WARSAW PACT DATA BASE STUDY - 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190042-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: January 19, 1967
• Content Type: PAPER

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BRIEFING PAPER FOR GENERAL SPIVY - 1000 Hours, 19 January 1967
I. SUBJECT: jWarsaw Pact Data Base Study - 1967
. II. PROBLEM: To determine the impact of DIA'
Warsaw Pact Data Base
Study_.- 1967, on existing National Estimates of capabilities of Soviet
and East European general purpose ground forces against the Central
Region of NATO, particularly to deploy about an 80-division force
into the Central Region in about three to four weeks with 11. to 15
days warning to NATO.
III. BACKGROUND:
1. NIE 11-14-66, dated 3 November 1966, was the basis for the
US position on the Warsaw Pact Threat in the Tripartite Talks held
in November 1966.
2. The Dr. Halperin paper, which was presented to Mr. McClay,
included views which were critical of the National Estimate 11-14766
and generally concluded that the Warsaw Pact threat as presented was
an exaggeration.
3. OASD (Systems Analysis) will probably use DIA's Warsaw Pact
Data Base Study - 1967 in an attempt to support the Halperin paper
and present a greatly reduced Warsaw Pact threat to NATO.
IV. MAJOR POINTS IN STUDY:
1. Order of battle on divisions:
a. Soviet:
Categories Total
I II III
NIE 11-14-66 61 48 32 141
Study - 1967 56 48 39 143
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b. The total number of Category I and II divisions in
the Western USSR (4 M.D.s) did not change and remains at 34, although
there are two less Category I and two more Category II divisions in
this total.
c. The readiness status of some of the 20 Soviet Category
I divisions in East Germany cannot be established with certainty.
d. East German, Polish and Czech divisions-- No change
in readiness status was made as a result of this study.
2. Nondivisional Combat and Service Support Units.
a. The 80-division force requirement is as follows:
3 Soviet Fronts (1-GSFG, 2-USSR)
18 Armies (5-GSFG, 8-USSR, 5-EE)
b. Armies within the USSR-- About 40% of the combat
support units required in the DIA estimated wartime TOE have been
identified as subordinate to these armies. Additional combat support
units exist under Military District subordination.
c. Armies within GSFG -- Data deficiencies exist at Army
level similar to divisions.
d. Armies in East Europe -- Adequate combat support
units exist.
e. The overall assessment of identified combat support
for the 80-division force is as follows:
Artillery -- Adequate for estimated TOE.
Signal -- Adequate for estimated TOE.
Engineer -- 50% of estimated TOE.
Ponton Units -- 75% of estimated TOE
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f. Service Support Units"? It is impossible to identify
these units on the ground. See also: NIE 11-14-66 para 8, page 7;
para 17, page 9; and Para 81, page 25.
V. MANNING AND EQUIPMT LEVELS
The data base project has resulted in the assembly of considerable
additional information from which to judge manning and equipment
levels. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties still remain'due
to the fact that the DIA holdings on TOEs are estimates (we have
no actual Soviet or EE TOE's) and our TOE holdings do not reflect
differences which would result from the tailoring of forces for
mission. Thus, there is an uncertain yardstick against which the
always difficult problem of assessing manning and equipment levels
must be undertaken.
VI. HALPERIN PAPER EXTRACTS
1. "Our own judgment... is that it would take the Pact something
like 50-90 days to assemble and deploy a combat-ready force of
80-85 divisions." (page 2).
2. "...it now appears that NATO could expect to receive at
least 3 to 4 weeks' warning, and possibly more." (page 7).
VI. DIA'S CONCLUSIONS
1. The Warsaw Pact Data Base Study -1967 does not provide a
basis for changing the reinforcement estimate as presented in NIE
11-14-66 (80-division
threat in about 3-4 weeks).
2. The DIA warning of buildup to NATO of 11-15 days is derived
directly from the 3-4 week reinforcement period and therefore
no basis is provided to change the warning element.
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