SUMMARY OF US POSITION ON WARNING TIME

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 3, 1998
Sequence Number: 
54
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5.pdf117.61 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5 OUJX SUMMARY OF US POSITION ON WARNING TIME 1. Warning of a buildup to a postulated attack posture will depend on four factors: a. The type or types of forces employed. b. The occurrence and scope of preparatory c. NATO intelligence acquisition capabilities. d. The rapidity with which warning is assessed and communicated. 2. A wide range of situations in which the Warsaw Pact might initiate offensive operations may be visualized, with possibilities extending from a surprise strategic attack with general purpose forces already in place, to an attack following a prolonged period of tension and a gradual deliberate buildup. In the case of the former situation the amount of warning could be measured in hours, if given at all. In the latter case, the "warning time" of the buildup and deployment of Warsaw Pact forces into an attack posture could amount to weeks, if not months. 3. The following pattern would be likely for an 80-division buildup prior to a nuclear attack: a. Period of preparation prior to movement of units from USSR--5 to 8 days; detection possible but unlikely. likely. b. Time of movement--15 to 18 days; detection c. Deployment and assembly in forward area--I to 2 days; detection likely. d. Time for buildup--21 to 28 days. Estimate detection of buildup with 10 to 13 days after initiation, leaving 11 to 15 days warning time, 4. Warning times for possible scenarios are given in attached table. .-... OUJX Approved For Release 2003/02127k': Eli--R DP85GO0105R000100190054-5 Approved For Re?eh'S ~V 02127: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5 WARNING TO NATO OF A WARSAW PACT BUILDUP Size of Force dies Warning Time 1. Surprise Nuclear Attack 0-12 hrs. 2. Non Nuclear Attack without Mobilization-I 1-4 days 3. Non Nuclear Attack 4-10 days without Mobilization-II 4. Non Nuclear Attack with Mobilization-I 5. Non Nuclear Attack with Mobilization-II P without Mobilization I 7. Surprise Limited Attack with Limited Objectives Comments Surprise for the nuclear attack would be essential. Movement of general purpose forceq prior to the nuclear attack would be very limited. They would attack in the wake of the nuclear attack rather than simultaneously with it. This attack would also be mainly with forces already in place with only limited reinforcements being provided mainly by the Soviet groups of forces in Poland and Hungary. Additional divisions and supporting air could be brought in from the USSR but there would be little opportunity to build up combat and service support. If all available East European forces were used, the ;:nrning time would be at the lower end of the range. With more Soviet forces, the warning would be greater. 7-13 days This situation allows for considerable reinforcement and filling up of units but stops the buildup at about 70 divisions, thus reducing the standard warning time of a major buildup. 11-15 days This situation takes maximum advantage of present Pact deployment and allows for the assembly and filling out of a Warsaw Pact force of about 80 divisions in 3 to 4 weeks. Should the buildup proceed at a slower pace, if, for example, the Soviets were to attempt some concurrent restructuring of their forces for a nonnuclear environment, the warning time could be greater. Warning time would be essentially the same as for scenarios 2 to 5 above. 0-1 day The extent of redeployment of forces and consequently the amount of warning would be limited by the requirement to gain surprise. SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTO%IATIC REGRADING DOD DO DOF; NOT APPLY `Approved For Release 2003102/27 : -CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5 WARSAW PA GTp ieS4 313 f7 ; IAi44D '$ O'1690,bf 100190054-5 AND WARNING TIME TO NATO LQ ~.j C!) COMPOSITION (DIVISIONS) AVERAGE TOTAL FORCE (DIV) BUILDUP TIME WARNING WARNING TIME TOTAL EEUR DIVS TOTAL SOV DIVS % EEUR DIVS 37 0 days 0-12 hrs 0 15 22 41% 45 3-7 days 1-4 days 3 days 20 6 9 2 4 4 - 19 26 427 60 7-14 days 4-10 days 7 days 20 6 ? 9 2 4 4/9 15/10 19/24 41/36 32%/40% 70 14-21 days 7-13 days 10 days 20 6 9 2 4 9 20 24 46 34% 80 21-28 days 11-15 days 13 days 20 6 9 2 4 9 30 24 56 30% C,) LU Approved For Release 2003102/27 CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5