COMMENT ON JIIRG REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100110009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 9, 1966
• Content Type: MISC

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9 August 1966
M2EE ON JZIRO REPORT
1. C
The reasoning and motives which led JIIRR to recommend that imagery ex-
ploitation be coordinated and managed by a USIB authority are sound. I cannot
agree, however, that a new separate USIB committee (COMER) should be
established to exercise that authority. The followi.n8 considerations have
caused me to disagree:
a. I believe that coordination end management of all aspects of
overhead reeonnaieeence should be subordinated to a Dingle authority responsible
to UST9. In our experience with satellite reconnaissance programs and their
A
products, targeting and exploitation Ore sufficiently interrelated to demand
subordination to central management. Th3 fact that exploitation has been
managed separately from the bueineeo of COb'4OR in the past has been one cause
of the growing need for exploitation management.
It can be argued by others that two separate and equal USIB
committees (COMDR and C(t4EX) could operate in concert. I believe they
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probably could in a etetlo A*t,*tion in vh'ich tai only routine buuineea was
hoing tv naocte4.. 3ut as tOtlite raoonnsioecncs is a dynsmio bueineee and
vtll COZatt.uao,.a a ba,so tot' a long time to togas.
b. Perhaps the real reason for ms's recom idation for a C MM X vas
that C OB, as presently organized, would find it difficult to cope with both
targeting and exploitation responsibilities. I thin% this would be eo, and I
agre* w1th the reasoning that two separate Croups ehou1s conduct targeting and
exploitation respectively. But, the two groups would function moot effectively
If they aorkad under the supervision of a single authority, a single authority
responsible to the DM and USIB.
I do not favor constituting a new committee or the CCNIOR as thin
eeuthoiity. 'hile C( ?20R has wwked acrrpriciaglyy vel1, it has shorn the usual
weeekueecees of the committee approach to policy deoieions and operational manage-
ment. 3P we are to introduce exploitation r aagement w A if it Is to be
conducted in teamwor% with targeting, then both functions should be conducted
? a !3 %WWAM.-Y 9t 0 ro n-4 mna~pr as r=ant and expert staff's.
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2. t would recommend, thsx'efore, thats
A. A aetellita reconn iesance tanager or director be appointed
by and directly responsible to the DCI and U3IB. A deputy should also be
appointed, with BMIB agreement that a CIA officer and a military officer would be
rotated in the two positions.
b. U ro permanent and ftll-tim* staffs be eatdbliehed umder the
wanavrp we for targeting (rep stint CMOOA and its Photo Working 4roupI,
and one for exploitation (replacing ADCti, ate). The tva staffs each would
be composed of oi'ficern from the member aCcncica o U3IB, with the addition of
an tO officer to the targeting stasff# and an VIC officer to the exploitation
staff.
~. An additionnl edvantege to this arraneement mould be that as authority
organized along ouch command Lines would op=to store effectively in time of
war under the Defense Department and Jp. Another erdvantages would be that
CIA at least could aoei.ga to the two otaffa office w'ho were esqnrienced in
and aenmiti.ve to the changing needs of lt-'oduuing intelligence otti es.
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4. mica
It is suggested that the OPICa should be under the management of IPIC,
and that, In whole or in part, they should be staffed by NPIC, 17PIC
memagement and staffing would ensure that the quality of work would be uniformly
high, with IIPIC being in a position to choose and supply the beet of training
and equipment, and able to rotate experienced personnel between NPIC headquarters
and OPTCs as needed.
no-hours
The report states (P? ?, pare 6) that imagery interpretation mQnhours
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=a is the !hind of Problem
that could be attacked by a permanent eXloitation r angement staff, but would
be difficult to handle in a committee oitumtion.
6. ;ncreased Requirement
There are two additional points in support of the HIM finding (p. 9,
Para ).3) that the magnitude of the effort required from 1967 to 1971 will be
subotantielly- Less than forecasts
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Even the estimate that there will be a cos hatlve increase on the
order of 30 percent over the next five year period should be considered with Caution
and doubt. An coverage, photo gmlitr end expertise in interpretation have
progressed over the past three years, intelligence problem open have narrowed.
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It Is reasonable to expect that caajor technical etdvancee owing into being
will facilitate feher the finding of needed Answers, and increase
the rapidity with Vhich new types of targsta art covered and satiafaotorily
analyzed, I1 w uses and needs for satellite rcconnaiaearrct will develop as
capab!Uties improve, but we should be able to transfer to these some of the
resources devoted to past uses and mods.
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