PLO: IMPACT OF THE LEBANESE INCURSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300470028-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: November 8, 1982
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
PLO: Impact of the
Lebanese Incursion
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
Secret
y 174
'r/
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SNIE 36.11-82
PLO: IMPACT OF THE
LEBANESE INCURSION
Information available as of 4 November 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 7
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SCOPE NOTE
The evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization personnel
from West Beirut has altered the political climate in the Middle East.
The PLO and the Arab states that support it are faced more directly
than ever with hard choices about the "Palestinian issue." In the
immediate aftermath of the war, Israel has been surprised to discover
that its military victory has not produced the expected political
dividends and seems to have strengthened its antagonists' political hand.
The introduction of both a US and an Arab initiative for dealing with
the Palestinians' political future has intensified the debate within the
PLO and Israel and among the Arab states.
This Estimate examines the likely effects of the movement of PLO
personnel on regional developments over the next six months to a year.
It assesses the impact of the relocation on the PLO's cohesiveness and on
its future policies. It considers the effects on the host governments and
their influence over their guests. It assesses the implications of the
evacuation for the political future of the West Bank and Gaza and for
the position of both superpowers in the region.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The PLO scored temporary political gains during the Lebanese
crisis by winning an improved international image and focusing
attention on the broader Palestinian issue. Its long-term political
position, however, is weaker than before the Israeli invasion because it
lost its independent base of operation and is more dependent on the
Arab states.
The PLO will remain organizationally intact for at least the next
year, but political divisions between the moderate and radical wings are
increasing over the moderate majority's efforts to involve the organiza-
tion in Middle East negotiations.
The PLO evacuated about 8,500 personnel from Beirut. The bulk
of the PLO's fighting forces remained behind in northern and eastern
Lebanon. They now number approximately 13,000,' including 1,000 or
more reinfiltrated via Syria. Most evacuated personnel outside Syria are
likely to stay put for the next several months, barring dramatic Middle
East political developments or a sharp decline in PLO morale.
The host governments are keeping the dispersed PLO units under
tight security, and the Palestinians have so far had little effect on the
hosts' domestic situation. Serious problems could develop if PLO morale
and discipline decline.
The member groups are unlikely to countenance the transforma-
tion of the PLO into a strictly political movement. Whether they turn to
violence on a large scale will depend on the progress of diplomatic
efforts to find a solution to the Palestinian problem.
Arafat's leadership within the PLO and his influence in Arab
councils is temporarily stronger than ever. He faces a greater challenge,
however, from the radical PLO groups committed in varying degrees to
leftist ideologies and more militant hostility toward Israel. Although his
advantage over other PLO leaders is likely to diminish during the next
year, Arafat will remain the dominant figure in the PLO.
The PLO power balance favors the moderates. Arafat and other
moderate leaders believe President Reagan's Middle East initiative
This number includes regular military structured units plus paramilitary units theoretically under the
control of the military commander for the area. It does not include irregular militia forces with some
military training.
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contains positive elements, but they are not willing to give it unqualified
endorsement. Progress toward a compromise solution of the Palestinian
issue would strengthen the moderates' willingness to confront the
radicals. Stalemate will continue to work to the advantage of the
radicals.
Even among the moderates, however, there is skepticism about US
resolve to remain committed to the plan in the face of Israeli opposition.
Arafat will probably claim that the PLO cannot make additional
concessions without a demonstration of Israeli willingness to compro-
mise or further indications of US intentions, such as sanctions against Is-
rael if settlement activity on the West Bank continues.
Arafat knows that recognition of Israel would irrevocably split the
PLO. His need to seek PLO consensus, his conviction that Israel will re-
ject all compromise, and his wariness concerning US intentions will
reinforce his inherent reluctance to make any but minor and incremen-
tal diplomatic moves. Arafat, in fact, is more likely to err on the side of
caution than to risk splitting the PLO.
Syrian President Assad's increased influence over the PLO radicals
improves his ability to prevent the PLO from adopting policies he
dislikes. Arafat, however, is less dependent on Syria and more willing to
take stands independent of Damascus, but he is unlikely to agree to any
Middle East settlement that Syria rejects.
The Arab states seem prepared to continue financing the PLO at
roughly the same level as before the Beirut evacuation. Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait apparently provide the bulk of the aid received by Fatah
and the Fatah-dominated central PLO treasury. Libya is the main
source of the radicals' funds.
The PLO in the near term is likely to preserve its enhanced
position in Arab councils. The moderate Arab states and the PLO will
work to keep their policies from diverging.
If Arafat can maintain his influence over PLO radicals, he is likely
during the next year to agree in principle to some form of Palestinian
affiliation with Jordan and to give Jordan a qualified mandate to
explore Middle East peace initiatives. Most Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza will continue to accept the PLO as their representative,
unless a breakthrough in the peace process convinces them the PLO is
missing a real chance for an advantageous agreement with Israel.
The PLO mainstream would welcome a dialogue with the United
States but it is unlikely to pay the price of unconditional recognition of
Israel.
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The USSR's ineffective response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
severely strained relations between the PLO and Moscow. The Palestin-
ians are muting their dissatisfaction, however, because they value the
Soviet connection as a vital source of arms and potential leverage on the
United States and the Arabs.
Moscow will attempt to disrupt efforts to establish a PLO-US
dialogue, knowing that PLO participation in a US-sponsored peace
initiative would severely diminish Soviet influence. The Soviets will try
to reconcile differences between Arafat and Syrian President Assad.
The widening rift between them complicates Moscow's efforts to stay
on good terms with both.
As long as Arafat can credibly hold out prospects for progress in the
diplomatic arena and maintain PLO discipline, the PLO groups will
probably forgo international terrorism. Radical elements will be harder
to control in the present circumstances, however, and even the moder-
ate leaders may be forced to approve limited attacks to maintain their
leadership if diplomatic successes are not forthcoming.
Non-PLO Palestinian extremists and sympathetic non-Palestinian
terrorist groups have already stepped up terrorist attacks as a result of
the Israeli invasion. Their plans increasingly include US and moderate
Arab targets along with the traditional Jewish and Israeli interests.
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North and South Yemen
76. The two Yemens appear to be coping without
major problems with their complement of PLO evacu-
ees. In North Yemen they have been housed in a new
military camp built especially for them 37 kilometers
south of Sanaa. The government seems to have chosen
an isolated area in the hope that they would be encour-
aged to leave. By mid-October, however, the Yemenis
were making plans to receive the families of the PLO
personnel, indicating they expect a long presence.
77. North Yemen asked to receive only Fatah units,
and traded some PFLP members included among the
original arrivals for some Fatah members sent to South
Yemen. The Fatah elements reportedly are well disci-
plined, but about 20 Palestinians described by the
government as radicals have been imprisoned for
"misbehaving." The Palestinians are permitted to
travel to Sanaa during the day but must return to the
camp at night. Officers are permitted to carry side-
arms in Sanaa. All others must remain unarmed
outside the camp.
that they may be settling in for an extended stay.
the current time, most are housed in a remote complex
built as an agricultural cooperative, a source of annoy-
ance to its intended inhabitants. The Palestinians have
complained that the facilities are inadequate. As many
as 300 may have remained in Aden.
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