DDI TALKING POINTS ON GRENADA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000200370036-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: October 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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19 October 1983
2200 Hours
Prime Minister Bishop is apparently again under arrest after having
been temporarily freed by civilian supporters yesterday.
-Unconfirmed press reports claim that four people were killed while
freeing Bishop, and that he and two other Ministers were wounded.
'esterday afternoon that two opposing
factions of the military were engaged in active fighting near St. Georges
and that the city was in total chaos.
Bishop's apparent rearrest indicates that former Deputy Prime Minister
Coard again has the upper hand.
--Popular support for Bishop, however, endangers the radicals' position.
reported on Tuesday that continuing meetings
of the central committee have not yet yielded a solution to the inner-
party conflict.
Regional reaction to the political crisis in Grenada has been one of
alarm.
--Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica is attempting to get CARICOM support
for a unified response to Grenada once the outcome of the power struggle
is evident. Leftist Michael Manley has requested Canadian intervention
in Grenada to save Bishop's life.
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--Barbados held an emergency high-level meeting to assess the Grenadian
situation and Trinidad and Tobago have put their defense forces on
alert.
--If any harm were to befall Bishop, it would have disastrous effects
on Grenada's relations with other islands of the eastern Caribbean,
which would prefer Bishop to the more radical Coard.
US intervention in the political crisis in Grenada would probably
have negative repercussions among the English-speaking Caribbean, who
apparently prefer that the US take a wait and see attitude toward the
power struggle.
--Moreover, we do not see the US citizens on Grenada endangered by
the current leadership crisis.
In our judgment, the Cuban Government is alarmed by the
power struggle in Grenada, its closest Caribbean ally.
--The crisis is unwelcome in Havana because the political instability
tarnishes both the Cuban and Grenadian regimes, gives the West a
propaganda opportunity, and raises the possibility of US intervention.
The Cubans apparently have decided not to choose sides
until a clear winner emerges.
--Both Bishop and Coard have strong ties to the Castro regime.
-The crisis does not yet threaten the continuation of a friendly
Marxist regime in Grenada.
Nevertheless, Havana almost certainly is becoming more
anxious about the protracted nature of the struggle and the
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prospect of further bloodshed, which makes a compromise
solution even more difficult to achieve.
We believe that if the situation is not resolved soon,
the Cubans will feel compelled to push for a solution that
avoids more bloodshed and preserves a role in the government
or ruling party for the charismatic Bishop.
--The Cuban Ambassador reportedly is canvassing leftist Caribbean reaction
to the crisis, and Havana is aware of Bishop's popularity among leftists
in the region.
If a compromise solution cannot be reached, however, we
believe the Cubans would throw their support to Coard's
faction, which apparently has the upper hand and the backing
of most of the military.
-In that case, Havana presumably would be forced to sacrifice
considerable leftist sympathy in the region for the sake of
restoring political stability to Grenada.
Havana almost certainly would react to a US military
intervention in Grenada with an extensive and virulent
propaganda campaign, but Castro would be unlikely to send
Cuban troops to oppose such a US action.
-The approximately 600 Cubans currently in Grenada, however, probably
would be ordered to join the Grenadian armed forces in resisting
a US intervention.
-A small number of Cubans dying in defense of Grenada would give Havana
a face-saving low-cost strategem to conceal their actual unwillingness
to try to protect its small ally against US forces.
SECRET
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Implications of a US Evacuation Effort
The US Government, with the assistance of its allies in
the Caribbean, would need a sizeable task force to conduct
an evacuation of the estimated 800 to 1,000 US citizens on
Grenada.
--Such an evacuation plan would require that an airfield and landing
beaches on Grenada be secured in advance of the operation, which
almost certainly be interpreted as preparations for an invasion.
--Most of the US citizens on Grenada are students at the US medical
school adjacent to the new Point Salines Airport on the southern coast.
Grenadian Army and militia forces, possibly with the
assistance of Cuban personnel on the island, would probably
react forcibly to US air or naval operations involved in the
evacuation.
-There are an estimated 400 to 600 Cuban construction workers at
the airport site, most with at least some type of previous military
training or experience, in addition to less than a dozen Cuban
military advisors.
-The 1,200-man Grenadian Army is garrisoned at several camps in the
St. Georges area, and at the Calivigny military camp east of the new
airport.
--Same 2,000 to 4,000 members of Grenada's militia could also be
brought into action in an emergency.
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Grenada's Army and Militia have been trained by the Cubans and are
equipped with a variety of Soviet weapons, including artillery, light
antiaircraft guns, and armored vehicles.
--There are at least three batteries of quad-barreled ZU-23 antiair-
craft guns on the island, probably located in the St. Georges
area and at the Calivigny camp.
--Some six BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and two BRDM-2 armored
scout cars, and a number of trucks have been seen in Grenadian
Army garrisons.
-The Coast Guard is equipped with three small British-built patrol
boats.
There are two useable airfields on Grenada, the new
facility at Point Salines, and Pearls Airfield near
Grenville on the east coast.
--Most of the 9,000-foot runway at the Point Salines airport is
paved with four layers of asphalt, but numerous oil drums and
other obstacles have been placed along its length.
--The smaller Pearls airfield is approximately 5,000 feet long,
however, it is far removed from the locations of US citizens
on the island.
--In an emergency, antiaircraft and light artillery units could
quickly be deployed to these airfields.
Last April, the Grenadian Armed Forces and militia
conducted a major defensive exercise (Defense of the
Homeland), the scenario of which involved a reaction to an
air and naval invasion by US forces.
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--Thousands of militia reportedly participated in the exercise
throughout the island, repelling mock landings on the beaches
countering paradrops, and defending airfields.
Political Consequences of US Military Involvement
An uninvited US intervention in the Commonwealth
Caribbean would have cascading negative consequences.
--It would reverse Cuban embarrassment over the spectacle of
public squabbling among Grenada's revolutionaries.
--Cuba has lionized Maurice Bishop.
--Cuban media have not informed the Cuban public about the
problems now in train in Grenada.
As things now stand, Cuba cannot intervene except as
mediator in without incurring the enmity of some faction.
-Caribbean governments friendly to the US would find it politi-
cally impossible to support a US intervention.
--Radicals throughout the Caribbean islands, who now have only
inconsequential support, would have an effective rallying cause.
-The island states, generally tranquil, would become polarized.
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