NICARAGUA: ACCELERATING MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85M00363R000100140013-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 16, 2007
Sequence Number:
13
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 7, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
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Nicaragua: Accelerating
Military Assistance
Directorate of TOD Secret
Intelligence
This paper was prepared by International Security
Issues Division, Office of Global Issues, and Middle
America-Caribbean Division, Office of African
and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Communist Activities Branch,
OGI
Top Secret
GI 83-10158C
ALA 83-10104C
uT7y9y 8i
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Top Secret
Nicaragua: Accelerating
Military AssistanceF_
Key Judgments The Sandinistas are acquiring military materiel at an increasingly rapid
Information available rate. In _1983 we have observed 16 military-related deliveries to Nicaragua,
as of 28 June 1983 compared with 14 for all of last year.
was used in this report.
In addition, AN-26 25X1
transport aircraft were shipped by the USSR to Cuba for assembly and
subsequently flown to Nicaragua. Deliveries this year included Nicara-
gua's first AN-26 transport aircraft, BTR-152 armored vehicles, air-to-
surface rockets, and probably 107-mm rocket launchers, as well as
additional helicopters and support equipment. 25X1
Communist countries, led by Cuba and the USSR, remain Nicaragua's
main benefactors. These suppliers account for an estimated $35 million of
the $45 million in agreements reportedly signed this year. Since July 1979,
they have constituted more than 80 percent of the estimated $260 million
in military agreements signed by Managua. Much of the materiel from
Communist countries probably is provided on a concessionary or grant
basis. Military support to the Sandinistas far exceeds that obtained by
Nicaragua during the Somoza years and is greater than the materiel
provided to any other Central American country since July 1979. Concom-
itantly, roughly 3,500 Communist-mainly Cuban-military/security per-
sonnel have helped improve Nicaraguan capabilities, including 1,500
Cuban troops reportedly sent between March and May 1983. 25X1
Assuring the success of the Nicaraguan revolution is Havana's paramount
goal in Central America. The Nicaraguan revolution is the only successful
case of Cuban-supported armed struggle in the hemisphere, and the
regime's long-term viability would help establish a precedent for continued
conventional operations.
The composition of recent deliveries indicates that Managua is focusing on
developing its capability to conduct and support counterinsurgency opera-
tions. Armed helicopters, for example, are well suited to this type of
combat, while the new transport aircraft will improve Nicaragua's ability
to move troops and equipment. Armored personnel carriers will improve
ground force mobility against the guerrillas and could be employed in
iii Top Secret
GI 83-10158C
25X1
25X1
July 1983
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Managua has developed only a limited capability to conduct offensive
operations against its neighbors. Tanks and field artillery could be used in
this regard, even though Nicaragua still lacks the ability to conduct
sustained operations. The offensive and defensive capabilities of Nicara-
gua's Air Force, still extremely limited, would be significantly improved by
the deployment of fighter aircraft now in Cuba.
We believe that Managua will continue to concentrate on expanding
counterinsurgency capabilities and improving defenses along the border
with Honduras. We expect near-term deliveries to reflect this focus, with
additional equipment designed for counterinsurgency and small-unit
operations
25X1
25X1
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