GRENADA'S SECURITY FORCES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370064-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Sequence Number:
64
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
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People's Revolutionary Army (PRA)
1,000-1,200 AK-47s, RPGs,
heavy machine guns,
mortars, recoilless
rifles, BTR-60 and
BRDM armored
personnel carriers,
three ZU-23 AA
batteries, and
possibly some
field artillery
Headquarters at Ft. Rupert with
camps near St. Georges and at
Calivigny. Groups of junior officers
NCOs trained in Cuba. Some Cuban
advisers on island provide basic
training. Officer Corps probably loyal
to Austin.
People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM)
2,000-4,000 AK-47s, small
arms, possibly
heavy machine
guns and light
artillery.
Created by Bishop as his personnel
security force. Several hundred
members reportedly trained in Cuba.
The Militia reportedly was disarmed
last week by PRA with Bullen subse-
quently executed. Loyalties unknown.
Commander: Major Ian St. Bernard
300-500 Small arms.
Coast Guard
has three
small British
patrol boats
provided by
Libya.
Consists of Prison Service, Immigration
Service, and Coast Guard. Some police
received training, including political
indoctrination, in Cuba.
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Construction Workers 350
Medical Personnel 25
Diplomats 15
Military Advisers 10-12
*Excludes personnel on Cuban ship "Vietnam Heroico" which recently
returned to St. George's.
Civilian Advisers 15
Diplomats 10-15
Of the approximately 400 Cubans present in Grenada, most are construction
workers and technicians involved with the Port Salines Airport project.
--Many of these civilian personnel are Cuban Army reservists or
combat veterans, and have had at least some military training.
--We estimate that there are less than a dozen Cuban military
officers providing training for the Grenadian Army and People's
Militia.
--The Cubans undoubtedly have access to the ample stores of weapons
and ammunition on the island, and could be quickly armed in an
emergency.
We believe that if US forces began a military operation
in Grenada, the Castro regime would be highly unlikely to
intervene with its own forces. Havana recognizes that it
would lose in a military clash with the US and Castro does
not want to provide Washington with an excuse to attack Cuba
directly. If US forces were not involved, the Cubans would
be most likely to intervene militarily if Havana perceived
that Cuban personnel on the island were in danger.
It is less likely, but possible that Havana would respond
positively to a request by the leftist military council for
Cuban assistance to repel an attack by Grenadian exiles.
Such an action is less likely in the near term because of
Havana's concern over US intentions and the serious impact
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it would have on Cuba's image in the region. If Castro did
decide to undertake such an action he probably would try to
use Cuban personnel already on the island and refrain from
the more provocative step of sending in combat troops.
Havana has the airlift and sealift capabilities to allow
it to respond rapidly to a deteriorating situation or
reinforce its position on Grenada.
--Cuban AN-26 transport aircraft capable of carrying up to 38 combat-
ready troops have sufficient range to reach Grenada, as do larger
transports such as IL-62s and TU-154s, that can transport up to
200 troops.
--MIG-23 fighter aircraft, when equipped with external fuel tanks,
would have the ferry range to reach Grenada, but would have to
land and refuel before engaging in combat.
--Some of Cuba's naval combatants, such as the F-class submarines,
Koni frigate, Osa-II missile boats, and Polnocny landing craft
have sufficient range, although the voyage to Grenada could require
up to three days.
We rate our current intelligence collection capabilities on Grenada
as being barely adequate to satisfy the increasing demands for up-to-
date information on the situation there.
--Our greatest need is for specific information on the status of
of US citizens, the disposition of Grenada's military forces,
and the location and types of Cuban personnel on the island.
In addition, we need increased coverage of Soviet Bloc
maritime shipping and naval activity in the area to provide
information on arms deliveries or troop introductions.
--The recent difficulty in determining the whereabouts of the
Cuban cargo/troop ship "Vietnam Heroico" that called at
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St. Georges Port illustrates this need.
--This could be accomplished by a heightened naval surveillance
effort by US Navy assets
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Port Facilities in Grenada
The commercial port of St. Georges on Grenada's west coast is
currently the only facility that could accommodate Soviet naval vessels
or Cuban ships. It is a natural deep harbor and has been used by Soviet
cruise ships as well as by Cuban merchant ships to ferry arms and
personnel to shipboard electricity or bunkering at St. Georges, which
has only a limited storage area, and the port is usually congested.
Rumors about an alleged secret submarine base in Egmont Harbor
adjacent to the new military camp at Calivigny are unfounded. In late
1981, a US company involved in landfill-operations at the Point Salines
Airport did some dredging at Egmont. The channel entrance reportedly was
deepened to a maximum of 18 feet and widened to 600 feet. Despite these
improvements, larger Soviet vessels such as a Soviet diesel submarine--
with a length of 300 feet and a 17 foot draft--would probably not be able
to enter the harbor because of the shallow channel entrance. A submarine
would have only about a foot of clearance and the Soviets reportedly prefer
7 to 10 feet as a minimum. In addition, even if a submarine were to risk
entering, tugs or tender would probably be required to turn it in the
narrow confines of the inner harbor. Also there are no shore facilities
presently available or under construction to provide support. US naval
experts believe that only small cargo ships as well as small coastal
patrol boats and landing craft such as Cuba's OSA guided-missile patrol
boats and Polnocy-class landing ships would use the harbor.
The Soviets have reportedly offered to do a feasibility study for
the construction of a deepwater port in the Grenville area on Grenada's
east coast. the offer was made
to Bishop during his July 1982 visit to the Soviet Union with the alleged
proviso that Soviet warships be granted the right to visit the new port
facility, as well at St. Georges, for recreational purposes. Bishop
reportedly agreed in principle to Soviet ships using the facilities,
provided advance notice of their arrival was given.
Although Soviet experts were to arrive in Grenada early this year to
begin feasibility studies for construction of the new port facility, their
arrival has not yet been confirmed.
The Soviets and Grenadians might see an advantage to having a port
facility in addition to St. Georges. For example, they might consider
the more isolated Grenville to be more secure for the servicing of naval
ships. Nevertheless, the construction of a major port would clearly be
both costly and prbtracted. Grenville is a small town 20 kilometers from
St. Georges, separated by mountains and rugged terrain. However, a small
functioning airfield--Pearls--is nearby. Construction of a deepwater port
there would be a long and difficult task--a large reef lies off the coast
and the shoreline is littered with large boulders. The labor force,
technical support and equipment would have to be imported.
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Air Facilities in Grenada
The new international airport at Point Salines on Grenada's southern
coast is scheduled for completion by early 1984. We are unaware of any
direct Soviet involvement in the project; Cuba has provided the bulk of
the labor and equipment for the construction of the $80 million facility.
More than 90 percent of the approximately 9,000-foot runway has already
been surfaced and the remainder is expected to be finished this year.
Construction of the airport terminal building, fuel storage area, and other
support facilities is also under way. According to a variety of sources,
navigational aides, including lighting and communication equipment obtained
from British and Finnish firms, are reportedly scheduled for installation
in mid-1983. A new housing area is being built near the airport that will
reportedly accommodate some 300 Cuban workers who are scheduled to remain
after the airport project is completed to work on other construction
projects.
The new airport is intended to provide a boost to Grenada's sagging
tourist industry by enabling direct flights from overseas points.
Although ostensibly designed for commercial use, the airport will also be
able to accommodate most of the military aircraft in the Cuban and Soviet
inventories. MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighters as well as AN-26 short-range
transports even now would be capable of operating from the approximately
Grenadian officials have generally denied that the aiport will be used
for military purposes and Andropov has publicly referred to it as a civil
airport, but the heavy Cuban involvement in the project suggests Havana
sees strategic advantages in it. The Cubans probably will want to use it
as a stopover point for Cubana Airlines IL-62 transports that regularly
ferry Cuban troops to and from Africa. The Cubans might also want to be
able to deploy some military fighter aircraft to the island, particularly
in case of the New Jewel Movement's hold on power came under seious threat.
5,000 feet of completed runway.
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Assessment of Reaction to Evacuation of US Citizens from Grenada
The US Government, with the assistance of its allies in the Caribbean,
would need a sizeable task force to conduct an evacuation of the estimated
800 to 1,000 US citizens on Grenada.
--Such an evacuation plan would require that an airfield and landing
beaches on Grenada be secured in advance of the operation, and would
almost certainly be interpreted as preparations for an invasion.
--Most of the US citizens on Grenada are students at the US medical
school adjacent to the new Point Salines Airport on the southern coast.
Grenadian Army and militia forces, possibly with the assistance of
Cuban personnel on the island, would probably react forcibly to US air
or naval operations involved in the evacuation.
--There are an estimated 400 to 600 Cuban construction workers at
the airport site, most with at least some type of previous military
training or experience, in addition to less than a dozen Cuban
military advisors.
--The 1,200 mar. Grenadian Army is garrisoned at several. camps in the
St. Georges area, and at the Calivigny military camp east of the new
airport.
--Some 2,000 to'4,000 members of Grenada's militia could also be
brought into action in an emergency.
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Grenada's Army and Militia have been trained by the Cubans and are
equipped with a variety of Soviet weapons, including artillery, light
antiaircraft guns, and armored vehicles.
--There are at least three batteries of quad-barreled ZU-23 antiair-
craft guns on the island, probably located in the St. Georges
area and at the Calivigny camp.
--Some six BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and two BRDM-2 armored
scout cars, and a number of trucks have been seen in Grenadian
Army garrisons.
--The Coast Guard is equipped with three small British-built patrol
--Most of the 9,000-foot runway at the Point Salines airport is
paved with four layers of asphalt, but numerous oil drums and
other obstacles have been placed along its length.
--The smaller airfield at Pearls is approximately 5,000 feet
long, however, it is far removed from the locations of the
US citizens on the island.
--In an emergency, antiaircraft guns and other light artillery
units could quickly be deployed to these airfields.
Last April, the Grenadian Armed Forces and militia conducted
a major defensive exercise (Defense of the Homeland), the scenario
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of which involved a reaction to an air and naval invasion by US
forces.
--Thousands of militia reportedly participated in the exercise
throughout the island, repelling mock landings on the beaches
and paradrops, and airfield defense.
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