SUMMARY OF US POSITION ON WARNING TIME
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5
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RIFPUB
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S
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3
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 3, 1998
Sequence Number:
54
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SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5
OUJX
SUMMARY OF US POSITION ON WARNING TIME
1. Warning of a buildup to a postulated attack
posture will depend on four factors:
a. The type or types of forces employed.
b. The occurrence and scope of preparatory
c. NATO intelligence acquisition capabilities.
d. The rapidity with which warning is assessed
and communicated.
2. A wide range of situations in which the Warsaw
Pact might initiate offensive operations may be visualized,
with possibilities extending from a surprise strategic
attack with general purpose forces already in place, to an
attack following a prolonged period of tension and a
gradual deliberate buildup. In the case of the former
situation the amount of warning could be measured in hours,
if given at all. In the latter case, the "warning time"
of the buildup and deployment of Warsaw Pact forces into
an attack posture could amount to weeks, if not months.
3. The following pattern would be likely for an
80-division buildup prior to a nuclear attack:
a. Period of preparation prior to movement of
units from USSR--5 to 8 days; detection possible but
unlikely.
likely.
b. Time of movement--15 to 18 days; detection
c. Deployment and assembly in forward area--I
to 2 days; detection likely.
d. Time for buildup--21 to 28 days. Estimate
detection of buildup with 10 to 13 days after initiation,
leaving 11 to 15 days warning time,
4. Warning times for possible scenarios are given in
attached table.
.-... OUJX
Approved For Release 2003/02127k': Eli--R DP85GO0105R000100190054-5
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WARNING TO NATO OF A WARSAW PACT BUILDUP
Size of
Force dies
Warning
Time
1. Surprise Nuclear
Attack
0-12 hrs.
2. Non Nuclear Attack
without Mobilization-I
1-4 days
3. Non Nuclear Attack
4-10 days
without Mobilization-II
4. Non Nuclear Attack
with Mobilization-I
5. Non Nuclear Attack
with Mobilization-II
P without Mobilization
I 7. Surprise Limited Attack
with Limited Objectives
Comments
Surprise for the nuclear attack would be essential. Movement of general purpose
forceq prior to the nuclear attack would be very limited. They would attack in
the wake of the nuclear attack rather than simultaneously with it.
This attack would also be mainly with forces already in place with only limited
reinforcements being provided mainly by the Soviet groups of forces in Poland
and Hungary.
Additional divisions and supporting air could be brought in from the USSR but
there would be little opportunity to build up combat and service support. If
all available East European forces were used, the ;:nrning time would be at the
lower end of the range. With more Soviet forces, the warning would be greater.
7-13 days This situation allows for considerable reinforcement and filling up of units
but stops the buildup at about 70 divisions, thus reducing the standard warning
time of a major buildup.
11-15 days This situation takes maximum advantage of present Pact deployment and allows for
the assembly and filling out of a Warsaw Pact force of about 80 divisions in 3
to 4 weeks. Should the buildup proceed at a slower pace, if, for example, the
Soviets were to attempt some concurrent restructuring of their forces for a
nonnuclear environment, the warning time could be greater.
Warning time would be essentially the same as for scenarios 2 to 5 above.
0-1 day The extent of redeployment of forces and consequently the amount of warning
would be limited by the requirement to gain surprise.
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`Approved For Release 2003102/27 : -CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5
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AND WARNING TIME TO NATO
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COMPOSITION (DIVISIONS)
AVERAGE
TOTAL
FORCE
(DIV)
BUILDUP
TIME
WARNING
WARNING
TIME
TOTAL
EEUR
DIVS
TOTAL
SOV
DIVS
% EEUR
DIVS
37
0 days
0-12 hrs
0
15
22
41%
45
3-7 days
1-4 days
3
days
20
6
9
2
4
4
-
19
26
427
60
7-14 days
4-10 days
7 days
20
6 ?
9
2
4
4/9
15/10
19/24
41/36
32%/40%
70
14-21 days
7-13 days
10
days
20
6
9
2
4
9
20
24
46
34%
80
21-28 days
11-15 days
13
days
20
6
9
2
4
9
30
24
56
30%
C,)
LU
Approved For Release 2003102/27 CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190054-5