CONTADORA TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000100140004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 5, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/07/17: CIA-RDP85M00363R000100140004-6
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CONTADORA TALKING POINTS
Contadora--because it is a peace initative and because it was sponsored by
respected Latin American democracies--has wide acceptance, but to the Central
American countries most threatened by foreign-supported subversion, the Contadora
initiative has produced a peace instrument of such imbalance that it augments,
not reduces the threat to them. Moreover, the current draft treaty virtually
guarantees the survival of Marxist Nicaragua and, thus, the consolidation of
Cuban/Soviet influence in the Isthmus. Because Contadora is a peace initiative
designed to end the bloodshed in Nicaragua and El Salvador, there is a
reluctance to criticize the draft treaty directly. Nonetheless, there is a
wide variance between the public and private attitudes of the leaders of the
Contadora countries toward the treaty and, with the exception of Mexico, these
leaders believe that the treaty provisions are particularly inadequate with
regard to verification. This concern persuaded the countries of Costa Rica,
Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador (Nicaragua was invited but refused to
attend) to meet and discuss revisions to the treaty. The result of that
meeting was to propose to replace the Additional Protocol with a Protocol
of Guarantor States. The meeting also agreed to have only the four original
countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela) sign the Protocol. The
Guarantor nations would be limited (suggestions are Brazil, Argentina, Spain
and West Germany. France would be welcomed as a guarantor as well).
The following represent an update of our perceptions of the views
of leaders of the Contadora countries toward the process. It is too soon to
know the reaction to the latest initative by the countries of Guatemala, Costa
Rica, El Salvador and Honduras to replace the Additional Protocol.
Mexico:
-- Mexican leaders appear more willing to strengthen the verification
procedures than their public statements would indicate.
-- The Mexican Government is, however, anxious to have a successful
conclusion to the Contadora process, even if an imbalanced treaty
favorable to Nicaragua emerges. Mexico continues to play the role
of a "protector" of Nicaragua.
Venezuela:
Venezuelan Government officials express their misgivings
about the Contadora process. One official believes the treaty as
written would be "unverifiable" and does not provide sufficient
guarantees against Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan penetration of the region.
Costa Rica:
-- Costa Rican officials have strong concerns about the Contadora
Treaty as originally revised. They believe their country will
have serious problems with Nicaragua, regardless of what happens to
the Sandinista regime. Through the Contadora process, Costa Rica
hopes to impose an "international big brother" on the Sandinistas.
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El Salvador:
-- The espousal by officials of the Salvadoran Government of the Contadora
process is for international consumption only. The GOES has no
intention of signing an agreement unless signficant changes are made
in the revised acta. The GOES does not trust the Sandinistas to
comply with any agreement in any event.
The GOES further believes that a "regionalization" of the Contadora
process would be desirable; its position is that the original
Contadora countries made a good beginning with the initial draft
agreement, but the process should go further and essentially make
Central America responsible for its own destiny.
Honduras:
-- There appears to be a difference in Honduras between civilian and
military authorities over the Contadora process. The civilians
believe that the revised.acta represents an improvement and that
it would be acceptable to Honduras with certain changes. In the
aggregate, these changes would signify a relinquishment by
Nicaragua of its current overwhelming military superiority.
-- The Honduran military puts no faith whatsoever in the Contadora
process as a solution to the problems in Central America. The
military believes it will merely buy time for the Sandinistas to
consolidate their regime.
Guatemala:
-- Despite its public stance of neutrality on regional issues, the
Guatemalan Government is privately concerned over the existence of
a Marxist, expanisionist regime in Nicaragua. Guatemala pays lip
service to the Contadora process, primarily because of its dependence
upon Mexico and Venezuela for oil
Panama:
-- Panamanian officials view the Contadora Process as an important and
irreplaceable initiative but believe that more negotiations are
necessary among the Central American countries. Panamanian military
leaders favor additional changes to make the treaty more restrictive
of Nicaragua.
Colombia:
-- President Betancur of Colombia was a primary proponent of the
Contadora Process and favors its rapid implementation, in part because
of the personal acclaim that he will-receive by that action. Recently, he
has become concerned that Nicaraguan intransigence vis-a-vis the
elections will damage the Contadora process and he is urging the
Sandinistas to postpone the elections and become more flexible.
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Nicaragua: Mil tary Deliveries
1979-83*
$ Millions
Non-Communist
Communist
1979 1980 1981 1982
(* 1983 projection based on January-June data)
1983
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