W. GERMANS WARY OF MOSCOW'S CARROT AND STICK TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450021-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 28, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/09/07 :CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450021-1
PART II _- MAIN EDITION -- 28 DECEMBER 1982
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 28 DECEMBER 19'82 Pg. 4
W. Germans wary of Moscow's carrot and stick tactics
Soviet gains in Bonn depend on whether US seen as serious in arms talks
By Elizabeth Pond soon as Western deployments begin.
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor The Soviet Union apparently hopes that its carrot and
Bonn stick will have a greater impact on the West German oppo-
Moscow's mixed appeal and threat to Western Europe to sition and public than on the government -especially dur-
choose between its American alliance and detente finds ing the campaign [or the planned March 6 general election
only a wary response so tar in the linchpin country of West ~ here. To this end the Soviets are emphasizing to Western
~~ Germany. European audiences the gWck US rejection of the Andropov
'i Moscow's further prospects for winning greater sympa- offer, portraying this as proof of American bad faith.
~ thy here in the 1983 "year of the missile" will depend This Soviet analysis finds a ready ear among the West
largely on domestic West German politlcs and on whether German anti-nuclear movement and the Jett wing of the
the United States is perceived to be serious in arms-control opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD), which take .tor
negotiations. granted American bad faith in arms control. The more ua-
The Soviet combination of carrot and stick was formu- certain question will be the eventual judgment by centrist
lated? most explicitly by Tess on Dec. 25. W estem European, Social Democrats and the broader West German public.
states, the official Soviet news agency warned, must decide Here the Soviets must perform a delicate balancing act.
between detente and following the US along "fts fatal path They are beginning to brandish their European nuclear su-
of confrontation." Western Europe thus [aces "an ex- periority_in_a new way in warning Western Europe of
tremely important alternative, perhaps the most important unspecified consequences if NATO deployments proceed.
in its entire history," Tass declared, echoing a shift in So- But at the same time they are continuing to portray them-
viet public relations in recent weeks toward greater im- selves as the real peace lovers as against a reckless Ameri-
plicit stress on the stick. can nuclear superpower. The new threats could backfire
Pravda's commentary followed a commas Western re- and induce a perception of need for greater NATO defense,
spouse with different national emphases to Soviet party acme observers here suggest -unless Washington makes it
chief Yuri Andropov's pre~hristmas speech on European- easy for Moscow by playing the ogre with an uncompromis-
theater intermediate range nuclear weapons. ing negotiating position.
- In that speech Andropov offered to reduce Soviet Euro- In this rather fluid competition to' win West German
peen-theater missile numbers (though not warheads) by "hearts and minds," the SPD hgs not yet made up its
several hundred to match British and French numbers - if ~ collective mind.
NATO would waive planned US deployments in Europe. Foreign Minister Genscher, who broke up his Liberal
Washington, London, and Paris Immediately replied that Parly's coalition with the SPD last tall over domestic is-
this offer was unacceptable -but was worth studying for sues, now accuses the SPD o[ abandoning the former com-
elements of flexibility. mon position of all the parties on Eurom)ssiles.
Reversing Phis order, Bonn immediately replied that the Allied diplomats here consider Genscher's view an exag-
? soviet otter was worth studying for elements of flexibility geratioa -but they note, as ope diplomat phrased it, "You
-but was unacceptable as it was. Foreign Minister Hans- sure g~ ~ feeling from talkia~ to various people in the
Dietrich Genscher added pointedly that a positive aspect of
the new Kremlin position was its implicit admission -tor Pm't3' that they are positioning themselves to espouse a
the first time -that the Soviet Union already possesses a moratorium or something at the (Japuary) party conter-
large Euromissile superiority over NATO. ence." A nuclear moratorium would presume a European
Moscow seems to have few hopes of dissuading Bonn's nuclear balance rather than the Soviet superiority that both
three-month-old conservative government from going Western official policy and now -implicitly - Andropov's
ahead with the NATO deployments due to begin at the end official policy assume ezists.
of next year if there is ao Soviet-American Euromissile So tar the SPD - in agreemeetwith the conservatives -
arms-control agreement before then. The govertunent re- has been avoiding making NATO missiles i! central issue in
peatedly asserts that the West German portion o[ these the imminent campaign. SPD presidium member Hans-
deployments will proceed in the absence of arms control - Jurgen Wisclwewski has given a warning signal in regret-
and that arms-control talks could then continue after the ling the American, British, and French "premature rejec-
t initial installations. Soviet spokesmen vigorously contest lion" of the. Andropov offer. But SPD chancellor candidate
the last point and threa_tea to break oK the negotiations as Hans-Jochen Vogel has expre~sed.no strong opinions of his
E owffo4"huclear weapons and arMs control
Approved For Release 2007/09/07 :CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450021-1