MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: ADD-ON TO GOL DESPAIR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 15, 2011
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 3, 1983
Content Type: 
CABLE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8.pdf119.62 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8 PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 9728 SIT833 AN009123 D T G : 031551Z 5 E-P 83 PSN:053918 TOR: 246/1555Z DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF KIMM JP VP KEMP SIT E08 DUR /012 WHSR COMMENT: --RED TAG-- FLASH D E RUEHBL X9728 2461554 Z 031551Z SEP 83 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2763 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC FLASH BEIRUT 09728 DEPARTMENT PASS TO AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE FROM COL GATANAS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, XF, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: ADD-ON TO GOL DESPAIR 1 SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 2. COL QASSIS (G-2) JUST CALLED COL GATANAS REQUESTING RESULTS OF WPENS-LEVY/FAIRBANKS-STINER MEETING AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION. GATANAS WILL GET BACK TO HIM BUT ASKED ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TH INCIDENT WHERE BIQA AREA COMMANDER GENERAL MAKKARUM AND 400 MEN WERE CAPTURED (REPORTED SEPTEL). OASSIS THINKS THIS IS SYRIAN RESPONSE BY ACTION TO YESTERDAY'S GOL LETTER TO SARG. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS ACTION 15 SIGNIFICANT ALSO BECAUSE IN THE PAST ONLY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND SMALLER NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE CAPTURED. SG G RE! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8 PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 9728 DTG: 031551Z SEP 83 PSN:O53918 3. COL OASSIS ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE "COMING DOWN THE HILL" AND DIDN'T GO INTO DETAILS ON THE OPE ) 8, 3. DILL0N. BT SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8 TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN Menachem, I have just concluded a meeting with my national security advisers to review the crisis in Lebanon. Bud McFarlane has returned from the area and personally reported on the results of his diplomatic efforts. We have concluded that the fundamental and immediate problem is the Syrian determination to undermine the internal reconciliation process which we think has a chance. The Syrian willingness to do this has been amply demonstrated during the past week and will be heightened as the IDF withdrawals. Indeed, the spectre of further bloodshed and massacres will have extremely damaging implications for both our countries and we must do everything in our power to prevent it. The Government of Israel's agreement to delay its withdrawal has contributed to significantly to our mutual efforts to forge internal political reconciliation, especially between the Druze and the GOL. I am aware of your government's skepticism toward this process, but no stone must be left unturned. In the past day, a GOL-Druze plan has been jointly drafted and is being reviewed by Gemayel and Jumblatt. Progress is also being made to bring the Shi'ite leader, Nabih Berri into the government. The success of these efforts is crucial to our strategy. But we need five more days to conclude the process. I know that last Monday, Ambassador McFarlane said that the request for a delay was final. However, in view of the violent events of the past week and the successful' performance of the Lebanese army, I must ask you and your government to consider an additional delay of the IDF redeployment. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8 The Army is now concluding its operations in West Beirut, and has extended its activity into East Beirut to demonstrate it is an army of all the Lebanese people. However, the army will not physically be able to move into the Shuf for several more days. It is vital to the success of your redeployment that the LAF move into the Shuf in an orderly, coordinated fashion. I have concluded that this delay is crucial to the attainment of our mutual goals in Lebanon and I must request your personal cooperation on this matter. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630006-8