GRENADA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370046-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: October 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
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CLASSIFICATION lOP c - PAGES'-
MESSAGE NO.
FROM
(NAME)
MESSAGE DESCRIBTION
TO (AGENCY)
DELIVER*TO:
REMARK*:
(EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)
DE_ /ROO!4 NO., EXTENSION
NSC review completed.
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TOP SECRET
GRENADA
jack round
Following a full review of U.S. policy toward Grenada
conducted by the IG (Core Group) and NSPG last May and June,
ahe President approued an action plat::
~- Approach the Bishop government and offer Ipetter relations
should ik address certain concerns: stop its anti-U.S.
rhetoric improve its human rights record,, and adopt a
more truly non-aligned foreign policy.
rr- Should toe approach produce no positive results, consult
with key Congressional leaders about our ;oncerns,
especially regarding the threat to the security of the
Eastern Caribbean and to U.S. supply routes posed by the
Cuban-backed Grenadian government.
Take steps to relocate the privately-owned American
medical school from Grenada to another island, thus
depriving the PRG of approximately $5 to $6 million in
foreign exchange annually.
The ninety-day testing period which followed a high level
conversation in Washington in late June with Bishop failed to
show any significant change in Grenadian policies. The
remainipg steps of the President's decision were in the process
of being implemented when the current crisis developed in
Grenada.
Current Situation
The outcome of the power struggle between Deputy Prime
Minister Coard and Prime Minister Bishop is uncertain.
Coard, who lacks popular support but leads the radical
faction of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and is viewed as a
hardline Marxist ideologue, apparently engineered a drastic
reduction in Bishop's power through moves inside the NJM's
Central Committee. Bishop was accused of employing dictatorial
methods, of not moving fast enough to consolidate the
revolution, and of failing to socialize econolic and political
TOP SECRET
DECL: OADR
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structures. The officer corps of the People's Revolutionary
0%rmy (PRA) seems to be backing Coard; however, the PRA's rank
,end file may still be loyal to Bishop. The C40ans, who have a
presence of a-out 500 personnel, consisting of some 12 military
ipdvisors, 25 pedical personnel, 20 diplomatic/technical
personnel, anti 400 construction workers at the new airport,
;seem to be avoiding taking sides at this point. They are
trying to mediate the dispute to insure that fpctional
infighting does not break out into a divisive civil war
-- a situation which would endanger their position in Grenada.
Some of Bishop's supporters have vowed to oppose Coard's
ascendancy. Violence has broken out. At one point Bishop was
reported to have been freed by a mob of his supporters who
marched on the PRA'S headquarters at Ft. Rupert. Troops fired
into the crowd. Bishop was reportedly recaptured and possibly
wounded and at least four people were killed. We have no
information indicating that any of the violence has been aimed
at the 800-1,000 U.S. citizens on the island. The American
community, the majority of whom are students attending the St.
George's Medical School, have not been targets of the
government in the past and have experienced little or no
hostility from the general population.
Should t-.e disorders continue to spread, however, U.S.
citizens could be endangered. We have information that the
Venezuelans have ordered the evacuation of the dependents of
their embassy. Amembassy Bridgetown has asked that we begin to
make preparations for a possible emergency evacuation.
Barbadian Prime Minsiter Ad4ns has offered to provide
Barbadian Defence Force personnel in an effort to rescue
Bishop, but indicated that he would be amenable Ko joining with
others,for more ambitious evacuation and stabilzption plans.
Issues for Review
Whether a capability for better information concgrning the
situation in Grenada could be developed.
Whether contingency plans for emergency evacu4tiipn under
hostile circumstances are adequate.
Whether the safe evacuation of U.S. citizens Mil,L requite
disarming tho local forces.
Now woyld th*- U.S. react to Cuban military inliervention in
Grenada?
TOP SECRET
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Better Information
TOP SECRET
State is exploring the possibility of statigning a
full-time, accredited officer in Grenada to mopit,or the
situation continuous) and rovide consular services to the
American community.
Emergency Evacuation Plans
JCS has alerted CINCLANT to the possibility of an
emergency evacuation of American citizens under hostile
conditions and has undertaken to staff out vario%s plans.
Depending on the location of forces and the urgency of
demands at the time of the evacuation become necessary, the use
of amphibious forces would be the preferred methpd. Should
time-urgency demands make it impossible to emg,lo amphibious
forces, airborne forces could be deployed to accomplish the
mission. JCS is developing more complete infqrm4tion on the
potential threat and the force level necessary to provide
adequate security during an emergency evacuation,
State would handle guidance to the media and the Hill in
the event of an evacuation.
Disarming Local Forces
If the situation deteriorates further and American lives
are threatened, triggering the emergency evacuation plans by
the U.S. military, should we take the additional steps
necessary to disarm local forces in order to complete the
mission?
On the up side:
--The U.S. would brin home threatened, point that
hesitater tooemployuthey
interests are e
necessary force to protect them.
--This could have a salutary effect on events in Central
America nincq U.S. willingness to use militar power under
critical circumstances would not be lost on tie Nicaraguans and
the Cubans.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
--The Caribbean would be freed of a pro-Cuban, pro-Marxist
dictatorship and Grenada's small neighbors would be spared from
the threats of subversion emanating from the ipland.
On the down side:
--There are no immediate alternatives to the current Grenadian
political leadership. Former Prime Minister Eric Gairy is
totally discredited and unpopular. There is a dearth of
leadership in the disunified exile community.
--Though the Grenadian army (1,500) and the militia (20000 -
3,000) would be not be an effective fighting forge, some
American casualties could be expected.
--Reaction from the Congress, public, and the me4ia would
probably be negative, unless a clear case of 'prq-tecting
American lives' could be made.
--Cuban military and other personnel in Grenada ipight have to
be disarmed and neutralized. Castro (and posgib4y the Soviets)
might feel compelled to react by taking some $or# of
retaliatory action.
--A unilateral U.S.'move would create a negative reaction in
the Hemisphere, though many (especially e'g neighbors)
would be secretly and perhaps openly --In the term additionals
of f l legg
restrictive 4mendments.
Direct?Cuban Military Intervention
Should the Cubans intervene militarily, It would indicate
that the situation is certainly out of control. By definition
then the situation would justify the emergency evacuation of the JCS
American citizens, plan for.evacuationimplementation
hostile conditions.
contingency
Advantages:
--We could persuasively justify our action to Congress and the
public as necessary to protect American citizens.
--it might encourage the Orenadians to oppose the Cubans as an
interventionist fates.
--It might induce the Cubans to show more caution about their
own tole.
TOP SECRET
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Disadvantages:
--There would probably be casualties, both civilian and
military.
--The U.S. would be accused of intervening in frenadian
political domestic affairs.
--it would detract attention from the Cuban military
intervention.
Actions to be Authorized
4. DOD should develop the contingency plan tq d4sarm the oca
5. When and if a decision is made to evacuate. U,S. citizens by
use of U.S. rilitary assets, State should infq,rm-immediately
our Latin American and Caribbean friends as wall as other
allies.
6. The RIG Should assess precisely what the 10.S, should do in
the event of direct Cuban military intervention 4n Grenada.
te should plan a strategy to brief Congress and e
St
a
8.
media if an emergency evacuation is ordered.
TOP SECRET
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