burden on Moroccan economy.
In Southern Africa, South Africa is more aggressive in supporting
Savimbi in Angola and pressing on Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Growing strength
of South African rebels in Mozambique has brought Soviet advisors there and
likely to bring in a few thousand Cuban troops.
Have reports same type of Interior Ministry force sent to Angola initially
is being made ready in Cuba. South Africa continues to hang tough on Namibia
until Cubans leave Angola. No sign that that can happen to any significant
degree soon. While the South Africans are now in the process of granting
limited political rights to Coloreds and Asians--a significant move by the
Botha government that split the ruling National Party earlier this year--there
is little prospect that this process will extend to black South Africans, who
now outnumber whites by a ratio of five to one.
On the economic front, continuing struggles with debt burden and prospect
of reduced oil prices are of major concern--lower oil prices will bring some
relief to debt burdened companies, but this is likely to be d )J
as oil rich countries find revenues shrinking and cut down on aid. Very good
DDI study on how this will impact on strategically located countries like Sudan,
Pakistan, Egypt--much more seriously than relief provided by lower oil prices.
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