NATO MINISTERIAL METING DECEMBER 1966 WARSAW PACT MILITARY THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190032-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: December 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
DECEMBER 1966
WARSAW PACT MILITARY THREAT
DIA DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
SUMMARY
The attached figures on the Pact's capability are drawn mainly from
the McCloy Trilateral Papers on that subject. The intelligence basis in
the Trilateral Papers is almost identical with that in the current NATO
intelligence estimate, SC 161/20, and in current US national intelligence.
As this year's accepted intelligence basis for NATO military planning,
SG 161/20 was approved by the three former Standing Group nations; next
year's, MC 161/67, will require approval by all 13 Military Committee
nations.
The Military Committee will distribute a recent internationally
agreed military intelligence appreciation at the Ministerial Meeting.
This estimate discusses general trends; it does not conflict with sta-
tistical evaluations of the threat to NATO in Europe.
FACTS/DISCUSSION
Attachment A compares Warsaw Pact force levels in last May's SG 161/20
with more current US intelligence. Attachment B describes both US and
Trilateral assessments of the threat to the Central Region under various
assumed situations, pointing out differences in conclusions where they
exist. In brief the situations are:
--Scenario 1 - Strategic nuclear surprise followed by up to 50
divisions and 3100 tactical aircraft.
--Scenario 2 - Planned non-nuclear attack without buildup by up to
46 divisions and 3600 aircraft initially.
--Scenario 3 - Non-nuclear attack without buildup, arising from
miscalculation, by up to 35 divisions and 2200 aircraft initially.
--Scenario 4 - Non-nuclear attack after mobilization and buildup
by 60 divisions, with 20 in reserve, and some 4000 aircraft.
--Scenario 5 - Surprise non-nuclear attack with limited objectives
by up to 20 Soviet or up to 9 East European divisions and no more than
800 aircraft.
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RECOMMENDATION
It should be noted that:
There is essential agreement on current force levels, but differences
arise over the timing and scale of various assumed attack situations.
Neither the latest US data nor the still incomplete Trilateral
findings are as widely known and accepted throughout the Alliance as
the established estimate, SG 161/20.
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COMPARISON OF US AND NATO ESTIMATES
us
Estimates
December 66
STRENGTH OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES 3,200,000
STRENGTH OF OTHER PACT FORCES 895,000
GROUND FORCES
Soviet Line Div 141(109) 1~
Other Pact Line Div 62(42) 1
SOVIET NAVAL FORCES
Operational Submarines 382
Cruisers 18
Destroyers and Escorts 199
Ballistic Missile Submarines 45
Cruise Missile Submarines 48
Guided Missile Patrol Boats 158
SOVIET AIR FORCES
Air Defense (PVO) Fighters 3580
Heavy Bombers (LRA) .210
Medium Bombers (LRA) 755
Tactical Fighters and Lt Bombers 3250 2/
Naval Bombers 580
OTHER PACT AIR FORCES (FIGHTERS & LT BOMBERS) 2475
SOVIET STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES
ICBM Launch Pads 350
IRBM/MRBM Launch Pads 710
WARSAW PACT FORCES AVAILABLE AGAINST
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE)
Category I & II Soviet Line Div 88
Other Pact Line Div available for
early commitment 42
LRA (Medium Bombers Only) About 600
Soviet Tactical Fighters & Lt'Bombers 2900
Other Pact Fighters & Lt Bombers 2475
IRBM/MRBM About 90% of total
25X1
1/ Numbers in parentheses represent Category I (manned at 75% or better)
and Category II (manned at 60-75%) Soviet divisions and other Pact
divisions available for early commitment.
2/ There are also some 500 older combat-type aircraft colocated with units
of Tactical Aviation; additionally, over 2,000,older fighters and light
bombers are believed to be in reserve status (active storage).
DOWNGR,DED ~1T 12 Y +,1; NTERVALS
NOT LY OE:LA SIrIED
DOD DI: 52'0.10
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SUMMARY OF TRILATERAL ASSESSMENTS
1. Primary factors in determining the threat against NATO are:
a. Available forces are those in European USSR and Eastern Europe.
b. The Soviet main effort would be against the Central Region.
c. Size of forces committed would depend on current deployments,
readiness, plans for surprise, urgency, geography, size of opposition,
and prospects for nuclear or nonnuclear war.
2. Forces available for early use against the Central Region are:
SOVIET CATEGORY I AND II DIVISIONS
MRD
TANK
AIRBORNE
Location
Cat I Cat II
Cat I Cat II
Cat I
Cat II
TOTAL
East Germany (GSFG)
10
0
10
0
0
0
20
Poland (NGF)
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
Hungary (SGF)
2
0
2
0
0
0
4
Western USSR
9
5
11
6
2
1
34
Kiev MD
0
2
1
3
0
0
6
TOTAL
21
7
26
9
2
1
66
EAST EUROPEAN DIVISIONS READY FOR EARLY COMMITMENT
Mechanized
Armored
Total
East Germany
4
2
6
Poland
4
5
9
Czechoslovakia
4
5
9
Hungary
2
1
3
TOTAL
14
13
27
SOVIET TACTICAL AVIATION
Ftrs
L. Bmbrs
Recce
Total
East Germany
575
120
96
791
Poland
222
0
60
282
Hungary
160
56
0
216
Western MDs
722
106
138
966
TOTAL
1679
282,
294
2255
S EC i
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EAST EUROPEAN AIR FORCES
Ftrs L. Bmbrs Recce Total
East Germany 300 0 0 300
Poland 769 52 64 885
Hungary 132 0 0 132
Czechoslovakia 530 0 91 621
TOTAL 1731 52 155 1938
3. The following are the scenarios developed by the Tripartite group
and the forces considered to be initially available for each situation.
Although the ground and air forces are lumped together geographically,
it should be recognized that the numbers of aircraft shown, as well as
additional aircraft from the USSR, could be employed more flexibly
than the breakdowns indicate.
a. Surprise Nuclear Attack -- occurs without preparation of general
purpose forces, following surprise strategic attack, and seeks to
exploit the chaos.
US POSITION
25X1
Divisions
Manpower
(000)
Tactical
Aircraft
Soviet
26
355
1289
East Germany
6
67
300
Polish
9
92
885
Czechoslovakia
9
92
621
TOTAL
606
3095
b. Non-NuQlear Sur rise) Attack without Mobilization (Deliberate) --
Movement of reinforcements from es ern 175 would-take place after the
start of hostilities and would be subject to NATO interdiction. (In this
case and also in. the following case of Non-Nuclear Attack without Mobili-
zation (Miscalculation) the US found it necessary to qualify the availability
of 20 Category I Soviet divisions listed by the UK and FRG as "USSR
reinforcement," because they are located at considerable distances from
the Central Region. Their use would require time to assemble divisions
from separate and widely scattered field armies and to deploy forward.
The Army and front support units for these divisions are well below wartime
requirements. Even the forces in the forward area have deficiencies in
command and control and in combat and service support, necessitating
substantial deployments of units and personnel from the Soviet Union.
Additionally, Soviet Forces in Hungary do not have rapid access to the
Central Region because of limitations in the transportation system, and
would require about as much time for commitment against the Central Region
as would an equivalent force from-the USSR,)
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US
POSITION
Divisions M
anpower
(000)
Tactical
Aircraft
Soviet 22
305
1289
East Germany 6
67
300
Polish 9
92
885
Czechoslovakia 9
92
621
TOTAL 46
556
3095
Soviet Reinforcements
USSR
SGF
(Not available for
initial phase)
c. thout Mobilization (Miscalc -- War begins
without deliberate preparations on either side. Movement of reinforcements
occurs only after the start of hostilities and is subject to NATO interdiction.
US POSITION 25X1
Divisions Manpower Tactical
(000) Aircraft
25X1
Soviet 20 280 1289
East Germany 6 67 300
Czechoslovakia 9 92 621
TOTAL 35 439 2210
Soviet Reinforcements
USSR
NGr
SGF
Polish Reinforcements
TOTAL
(Not available for
initial phase)
d. Non-Nuclear Attack with Mobilization -- launched by conventional
forces following some period off ension an "a rapid buildup of forces in
the forward area. Differences between national positions are based primarily
on estimates of time to build up the assumed force: US - 3 to 4 weeks;
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US POSITION
Divisions
Manpower
(000)-_
Tactical
Aircraft
Soviet in E. Europe
26
429
1289
Sov Reinforcements
30
507
966
East Germany
6
81
300
Polish
9
121
885
Czechoslovakia
9
121
621
TOTAL
80
1259
4061
e. Si-irprise T.' tt k cait invited Objectives Non-nuclear
attack aimed at achieving surprise and design to attain a specific, short
range objective.
US POSITION 25X1
Divisions Manpower Tactical
- (000) Aircraft
USSR (GSFG) Up to 20 Up to 280 Up to 791
OR if a
"proxy"
attack
East Germany Up to 6 Up to 67 Up to 300
OR Czechoslovakia Up to 9 Up to 92 Up to 621
4. In the scenarios shown in paragraph 3 above the figures on divisions
and tactical aircraft as shown under the UK/FRG position are the same
as in SG 161/20. Manpower figures reflect estimates of division forces
(army or front division slices) and are not found in SG 161/20. US figures
are based on NIE 11-14-66, dated 3 November 1966. -
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