NSPG MEETING, FIRDAY, JULY 15, 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300590005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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QQC1
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EXDIR
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D/ICS
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DDI
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DDA
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DDO
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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GC
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IG
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Compt
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D/EEO
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D/Pers
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D/OEA
/PAD EA
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IA
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LAP
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0/DCI
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C/IPD/01S
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STAT
eeutiv retary
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90872 Add-on
NATIONAL s[CURITY COUNCIL
WASH I NGTO W . D.C. IIONS
TTACHMENT
July 14, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
LT. COL. W. RICHARD HIGGINS
Assistant for Interagency Matters
office of the Secretary of Defense
I .DTs
Executive Secretary
Central intelligence Agency
MS. JACKIE TILLMAN
Executive Assistant to the United States
Representative to the United Nations
COL. GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting, Friday, July 15, 1983
Attached is a paper for the subject meeting, prepared by an
interagency group chaired by the Department of State.
obert M. inanitt
Executive Secretary
-SBGPArATTACHMENT
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SECRET/SEWSITTV!
Subject: Now to handle Israeli Partial Withdrawal in Lebanon
During, the Secretary's visit to Israel, Defense Minister
Arens described Israel's burden in Lebanon--longer reserve duty
for its soldiers, financial costs of the presence, and
continuing casualties--ac not justified by Israel's security
concerns. The burden, Arens stated, needed to be shared by the
Lebanese and possibly by the Multinational Forces (MNP). It is
inevitable, he said, that in the very near future Israel would
undertake a 'redeployment' of its forces, i.e. a partial
withdrawal, in the direction of putatively more secure areas in
Lebanon. The IDr briefed U.S. officials July 14 on its
preferred option of withdrawal to the Awali and dig in for the
long term' {see attathrent 3).
Thy Israelis are portraying redeployment as essential to
convince Syria that U.S. -Lebanese- Israeli cooperation is close
and vigorous enough so that Syria cannot hope to achieve its
aims of controlling Lebanon as it did in the past and of
destroying the Lebanon-Israel Agreement. The Israelis feel
that redeployment should, therefore, be a -first stop in
implementation of the Agreestient, and that pressure on Syria
should consist of four elementst
Maintainanee of the IDl poised in areas of Lsbaiioe
only 22 kiluY :eters from Damascus (the southern aekss
Valley):
Greater Lebanese-Israeli cooperation, includlag
bringing the. Agreement into force and coordinating
IDr redeployment,
Greater diplomatic and political isolation of $yrisl
and,
Greater 'costs and penalties' for the Syrian
presence, presumably unorthodox military actions.
The bottom line of the Israeli position is an IDF redeployment
in the context of bringing the Agreement into force, effected
in coordination with the LAP, and, possibly. involving the
MIFF. It is doubtful that Israel envisions implementation of
all aspects of the Agreement, especially portions of the
security arrangements annex. .
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DLCL: QADR
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SECRlT SENS VE
Israeli redeployment, which has been brought to the fore
as an issue because of Syria's intransigence on withdrawal and
mounting pressure In Israel to cut casualties and costa,
presents fundamental policy issues for the U.S. In three
critical and interrelated areas. First, bearing in mind
Syria's intransigent posture on negotiations with Lebanon
.and/or the U.S., we need to decide what the U.S. position will
be on a redeployment/partial withdrawal by Israeli forces in
Lebanon. Second, we need to consider our stance on
implementation of the Agreement in the context of an Zscaell
redeployment, as it is clear that Israel will seek to have the
U.S. press Lebanon to implement the Agraaaent. Finally, and
irrespective of our views on the implementation of the
Agreement, we must consider how to respond to the Lebanese
request that the PONT deploy in association with the LA! in the
event of an Israeli redeployment. These Issues bear on one
another, so we will consider each in detail.
A. Israeli Redeployment 00
As the visits' to Washington by President Geaayel and Prism
Minister begin approach, the Lebanese and the Israelis are
diametrically divided on the issue of a possible Israeli
redeployment. Moreover. the protinence of this issue has been
heightened by Syria's continuing obduracy on any negotiations
for Syrian withdrawal. There is great political pressure is
Israel on the begin government as a consequence of the steady
casualty toll in Leba'^n and the apparently dim prospects for
any relief soon of Israel's troubling involvement there.
On the other hand, Lebanon vehemently opposes any Zsroe li
redeployment that is not linked to a full withdrawal.
President Cemayel'a fear is that a redeployment would lead to
consolidation of both the Syrian and Israeli occupation fore..,
-resulting in do facto partition and removing the incentive for
any further Israeli and Syrian withdrawal which results from
their respective current positions of confrontation. As an
objective matter, there is indeed grave risk of de facto
partition as both Israel and Syria appear equally prepared to
remain in Lebanon indefinitely. Lebanon's weak government
might not be able to withstand this challenge in its present
form.
With regard to the Syrians, Assad remains adamantly
opposed to the Agreement. H. is content to watch pressure for
Israeli withdrawal increase along with Israeli casualties sad
Lebanese frustration. -Assad would interpret any redeployment
SECRE'P/SENSITIVE
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bELKET/SENSITIVE
as a partial withdrawal and a vindication of his intransigent
policy, thus reducing the incentive for negotiations and
increasing the incentive to inflict even greater casualties on
the Israelis. Furthermore, there is no current indication that
any sort-of Israeli redeployment would be matched in any
fashion by the Syrians. In tact, the Syrians ace likely to
stand pat and might even oppose LAY expansion into areas
vacated by the Israelis by causing problems with the Muse of
by exerting military pressure of their own, directly or through
groups under their control. They would claim that the Israelis
are achieving ma?or `gains' in order to )ustity their position.
There are other problems associated with IDI
redeployment. First, it is by no means certain that the COL
.could arrange a political/security agreement for the
strife-ridden Shut area if the Israelis were to leave the
Shuf. The Druze are demanding withdrawal of all rival
'Lebanese Forces' (Christian militia) from all parts of the
Shut, but it would be impossible for the GOL to enforce aucb an
arrangement if the IDF did not pull completely out of all
areas. Moreover, the Lebanese Forces militia has not so far
expressed any willingness to leave its positions in the Shut.
The GOL believes its ability to broker, implement and enforce a
successful 'deal' in the Shuf requires an Israeli withdrawal
completely out of the area in a short timetrame. Second,
Lebanon's Shis, the least represented but most numerous of
Lebanon'.s confessional -coups. would be most alienated by an
Israeli redeployment, which would leave predominantly Shia
southern Lebanon in the hands of the Israelis. Third, the
ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAY) to effectively
control the Shuf area would be uncertain given that the LAY
would 'move without the surety of agreements for Israeli and
Syrian full withdrawal.
At the some time, there are different redeployment
options, ranging from minor adjustments of the IDF presence In
the greater Beirut area to a phased pullback to the Awali
Aiver,'just north of Sidon. There is an inverse range of
political risk for the GOL, with an Israeli redeployment which
did not include the sensitive Shuf area and Juablatt's home
village of Mukhtara presenting the greatest difficulty. The
U.S. reaction to Israeli redeployment will, therefore, need to
be conditioned on the extent of the ID? pullback. It should be
underscored that any redeployment should be conducted in a
fashion which both permits the.GOL to establish the necessary
political accommodations and minimizes the difficulties for the
LAF as it moves into sensitive areas.
SECRET/SENS ITI VIr
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Since ?the?Israeli invasion last June, O.S. policy had boos
to achieve the. full departure of all external forces= during
the negotiations, this policy was a basic principle undetlying
our mediatory role. For the U.S. now to support a
redeployment/partial withdrawal would be read by many in the
area as an admission of failure in meeting our original policy
goals as well as an invitation for the Israelis and Syrians to
stay. On the other hand. Israel is unquestionably moving
toward a unilateral redeploysent, preferably with U.S. and
Lebanese collaboration, but without it it necessary. It
casualties continue, we will probably not be able to do mare
then persuade Israel to delay somewhat in acting. It could be
beneficial for Lebanon successfully to gain control over more
of its national territory. It could also be argued that this
kind of partial withdrawal would not lessen the two aspects of
Israel's occupation which put the most pressure on the
Syrians: the presence -f Israeli military forces in the
southern Bekaa and the threat that long term occupation of
..southern Lebanon-will turn it into another west Bank.
Finally, it should be noted that our Embassy in Beirut bas
conveyed its belief, that 'U.S. support for any partial pullback
in ? the absence of a ?f irm commitment for full withdrawal will
place U.S. interests at serious risk regardless of the specific
role of U.S.'troops.'
OPTIONS
In addition to other diplomatic efforts:
1. Continue current U.S. policy of seeking the full
withdrawal of all external forces and firmly oppose any
redeployment/partial withdrawal, citing risks and disadvantagee
to U.S. interests. Israel would be told that the V.S. would
not support implementation of the Agreement in these
circumstances and would not agree to any change in the status
of the MNF.
2. Offer to support an Israeli redeployment by available
means (Agreement, Mai), but only if it is linked to a scheduled
full withdrawal by a date certain.
3. Offer to support an Israeli redeployment by all
available means and press the Lebanese to agree that it be done
In implaw.ntetion of the Agreement..
t. Recognise an Israeli redeployment/partial withdrawal
as Inevitable and work with the' Lebanese to ensure its smooth
SEC1tET/SENSITIVE
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and effective. implementation, but not under the Agreement. Try
to package it to keep the focus on full withdrawal of all
external forces.
B. Status-Of the Agreement In the !gent of IDr Rede to nt
The preferred Israeli scenario, which they raised but did
not press. during the Secretary's visit, calls for bringing the
Agreement Into force, and portraying the redeployment as the
first step in its implementation. The Israeli concept would
allow Implementation of certain pacts of the Agreement and not
others.. The exchange of instruments of ratification would
trigger certain portions of the Agreement--for example,
termination of the state of war, Israel's right to open a
liaison office in Beirut--which would highlight for the Arabs
some of the objectionable pacts of the Agreement, without
achieving .the withdrawal of all Israeli forces. Entry into
force of the Agreement would also trigger U.S. assurances under
the U.S.-Israel MOIL and the Reagan-Cesayel letter.
other important political considerations associated with
entry into force of the Agreement include:
-? The Lebanese Parliament has taken a position against
implementation of the Agreement unless it is in the contest of
a full Israeli withdrawal.
-- The Shi'a in southern Lebanon would resent the Gesayel
government for 'freeing' the Druxe in the Shut by a
redeployment, while leaving them under the yoke of the Israeli
occupation. This would have serious negative implications for
efforts to maintain.internal consensus.
-- It the Agreement is biought into force, Israel will be
obligated to complete its withdrawal in 12 weeks. If it does
not, Lebanon has reserved the right to 'suspend', or even
declare "null and void', the Agreement. As time passes with no
further Israeli withdrawals, pressure would increase on Ceoayel
to take such steps.
Gemayel has decided for now that he would agree to put the
Agreement into force only it there is the prospect of full
Israeli withdrawal, unilateral or simultaneous. This decision
appears firm. The Israelis argue, on the other hand, that
until the Agreement actually goes into effect, Syria will
continue to hope that it can block the process. On balance,
there appear to be more problems than advantages to vs if wo.
try to force Lebanon to implement the Agreement for a partial
Israel withdrawal.
SECRET SEWSIT!VE
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At the same time. Israel has reacted negatively to an
alternative presented by Phil Habib just before the Secretary's
trip to:the area. Angered by an unfortunate leak, the Israelis
resisted the suggestion that we work to secure a verifiable add
assured departure (not necessarily simultaneous) by all
external forces in conjunction with deeoupling the withdrawal
and agreement issues. Despite this strong Israeli reaction,
the G01 has now been exposed to the fact that we have been
thinking along these lines and we could try a variant: that we
would accept implementation of the Agreement in the context of
a redeployment/psTtial withdrawal only it Israel provided at
the same time a date certain--whether the 12 weeks specified in
the Agreement or another agreed date, say six months or a year
-- by.which all of its forces will have been withdrawn.
(Certain elements of the Agreement -- for example, the
initiation of discussions on movement of persons and goods, and
the ispleotntation of the interim ?ccangements in this area are tied to the completion of Israeli withdrawal and would
hence automatically be deferred if the 12 week period wecd'
extended,) The risk of deferring Israel's obligation to
withdraw, while allowing the Israelis to receive political and
economic 'gains' and to overcome the domestic crisis over
casualties, is substantial. Six months to a year from new, the
Administration will be under election-related pressure to
cooperate with the Israeli government if the Israelis inform as
that they do not intend to honor the withdrawal commitment.
The options on implementing the Agreement clearly depeml
on our decision on a policy toward Israeli redeployment.
1. Oppose any implementation of the Agreement in the
context of a redeployment. (Options 1 and 4 on redeployment).
2. Support implementation of the Agreement in the event
of Israeli redeployment. (Option 3 on redeployment.)
3. Propose to Isteel and Lebanon an implementation of the
Agreement in the context of a scheduled Israeli full
withdrawal, of which the redeployment would be the first step.
(Option 2 on redeployment).
C. KNl -Options
Until now we have assumed that the MNF contributors world
face the problem of a change in the MNF's area of operations
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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S ECIMT/S ENS RIVE
.and site only in the con-text of a full withdrawal of all
external.forces. However, the Lebanese have now officially
requested decisions from the NUT cOntzibutinq countries on
their role in support of the Lebanese Azusa Forces (LAP) as the
LAY moves to replace Iscaeli torees in areas from which the
Israelis might withdraw. The Israelis also appear favocabLe
to the idea of an KNr role with the LAt, but
.refrained from pressing forcefully on the int probably have
expect to COL to do so). In addition, a decisionecanuourthtr
response A. requited because of the growing prospect of a
redeployment-- whether or not it is linked to a scheduled full
withdrawal--and the need for contingency planning. This
decision is required irrespective of our views on
implementation of the Ayreeaent under any of the scenarios
contemplated, or our position of supporting or opposing
Israel's partial withdrawal.
Whatever its formal position on an Israeli rede to
the COL would be compelled to take any o p Imt'
control over more of Lebanon's national territoory. to 4eo
if the LAY-does not move into the areas vacated by the[elr'
Israelis, serious factional fighting between Lebanese Druse and
Christians would probably erupt, threatening the integrity
President Amin Gemayel's government. It is also conceivblot
that the Syrians and PLO would attempt to move Into the
vacuum. The LAY fully intends to move in behind the
withdrawing Israelis, but wants MY support and considers U.S.
participation essential; otherwise, the Syrians may not be
deterred and the local population in the affected areas may not
have confidence in the GOL's political/security arrangements.
We envision a similar role for the MY as the current oRe
in Beirut--not a combat or interns; security role, but one of
support for the LAY by presence. The basic objective of
strengthening the authority and control of the central Lobar se
government would remain the primary task of the MNF. lowevee,
the COL. in proposing a mission for the U.S. MY in the comet
of-an IDF redeployment and subsequent LA? move has
that the'U.S. contingent would 'su ? proposed
roads' and in keeping 'infiltratorssoout. For Fthe U.S tiny
contingent, the road specified is the coastal road south from
Beirut to Sidon. We most receive a b.tter understanding fray
the COL on the true meaning of their proposed mission of
'support... In securing...', as this might result in a combat or
combat support role for the U.S. contingent.
Our Vabassy in Beirut has also raised the Issue of
protection of the Palestinians resident along the Beirut-sidmt
SE~ENSITIVE
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5Lc1xL JSLNsiTAr
road, noting that: It would be essential for us to identity
fully all. 'areas along the highway where Palestinians ace
resident and assure ourselves that adequate measures for their
protection were being taken before assuming the implicit
responsibility for their safety that our presence in the area
would suggest.'
There are appreciable difficulties with any move of the
MNF from Its current duties into an area between two
belligerents and where serious factional conflict is imminent
or underway. The relatively benign environment of Beirut in
which the MNT now operates would be very different, and
possibly hostile, in the event of an Israeli partial vitbdcawd
which occurs in the absence of any agreements for full Israeli
and/or Syrian withdrawal. Moreover, some Lebanese elements are
likely to react violently to the redeployment as meaning dd
facto partition with NUT, and especially American, support.
.Serious Congressional concern over out decision is certain,
especially as it will appear that the MMT is taking over in
areps where Israel would not star because of its costs. it
will be clear that in this situation our forces would be
engaged in Lebanon. for an indefinite duration and in the
context of uncertain political and 'security arrangements.
Also, the risk of taking casualties will undoubtedly increase.
The threat against the US MOT will increase if the IDt
continues to use the Beirut-Sidon highway and Old Sidon road
for resupply of its liaison office in Yarze or if the LAY allow
the LT to continue to resupply LF forces in Ally/Shut using the
Beirut-Sidon Road. There is little `military' need for the
LAP's proposed mission for the US MILT along the coastal roads
however, it does provide the desired political support for LAY
deployment.
A changed deployment of the U.S. contingent of the III!
will raise two Congressional questions. Most importantly, any
substantial change will require the Executive branch to seek
authorization from Congress. The 1963 Lebanon supplemental
requires the President to 'obtain statutory authorization free
the Congress with respect to any substantial expansion in the
number or role in Lebanon of U.S. Armed Forces, including any
introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Lebanon in conjunction
with agreements providing for the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from. Lebanon and for the creation of a now multinational
peacekeeping force in Lebanon.' (Rey floor statements
indicate that this provision would apply if the number of
Americans were increased by several hundred or more, it the
nature of their current functions were changed, of it they were
deployed outside the 'Beirut area'. The Executive Stanch
SLC1ttT/SZHSITIVZ
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
acquiesced in this provision. While the Lebanon supplemental
does not require that authorisation be obtained prior to
redeploying the U.S. contingent or increasing its sire, the
keen interest displayed by the STRC and thi NPAC in this issue
would argue for broad consultations with the Congress as soon
as the-outlines of the changes are known and for the early
submission of proposed legislation.
The second Congressional question involves the War Toes
Resolution. The Lxecutive branch will be required to make a
report to-Congress under the War Powers Resolution if
redeployment of the MNt in connection with a partial Israeli
withdrawal* (a) constitutes an introduction of U.S. forces into
a situation.'where Imminent involvement in hostilities is
indicated by the circumstances' (section 4 (a) (1)) and/or (h)
constitutes an introduction of U.S. forces in numbers which
substantially enlarge U.S. Armed forces equipped for combat
already located in a foreign nation' (section 4 (a) (3)). Under
section S (b) of the War Powers Resolution, an introduction of
U.S. troops sbroad into a situation where imminent ineo.vii/nt
in hostilities is indicated purportedly requires a withdrawal
of the U.S. torces'within sixty days unless Congressional
authorization for their retention is obtained. While the
recent Supreme Court decision in the CDadha decision coneecaLn
legislative vetoes has irrvalidated section 5 (c) which
permitted Congress to direct the President by concurrent
resolution -to remove U.S. troops engaged in hostilities abroad,
it does not resolve the question of the relative authority of
the President and the Congress to regulate the introduction of
U.S. troops abroad with is involved in section 5 (b).
Introduction of U.S. troops into areas where Israeli troops
-have been taking casualties is certain to raise questions is
Congress as to whether U.S. troops have been introduced into
situations of 'iaainent hostilities' and whether the sixty-day
period is running. Under these circumstances, if an
authorization has not been sought and obtained within sixty
days after the redeployment, the entire O.S. participation in
the MNf could be placed?in.jeopardy.
On the other hand, the imminence of an Israeli
redeployment requires that we undertake adequate planning and
preparations now if we do decide on U.S. participation with the
MNr in backing up the LAf in the areas Israel leaves. We need
to begin urgent consultations with our MNt
co-contributors--trance, Italy, and Great Britain--on the
principles of a joint response to the Israeli and Lebanese
requests, making cleat that we are engaging only in contingency
planning-. it is not clear at this time how our nor
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co-contributors view the prospect of an expanded role,
particularly as the Lebanese appear to expect a more active
French and Italian role. In addition, we may wish to see what
we can do to help work out an agreement with the Druz* and to
try to secure Syrian cooperation, or at least acquiescence is
the redeployment, perhaps through the newly-established joint
U.S.-Syrian working group. For these reasons, a decision is
needed soon.
The extent of Israeli redeployment will affect the
requirement for additional U.S. forces. Under so.e
circumstances, such as an ID? departure from greater Nirut? no
expansion would be required.
1.? Status 9uo. The us MNr remains in place with the some
force sizee snd mission.
2. MNF Deploys de and Beirut - No Lie nsion. Without
expanding, the current MNT deploys along key lines of
communication (LOCr), as requested by the GOL. The US MINI
continues its presence at Beirut International Airport ISLA)
.while deploying elements in support of LAP operations to
establish a presence along the coastal road south of DIA to the
Israeli line of withdrawal. No change in mission.
3. MNF Ex ands and Deploys Be and Beirut. US and other
contributors expand as necessary a deploy a ong LOCI as
requested by the GOL. The US MNr continues its presence at BIA
while deploying elements to establish a presence along the
coastal road south of BIa to the Israeli line of withdrawal.
a. No change in missions
or,
b. MNF mission charged to allow prevention of infiltration
(GOL request).
4. UNIFIL Employed as Interposition Force. GOL repwate
and UN approves a new ^an ate for UNIFIL allowing UNIFIL units
to be deployed, in coordination with the L-F, as an
interposition farce in areas from which the ID? and/or Syrians
withdraw. MNF forces remain in place and continue their
current mission.
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- 11 -
5. M ? Deploys as ntst sition Force. MW? deploys with
LAF as an interposition into areas vacate by IDF.
A brief description at each option is-contained In thf
Annex on MNF Deployment Options.
Attachments:
U.S. Position on R.deploys+ant - Spce.d Sheet
MN? Deployment Options
IDt Proposed Redeployment Plan
StCR=T/SENSZ_
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SR~CRE BENS?T
U.S. Po6IY20N o1 REOETGOYMIlNt IMALI ?IONS or OPTIONS POOL AGN2136NT NP? -CA
Cootinue current S.
c of seeking t e
u w t rawa o a l
external forces and
0 ose an redeploy..
^ent act al w th raw-
a because it?woy be
ttrdimeennta -to
end
A9re.Ment No implementation
MNF No change.
Offer to?su ort an Israeli Offer to support an Israeli
.rhea oyeen y ava a e 7;3-epla nt -*-IT available
Means (Agreement, MNF means and ress the, Lebanese
ut on It is linked o a ree that
it a one n
to o-a ache u e u t, ementat on o( the
withdrawal- . Agreement.
support implementation Support implementation
Possible expansion Possible expansion of
of site and role size and role.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
T
Rec nice an Israeli redo to -
aen rt a w thdcawal
as
inevitable and work w th the
Lebanese to ensure smooth an
effective m ementat Ion but
not under the-Agreement.
Tr
F ac age It to ee the
Drub on u w t rawal of
a _ externs orces.
no implnentation
Possible expansion of
size and role.
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 M
jLbhhL 1
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MNF DEPLOVM$NT OPT12118
pt': I SEC - 1 ) Jul 0 )
ADVMT G o~ - rr>
status quo. - No expansion of NNr required. - As a political concern, doss not
satiety OOL request for *sr
deployent beyond $eitrut In support of
- Forces LAP to accept respon- I".
sibillty for exercising
governmental authority. - Could deter other NNr contributors
lrow expanded deployment.
No increase in risk to IM?.
- It other MNp contributors deployed
beyond Beirut, Us old be s.en as
tailing to support Herds of OOL (Notes
US can point out the burden of the
extensive efforts/expenses that us bas
ben esp.nding in LAY Modernisation
Progra*) .
wr Deploys Beyond - No expansior of itNr forces. - possible tier Powers Re-rolution.
'mt.
Provides political and symbolic - inquires Congressional authorltstlosti.
^ilitaty support for COL.
- presence mission is lees than that
- Naal.ises use of available iopllod by OOL request.
oroes.
- loss increased risk to NW.
- Could be eons t r sad as s.ppsis t toe
Cbrl4tia. srausnt or partitlos.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300590005-4
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SECRET
IDr Proposed Redeployment Plan
General Moron, together with General ISiahony from
the Israeli. Embassy, presented the IDF's proposed redeploy-
Pent plan in Lebanon to State, Defense and NSC representa-
tives on Wednesday. Heron characterized the plan as the
IDF's favored option which would most likely be accepted
by the Israeli Government. It provides for IOF withdrawal
south to the Awwali River, along a line that turns north
along Nahr al Baruk, extended along the Western base of
the ridge to the current IDF lines -- which run east-west
below-the road to Damascus. The withdrawal is thus limited
to the area south of Beirut and into the Shuf. It cuts
through the bruze area in the Shuf (Walid Jumblatt's town of
Al Mukhtarah remains under IDF control) and leaves the
IDF in control of central, eastern and southern Lebanon.
Moron 4tressed the Israeli desire to coordinate with-,
drawal with the Lebanese Government and the US, and tbels
willingness to execute redeployment over a period of six
to eight weeks if'necessary to meet the needs of the LAP.
The 10?, went withdrawal to be completed by October.
Heron defended the plan as consistent with the Israeli
objective of reducing casualties, while leaving Syria with
an incentive to event--ally withdraw. He noted that with tho
IDF 3m, in the east remaining less than thirty kilometers
from Damascus and only a few kilometers from the road. and
with the new line in the Western sector substantially .amts/
IDF operational' problems, Syria would recognize that Israel
was prepared to suqtain its presence in Lebanon. heron
offered his personal view, however, that the Syrians would
not withdraw until forced to by political, military or
economic pressure.
When asked for their judgment about whether the LAP?
would be able to maintain internal security in the area
evacuated by the IDF, General Siahony said that provided
the necessary arrangements are made, between the Christians
and Druz*, he thought one LAP Brigade, with tanks, could
control the area and deal with the infiltration proolem.
no noted that the area was relatively small, withdrawal
could be phased (e.g. first line south to Damur), the,
IQUF would be in Beirut, and the 1Dt would be very close
and ready to provide support it necessary.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300590005-4
SCCAET
Moron left a clear message that the sodalities of withdrawal
and arrangements with. the LAP following redeployment were not
liked and could be dealt with in consultation with the US and
the GOI.. For example, while Siahony said that the IDF would
want to-continue to use the Beirut-Sidon road to resupply the
IDf company at the MFA liaison at Yarse. Moron corrected his
to say-that such matters were open to discussion and that in
this particular case the LAP might take up the task. Similarly,
on issues such as continuing Haddad's position at the Awwali,
or eventual LAr presence south of the Awwali in the IDt controlled
area, Moron indicate# that no firm decisions had been made.
With respect. to overflight for reconnaissance., however, llsspa.
was emphatic about IDF intension to continue to use the airspace
over'' the vacated irea.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/23: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300590005-4
LEBANON
11MM%
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Lebanese-Israeli Withdrawal Lines
Withdrawal Line A
Withdrawal Line B
(Zahran)
Israel
OE RIVATIVE CI BV 1Q6S2Q
DE CI oAOu
oERrvEO rROM crn a B~
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