NSC MEETING ON THE PRESIDENT'S JAPAN TRIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000200240003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 21, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/09/27: CIA-RDP85MOO363ROO0200240003-5
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR : A Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
FROM
Chairman
National Intelligence Council
NIC #7608-83
21 October 1983
David D. Gries
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT : NSC Meeting on the President's Japan Trip
1. The NSC meeting is being called to review trip plans. The NSC has
belatedly confronted the prospect of the President's traveling to Japan
without any meaningful plans to address bilateral economic and trade problems.
--The NSC is searching for measures that will confirm US
seriousness. Since a host of measures are under consideration, I will
try to find out which of them might be discussed at the NSC.
--The NSC also believes the President's Japan trip lacks focus. He
is doing everything from addressing the Diet to appearing on television
to meeting Nakasone repeatedly. What should be the centerpiece of the
visit?
2. Three tabs are attached:
--Tab A is the NSC announcement.
--At Tab B are Interdepartmental Group papers submitted to the White
House by State. It is these bland papers, and especially their failure
to underscore the gravity of the trade problem, that started the NSC
thinking about holding a Cabinet-level meeting.
--Tab C is selected background from recent Intelligence Community
publications. Although you have probably seen much of it before, it will
refresh your memory on the key issues of trade, direct investment, yen
valuation, foreign relations, and Nakasone's political prospects.
3. You have scheduled
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5. One mechanism that both sides often resort to is the formation of
study committees, such as the Wise Men's (roue and its current replacement and
the various sub-Cabinet groups that study specific aspects of the trade
problem. None of these study committees has had much effect. The Japanese
like them because they diffuse and bury the issues; the US likes them because
they divert political heat.
6. But there are other possibilities. Last month I suggested to the NSC
(not as NIO, but as an interested citizen) that Reagan and Nakasone in Tokyo
announce formation of a Cabinet committee chaired by the Vice President and
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Secretary of Treasury,
State, Commerce, and STR on our side, and the Minister of Finance, Foreign
Affairs and MITI on their side. These officials--not their subordinates--
would meet twice yearly to monitor progress and prepare recommendations for
Reagan and Nakasone on:
--increasing direct investment in the two countries;
--promoting market openness for merchandise and services; and
--pressing for capital market liberalization.
7. I also suggested to the NSC that they explore the idea of a US-Japan
Joint Businessman's Training Center. Such a Center, located perhaps in
Hawaii, could offer courses in Japanese and English language, culture,
business practices and home market characteristics. Funding would come from
foundations and corporations in both countries. US businessmen often are
poorly prepared to do business in Japan; announcement of such a Center by
Reagan and Nakasone would put the leaders of both countries on the side of
improving that preparation.
8. But the problem is that, as has so often been the case in the past,
the NSC has waited until the last minute to face the economic issue. Thus it
is probably too late to do more than agree on cosmetic measures. In
US-Japanese economic relations history nearly always repeats itself--to the
disadvantage of the US.
David D. Gries
Attachments:
As stated
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Approved For Release 2007/09/27: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200240003-5