FOREIGN REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING US FORCES IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100200016-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 17, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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SNIE 20-67
17 February 1967
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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 20-67
FOREIGN REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES
OF ACTION REGARDING US FORCES IN EUROPE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
17. February 1967
1 # ?~ zr e s on will be. published.
> L .fl1SSE
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and
Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Mr. Sherman Kent, for the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., for the Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency
Dr. Louis W..Tordella, for the Director, National Security
Agency
Abstaining:
Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager,
Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William 0. Cregar, for
the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the''-subject-being outside of their jurisdiction.
WARNING
con ns, infor on affecting the National Defense of the United;States
lit of the a ionage'laws, Ti#le fiQ t1SC, Seca. 793 and. 794 the trpns-
s ss~ # reve tion of w# % s manner to air un authorized ,peen is t ted
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
17 February 1967
SUBJECT: SNIE 20-67: FOREIGN REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
REGARDING US FORCES IN EUROPE
This SNIE has been prepared in response to a State Department request
for a review of an earlier estimate with the same title (SNIE 20-1-66,
dated 27 October 1966, SECRET/SENSITIVE), The assumptions given for the
present estimate are altered, particularly in that the alternative scales
of proposed force withdrawals from Europe are in a more modest range. In
addition, the paper considers certain recent changes in the political con-
text which would have a, bearing on reactions to the postulated moves.
Finally, this paper primarily addresses reactions to the proposed withdrawals
and does not attempt to measure the longer term effects.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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To estimate :foreign reactions to various US courses of action affecting
American ior:cos ^ta.tioned in Euroi-)e. The alternative courses are;
Case 1: Maintain US ground and air forces in West Germany at
their present level.=f
Case 2: Return to the US one division and some support elements,
leaving in Germany one brigade of this division on a rotational basis. Dual
base in the US 216 of the 662 US tactical aircraft now based in Europe, with
the result that at least 500 aircraft are in Europe at any one time (54+ on
rotation basis). The total number of US ground and air personnel i Withdrawn
would amount to some 27,000 men plus dependents.
Case 3: Return to the US two divisions and some nondivisional
support elements, leaving in Germany one brigade from each division on a
rotational basis. Dual base in the US Ii-32 of the 662 US tactical aircraft
now based in Europe, with the result that at least 338 aircraft are in
Europe at any one time (108 on rotation basis). The total number of US
ground and air personnel withdrawn would amount to some 61,500 men plus
dependents.
=! The authorized strength of US ground forces in West Germany is 223,270
men includinL five combat divisions, three brigades and supporting ele-
ments; present USAir Force strength in Europe consists of 662 tactical
aircraft and about 25,000 men.
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I. RECENT DEVELOPP 1TS FtF'.ARING ON LIKELY REACTIONS
1. The idea that American force withdrawals may occur has become more
familiar to informed opinion in Europe in recent months. Any agreements
reached to reduce American forces, especially if the cuts are of the kind
and scale now proposed, would be less likely to produce the kind of polit-
ical shock they might have some months ago. The broader public, however,
is not as well prepared as the governments, and the degree of general con-
cern that might be manifested would still depend considerably on the way
the matter was handled and on the efforts made by European leaders to
support and explain the move.
2. A number of developments have probably worked on European opinion
to make some reduction in the American military presence in Europe seem
inevitable, and for some, acceptable and perhaps even desirable. Awareness
of the scale, cost, and probable prolongation of the American effort in
Vietnam has no doubt increased. Because this effort is widely disapproved,
there is in some subtle way a decline in the sense of shared policies and
purposes which had earlier characterized the European-American relation-
ship. Although there is no way of measuring it precisely, the Gaullist
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emphasis on "independence" from American influence appears to have gained
some support, even in quarters where de Gaulle himself is not much admired.
The feeling is probably growing that the Atlantic Alliance is entering upon
a phase in which the roles and relationships which have obtained in NATO
have begun to change.
3. Developments affecting Soviet policy have strengthened these trends
of opinion in Europe about the Alliance. Recent events have lent still
greater conviction to the belief that the USSR's desire for detente in
Europe is real. Signature of the Outer Space Treaty and reported progress
toward a Non-Proliferation Treaty have been interpreted in Europe in this
sense. But most important in this respect has been the dramatic deterio-
ration in Soviet relations with China in recent months which, rightly or
wrongly, persuades many Europeans that the Soviets are now compelled to
stabilize and improve their relations with Europe. Heightened Soviet
diplomatic activity in recent months, marked by a series of state visits
by Soviet leaders, has nourished the idea that more stable and constructive
East-West relations in Europe are possible. In turn, such an idea postu-
lates a decline of American influence in European affairs.
1,-. The sin? le most important new development in Europe, however, is
the emerCence of a new West German Government which has both resulted from
and given new impetus to a shift in German opinion and policy. This has
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been manifested primarily in the priority given to an effort to restore
good relations with France and to improve relations with Eastern Europe.
The new government has thus sought quickly to convey an impression of
activism and independence, and to reduce the heavy reliance on Washington
which proved to be a political liability for the Erhard administration.
There has been nothing explicitly anti American in these moves, but they
have nevertheless suggested that the new government would not be disinclined
to see some reduction in the weight of American influence in the affairs of
the Alliance.
5. These recent developments do not mean that there is a desire in
Europe to see the Atlantic Alliance dissolved. The overwhelming weight of
opinion no doubt continues to regard the American commitment to Europe's
security as vital. But there is probably a growing feeling that the time
has come for Europe to chart a more independent course. Moreover, although
the NATO governments recognize that the military capabilities of the Warsaw
Pact countries are improving, they feel that the threat of war has diminished
and that this, together with the changes in the general climate in Europe
in recent months, has made acceptance of a reduction of the American
presence and influence more palatable. It is probably also true that the
shift in European attitudes toward the Alliance and the European-American
relationship described above is likely to develop further in any case,
whether or not the American forces are reduced.
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6. The substantial American military commitment in Europe for the
last 15 years or so has been a major instrument, though not the only one,
of our effort to preserve security and our influence in the area. A reduc-
tion in the American military presence would probably give some added
stimulus to the trends described in the preceding paragraphs toward a decline
in American influence, even though these trends seem likely to continue in
any case. It might contribute to the feeling that the relevance of American
power and presence to Europe is declining and that American influence and
policies merit less attention and accommodation from the Europeans. And,
generally speaking, it is to be e;pected that the larger cuts envisioned in
Case 3 would carry a. greater potential for adverse developments in American
relations with Europe than would the more modest cuts under Case 2.
7. The political context in which the move was made and the tact and
skill with which allied assent was obtained would perhaps be more important
than the difference in the size of the two drawdowns. If agreement is
reached, after clue deliberation in appropriate Allied councils, that the
move is acceptable and perhaps even advantageous in the present stage of
East-test relations, the political risks would be small. If the US makes
what is seen as in effect a unilateral decision, for reasons of its own
which are not persuasive to the Allies, the political risks could be sub-
stantial. The Europeans would then be less concerned about the actual
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size of the cut than with what they thought it meant for the general
direction of US policy, and in particular for the future of the American
commitment to Europe's security.
8. Under Case 1 there would be some political risks but these would
be offset by definite political and military advantages. Uncertainty about
possible future US moves to reduce forces would remain as an unsettling
factor in any case. But there are important differences between Case 1 and
Cases 2 and 3. Those West European reactions of suspicion and concern which
might arise from US force cuts in the present atmosphere within the Alliance
would be avoided under Case 1, since the visible symbol of the US security
commitment would not have been altered. West European doubts about NATO's
validity and longevity would to a certain extent be mitigated. Finally,
greater flexibility would be retained for approaches to the USSR on pos-
sible force cuts on a reciprocal basis.
9. S e believe that the Kiesinger government would be much more
willing than its predecessor to accept US force reductions. The new
German leaders apparently already expect that some cuts of US and British
forces in Germany will be made, and they are almost certainly considering,
not how to forestall this development, but rather how to react to it and
perhaps capitalize on it as a political issue. Bonn would probably agree
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fairly readily to the smaller of the proposed cuts. At present it might
be reluctant to accept the larger reduction, but it could probably be
brought around to do so by careful and deliberately-paced negotiations.
Moreover, the Federal Republic wants to hold its offset payments to the
minimum in the future, and a lower level of US forces would allow it to
argue for a reduction of such payments. In one sense a US cutback might
be regarded with positive favor by the new Bonn government. In their
present efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe, Kiesinger and
Brandt could exploit the US cuts, and Bonn's acceptance thereof, both as
a German contribution to detente in Europe and as a. basis for urging
reciprocal Soviet moves.
10. The new government in Bonn with its large parliamentary majority
would also be much more capable than its predecessor of managing the polit-
ical repercussions inside Germany of US force cuts. German politicians who
wished to appeal to nationalist tendencies and to reduce the US role in
German affairs would of course cite any cutbacks as evidence of American
unreliability. Efforts by the Bonn government could, however, help to
minimize the effectiveness of such appeals. This could be best done by a
united coalition, but there is some risk that moves to redefine the German-
American military relationship could in themselves be divisive.
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11. The eventual risks which might attend a. change in the German-
American military relationship are not all measurable now. If the CDU-SPD
coalition should prove unstable, if Bonn's new initiatives in its Eastern
policy should be frustrated, if US dealings with the USSR nourish the view
that Soviet American detente is developing at the cost of German interests --
then German opinion might in retrospect magnify the significance of a draw-
down of US -forces, seeing it as the turning point at which the American
commitment to support German aspirations manifestly weakened. This is why
so much hangs on the manner in which the decision for US force cuts is
undertaken. An unhurried negotiation, i.e., not conducted under pressure,
which ended with Bonn fully and freely committed to the decision, would
help to minimize the long-term risks.
B. Implications for PLATO as a Whole
12. Since either of the proposed cuts would leave substantial American
forces in Europe, they would not, as isolated measures, be interpreted as a
deliberate US disengagement from European affairs. Some Europeans would
see them, however, as the confirmation of a, trend. Either of the cuts
would add to the continuing debate that has developed in Europe about the
future of the Alliance, but this debate -- assuming that the threat of war
continues to rein remote -- will probably intensify anyway over the next
several years. In addition, all members of the Western Alliance except
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France still cant NATO to continue as on instrument of Atlantic political-
military cooperation, in part because it is seen as a. framework in which
to contain the Germans. US cutbacks of the size indicated might in fact
rouse some member states to try to insure that such a move did not portend
a significant decline in American involvement with Europe's affairs.
13. The proposed cuts would to some extent bolster de Gaulle's efforts
to destroy the organizational superstructure of TTATO and to undermine the US
position in Europe, but probably only marginally. They would generate some-
what greater receptivity for the Gaullist argument that the US commitment
to Europe is unreliable, and de Gaulle could be counted on to encourage
suspicions that small cuts were only a prelude to larger ones. Such tactics
would probably gain some support in other West European countries for French
policies, if not for French leadership.
14. Great Britain will almost certainly cut back the British Army of
the Rhine whether or not there are US cuts, because it is now clear that
the Germans will not meet offset costs to Britain on the scale demanded.
US actions might affect the timing of British moves, and would certainly
allow London to justify cutbacks more easily in European eyes. Unless the
US itself helped with the British offset problems, the size of the British
cuts Mill probably not be much affected by what the US does. On the other
hand, among all the allies the British would most clearly understand that
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US cutbacks of the sizes indicated did not portend an American pull-out
from Europe. Other NATO allies, such as Canada and Belgium, would also
probably reduce the size or alter the composition of their military forces
in NATO following US cuts.
15. In general, although some members of NATO would be disturbed by
implications they might see in the US move, none of them appears to be
particularly worried about an immediate threat of Soviet aggression, and
none would build up its own defenses in response to US cuts. But most of
them will wish to see a strong US presence in Europe continue, not only
because of the potential Soviet threat, but because they regard it as a
restraint on a possible revival of German nationalism and on a Franco-
German combination prejudicial to their interests.
III. 32-T-ORTAIICE OF THE MODALITIES AVID TII.MTG OF US FORCE
16. The prospects for minimizing the adverse effects of force reduc-
tions in Europe would be significantly influenced by the way in which the
issue was handled. If the cuts followed careful consultations in the
existing trilateral mechanism and in NATO, and if the result were an agreed
drawdown and agreed arrangements on offset, we believe that the repercus-
sions in Germany end elsewhere would be manageable. European reactions
would be much more negative if the cuts were carried out precipitately
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and if sufficient time were not allowed for careful consultation. It is
especially important that any actions to change force levels taken by the
British and ourselves, and possibly others, be so coordinated and timed as
to reflect NATO acceptance of the strategic as well as other considerations
which prompted the change.
17. In West Germany, it would probably help to play up the beneficial
effect which US force cuts might have on Bonn's Ostpolitik. In Europe as a
whole it would probably help to emphasize the US move as a contribution to
East-West detente. If a, persuasive argument could be advanced that increased
firepower, mobility, and capability for reinforcement would allow cuts to
be made without danger, the US case might also be buttressed. Most other
possible rationales which the US could use would tend to heighten rather
than mitigate adverse reactions. Explanations which emphasized the financial
and manpower needs of the Vietnam war, or US balance of payments difficul-
ties, would imply to Europeans that the US really was being forced to reduce
its commitment to Europe. Explanations which emphasized German unwilling-
ness to accept satisfactory offset arrangements, or the unwillingness of
other European nations to maintain adequate defense efforts, would also
suggest that the US was reducing its commitment to Europe -- not because
it had to but (in European eyes) because of pique with the Europeans.
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18. The timing of US force reductions would also affect their reception.
The German response would probably not be very favorable, and German efforts
to cushion their public reception not very helpful, if widespread German
uneasiness in connection with the nonproliferation agreement still persisted.
On the other hand, should the problems related to this agreement be resolved,
the German response might be more helpful.
19. The European reaction to force cuts would also vary depending on
the status of the Vietnam war at the time cuts were formally proposed. If
the proposal came during a. period when US activity in Vietnam was still
expanding, most Europeans would be convinced, whatever the US said., that the
cuts were prompted mainly by the war, and that the US was becoming ever
more involved in Asia at the expense of its commitment to Europe. On the
other hand, if the cuts were proposed when the Vietnam war appeared closer
to resolution, rationales which at present would have a negative effect on
European opinion might then be accepted or even have a beneficial impact.
Reductions at such a time might also increase the chance of reciprocal
cuts of Soviet forces in East Germany. Moscow would presumably no longer
be under pressure to avoid actions which would make it easier for the US
to strengthen its forces in Vietnam.
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20. There have been no developments in recent months which would
substantially change Soviet or East European responses to US troop reduc-
tions in Germany. The Bloc States would see the cut as favorable to their
present policies toward Western Europe. Moscow would probably continue,
at least for a time, its present conciliatory line toward that area. Whether
or not US cutbacks occur, the USSR in the coming year will probably accelerate
its diplomatic campaign to stir up discussion and ferment on the general
subject of European security. It would probably regard US force cuts as
something which might enhance the prospects of these diplomatic efforts,
by making West Europeans a little more willing to deal with the USSR
independently of the US.
21. We still believe the chances are good that the USSR would, after
it had taken some time to appraise the political-military effects of the US
withdrawals, unilaterally carry out some withdrawals of its own in East
Germany.2/ Moscow probably would not wish to negotiate a formal agreement
on this, however, at least until the Vietnam war had reached some resolu-
tion, and probably even then only in the framework of broader East-WW7est
undertakings which would have the effect of consolidating the status quo
in Germany. die coo not believe that the recent intensification of the
Maj. Gen. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that, while a pos-
sibility of Soviet withdrawals exists, available evidence is
insufficient to support a judgment that "the chances are good that
the USSR would ...carry out some withdrawals of its own ...
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Sino-Soviet dispute will make it necessary for the USSR to withdraw troops
from East Germany.
22. In general, the reactions of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies to
the moves discussed in this estimate would be much the same as those of
the USSR. The idea of a developing detente on terms which the East has
advocated would be congenial to them. They would welcome the opportunity
to develop their trade with Western Europe, and would hope that military
burdens could be eased. Some of them might want to move faster in develop-
ing relations with West Germany than East Germany, Poland, and the USSR
would want. Rumania, for example, would welcome changes on the European
political scene which would permit it Greater freedom in pursuing its own
interests with Western European states. The USSR might think it had reason
to be concerned about the degree of independence that would develop in time
from the assertion of such interests. But unless there were fundamental
changes in the political and military structure of Europe, the basic
alignment of these countries with the USSR would not be affected.
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