NSC MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 23, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
23 September 1983
E: ` 983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Deputy Director for Intelligence
$JECT NSC Meeting on Central America
1. The meeting was simply an update for the President on
the status of the diplomatic and military effort since July.
2. My briefing (attached) spoke to the points I was asked
specifically to discuss, as well as a comment on the longer term
economic problem with Jamaica as an example. Secretary Shultz
took exception to the notion that $2-3 billion a year in aid
would be required over the next several years but I had the
opportunity to set him straight that I simply was saying that
without that level of aid -- which almost certainly would not be
forthcoming -- the economies of the Central American countries
would almost certainly worsen in the next year or two. That
point understood, both he and the Acting Chairman. JCS repeatedly
expressed agreement with points I had made.
3. Shultz reviewed in excruciating detail diplomatic and
political initiatives underway and had Dick Stone talk a bit
about his efforts on the Hill. The Secretary underscored the
importance of pursuing both the diplomatic and military tracks
(Dewey and I also thought that he was sending a few arrows at
Judge Clark by lauding the work of the SIG and IG under
Motley and the way he presented the Stone mission).
the region and progress made in training the Salvadoran army.
5. My briefing lasted about five minutes and Shultz and
Watkins basically took the rest of the hour. The President asked
no questions and at the end simply expressed his satisfaction
with the direction of events. The overall thrust of the meeting
was realistic -- moderate optimism over developments in both El
Salvador and Nicaragua (as well as in the Congress) but realism
that there will still be ups and downs for the Salvadoran army as
well as difficult longer range problems-such as the economic
Attachment:
As Stated
SECRET- 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
I. Nicaragua: Cuba-Soviet Connection
Soviet, Cuban and Libyan military 25X1
support for the Sandinistas is continuing.
-- Nicaragua has been granted observer status in CEMA,
indicating that Soviet Bloc economic ties will continue
to expand.
-- The Cubans are making a special effort to hide their
presence, however, probably as a result of Castro's
public offer to withdraw his "200" military advisers in
Nicaragua.
II. El Salvador: Guerrilla Perspective
Turning to El Salvador, most insurgent leaders 25X1
view the military situation on pessimistic terms, believing
that their forces have generally been contained.
-- They also believe they lack enough popular support for a
military victory, and were bothered by increased
desertions during the amnesty period.
-- As the Salvadoran army becomes more effective and as the
Nicaraguans are forced to pay more attention to the
threat in their own country and diminish their support
to the Salvadoran insurgents, we see the Salvadoran
insurgents hurting for ammunition, for food, for money,
and experiencing a higher desertion rate.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
More aggressive army sweeps have, for more than three
months, kept the guerrillas on the run. They have had
their bases cut off and have been forced to move their
camps frequently to avoid government ground sweeps. The
Salvadoran guerrillas have become acutely aware that
their fate hangs on Cuban/Nicaraguan policy shifts.
Ithe different insurgent
factions are strongly divided over whether negotiations
can yield positive results.
Their recent surprise attack on San Miguel, the largest
city in eastern El Salvador, indicates they remain a
potent force, and Army casualties are again on the rise.
III. Prospects
Situation on ground in both El Salvador and Nicaragua
developing favorably. Pressure on insurgents and
Sandinistas building.
-- Danger of psychologically telling blow with little
military significance.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
- Longer range prospects for stability less optimistic --
threatened by serious economic problems. If insurgent
activity continues at level of last several months,
Central American countries will need between $2 and $3
billion a year in foreign aid just to prevent further
decline in living standards and drop in real GNP.
Even decisive victories over insurgents and faster
global economic recovery than expected would not
generate quick economic improvement; foreign aid
needs would remain high.
-- Case in point: Jamaica -- a showcase of US Caribbean
Basin policy -- Success in defeating leftist Manley, but
now Seaga in serious difficulty because of economy,
(30% unemployed). May be defeated by Manley in '85
election - leading in 24 of 36 parliamentary
constituencies. Seaga's fate tied to economy.
-- In sum, security situation developing positively.
Exploiting this success to strengthen stability over
longer term threatened by economic problems.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
I. Nicaragua: Cuba-Soviet Connection
Soviet, Cuban and Libyan military
support for the Sandinistas is continuing.
-- Nicaragua has been granted observer status in CEMA,
indicating that Soviet Bloc economic ties will continue
to expand.
-- The Cubans are making a special effort to hide their
presence, however, probably as a result of Castro's
public offer to withdraw his "200" military advisers in
Nicaragua.
II. El Salvador: Guerrilla Perspective
Turning to El Salvador, most insurgent leaders 25X1
view the military situation on pessimistic terms, believing
that their forces have generally been contained.
-- They also believe they lack enough popular support for a
military victory, and were bothered by increased
desertions during the amnesty period.
-- As the Salvadoran army becomes more effective and as the
Nicaraguans are forced to pay more attention to the
threat in their own country and diminish their support
to the Salvadoran insurgents, we see the Salvadoran
insurgents hurting for ammunition, for food, for money,
and experiencing a higher desertion rate.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
-- More aggressive army sweeps have, for more than three
months, kept the guerrillas on the run. They have had
their bases cut off and have been forced to move their
camps frequently to avoid government ground sweeps. The
Salvadoran guerrillas have become acutely aware that
their fate hangs on Cuban/Nicaraguan policy shifts.
Ithe different insurgent
factions are strongly divided over whether negotiations
can yield positive results.
-- Their recent surprise attack on San Miguel, the largest
city in eastern El Salvador, indicates they remain a
potent force, and Army casualties are again on the rise.
-- Situation on ground in both El Salvador and Nicaragua
developing favorably. Pressure on insurgents and
Sandinistas building.
-- Danger of psychologically telling blow with little
military significance.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5
-- Longer range prospects for stability less optimistic --
threatened by serious economic problems. If insurgent
activity continues at level of last several months,
Central American countries will need between $2 and $3
billion a year in foreign aid just to prevent further
decline in living standards and drop in real GNP.
Even decisive victories over insurgents and faster
global economic recovery than expected would not
generate quick economic improvement; foreign aid
needs would remain high.
-- Case in point: Jamaica -- a showcase of US Caribbean
Basin policy -- Success in defeating leftist Manley, but
now Seaga in serious difficulty because of economy,
(30% unemployed). May be defeated by Manley in '85
election - leading in 24 of 36 parliamentary
constituencies. Seaga's fate tied to economy.
-- In sum, security situation developing positively.
Exploiting this success to strengthen stability over
longer term threatened by economic problems.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230004-5