INTELLIGENCE IN THE MISSILE CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100040003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1966
• Content Type: SPEECH

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The production of hard Cuba
information in the fall of 1962.
INTELLIGENCE IN THE MISSILE CRISIS
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1
Excerpted from the author's presentation to the Intelli-
gence Methods Conference.
25X1A6a
It was the fall of 1962, an election year, and a silver-
haired senator of the opposition was taxing the administration
with its failure to "do something'.' in light of all the ,reports
he had about Soviet missiles in Cuba. Asked about this at a
news conference, President Kennedy responded, ... To persuade
our allies to c.: with us, to hazard ... the security ... as
well as the P_-ace of the free world, we have to move with hard
intelligence."
How _:"resident was provided with hard iut;clligence
throughou- those fateful October days is the subject of this
parr. most conspicuous element in that intelligence, the
dr.t=:ati, -2 and low-level photography, has long enjoyed the
prc s it deserves; I wish rather to highlight some other
s of action taken by the intelligence community to meet
extraordinary demands of the President and his advisers.
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In the first place, the events of September and October
1X52 did not burst upon an intelligence community only dimly
aware of Cuba and the problems .it posed. In a way, the com-
munity had without realizing it been gearing itself since late
1SO1 for the crisis. Under directives from Mr. McCone, the
increases in the collection of information were matched
dev opments-intelligence--producing offices. In CIA, for
e=Y mpie, a Cuba Branch was established in the economic research
4NNWAW
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organization, and the Latin American Branch of the geographic
research element began to concentrate almost all its effort
on Cuba. ,IBIS expanded its coverage of Cuban radio broadcasts
and began to issue pe:: iodic analyses of them. The NPIC assigned
more interpreters to work on Cuban photographs. And in March
of i0^02 the CIA Office of Current Intelligence began to publish
", L:IG-21s, and Komar boats and given control of them.
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Right up to today, Cuban reporting continues to receive
activity continue to come in through a variety of sources,
,special attention. Reports of-missiles or missile-related
mostly exiles and agents in Cuba.,.Now, as then, these reports
25X1X48 Ph=dUareiully checked against shipping information and the
I don't think anyone
expects the Soviets, 'having been once burned,` to be twice
foolish, but then we didn't expect them to beonce foolish
either.
The words of President Kennedy in mid-December of 1962
of the times:
as he reflected on the crisis speak to one of the lessons
think, looking back on Cuba, what is of concern
is the fact that both governments were so far out of
contact, really. I don't think that we expected that
[1hiushchev] would put the missiles in Cuba,. because
it would have seemed such an imprudent action %for him
to take, as it was later proved. Nov, he obviously
must have thought that he could do it in secret and
that the United States would accept it. So that he=r
did not judge our intentions accurately.
the importance of helping analysts working with one.Part'of
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Of lessons more particularly for intell.gen
ce,, one is
a problem communicate with those working in related areas,
in this instance the shipping analysts had information of
im4;rt to those concerned with military and political matters,
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*'i`
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and the timely sharing of this information was vital. A more
: ? W sc it hind of eparation to overcome is that that divides
tI: .na1yst from the intelligence collector, especially where
collection :systems or highly ccnr it ive sourced are in-
valved. At ties it almost seez3s--to the analyst, at least--
.hat -he collector regards collection as an end in itself.
It ic.a't, of course, and this kind of obstacle is the mutual
p-o lem of the collector and the analyst.
o h r lesson is the need for great procedural flexi-
hil:i'sy in time of crisis. Our normal organization is design-
ed to do? complete job within normal deadlines. Doing it,
rrw add to of fund of knowledge and expertise. But this
nor a.= os anization is rarely ve11 suited to the kinds of
ac %~i.ionz necessary in a crisis. Nor are plans for crisis
:: wn e--ent drawn up. in advance usually of much help. The
crisis imposes its own shape, its own schedules, its own
tmo:~s, and its own answers. In short, the intelligence
w ac best prepares for crisis by filling up the fund of
'kno;icd e and ability when he can and by using it as efficiently
mad imwgi.n vc1y as he knows how when the crisis breaks.
a tha11y, let r..-; return to President Kennedy's statement
"vo have to t vo with hard intelligence." The U.S.
;oe?:x?~aL uws able to act with precision and certainty in
w6fifivdiom
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this crisis because at the crucial stage its? intelligence
cum tawry developments in Cuba and elsewhere was hard.
So;; h: vc interpreted this to mean photographic evidence. I
believe this exa gorates the role of photography in intelli-
v ~:ce reportin , important as it is. I believe that one
1c: ion of the Cuban-missile crisis is the indispensability
of usin all sources, human and technical, and all techniques
and r^_cthodologies to achieve hard intelligence. If there is
cuo Icon we should have learned by now it is the danger of
sing';o_ource intelligence, no matter what the surface promise
of tha,t source may be.
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