US-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review completed
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State Dept. review completed
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Executive Summary
The purpose of this study is to consider what we can expect
from the Soviets over the next 6 - 24 months and how we should
attempt to steer East-West relations in that same period. It
concludes with a summary of possible Soviet initiatives,
suggested US responses, and possible US initiatives. These
conclusions are based on analysis of:
? the Andropov regime's view of the world situation and
of how Soviet interests can be advanced;
? the strength of Andropov's political position and the
resources and constraints that define what he can attempt and
achieve; and
? our view of American interests and what we would like
to see the Soviets do, stop doing, or abstain from doing
insofar as their conduct affects our interests.
This study is based on the long-term framework for US
policy toward the USSR established by NSDD 11-82.
THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW
Assets and Liabilities
In assessing its inheritance, the Soviet leadership finds
major gains and assets:
? superpower status and global reach;
? a quarreling, economically shaky West;
? domestic political stability; and
? an economy strong enough to support massive military
outlays while keeping popular discontent within tolerable
limits;
. . . as well as problems:
? discontent in Eastern Europe;
? declining productivity, morale and economic growth (to
below 2% percent per annum);
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? the Afghanistan predicament; and
? Western--especially American--rearmament.
With regard to military competition, the regime finds
itself with:
? rough overall balance, with Soviet leads in ground
forces, long-range INF missiles, and ICBMs, as well as reduced
American advantages in naval and other power projection forces
and in military technology;
? prospective loss of the Soviet advantage in INF, as
well as American strategic modernization and restored American
naval and technological supremacy.
Basic Choices
On balance, Brezhnev's successors will be sufficiently
content with these conditions, unsure of how to effect basic
change, and sober about the consequences of unregulated
competition or direct confrontation with us that they will not
be inclined to depart from the country's general historical
course.
The leaders probably think the economy can sustain roughly
the current pace of military effort (4% per annum growth) and
international aggrandizement, but not much more. It would take
a much graver economic crisis than expected to force the regime
to consider military and international contraction, given that
this would mean abandonment of Brezhnev's main achievement:
Soviet might and reach comparable to ours. At the same time,
the deteriorating economic situation will make the regime
cautious about taking on a larger military burden and new
international liabilities. In sum, the regime will opt for
neither an expansionist surge nor broad retrenchment.
Nothing in Andropov's background or character suggests that
he would be predisposed to swing widely from Brezhnev's
course. Moreover, while his position in the leadership is
strong--in part because his colleagues want a strong leader--he
is bound by consensus, and particularly beholden to Ustinov and
Gromyko. These factors also militate against major domestic or
international shifts.
Foreign Policy Directions
This by no means implies passive continuity in foreign
policy. The difficulty of effecting domestic change could
encourage foreign policy dynamism, albeit within the framework
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set under Brezhnev. The Soviet leaders may see more
sophisticated, innovative, agile, and diversified diplomacy as
the best and cheapest way to undercut and pressure us, expand
their influence, relieve internal pressures, and perhaps cut
the political costs of some of their more exposed positions
abroad. They may be contemplating a mix of selective
international "opportunity-seizing" and "loss-cutting," but in
both cases with costs, risks and deviations kept to a minimum.
The new leadership, like the old, sees in Washington an
Administration that refuses to respect Soviet status and
prerogatives as an equal superpower, even while--in their
view--exaggerating Soviet military advantages. They see us as
having raised the costs and risks of military and international
competition. However, they may doubt the Administration's
ability to maintain a national consensus in support of
restoring American strength, or to forge a Western consensus
around Washington's East-West outlook and policies. They doubt
our willingness to respond positively to anything less than a
broad Soviet retreat, which they will not contemplate.
For some in Moscow, this assessment of Washington calls for
a more confrontationist approach, an expanded Soviet military
effort, greater sacrifice, and less regard for Western public
opinion. There may be those at the other extreme who believe
the USSR must deal directly with American concerns in order to
avert a level of competition and confrontation the country
cannot afford. However, while resource constraints will work
against the advocates of a major military and international
surge, they will not dictate retreat either. Thus, the view
most likely to prevail is that US-Soviet relations should be
placed in a holding pattern until it becomes clear whether or
not this Administration's strategic approach is a passing
phenomenon.
Thus, on the whole, with the possible exception of START,
it is unlikely that the Soviets see much percentage in making
major concessions in the hope of satisfying this
Administration. They may probe our willingness to do business
with them, but their expectations will be low. They are more
likely to try even harder to put us on the defensive
politically and to stimulate a public and Allied backlash
against our policies. In the process, however, they might be
induced to take some real if limited steps that would partially
meet our concerns.
With regard to arms control (notably START and INF), the
Soviets have a definite interest in somehow heading off
unrestrained competition. Indeed, the leadership may be less
than sanguine about having to back up threats of,,stepped-up
Soviet military programs in the event that our effort
continues. At the same time, they doubt that we are genuinely
interested in agreements that take account of their concerns
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(e.g., cruise missiles), and their military establishment is in
a position to block "disadvantageous" deals. The Soviets will
therefore follow an integrated arms control strategy combining
propaganda with real but limited concessions, their purpose
being to cut off domestic and Allied support for our build-up
while leaving open the possibility of our addressing their
concerns and thus reaching agreements. To the degree they
succeed in cutting off our support, they will care less about
actually reaching agreements with us, since they could then
avoid reducing their forces without fear of being forced into
an expanded military effort.
In general, the Soviet leaders may feel that Soviet
interests are best served by isolating and "outflanking" us as
much as possible--that is, by orienting their foreign policy
away from US-Soviet relations, and by trying to come to grips
with some of their problems without reference to us. This
would enhance their freedom to ignore our concerns, their
ability to weaken our relations with others, and their ability
to pursue new initiatives. In INF, the direct negotiations
with us are secondary, indeed subordinated, to the task of
turning Europe against deployments. Even in START, where they
must deal with us, they will try to reach American public
opinion over our heads.
Trying to operate around the US over the next 6 - 24 months
would represent a necessary "tactical"--and, they probably
hope, temporary--departure from the Soviets' basic emphasis on
the centrality of the US-Soviet relationship in managing world
affairs.
THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON
Our program to re-establish American ascendancy involves
rearmament, world economic recovery, respect for international
law and order, and the promotion of democratic values.
Progress in achieving these goals affects and is affected by
our competition with the Soviet Union.
? The more successful we are in our overall program, the
more able we will be to induce more restrained Soviet conduct
or, failing that, to counter Soviet misconduct.
? The Soviets want to impede our program, mainly by
dividing us from those at home or abroad whose support we need
for success.
The results we have achieved so far are mixed:
? We have succeeded in making the Soviets more cautious
but we have not caused them to retreat from existing positions.
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? We have increased public awareness of the Soviet
challenge here and abroad, but we have not laid to rest
questions about our own commitment to better East-West
relations--questions which the Soviets are quick to feed.
Our Goals
Over the next 6 - 24 months, our chief aims toward the
competition should be:
? to consolidate domestic consensus in support of
sustained growth in defense spending, and thus to convince the
Soviets that they are not witnessing a passing phenomenon;
? to prevent further Soviet encroachments;
? to reduce existing international problems caused by the
Soviets, and to increase the costs to the Soviets of those
problems on which there is no progress;
? to maintain control of the East-West agenda, the terms
by which problems are dealt with, and the standards by which
Soviet behavior is measured;
? to strengthen our general Western coalition and keep
our coalitions on specific issues intact;
? to reduce Western contributions to Soviet power and
dependence on East-West trade;
? to engage the Soviets constructively on issues where
our interests overlap; and
? to show that our approach to East-West relations is
bearing fruit, in the sense that both Soviet behavior and our
competitive position are beginning to improve.
Because the Andropov regime will probably follow a more
active and sophisticated foreign policy, oriented away from
addressing problems with us and on our terms, and because it
may find it easier to mollify others than to satisfy us, we
need to preserve our influence over the manner in which
outstanding issues are played out. This does not mean that we
should alter our general stance: we should remain in a broadly
reactive posture, in the sense that only genuine improvement in
Soviet conduct will bring about more positive American policies
toward the USSR. At the same time, in view of the Soviet
policies we foresee, we may need to take initiatives to
maintain our coalitions and to maintain demanding but
attainable standards for Soviet conduct on outstanding problems.
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Because we cannot force broad Soviet retreat, we should be
selective and opportunistic ourselves if we want to cause
concrete improvement in Soviet conduct in the next two years.
To remain relevant regarding international problems the Soviets
would like to deal with without reference to us (e.g., Poland,
Afghanistan, Kampuchea), we have to be, and appear to be,
realistic in setting near-term goals. Our long-term goals
concerning such problems could become obsolete if we don't
define the near-term progress we want. We should be true to
our promise to respond positively to real improvement in Soviet
international conduct and reasonable in recognizing what is
real and what is not or else we will lose our capacity to
influence Moscow and to keep our partners with us. We will
assist the Soviets in their effort to isolate us if we are seen
as staking out rigid and maximal positions that we know cannot
be a basis for progress, however noble those positions might be.
Just as the Soviets may now try to outflank us, we have to
be ready to execute our own political flanking movements to
ensure that they cannot escape from our agenda of concerns and
our standards for responsible conduct and real progress. This
means we should consider how to use not only US-Soviet
relations to induce improved Soviet behavior but also our
relations with other key actors, such as our'European Allies,
Japan, China, ASEAN, Pakistan, and African Front-Line States.
Only if we frustrate Soviet efforts to divide us from our
support, at home and abroad, can we induce them to move from
shadow to substance as they attempt to reduce the costs to them
of the problems they have caused.
With regard to arms control, we should above all avoid
being left in a position in which Soviet programs are not
limited while ours cannot be sustained due to lack of public
and Allied support. To the degree the Soviets can convince our
own and European publics that we do not want progress, they may
succeed in blocking our rearmament while avoiding reductions
and retaining their advantages. Our aim must be to avoid being
outmaneuvered in this way without compromising our principles
of reductions, equality and verifiability.
The Relationship of Short-term and Long-term Goals
Even if we succeed over the next two years in preserving
support for our policies, in preventing new Soviet
encroachments, and in reducing one or'more outstanding
problems, the basic facts of US-Soviet relations will persist:
the Soviets will still have the means and incentive to
challenge our interests in the Third World; they will be able
to maintain the internal discipline needed to bear a massive
military burden; and they will continue to try to undermine
support for Western rearmament.
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If we want to alter these facts fundamentally within the
next two years, the approach outlined above is inadequate.
Some would therefore argue that instead of trying to reduce
existing problems, we should allow them to get worse for the
sake of weakening the Soviets. By this reasoning, we should,
for example, not help the Soviets find a way to put their
Afghanistan encumbrance behind them. We should not facilitate
Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, nor address Soviet
objectives as part of the give-and-take of arms control. And
we should do nothing to avert turmoil in Eastern Europe--much
less in the USSR itself--that could relieve the Soviets' burden.
Others believe that there are several basic flaws in this
line of reasoning:
? It seriously underestimates the Soviets' ability to
cope with their problems and to resort to extraordinary
harshness to maintain control and avoid defeat.
? It overestimates our ability to preserve essential
support among those at home and abroad who want to see
outstanding problems solved, even if the Soviets might stand to
gain.
? It ignores our genuine interests in easing human
suffering (whether in Kampuchea or Afghanistan) and advancing
reconciliation, justice, and human rights (as in Poland).
? Most fundamentally, it overlooks the fact that we are
in a dynamic situation, dealing with volatile problems which
could lead to dangerous instabilities we may not be able to
control. Southwest Asia and nuclear arms competition are but
two graphic examples. Simply put, while we may be able to
damage Soviet interests through uncontrolled competition, we
cannot be confident of safeguarding our own. Thus, we want to
contain and reduce conflict, even as we force the Soviets to
pay a high price for their misdeeds.
In sum, having advanced a set of goals for improved Soviet
behavior, this Administration should not and cannot now fail to
seize whatever opportunities present themselves to achieve
them, even if the Soviets can benefit from a lessening of the
problems they have created. Moreover, if we can show in the
course of the next two years that we are causing the Soviets to
behave more responsibly, we will help to establish a durable
political basis for this Administration's approach for the rest
of this decade and beyond.
In view of the foregoing assessment, we must anticipate our
interests being affected by Soviet policies in the following
specific areas:
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Sino-Soviet Relations. The Soviets may be willing to make
limited but concrete concessions, like modest withdrawal of
forces from the border, in order to pressure us and give
themselves more maneuvering room. Also, insofar as the Soviets
might be disposed to show flexibility and cut costs on such
problems as Afghanistan, they would have an interest in playing
such movement as concessions to Beijing, not us.
Broadly speaking, we want to avoid having our freedom of
action toward either country limited, more than it already is,
by the prospect and reality of progress between them. We also
have an interest in preventing a reduced Soviet threat to China
from increasing the Soviet threat to NATO, Southwest Asia, or
other US interests. We have an interest in maintaining
influence over Chinese policies, e.g., toward Taiwan and
Southeast Asia, influence that could be eroded if the Soviets
draw Beijing into closer relations. Finally, we have an
interest in maintaining the confidence of our
friends--especially Japan, but also the Europeans--in our
ability to manage US-Soviet and US-Chinese relations in a way
that keeps chances of Sino-Soviet rapprochement to a minimum.
Japan. The Soviets may try to use conciliatory
actions--perhaps punctuated by threats--to reverse the growing
Japanese inclination to support firmer East-West policies on a
global basis, even though they must know they cannot shake the
basic US-Japan bilateral security relationship. Rapidly
advancing Sino-Soviet relations (and deteriorating Sino-
American relations) could make the Japanese more susceptible to
Soviet blandishments.
We have an interest in seeing a genuine reduction of the
Soviet threat to Japan, e.g., a pull-back from the disputed
islands; but we must hope--and can expect--that the?Japanese
would not be lulled by tokenism nor regard Soviet concessions
as a reason to reverse their movement toward a more solid
stance on East-West relations generally. We also have an
interest in showing both the Soviets and the Japanese that we
will not ignore attempts to intimidate Japan.
Kampuchea. A Soviet attempt to nudge the Vietnamese toward
withdrawal would fit with Moscow's interests in cooperating
with Beijing, gaining respectability with ASEAN, and easing an
existing problem on their terms and without reference to us.
At the same time, the Soviets greatly value their relationship
with Hanoi and will be reluctant to strain it.
Our interest lies in total withdrawal and Kampuchean
independence and non-alignment. The conflict is not such a
burden on the Soviets that we should wish it to continue;
indeed, we would welcome some reduction in the conflict and
especially the threat to Thailand. We must, of course, guard
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against mere gestures designed to crack our coalition with
ASEAN and China. But we would welcome Soviet pressure on
Vietnam, and we are confident that our coalition will survive
possible moves in Kampuchea as long as the Soviets and
Vietnamese represent a continuing threat in the area.
Afghanistan. The Soviets might show limited flexibility in
an effort to satisfy the Paks, the Chinese, and our Allies and
to pinch off support to the Afghan resistance. Beyond reducing
political costs, Andropov probably would like to find a way to
wind down the war itself--presumably unilaterally but not
ruling out a settlement on terms that would leave the Soviets
in control with fewer troops committed. Threats to increase
military pressure on Pakistan would not be inconsistent with
these objectives.
As in Kampuchea, we want total withdrawal, non-alignment,
and a government of the people. Given that these goals are
unattainable, at least in the near term, we face a dilemma. On
the one hand, we would welcome some improvement in conditions
for the Afghans and a reduced Soviet threat to Pakistan,
provided partial progress did not deprive us of the means
(mainly Pak support) to press for an acceptable solution. On
the other hand, a continuation of the conflict has benefits for
us insofar as it is a military and political burden on the
Soviets. In either case, we have an interest in preserving our
ability to influence the terms of a settlement, in maintaining
Pak support for Afghan resistance until Soviet occupation ends,
and in making the war as painful as we can as long as it goes
on. Whether we should work actively to push the Soviets from
cosmetic to real movement depends on whether we believe our
interests are served more by reducing conflict in Southwest
Asia than by keeping the Soviets tied down in a no-win--if also
no-lose--war.
Middle East and Persian Gulf. The Soviets will exploit
lack of progress on our peace initiative, as well as our
support for Israel, to recover if not expand their influence
among the Arabs, if possible beyond their standard clients.
Efforts to destabilize regimes are not excluded but would
likely be quite tentative. Like us, the Soviets cannot drive
the Iran-Iraq war toward either a military or political
conclusion.
Our interests are clear: minimize Soviet influence in the
Arab world and defeat any attempts to sabotage the peace
process, subvert our friends, or exploit instability around the
Gulf. We want to be sure the Soviets understand that we will
do whatever is necessary to protect our vital interests in this
region.
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The Horn of Africa. The Soviets are unlikely to consider
engineering a draw-down of Cuban forces in this area. It is
more likely that they will test us here--if they are disposed
to test us anywhere--since their Ethiopian clients have a
military advantage and since they may doubt our willingness and
ability to save Siad if pressed.
Our interest over the next year or so is in stabilizing the
status quo while gradually building up Sudan and Somalia. Our
interest in a Cuban draw-down is not as immediate here as it is
in Southern Africa. We also have a long-term interest in
reorientation of Ethiopia toward the West, but we cannot gear
our policies to this highly difficult possibility.
Southern Africa. The Soviets are likely to be
uncooperative with regard to a Namibia-Angola settlement unless
convinced that they will bear the onus for failure throughout
black Africa, or that they can somehow benefit from or share in
the credit for success.
Our interest in a Namibia-Angola settlement includes but
goes beyond our desire to weaken the Soviet position in this
volatile and strategically important area. We will not achieve
our immediate goal of Soviet acquiescence if Moscow believes we
would crow about and try to exploit a Soviet retreat. In fact,
we can succeed without requiring a clear Soviet defeat. US and
Soviet interests hardly coincide, but they may intersect.
Central America. The Soviets are unlikely either to
escalate or to try to curb the Cubans, unless they see Havana
drawing them toward a confrontation with us that they do not
want. They will try to keep up pressure through low-risk
support for Marxist elements because of their long-term
interest in having us become pre-occupied with instability
along our frontier.
Our interest is in defeating subversion, advancing economic
and political development, and eventually restoring tranquility
on our Southern porch. Our aim should be to convince the
Soviets that we have a far more compelling interest in
defeating threats in Central America than they do in fueling
them--and thus, that we will do what it takes to prevail in a
show-down, e.g., over introduction of MIGs or Cuban combat
units into Nicaragua. These interests-apply throughout the
Caribbean, but especially on the mainland.
Eastern Europe and Human Rights. Andropov may try subtly
to exploit Romanian and Yugoslav problems, while balancing
between crackdown on political dissent and tolerance of
controlled economic reform elsewhere. Moscow probably thinks
that the peak danger of an explosion in Poland, and of
spillover to the rest of the Bloc, has passed. They will
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probably permit tightly controlled moves toward minimal
reconciliation in Poland while hoping that the West will
contribute to economic recovery without insisting on
significant political quids.
We have an interest in evolution toward greater pluralism,
national autonomy, and respect for human rights in the East.
Our immediate aims include convincing the Soviets that the
risks of pressuring the Yugoslavs are prohibitive and that we
will not exploit--indeed we will respond positively to--real
movement toward greater openness in Eastern Europe. While we
can--indeed, must--distrust Soviet motives for tolerating some
economic and political loosening up, we should nevertheless
encourage it because controlled erosion is still erosion.
We want the Soviets to permit national reconciliation and a
resumption of reform in Poland. But we also have an interest
in ensuring that cosmetic concessions not undermine West
European support for our stance nor increase pressures on us to
agree to a CDE.
It can be argued that our interests our best served by
making the Eastern European burden as heavy as possible for the
Soviets, and thus that we favor turmoil instead of reform and
independence in Poland and elsewhere. However, if we were to
eschew limited progress in hopes of promoting crisis, there is
a serious danger that we would witness only more severe and
unremitting oppression without really taxing the Soviets'
ability and will to maintain control and simultaneously bear
their heavy military burden.
Western Europe. Blocking INF deployments will be the
highest foreign policy priority of Andropov and his
colleagues. To achieve this, they will try to offer a deal
that our Allies feel would justify cancellation or postponement
(which would be tantamount to cancellation) of our deployment
program. They will increase Allied incentives to succumb by
painting a frightening picture of the alternative. If and when
the point is reached at which the Allies want to settle, we
would have to accept or else witness collapse of support for
deployment anyway. (Further discussion on arms control follows
below). The Soviets will also try, with carrots and sticks, to
abort our attempt to achieve Western agreement to constrict
East-West economic relations. They may try to play on
European, especially German, desires to preserve the human
gains of the past decade.
We have a vital interest in beginning INF missile
deployments at the end of 1983, since we know that the threat
cannot possibly be eliminated through arms control. Our
interest in minimizing political turbulence in Western Europe
is strong but subordinate. We have an interest not only in
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defeating Soviet efforts to isolate us by making us appear
unreasonable, but also in deterring and/or countering Soviet
threats against our Allies should it come to that.
Arms Competition and Arms Control. We cannot exclude that
the Soviets will decide that serious arms control negotiations
will not be possible until there is a new US administration.
However, it would be far more consistent with their overall
outlook, internal situation, and likely international strategy
for them to become even bolder in this area. Whether or not
they believe we genuinely want agreements, they have an
interest in confronting us with choices between: on the one
hand, agreements in START and INF which meet their concerns;
and, on the other, collapse of our domestic consensus and
Alliance consensus in support of our defense program and INF
deployment, respectively. Either outcome would offer some
easing of their military burden, though with respect to INF
they would probably prefer splitting the Alliance over reaching
an agreement. In addition, focusing US-Soviet relations on
arms control would be consistent with their aim of taking the
agenda of international problems out of our hands. Although
Andropov will face internally-imposed limits on how far he can
go, we should be prepared for further Soviet concessions.
Our interest is in drawing the Soviets toward our goals of
reductions, equality and verifiability, while keeping popular
support for our negotiating efforts and force programs intact.
We also have an interest in keeping arms control from
dominating the bilateral agenda. We probably cannot use the
prospect of arms control progress to get Soviet concessions on
international problems, unless we were prepared to abandon our
insistence on reductions, equality, and verifiability.
Unless arms control proves to be so extraordinarily
successful in the next two years that it alters fundamentally
our strategic concerns, we have an interest in compounding
Soviet military problems and frustrating Soviet planning.
Exploiting new technologies and geographic advantages is key.
Improved force projection capabilities and NATO conventional
defense are the highest priorities. But in addition, we should
explore how to increase the Soviets' estimate of the multiple
risks to the Russian homeland of any conflict with us.
US-Soviet Cooperation. In addition to possibilities
mentioned above (notably Southern Africa), we have an interest
in getting the Soviets to cooperate concretely on functional
problems where we and they have overlapping interests and where
the Soviets matter. The most obvious is non-proliferation; the
Andropov regime should be amenable to helping us tighten up
international safeguards and IAEA effectiveness. At the same
time, Moscow is unlikely to view such highly selective US
interest in cooperation as a sign of a generally more
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constructive attitude on our part. In a different vein,
challenging the Soviets to provide more support for economic
development might produce modest but welcome results, or at
least undercut their pursuit of closer "East-South" relations.
Less Likely Developments. If our overall assessment of the
view from Moscow proves to be too conservative, the most likely
contingencies that could affect important US interests--for
worse or better--include:
? Soviet-directed escalation in Central America;
? support for large-scale aggression against Somalia;
? significant pressure on Yugoslavia;
? shipment or deployment of "offensive arms" to Cuba;
? a major effort to expand Soviet influence in Iran;
? major concessions on Afghanistan, including substantial
withdrawal;
? concessions in START and/or INF of a magnitude clearly
intended to satisfy us and assure agreement, as opposed to
weakening our support;
? heavy pressure to restrain proxies (Cuba, Libya,
Vietnam); and
? an unexpected surge in Soviet military spending.
Such actions would present us with more straightforward--if
not easier--choices. The real dilemmas will arise when the
Soviets make more limited encroachments and/or concessions. We
will have a harder time gaining support for effective responses
to more subtle Soviet misconduct, and conversely, preserving
support for our positions when the Soviets take partial steps
to satisfy others' concerns but not ours. This is exactly the
sort of conduct that seems most likely, and toward which the
remainder of this paper is addressed.
INITIATIVES
Possible Soviet Initiatives and US Responses
The following possible Soviet initiatives during the next
six months would be consistent with our analysis of how the
Andropov regime thinks it can advance Soviet interests given
its constraints. They are illustrative; the exact description
of each initiative is not as important as the thought that
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action generally along such lines is possible. We have not
attempted to assign probabilities; some of the contingencies
approach the edge of the band within which we expect the
Soviets to operate. The order of presentation is from East
Asia through Southwest Asia and Africa, Eastern and Western
Europe, and finally, the Western Hemisphere. Possible American
responses are also indicated.
1. A Soviet offer to the Chinese to withdraw forces from the
border, or a unilateral withdrawal.
American responses:
- Ask the Chinese to insist that withdrawn Soviet forces be
demobilized.
- Depending on the size of withdrawal, publicize the
potential increased threat to others.
2. A Soviet nuclear arms control proposal to the Chinese.
American responses:
- Reaffirm our insistence on global INF limits.
- Consult with the Chinese on the dangers to both of us
presented by Soviet attempts to regionalize nuclear army
control.
- Welcome any substantial reduction to the nuclear threat
to our East Asia friends.
3. A Soviet offer to Japan to reduce forces on the disputed
islands, or a unilateral partial withdrawal.
American responses:
- Encourage the Japanese to drive a hard bargain.
- Welcome real reduction of the threat.
4. A Soviet threat or move to build up forces on the disputed
islands.
American responses:
- Explicitly reaffirm our commitment to Japanese security.
- Privately offer to increase US forces in Japan.
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5. Soviet pressure on Vietnam and/or announcement of more
reasonable terms for settlement in Kampuchea.
American responses:
- Welcome real moves in the right direction.
- Work with ASEAN and China to reiterate our terms and to
see whether and how the Soviets and Vietnamese can be drawn
toward more substantial movement.
6. A Soviet proposal to the Chinese and/or Paks involving, for
example, termination of support to the Afghan resistance and
acceptance of the Afghan regime in return for phased draw-down
in Soviet forces as resistance declines.
American responses:
- Mobilize Pak-PRC-European coalition to reaffirm our terms.
Remind Paks of the consequences of being separated from
- Indicate interest in discussion of real moves toward our
desired outcome.
7. A Soviet "Indian Ocean Peace Offensive."
American response:
- Resist efforts to link Soviet flexibility in Afghanistan
with reduction in US presence in the Indian Ocean.
8. Stepped-up Soviet subversive activities in Iran or
elsewhere near the Gulf.
American responses:
- Explicitly reaffirm that we will not allow our interests
near the Persian Gulf to be damaged.
- Look for opportunities for direct or indirect dialogue
with Iranians.
- Activate contingency planning with key partners.
9. Soviet diplomatic initiative in Southern Africa.
American responses:
- Welcome any real moves to facilitate a settlement.
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- Attempt to capture any Soviet concessions within our
peace effort, as opposed to letting the Soviets start a
separate track.
10. Offers of major new economic deals with our Western
partners.
American response:
- Attempt to get decisions postponed until our East-West
studies have been concluded.
11. Release of dissidents or increased Jewish emigration from
the USSR.
American responses:
- Welcome on humanitarian grounds; if numbers are
signficant, welcome on political grounds as well.
- Resist attempts to use this as pretext for de-railing our
East-West economic studies.
- Express hope that this can lead to progress in CSCE..
Possibly relax one of our formal CSCE human rights demands.
Assuming that Soviet human rights moves fall well short of our
needs, find a graceful way to end Madrid meeting, e.g.,
agreement on follow-on experts groups.
12. Soviet acceptance of our position on the CDE zone.
American responses:
- Welcome Soviet acceptance of the need for CBMs on Soviet
territory.
- Reaffirm insistence on human rights balance in CSCE.
Convince Allies that, in view of Soviet move, best strategy to
reach agreement in Madrid is maximum solidarity and pressure on
human rights.
13. Significant further Soviet concessions in INF talks,
linked to zero NATO deployments.
American responses:
- Welcome Soviet willingness to consider reduction in
nuclear threat. (The Soviets probably welcome categorical US
rejection of Soviet moves insofar as it helps them paint us as
being unreasonable.)
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- Consult with Allies at highest level about the imperative
of not letting the Soviets drive a wedge between us.
- Secure Alliance reaffirmation of insistence on equality
in INF arms control and commitment to proceed with deployments
if the Soviet threat is not eliminated.
14. Stepped-up threats against our Allies in the event our
missiles are deployed.
American responses:
- Declare that we regard threats against our Allies as
threats against ourselves, and that our Allies can count on us
in the face of all pressures.
- Exploit by underscoring Soviets "true colors" and
reinforcing European appreciation of the need for solidarity.
15. Significant Soviet movement toward acceptance of
significant cuts in ICBM warheads linked to limits on strategic
cruise missiles and non-deployment of INF.
American responses:
- Declare that we will refuse to consider altering our INF
program except in the context of a reduced Soviet INF threat to
our Allies.
16. Increased Soviet-Cuban support for Central American
Marxists.
American responses:
- Take steps to counter on the ground.
- Warn Soviets of the danger to their interests here and
elsewhere. Advise them that we are prepared to do whatever is
required to protect our interests and deliver them a defeat.
- Apply direct pressures on Cuba.
17. Soviet efforts to restrain Cuba.
American responses:
- Signal our acknowledgement.
- Seize opportunity to pursue US-Soviet dialogue on Cuban
behavior.
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General Patterns and Responses
The foregoing mix of Soviet moves and US responses reflects
our expectation of, on the one hand, limited risk-taking and
threats, and on the other hand, limited cost-cutting and peace
offensives, occurring along a basically unchanged center-line
of Soviet policy that falls between broad expansionism and
broad retreat. The pattern of Soviet behavior that actually
emerges could of course have a more conciliatory center-line or
a more menacing center-line. Therefore, in addition to
preparing specific responses, we have to ensure that our
overall response fits the overall pattern. The key to
indicating general direction is our rhetoric:
? For now, we should stick to the line that US-Soviet
relations will improve if, but only if, the Soviets behave more
responsibly. We should be firm, quiet, and inject only a hint
of hopefulness. If we raise expectations now, the pressures to
fulfill them will be mainly on us--and conversely, we will bear
the blame for disappointment.
? Ingf the Soviets become both more conciliatory and more
menaci--i.e., roughly what we expect--we should, rhetorically
at least, "reward" the positive and "punish" the negative,
while stressing that improvement in the relationship can, at
best, be narrow unless improvement in Soviet behavior is broad.
? If risk-taking and threats emerge as the dominant
quality, we should warn that the new Soviet regime appears to
be headed down a path which could threaten peace and Soviet
interests. Our rhetoric should convey total resolve but be
unprovocative. One reason to be quiet and slightly hopeful now
is to be sure that it cannot be said that we were responsible
for getting off on the wrong foot.
? If the emergent trend is toward Soviet cost-cutting,
conciliation, caution, and peace offensives, our rhetoric
should become more hopeful, stressing that we welcome good
intentions but insist on good behavior. We should credit
Andropov for being more constructive than his predecessor,
while crediting oursevles for having produced a shift. The
most difficult task will be to sustain public awareness of the
threat and the need for continuing rearmament without appearing
to ignore the beginning of progress. Obviously, we can refine
this further depending on how much, if any, substance there is
in Soviet peace initiatives.
Specific US Initiatives
In addition to anticipating Soviet moves and correct US
responses, we should consider moves of our own. Our overall
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purpose should be to avoid being outflanked on international
problems and outmaneuvered in arms control. More specifically,
we should aim to:
? preempt Soviet moves;
? illuminate Soviet tokenism and spur them toward real
movement;
? signal our interest in progress;
? cement our support, at home and abroad;
? update our terms for solutions; and
? prevent the Soviets from thinking they can address
problems without reference to us, and keep them engaged in a
dialogue on our agenda of concerns.
Such initiatives would, of course, be in addition to
efforts already underway to induce improved Soviet behavior, to
strengthen Western cohesion and firmness, and to prepare
ourselves better to defend our interests. What we are
currently doing with regard to the US defense effort, INF
deployments, security assistance, reduced Western
"subsidization," calling attention to Soviet misconduct,
pressing for progress in the Middle East, high level
Sino-American dialogue, and so on, are all relevant--indeed,
essential--to the next 6 - 24 months.
New steps might include internal USG planning,
consultations and actions with others, and actons within the
US-Soviet relationship. The following possibilities should be
viewed as building blocks, which can be assembled into an
overall, internally-consistent approach when it becomes clearer
which initiatives we want to pursue on their own merits.
A. Internal planning
1. Form a select interagency group to develop contingency
plans for possible new Soviet encroachments. Rationale:
Existing plans may not suffice, given that the new Soviet
regime may take a different view of opportunities and risks.
2. Develop a plan for using prospective US-Soviet trade to
induce improved Soviet performance, e.g., on human rights.
Rationale: In addition to working out security-related
"denial" guidelines with the Allies, we need to know the
political role of those elements of US-Soviet trade that need
not be denied on security grounds.
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B. Actions with others
1. Conduct early extensive (and tailored) bilateral
consultations on prospective Soviet policies/initiatives with
our Allies, Japan, Pakistan, ASEAN, China, and possibly
others. Rationale: We need to be sure others are prepared to
drive hard bargains, not be lulled, and not be separated from
2. Conduct early consultations with China on possible
Soviet military/negotiating moves, with the aim of reaching an
understanding (perhaps tacit) that each will avoid agreeing to
anything that would damage the other (e.g., shift of SS-20s
from West to East or troops from East to West). Rationale: We
need to probe Chinese intentions and ensure they understand
that we expect them not to damage our interests as they pursue
Sino-Soviet relations, especially if they expect us to be
sensitive to their interests.
3. Organize a new initiative on Afghanistan with Pakistan,
China and possibly the EC, calling for phased, complete
withdrawal, transition leading to safeguards of Afghan
non-alignment, self-determination, and return of refugees.
Rationale: We need to preempt the Soviets, maintain our
coalition, and set demanding but attainable standards for
progress. If we can get the Soviets engaged, so much the
better.
4. Discuss with Allies a realistic step-by-step plan for
reform, reconciliation, and recovery in Poland. Rationale:
Our current stance could become obsolete, and we could find
ourselves without clear goals and means in post-martial-law
conditions. We should also consider presenting it to the Poles
and Soviets. Step-by-step removal of sanctions could be linked
to progress.
5. Discuss with Allies possible steps in INF arms
control. Rationale: We could find ourselves trapped by a
Soviet zero/zero-plus position with broad appeal in Europe
(e.g., an improved "Andropov proposal"). We must have Allied
agreement that more than zero on the Soviet side must mean more
than zero on our side. in this connection, we should analyze
the idea of a 300/300 missile warhead proposal mentioned in the
JCS comments on the previous version of this paper.
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1. Follow up US-Soviet talks on non-proliferation,
Southern Africa, human rights. Rationale: It is important to
show the new regime--and others--that we are prepared to join
in practical efforts to achieve progress, even if the base is
narrow.
2. Early Hartman-Korniyenko tour d'horizon. Rationale:
We need to impress upon the Soviets that we will persist with
our list of international concerns--i.e., that they can't
ignore us. We also need to set agenda for Shultz-Gromyko
meeting, perhaps in April or May. If the Soviets show a
reluctance to enter broad and substantive discussion, we should
not demandeur, but we should publicize that the Soviets appear
not to want dialogue.
3. Propose and facilitate rapid progress toward a nuclear
CBMs agreement. Rationale: This is in our interest. It will
also relieve "freeze" pressures, albeit slightly in the US and
not at all in Europe. Finally, it would enable us to show
Soviets and public that we want progress where possible.
4. Communicate to the Soviets that we are prepared to
agree to START limits on strategic cruise missiles provided
there is agreement significantly to cut ballistic warheads.
Rationale: It is in our interest to convince the Soviets that
we are prepared for a give-and-take negotiation and to create a
dynamic that could lead to an agreement along our lines within
the next two years.
5. Announce our willingness in principle to hold a summit
in 1983, pending outcome of a late-spring Shultz-Gromyko
meeting. A Reagan-Andropov meeting at the 1983 UNGA might be
preferable to a more grand version. Rationale: The pressures
to hold a summit before our INF deployments begin will be
enormous. It is better to preempt this, get some credit, and
establish a clear track that suits our interests than to get
dragged into it. More importantly, a summit could be an
important tool in our effort to induce more responsible Soviet
behavior, provided we guard against the possibility of it
appearing to ignore Soviet misbehavior. The Soviets will not
pay a price to have a summit. But they can be expected to make
a genuine effort to have a successful' summit, which means they
might offer concessions if they are able to foresee some gains
for themselves.
6. Take steps to improve our access to Soviet society,
e.g., opening consulates in Kiev and Tashkent. Rationale:
Paradoxically, we can show our willingness to advance bilateral
relations and expand our penetration. We should consider what
we can get in return, e.g., in the human rights area.
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7 Expand military-to-military contacts at a measured
pace. Rationale: Such contacts would develop a valuable
interface currently available only in formal negotiations.
Public Diplomacy, Information, and Action
To be effective over the next 6 - 24 months--assuming the
Soviets act as we believe they will--our public information
effort must demonstrate:
? that our concerns about Soviet behavior are valid;
? that our positions are correct;
? that we want progress and will be reasonable; and
? that our policies are working.
Obviously, it is not enough to assert these points; they
must be evident from and supported by our policies. If any one
of the four points does not come through, the effect of the
others will be weakened. For example, if we are seen as
exaggerating Soviet misconduct, it will be hard to hold support
for our positions. If we are perceived to be sticking to.
positions that we know cannot produce progress, we will be
judged as wanting no progress rather than praised for the
correctness of our positions. Finally., if we cannot show that
our approach is beginning to work, doubts about its efficacy
will eclipse acceptance of its correctness--thus, we at least
need to be in a position to claim that any improvement in
Soviet positions that does occur is attributable to our
policies.
Public initiatives should be predicated on and used to
reinforce policy initiatives. Among the possibilities are:
? An early speech on US-Soviet relations by Secretary
Shultz laying out our positions, hopes and standards for
progress, and resolve if there is none.
? A speech by the President in, say, two months, when we
will have a better fix on where the Soviets are headed and what
we want to do, especially with regard to START, INF, key
international problems, and a possible summit.
In addition, a select interagency group should be formed to
consider what public initiatives we should consider to
reinforce the particular US initiatives indentified in the
preceding pages.
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