U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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S/S: 8238946
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE December 20, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR ? MR . WILI,IAA{ P . CT,.A-RK .
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject' U. S_ /Soviet Relations -
Attached is the State Departmen,t'.s:-'Executive
Summary of the various tapers- on. U. S?. /Soviet. relations.
Please note that the Secretary-has not had. tine: to
review this summary. it is provided for -jou?to circu-
late to the other n? mbers of the group prior to
lwednesday`s meeting.
Attachment:
Executive Summary
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary - -
TS820363
Cy
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US-SOVIET RELATIONS
Executive Summary
The purpose of this study is to consider That we can expect
from the Soviets over the next 6 - 24 months and how we should
attempt to steer East-West relations in that same period. It
concludes with a summary, of possible Soviet initiatives,
suggested US responses, and possible US initiatives. These
conclusions are based on analysis of:
a the Andropov regime's view of the'world situation and*
of how Soviet interests can be advanced;"
the strength of Pndropov's political position and the
resources and constraints that define what he can attempt and
achieve; and
our view of American interests and what we would like
to see the Soviets do, stop doing, or abstain from doing
insofar as their conduct affects our interests.
This study is based on the long-terra framework for US
policy toward the USSR. established by NSDD 11-82.
Assets and Liabilities
In assessing its inheritance, the Soviet leadership finds
major gains and assets:
superpower status* and global reach;
a quarreling, economically shaky West;
? domestic political stability;. and
an economy strong enough to support massive military
outlays. while keeping popular discontent within tolerable
-limits.;
. as wekl as problems:
? discontent in Eastern Europe;
declining productivity, morale and growth (to below 2%,
percent per annum);
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the Afghanistan predicament; and
? Western--especially American- re~_ru,a;n~ , t.
With regard to military competition, the regime
itself with:
finds
? rough overall balance, with Soviet 7 e, ds in ground
forces, long-range INF missiles, and ICBMs, as well as reduced
American advantages in naval and other power projection forces
and in military technology;
. but also:
? prospective?loss.of the Soviet advantage in IN-r, as
well as American strategic. modernization and restored American
naval and technological supremacy.
Basic Choices
On balance, Brezhnev's successors will'~be sufficiently
content with these conditions, unsure of how to effect basic
change, and sober about the consequences of unregulated
competition or direct confrontation with us that they will not
be inclined to depart from the country's general historical
course. They will opt for neither of two clear paths:
economic reform, reduced military effort and
international retreat; and
''accelerated military growth, broad expansionism, and
Stalinist economic and political measures at home.
The leaders probably think the economy, can sustain roughly
the current pace of military effort (4g per annum growth) and
foreign positions, but not much more. It would take zero
growth and widespread hunger to force the regime to consider
military and international contraction, given that this would
mean abandonment of Brezhnev's lain achievement: Soviet might
and reach comparable to ours.
Nothing in Andropov's?'background or character suggests that
he would be predisposed to swing widely from Brezhnev's
course. Moreover, while his' position in the leadership is
-strong--in part because his colleagues want. a strong leader-.-he
is bound by consensus, and particularly beholden to Ustinov and
Gromyko. These factors also tend to rule out major domestic or
international shifts.
Foreign Policy Directions
This by no means implies passive continuity in foreign
policy. The difficulty of effecting domestic change could
encour " fnrPi ern nnl i ,-v rl 'r mi em - , 1 : +- ., 4- 1- _ - mework
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set under Brezhnev. The Soviet leaders r,E:y see more
sophisticated, innovative, agile, and diversified diplomacy as
the best arid cheapest way to undercut and pressure us, expand
their influence, relieve internal pressures, and perhaps cut
the political costs of some of their more exposed positions
abroad. They may be contemplating a mix of selective
international "opportunity-seizing" and "loss-cutting," but in
both cases with costs, risks and deviations kept to a minimUM.
The new leadership, like the old, sees in Washington an
Administration that refuses to respect Soviet status and
prerogatives as an equal superpower, even while--in their
view--exaggerating Soviet military advantages. They see us as
having raised the costs and risks of military and international
competition. However, they may doubt the Admini stration's
ability to maintain a national consensus in support of ?
restoring American strength, or to forge a Western consensus
around Washington's East-West outlook. and policies. They doubt
.our willingness to respond positively to anything less than a
broad Soviet retreat, which they will not contemplate.
For some in Moscow, this assessment of Washington may argue
for waiting for a new American ?admiriistration before attempting
to improve US-Soviet relations. Others may believe it calls
for confrontation with the US, without regard for Western
public opinion, which in turn demands an even greater Soviet
military' effort---and sacrifice. However, while resource
constraints do not dictate retreat, they will work against
those who advocate a major bulge in military spending and
-- expansionism.
On the whole, with the possible exception of arms control,
it is unlikely that the Soviets see much percentage in naking
major concessions in the hope of. satisfying this
Administration. They may probe our willingness to do business
with them, but their expectations will be low. They are --yore
likely to try even harder to put us on the defensive
politically and to stimulate a public and Allied backlash
against our policies, though.in the process they night take
some real steps that would partially meet our concerns.
With regard to 'arms control (notably START and IN_), the
Soviets have a definite interest in heading off unrestrained
competition one way or another. Indeed, Athe leadership may be
quite uncertain about their ability to back up threats of
stepped-up Soviet military programs in the event that our
effoxt continues. At the same time, they doubt that we are
genuinely interested in agreements that take account of their
concerns (e.g., cruise missiles), and their military
establishment is in a position to?block disadvantageous"
deals. The Soviets will therefore follow an integrated arms
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Control strategy coInlbining propaganda with real but limited
concessions, their pnrpo_,e being to c ;t off domestic and Allied
support for our build-up while leavino open the possibility of
our addressing their concerns- and thus :reaching agreemez-lts. To
the degree they succeed in cutting off our support, they will
care less about actually reaching agreements with us, since
they could then avoid reducing their forces without fear o:`
being forced into an expanded military effort.
In'general, the Soviet leaders may feel that Soviet
interests are best served by ignoring and "outflanking" us to
the maxirnum.degree--that is, by orienting their foreign policy
away from US-Soviet 'relations, and by trying to come to grips
with some of their.-.problems without reference to us. This
would enhance their `freedom to ignore our concerns, their
ability to weaken our relations with others, and their ability
to- pursue new initiatives. The principal exception to this
pattern is likely to be START, where they must deal with us
(but will also try to reach American public opinion, around
us)Trying to operate around the US'"over the neat' 6 - 24
months would represent a necessary "tactical"---and, they
probably hope, temporary--departure from the Soviets' basic
emphasis on the centrality of-the US-Soviet relationship in
managing world affairs.
THE VIE5w FROM WASHINGTON
Assessment
Our program tore-establish American ascendancy involves
rearmament, world economic recovery, respect for international
law and order,:. anal the promotion of.democratic values.
Progress in achieving these goals affects and is affected by
our competition with the Soviet Union.'
The more successful we are in our overall program, the
more able we will be to induce more restrained Soviet conduct
or, failing that, to counter Soviet misconduct. -
The Soviets want to impede our program, mainly by
dividing us from those at home or abroad whose support'we need
for success.
The results we have achieved so far are mixed:
"We have succeeded in making the Soviets more cautious
but we have not caused them to retreat from :existing positions.
We have increased 'public awareness of the Soviet
challenge here and abroad, but we have not laid to rest
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Our Coils
Over the next 6 - 24 months, our aims toward t.,
competition should be:
v to consolidate doriestic consensus 5-n support of
sustained growth in. defense spending;
to prevent further Soviet encroachments;
0 to reduce existing international problems caused by the
Soviets;
? to maintain. control of the East-West agenda, the terms
by which problems are dealt with, and-the standards by'which
Soviet behavior is measured; -
?.to keep both our general Western- coalition and our
coalitions on -specific issues intact;
? to reduce Western contributions to Soviet power and
dependence on East-West trade;
? to engage the Soviets constructively on issues where
our interests overlap; and
? to show that our approach to East-West relations is
bearing .fruit.
Lecause the Pndropov regime--will probably follow a more
active-and sophisti-cated foreign policy, oriented away from
addressing problems with us and on our terms, and because it
may find it-easier to mollify-others than to satisfy us, we
need to preserve our influence over= the manner in which
outstanding issues are played out. Thus, while we are in a
reactive posture in the general sense that only genuine
improvement in Soviet conduct will bring about more positive
American policies toward the USSR, we may also need to take
initiatives to maintain our coalitions and to establish
.demanding but reasonable standards for Soviet conduct -on
outstanding problems.
Because we cannot force broad Soviet retreat, we should be
selective and opportuiiisti c ourselves 'i f we. want to cause
concrete improvement in* Soviet conduct.' To remain relevant
regarding international problems the Soviets would like to deal
with--without reference to us (e.g.,'Poland, Afghanistan,
Kampuchea), we have to be, and appear to be., realistic in
setting near-term goals. Our long-term gods concerning such
problems could become obsolete if we don't define the near-term
progress we want. We should be true to our promise to respond
}-~hr_; t-;vP1d f-n real irsDrovenent in Soviet internTi:-.ional conduct
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and reasonable in recognizing what :i.s real and what is not or
else we will lose our capacity to influence Moscow and to keep
our partners with us.
Just as the Soviets may now try to outflank us, we have to
be ready to execute our own political flanking movements to
ensure that they cannot escape from our agenda of concerns and
our standards for responsible conduct and real progress. This
means we should consider how to use not only US-Soviet
relations' to induce improved Soviet behavior but also our
relations with other key actors, such as our European Allies,
Japan, China, ASEAN, Pakistan, and African Front-Line States.
Only if we frustrate Soviet efforts to divide us from our
support, at 'home and - :.broad,- can we induce them to move. from
shadow to substance- as they attempt to -reduce the costs to. them
of 'the problems they have caused.
With regard to arms-control, we should above all avoid
being left in a position in which Soviet programs are, not
limited while ours cannot be sustained dte to lack off'publ.ic
and Allied support. To the degree the Soviets can convince our
own and European publics that we do. not want progress, they may
succeed in blocking our nuclear rearmament while avoiding
reductions and retaining their advantages. Our aim must be to
avoid being outmaneuvered in this' way without compromising our
principles of reductions,. equality and verifiability.
THE.-INTERSECTION OF SOVIET CONDUCT AND US INTERESTS
In view of the foregoing assessment, we mu;:-,t anticipate our
interests being affected by Soviet policies in the following
specific areas:
Sino-Soviet Relation's. The Soviets may be willing to make
limited but concrete concessions, like modest withdrawal of
forces from the border, in order to pressure us and?give
themselves more maneuvering room. Also, insofar as the Soviets
Knight be disposed to show flexibility and cut costs on such
problems as Afghanistan., they would have an interest in playing
such movement as concessions to Beijing, not us.
Broadly speaking, we-want to avoid having our freedom of
action toward either country limited, more than it already is,
by' the prospect and reality of progress between them, We also
have an interest in preventing a reduced Soviet threat to China
from increasing the Soviet threat to NATO, Southwest Asia, or
other US interests. We have an interest in maintaining
influence over Chinese policies, e.g., toward Taiwan and
Southeast Asia, influence that could be eroded if the Soviets
draw Beijing into closer relations. Finally, we have an
interest in maintaining the confidence of our
friends--especially Japan, but also the Europeans--in our
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JavcD 'n. The Soviets Bey try to use conciliatory
actions-----perhaps punctuete,: by threats--to reverse the crowi znc
Japane , inclination to s,fort firmer Eas,. Vest policies of
global basis, even though they must know tli._:y cannot shake tile
basic US---Japan bilateral security relations?l:ip. Rapidly
advancing Sino-Soviet relations (and deteriorating Sino-
American relations) could make the Japanese more susceptible to
Soyiet blandishments.
We-have an interest in seeing a genuine reduction of tie'
Soviet threat to Japan, e.g.., a pull-back from the disputed
islands; but we must hope--and can expect---that the Japanese
would not be lulled by tokenism nor regard Soviet concessions
as a reason to reverse their movement toward a more solid
stance on East-West relations generally. We also have an
interest in showing both the Soviets and the Japanese that we
will not ignore attempts to -intimidate Japan.
Kampuchea. ' A Soviet attempt to nudge the Vietnamese toward
withdrawal would fit with N,oscow' s interests in cooperating
with Beijing, gaining respectability with ASEF,N, and easing an
existing problem on their terms Sand without reference to us.
At the same time, the Soviets greatly value their relationship
with Hanoi and will be reluctant to strain it.
Our interest lies in total withdrawal and Kampuchean
independence and non-alignment. '..We have to guard against mere
gestures designed to crack our coalition with ASEAN and china.
.That said, we would welcome-Soviet pressure on Vietnam; and we .
are confident that our coalition will-survive possible moves in'
Kampuchea as long-as the Soviets anc Vietnamese represent a
continuing threat in the area.
Afcrhanistan. The Soviets might- show limited flexibility in
an effort to satisfy the Paks,' the Chinese, and our Allie s, to
pinch off support to the Afghan resistance, and to promote
settlement terms- that' would leave them in control if not
occupation. Threats to increase military pressure on Pakistan
would not be inconsistent with this. It is also possible that
.they will seriously move toward extricating themselves'.
As?in Kampuchea, we want total withdrawal, non-alignment,
and a government of the people. We would welcome substantial
.par?ti_al movement toward :these goals, provided it didn't deprive
us of the means, mainly Pak support, to press for a complete
solution. Our immediate interest is in preserving our ability
to influence the terms of a settlement and pace of withdrawal,
and'in maintaining Pak support for Afghan resistance until
total withdrawal is achieved.
Middle East and Persian Gulf. The Soviets will exploit
lack of progress on our peace. initiative, as well as our
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among the Arabs, if possible beyond their standard clients.
Efforts to destabilize recines are not excluded but would
likely be quite tentative. Like us, the Soviets cannot drive
the Iran-Iraq war toward eith=er a military or political
conclusion, though they have less reason?than we to want to see
hostilities end.
Our interests are clear: minimize Soviet influence in the
Arab world and defeat any attempts to sabotage the peace
process, subvert our friends, or exploit instability around the
Gulf. We want to be sure the Soviets understand that we will
do whatever is necessary to protect our vital interests in this
region.
The Horn of Africa. The Soviets are unlikely to consider
'.engineering a draw-down of Cuban forces in this area. It is
more likely that they will test us here--if they are disposed
to test us' anywhere-'-since their client has a military
advantage and since they may-doubt our willingness.,-and ability
to save Siod if pressed.
Our interest over the next year or so is in stabilizing the
status quo while gradually building up Sudan and Somalia.. Oiir
interest. in a Cuban. draw-down is not as immediate here as it is
in Southern Africa. We also have a long--term interest in
reorientation of Ethiopia toward the West,' but we ca=not.gear
..our' policies to this. highly difficult possibility.
Southern Africa. The Soviets are.,-likely to"be
uncooperative ._unless convinced that they will bear the onus for
.failure throughout black 1. frica, or that they can somehow
benefit from or share in the credit for success.
Our interest in a Namibia-Angola settlement includes but
goes beyond our desire to weaken th.e Soviet position in this
volatile and strategically important area. We will not achieve
our - immediate goal of Soviet acquiescence if Moscow believes we
would crow about and try to exploit a Soviet retreat. In fact,
we can succeed without requiring a*clear Soviet defeat. US and
Soviet interests hardly coincide, but they may intersect.
Central America. The Soviets are unlikely either to
escalate or to try to-curb the Cubans, unless they see Bavaria
drawing them toward a confrontation with us that they do not
want. They will try to keep up pressure through low-risk
support for Marxist elements because of their long-term
interest in having us become pre-occupied with instability
alopg our frontier. =
Our interest is in-defeating subversion, advancing economic
and political development, and eventually restoring tranquility
on our Southern porch. Our aim should be to convince the
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defeating threats in Central America than they do in fuelinca
them---and thus, that we will do what it ta) es to prevail in
show-down, e.g., over introduction of 1IGs or Cuban combat
units into Nicaragua.
Eastern Europe and Hunan :iahts. Andropov ray try subtly
to exploit Romanian and Yugoslav problems, while deciding
between crackdown and tolerance of controlled reform--or at
least gestures in that-direction---elsewhere. Moscow probably
thinks that the peak danger of an explosion in Poland, and of
spillover to the rest of the Bloc, has passed. They will
probably permit but tightly controlled moves toward mininal
reconciliation in Poland while hoping that the West will
contribute to economic recovery.
We have an interest in evolution toward greater pluralism,'
national autonomy, and respect for human rights in the East.
Our immediate aims include convincing the Soviets that the
risks of pressuring the Yugoslavs are prohibitive and that we
will not exploit--indeed we will respond positively to--real
movement toward greater openness in Eastern Europe. While we
can--indeed, must--distrust Soviet motives for tolerating some
economic and political loosening u.p, we should nevertheless
encourage it because controlled erosion is still erosion.
We want.the Soviets to permit national.reconciliation and a
resumption of reform in Poland. But we- also have an interest
.in ensuring that cosmetic concessions not undermine West
European support for our stance nor increase pressures on us to
agree - to -a CDE_
Western Europe. Blocking- INF deployments will be the
Andropov regime's highest foreign policy priority. To achieve
this, it will try to offer a deal that our Allies feel would
justify cancellation of our deployment program, and they will
increase Allied- incentives to succumb by painting a frightening-
picture of the alternative. . If and when this point is reached,
we would have to accept or else witness collapse of support for
deployment anyway. (Further discussion on arms control follows
below). The Soviets will also try, with carrots and sticks, to
abort our attempt to achieve Western agreement to constrict
East-West economic relations. They may try to*play on
European; especially German, desires to preserve the human
gains of the past decade..
We have an interest not.-only in defeating efforts to
isolate us, but also in deterring and/or countering Soviet
threats against our Allies should it come to that.
Arms Competition- and firms Control. We cannot exclude that
the Soviets will decide that arms control pr.oggress will not he
possible until there is a new US administration. however, it
would be far more consistent with their overall outlook,
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internal s?ituat?on , and likely interns ti_onal strategy for them
to become even bolder in this area. They have an interest in
confronting us with choices betwaen: on the one hand,
a greemen_ts in START and INF which meet their concerns; and, on
the other, collapse of our domestic consensus and Alliance
consensus in support of our defense program and INF
depioyxnent, respectively. Either outcome would offer some
easing of their military burden. In addition, focusing
US-Soviet relations on-arms control would be consistent with
their ai-m?of taking the agenda of international problems out of
our hands. Although A.ndropov will face internally--imposed
lixnits~ on how far he can go, we should be prepared for further
Soviet concessions.
Our interest is in"-drawing the Soviets toward our goals of
reductions,' equality and verifiability, while keeping popular
support for our negotiating efforts and force programs intact.
We also have an interest in keeping arms control from taking
over the 'bilateral agenda. We probably cannot use the prospect
.of arms control progress to get Soviet concessions on :,;-?
international problems, unless we were prepared to ab_ndoli our
insistence on reductions, equality, and verifiability.
US?-Soviet Cooperation. In addition to possibilities
mentioned above (notably Southern Africa), we have an interest
in-getting the Soviets to cooperate-concretely on functional
problems where we have overlapping .interests. and where the
Soviets. -znatter. The most obvious : is non-proliferation; the
Andropov regime should be amenable -.to . helpin5 us tighten up
international safeguards and IAE effectiveness. At the same
time, Moscow is unlikely to view such highly selective US
interest in cooperation as a sign of a generally more
constructive attitude on our part.: In a different vein,
challenging the Soviets to provide more support for economic
development might produce modest but welcome results, or at
least undercut their pursuit of closer "East-South" relations.
Less Likely Developments.- If our overall assessment of the
view from Moscow proves to be too conservative, the most likely
contingencies that could affect important US interests--for
worse or. better---include.:
? Soviet-directed escalation in central America;
?:0 'support for large-scale aggression against Somalia;
significant pressure on Yugoslavia;
? shipment or deployment of "offensive arms" to Cuba;
a major effort to expand Soviet influence in Iran;
? major concessions on Afghanistan, including substantial
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concessions iri START and/or lr: of a x gni ude clearly
us and assure agreement, as opposed to
weakening our support; and
heavy pressure to restraiiri proxies (Cub-;, Libya,
Vietnam).
.Such actions would present us with more straightforward---if
not easier choices. The real dilemmas will arise when the
Soviets make more limited encroachments and/or concessions. We
will have a harder time gaining support for effective responses
to mote subtle Soviet misconduct, and conversely, preserving
support for our positions when the Soviets take partial steps
to satisfy others' concerns. but. not ours. This is exactly the
sort of conduct that seems host -likelya
INITIATIVES
Spe::jfj e Soviet Initiatives and US Responses
The following illustrative Soviet initiatives during the
next six months would be consistent with our analysis of how
the Andropov regime thinks it can advance Soviet interests
given its constraints. The exact description of each
initiative is not as important as' the thought that action
generally along such lines is possible.. We have" not attempted
to. assign probabilities. PossibleAmerican responses are also
indicated.
1. A Soviet offer to the Chinese to withdraw forces from the
withdrawal.
border, or a unilatera.l
.- Ask the Chinese to insist that withdrawn Soviet forces be
demobilized.
- Depending on the size of withdrawal, publicize the
potential increased threat to others.
2-. A Soviet nuclear arcs control ror"osal to the Chinese.
'American responses:
Reaffirm our insistence on global INF limits.
Consult with the Chinese on the dangers to both of us
presented by Soviet attempts to regionalize *nuclear arms
control.
-- Welcome any substantial reduction to the nuclear threat
to our East Asia friends.
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3. A Soviet offer to an to reduce forces on the c?:isnuted
islands, orMaunilateral Uarti.~~_I_ ithdrawal. V __~._
American responses:
Encourage the Japanese to drive a hard bargain.
?- Welcome real reduction of the threat.
4. A Soviet threat or move to build up forces on the disputed
islands.
American responses:
-- Explicitly reaffirm our commitment to Japanese
-- Privately offer to increase"US forces in Japan.
5. Soviet pressure on Vietnam and/or announcement -of
b
i
reasona
le terms for settle,:tent in fia pucl,ea.
security.
American responses:
-- Work with ASEAN and China to reiterate our terms and to
see whet-her and how-the Soviets and Vietnamese can be drawn
?- Welcome real moves in the right direction.
toward more substantial movement.-
6. A Soviet prooposal to the Chinese and/or Paks - inv~lvir,c, for
exapZe, termination of support to the Afghan resistanre and
acceptance of the Afghan regirue. in return for future draw-down
in Soviet forces.
American responses:
15obilize Pak-PRC-European coalition to-reaffirm our terms.
Remind Paks of the consequences of being separated from
-- Indicate interest in
aesired'outcome,
'~. 'A Soviet "Indian Ocean
discussion of real moves toward our
Peace Offensive. "
American response:
Resist efforts to link Soviet fle>:ibility in Afghanistan
with reduction in US presence in the Indian Ocean.
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8. Ste ned up Soviet subversive actjvities in Iran or
elsewhere near the Gulf.
American responses:
- L?xplicitly reaffirm that we will not allow our interests
near the Persian Gulf to be damaged.
-- Loo}; for opportunities for direct or indirect dialogue
with Iranians.
-- Activate contingency planning with key partners.-
9. ''Soviet diplomatic initiative in Southern Africa.
American responses:
Welcome any real moves to facilitate a settlement.
"Attempt to capture any Soviet concessions within our
peace effort, ~as.opposed to letting the Soviets start a
separate track.
10. Offers of major new economic deals with our 1?7?stern
partners. `~'--
American response:
Attempt to get decisions postponed until our East_Y est
studies have been concluded.
11.' Pelease of dissidents or increased Jewish emigration front
the USSR.
American responses:
Welcome on humanitarian grounds; i f numbers are
signficant, welcome on political grounds as well.:
Express hope that this can lead to progress in CSCE.
Possibly relax one of our formal CSCE human rights demands.
Resist attempts to use this as pretext for de-railing our
east-West economic studies. -
.12.- Soviet acceptance of our position'on the CDE, zone.
American responses:
Welcome Soviet acceptance of the Deed ::[or CBMs on Soviet
territory.
-- Reaffirm insistence on human rights balance in CSCE.
Convince Allies that, in view of Soviet move, best strategy to
reach agreement in Madrid is maximum solidarity and pressure on
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 -- Declare that we will refuse fo consider altering our INF
program except in the context of, a reduced Soviet XNF threat to
our Allies.
- Welcome movement on ICBM cuts.
- Affirm our readiness to discuss cruise missile limits.
16. Increased Soviet-Cuban support for Central American
2:arxists.
American responses:
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13. Significant furtherSoviet coi'
)cessions in 71JP tal};s,
linked to zero NATO deu)-oynents.
American responses:
- Secure Alliance reaffirmation of insistence on equality
in INF arms control and commitment to proceed with deployments
if the Soviet threat is not elininated. -
- Consult with Allies at highest level about the imperative
of not letting the Soviets drive a wedge between us.
- Welcome 8
nuclear threat.
14. Stepped-up threats against our Allies in the event our
missiles are deployed.
American responses:
.- Declare that we regard threats aga irrst our Allies 'as
threats against ourselves, and that our Allies can count on us
- Exploit by underscoring Soviets "true colors" and
reinforcing European appreciation of the need for solidarity.
15._ Significant Soviet movement toward acceptance of
s nificant cuts in ICBM warheads linked to limits on strategic
cruise missiles and non-deployment of INF. _
American responses:-.
- Take steps to counter on, the ground-
-- Warn Soviets of the danger to their interests here and
elsewhere. Advise them that we are prepared to do whatever is
required to protect our interests and deliver them a defeat.
Apply direct pressures on Cuba.
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17. Soviet efforts to restrain Cuba.
American responses:
Signal our acknowledgment.
- Seize opportunity to pursue US-Soviet dialogue on Cuban
behavior.
General Patterns and Responses
The. foregoing mix of Soviet moves and US responses reflects
our expectation of, on the one hand, limited risk-taking and
"--threats,,, and on the other hand, ,liraited cost-cutting and peace
offensives, occurring along a basically -unchanged -center-line of
-~- Soviet policy that falls between broad expansionism and broad- re-
treat. The pattern of Soviet. behavior that actually emexges,'could
of course have a. more conciliatory center-line or a more menacing
center-line. In 'addition to preparing specific responses, we have
to ensure that our overall response fits,the overall pattern. The
key to indicating. general direction is our rhetoric:
o. For now, we,-should stick to the line that US-Soviet
relations can improve only if the Soviets behave more responsibly.
We should be firm, quiet, and inject only -,a hint of hopefulness.
if we raise expectations now., the pressures to fulfill them will
be mainly on us--and conversely, we will bear the blame for dis--
appointm.Eizl t'_
If the Soviets become both more 'conciliatory and more
menacing--i. e. ; roughly what we expect--we should, rhetorically
at least, "reward' the positive and "punish" the :negative, while
making the point that improvement in the relationship can, at
best, be narrow unless improvement in Soviet behavior is, broad..
e- If ta=sk-taking and threats emerge as the dominant quality,
we should warn that the new Soviet regime appears to be headed
down a path which could threaten peace and Soviet interests. Our
rhetoric should convey total resolve but be unprovocative. One
reason to be quiet and slightly hopeful now is to be sure that it
.cannot be. said that we were responsible for getting off on the
wrong foot. -
o If the:-emergent trend is toward Soviet cost-cutting, con-
ciliation, caution; and peace offensives, our rhetoric should be-
come more hopeful, stressing that we welcome good intentions but
_i.nsa st on good behavior. Obviously, we can refine this further
? " depending on how much, if any, substance there is in Soviet peace
initiatives.
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Speci_c.c US Initiatives
In addition to anticipating Soviet moves and correct US
responses, we should consider moves of our own. Our overall
purpose should be to-avoid being outflanked on. international
problems and outmaneuvered in arms control. More specifically,
we should. air if
preempt Soviet moves;
o illuMinate Soviet. tokenism and to spur them toward
real movement;
signal our interest in progress;
? cement oux' support, at home and abroad;
o update our terms for solutions;
m prevent the Soviets from thinking they can address
problems without reference to us, and keep them engaged in
a dialogue on our agenda of concerns.
Such initiatives would, of course, be in addition to efforts
already -underway to induce improved; Soviet behavior, to strengthen
Western cohesion and firmness, and .to prepare ourselves' better to
defend our interests. That we are currently. o.ing with regard to
the US defense effort,INF deployments, security assistanc?, reduced
Western "subsidization", calling attention to Soviet raisco~duct;
pressing for progress in the Middle East, high-level'Sino-American
dialogue, and so on, are all relevant---indeed, essential--to the
next 6.29 months.
New steps might include internal USG planning, consultations
and actions with others, and actions within the US-Soviet relation-
ship. The following possibilities should be viewed as building _
.blocks, which need to be assembled into an overall, internally-
consistent approach: -
Internal planning
I.%* Form a select interagency group to develop contingency
plans for possible new Soviet encroachments. Rationale: Existing
plans may not suffice, given that the new Soviet regime may take a -
different view of opportunities and.risks.
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17
2. Develop a plan for u .ng prospective UE --Soviet trade to
induce improvcCi Soviet performance, e.g.., on human rights.
Rationale' In addition to working out "denial" guidelines with
the Allies, we need to know the political role o those elements
of US-Soviet trade that will not be denied for security reasons.
B. Actions with others
1. Conduct early extensive. (and tailored) bilateral con-
sultations on prospective Soviet policies/initiatives with our
Allies, Japan, Pakistan, ASEAN, China, and possibly others.
Rationale: i1e need to be sure others are prepared to drive hard
bargains, not be lulled, and not be separated from us.
2. Conduct early consultations with China on possible Soviet
military/negotiating moves, with the aim of reaching an:-under--
standing. (perhaps tacit) that each will avoid agreeing-'to anything
that would damage the other (e.g., shift of SS-20s from West to
East or troops from East to West) . Rationale: We need to probe
Chinese intentions and ensure they understand that we expect them
not to damage our interests as they pursue Sino-Soviet relations.
3. Organize a new initiative on Afghanistan with Pakistan,
China and.' possibly -the -EC, calling for phased, - complete withdrawal,
transition leading to safeguards .of Afghan non-alignment, self-
determination, and return of refugees. Rationale: tie need to pre-
empt the Soviets,-- maintain our coalition; and set .demanding but.
reasonable standards for progress. If we can get the Soviets
engaged, so much the better. .
4. Discuss with Allies a realistic step-by-step plan for
reforms, reconciliation, and recovery in Poland. Rationale: our
current stance could.become obsolete, and we could find. ourselves
without clear goals and means :in post-martial-law conditions. We
should also consider presenting it to the Poles and Soviets.
Step-by-step removal of sanctions could be linked to progress.
5. Discuss with Allies possible steps in INF arms control.
Rationale:.' %~?e could find ourselves trapped by a Soviet zero/zero-
plus position with broad appeal in Europe. We must have Allied
agreement that more than zero on the Soviet side must mean more
than zero on our side.
C. AcLons with Soviets
1. Follow up us-soviet talks on-non-proliferation, Southern
Africa, human rights.' Rationale: It is important to show the new
regime that we are prepared to join in practical efforts to achieve
progress, even if the base is narrow.
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2. Early Hart-rn n-Korni_yerko tour d' horizon. Rat' _i onale:
F;?: need to impress upon the Soviets na~. we will pels:i.st with
our List of international concerns--_.i e. , that they car,' t ignore
u We also need - .o set agenda for Shultz-Gromyko meeting. If
the Soviets refuse to enter substantive discussion, we should
not be demandeur, - hut- we should publicize that the Soviets don't
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want dialogue.'
3. Propose and facilitate rapid progress toward a nuclear
CBMs agreement. Rationale: This is.in our interest. It will
also relieve "freeze" pressures, albeit slightly in the US and
not at-all in Europe. Finally, it would enable us to show Soviets
and public that we want progress where possible.
4. Show--that we are prepared to agree to START limits on
strategic cruise missiles provided there is agreement signifi-
cantly to cut ballistic warheads. Rationale:"' It is in ou:interest to convince the Soviets that we are prepared for a
give-and-take negotiation.
5. Announce our willingness in principle to hold a summit
in 1983, pending outcome of late-spring Shultz-Gromyko meeting.
Rationale: The pressures to hold a sum-nit before our INF deploy -
ments begin will.be enormous. It is better to preempt this,
get some credit, and establish a clear track that suits our inter-
ests than to get dragged into it. Nore importantly, a . sur,I-.i t could
be an important tool_in our effort to'induce viore responsible Soviet
behavior, p':ovided we guard- against the possibility of =_t appearing
to ignore Soviet misbehavior.
6. Take steps to improve our access to Soviet society, e.g.,
opening consulates in Kiev and Tashkent. Rationale: Paradoxically,
we can show our willingness to advance bilateral relations and ex-
pand our penetration. We should consider'what we can get in return.
Public Diplomacy, information, and Action
To be effective over the next 6-24 months---assuming the Soviets
act as we believe they will--our public information effort must
demonstrate: ,
that our concerns about Soviet behavior are valid;
that-our positions are correct;
o that we want progress and wili be reasonable;
e that our policies 'are working.
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Obviously, it is not enough to assert these they
In-cist be evident from and supported by our policies. I:[ any one
of the four points does not come through, the effect of the
others will be weakened. For example, if. we are seen as exag-
gcra-ting Soviet xaisconduct, it will be hard to hold sup port for
our positions. If we are perceived to be sticking -L'--c) positions
that we know cannot produce progress, we will be judged as
wanting no progress rather than praised for the correctness of
our positions. Finally, if we cannot 'show that our approach-?is
beginning to work, doubts about its efficacy will eclipse ac-
ceptance of-its correctness-.- tbus, we at least need to be in a
position to claim that any improvement in Soviet positions that
does occur is attributable to our policies.
Public initiatives should be predicated on and be used to
reinforce policy initiatives. Among the possibilities are:
D An early speech on US-Soviet relations by Secretary
Shultz laying out our positions, hopes and standards for
progress, and resolve if there is none.
A speech by the President in, say, two months, when we
will have a better fix on where'the Soviets are headed and what
we want to do, especially with regard to START, INF, key inter-
national problems, and a possible summit. -.
In addition,. a select . interagency. group, should be formed to
consider what public initiatives we should consider to reinforce
the particular US initiatives identified in the preceding pages.
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