INFORMATION ON STRATEGIC OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000200280005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 28, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200280005-9
NSC review completed.
Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200280005-9
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Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200280005-9 ~I-
VVI IWLJI I IP1L
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
November 28, 1983
' ~k
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBER
M. GATES
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Information on Strategic Oil and Gas Equipment
We would appreciate your assistance in providing information
relevant to U.S. strategic oil and gas policy. Part of the
material needed Concerns i- USSR's Barents Sea project; we 25X1
understand that of your agency is familiar with at
least some aspe ssue and probably could be helpful.
Our information needs cover the following areas: 25X1
1. Preparation of a matrix (for easy reference) that is
composed of (a) the specific 17 dual-use oil and gas items
already proposed to the allies for COCOM controls; (b) when
they were last under national security controls, if ever; (c)
the potential military significance of the items and examples
of their possible applications; (d) the probability of their
use in construction of the huge Soviet offshore project in the
Barents Sea.
Orlyi
2. An update on the Barents Sea project, including: (a)
status of Soviet negotiations with potential suppliers; (b)
degree of reliance on imports of Western oil and gas equipment;
(c) probable oil and gas equipment and technology for use on
the project that is likely to be largely or exclusively avail-
able in the U.S.; (d) degree of leverage the West could poten-
tially exercise if most or all of the 17 items proposed to
COCOM were brought under multilateral controls, i.e., effect on
overall feasibility of project, resulting delays, increased
costs, etc.; and (e) possible effects on the Soviet economy if
the Barents Sea does not come on stream or is delayed. 0
3. Brief analysis of ways in which the economic reper-
cussions from imposition of additional proposed COCOM and IEA
controls on oil and gas equipment might affect the Soviet
economy and alter Soviet foreign and military policy - e.g.,
ability to maintain energy exports and effect on balance of
payments and domestic economy, increased likelihood of pressure
on or military moves against Iran andthr, Persian Gulf area,
ability to sustain military buildup. ,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200280005-9
 Approved For Release 2008/11/21: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200280005-9
CONFIDENTIAL
We would like to receive this information as quickly as
possible. Roger Robinson (395-3622) of the NSC Staff
International Economic Affairs Group can answer any ques-
ti,ons you may have. Your assistance is greatly appreciated.
Kenneth E. deGraffenreid
Director of Intelligence., Programs
Approved For Release 2008/11/21- CIA-RDP85M00363R000200280005-9