FY 1986 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R001201490006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 15, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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S-E-C-R-E-T
15 September 1983
MEMORANDtM FOR: Chief, Planning Division, O DDS&T
_Iffff
DDA Planning Officer
SUBJEECT: FY 1986 Research and Development Program
/OV_a L
REFEREIE: Your Multiple Adse Memo dtd 4 Aug 83, Subject:
FY 86 R&D Planning Cycle
.1. The attached statements of research and development
requirements for the Directorate of Administration are submitted for
your review. and for forwarding to the research and development offices.
12. As you requested, we have provided fewer, broader, generic
long-range requirements. For elaboration and clarification, we have
included problem statements which address specific concerns within
these generic topics. As in previous years, we have placed the
polygraph research and development requirements in a separate category.
3. In view of the small number of generic categories submitted,
we consider each category to be of Priority 1 rank. We expect
multiple solution statements to be prepared for each of the generic
categories. While we have tried to comply with your recommended
format, we are concerned that these broad generic categories contain
high and low specific priorities. To rank the generic categories
against each other would undermine the possibility of needed research,
should one entire generic category fail to be addressed. This
approach can be used to develop a successful program only if all
generic categories receive funding.
4. In order to further enhance the success of the research and
development program, we encourage increased communication with the
contact officers in this Directorate. We also request an updatEe on
the status of the FY 1985 program. This update will help us in our
review of the proposed FY 1986 program and allow our offices to
identify the appropriate contacts to support the research and
development projects.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS
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5. We restate our interest in the Artificial Intelligence
research and would like to see a proposed AI project in support of a
requirement in this Directorate.
6. We look forward to the successful development of the FY 1986
research and development program.
1 - DDA Subject (w/att)
- DDA Chrono (w/o att)
1 - DDA/MS Subject (w/att)
1 = DDA/MS Chrono (w/o att)
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DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION
RESEAICH AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS
o Security in the Electronic Office
o Information/Communications Systems Security
o Physical Security
o Technical Security
o Communications
o General Computer Applications
o Polygraph
S-E-C-R-E-T
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SECURITY IN THE ELECTRONIC OFFICE ( ONGOING )
The changes to the office environment that are creating
both the "electronic office of the future" and advances in
communications technology may have the greatest impact on the
security threat. The electronic office explicitly includes
word and data processing systems, electronic telephones and
computerized branch exchanges, systems for mass storage on
magnetic media, and local area networks (LAN's) that link
telephones, word and data processors together. These new
capabilities will certainly change how we handle intelligence
information. How we protect this information can only be
addressed after a thorough threat assessment. Along these same
lines, advances in communications technology have the potential
to change our present technical collection threat assessment.
.Countermeasures to new hostile systems can only be addressed
after we have taken into account what our vulnerabilities are.
While technological change will create new security
threats, it may offer new methodology to address both current
and future threats. An all-encompassing program to investigate
new technologies that have countermeasures applications against
an updated threat assessment must be undertaken.
Specific Topics / Projects in priority order
Office Electronics Security ( ONGOING )
Destruction of Non-paper Storage Media ( ONGOING )
Advanced Telephone Systems ( ONGOING )
Office Shielding Materials ( NEW )
Low-Cost TEMPEST Technology (RESUBMISSIOiu)
Device Security Profiles (014GOING)
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OS TSD.
Problem Number DDA
Office : OS/TSD
" Ot-fice Electronics Security (ongoing)
Tit
11`1'
(ror~:erly Office Machine Protection)
Problem Descriptio ~:
ip
The market for new office electronic equipment is expanding
so fast that it is. not possible to keep pace with the security
implications of each new device that appears to save time and,
money. Assuming the technological advances continue, it is
extremely difficult to predict what new classes of equipment
will be available-in the near future. The security implica-
tions of these devices will not only include the traditional
vulnerabilities, such as easy concealments, substitutions and
emanations, but they-will foster new security hazards- The
concept of office automation is moving ahead much faster than
the security measures which need to be associated with these
new machines 25X1
Time Requirement. -
Security Droblems associated with currently available
office machines are a serious problem already since marry
sensitive areas have equipment which is not fully evaluated
from a security standpoint. Similarly as ever. new equipment
is developed additional study efforts will need to be undertaken
promptly. 25X1
Background/R~P History/References: -
Traditionally only-a few relatively simple office
machines were available such as typewriters and copiers.
Besides offering places for easy concealment of various
types Of buys or sen sors, some have been found to produce
'
Or CP.araCper ~ic_1C sigma ureS which
CG`OrO===~1='-x ~...2n nt10 S
can be easil Dread and, translated bacl: into p'? ain text.
0 ice o-Co---.uu:ai catlo'sls tempest testing has detected and
barred such naciines from sensitive areas until they could
be properly modified or cone fined. 25X1
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Newer office machines such as word Drocessors and
computer devices that use magnetic recording materials for
information storage, present additional problems that have
not yet been defined. The CRAFT and similar programs are
attempting to consider the security problems associated with
massive network systems, but have now been forced into real
time, ad hoc solutions. Protection is often discussed, but
if the methods of exploitation are not. kno~ti-n, it is difficult
to determine what effect the protective measures will have. p25X1
Benefits/Description of Output:
The primary effort should identify the classes of
office equipment that may soon be developed and marketed
along with the inherent security risks that each may exhibit.
A study of this nature should also include the vulnerabilities
to exploitation that each will offer as well as quantities of
these machines that are expected to be found in sensitive
areas. -This list will certainly include but not be limited
to typewr copiers, word processors, and magnetic storage
machines. 25X1
Once a comprehensive-list has been compiled categorical
vulnerabilities by class should yield a "security profile".
This information should indicate corrective action to lower
the "security- pro--File" and further indicate how remaining
weaknesses can be determined or detected in the field
environment. The "security profile" should address the trend
for having this "smart hardware" advise the custodian of
tamper violations, after-hours power use, etc. Current
security alarms are not appropriate for this function. 25X1
Policy/Basis Justification:
The world of office machinery is quickly advancing toward
the point where there will be a totally paperless society. The
Dl has expresser.: a strong interest in following this trend,
as it will solve the current problems of pa-o_ er document comProiFtise.
However, the developing market of automated office machines does
not necessarily solve the compromise problem, it merely redirects
it to unexplored terr_..ory. 25X1
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Problem Number -DDA OS TSD
Office: OS/TSD
Destruction of Non-paper Storage Mledia (New)
Problem Description:
M.any commercial devices and Agency unique hardware systems
now contain assorted non-volatile storage schemes. RAM, ROM,
EPROM, Bubble Nenory, and the total variety of magnetic storage
materials have na approved method of destruction - emergency or
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routine.
I
Time Requirement:
This requirement is currently critical due to imminent
deployment of data processing systems to overseas facil-
Proto~type systems have been deployed and are operating. 25X1
Background/REID History/References:
On degaussing of floppy and rigid discs, and various
sizes of .reel tape there has been much discussion. ghat
c s not been forthcoming is a declarative summary of the
performance, specifications, health and safety data on
an approved final or terminal destruction device for magnetic
materials. 25X1
The non-volatile electronic storage components and
devices that will definitely be integral com-oonents or
subassemblies of systems have not been addressed.
An additional concern must be a USG standard for degaussing
and destruction. NSA was thought to be `h erent authority
but this has not been verified to date. 25X1
7,e-efits,' escriT- ion of Output: -
There should be a profile addressing the "writing" strength
and density, and indicating the corresponding degausser strength
and time reou l _ ed for total oeciass zflcatlon of the data. The
d f rence e tween. A- dec cussing and D:, i rare-earth .magnet)
ce au ssa s- ould be I?Icoh; ct"tted The Cep cits5~ he evl'' ,.. emit
may be Ar- COwerec but there must be a satlsfac rv ?^G~'.'21 en ~.
capability that is indepencent of host power. 25X1
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dominant. concern.
ccnC t,S e verification capability is essential for
both data storage scenarios. It, is preferred that he
degatissing/destruction/verification nave routine use snot
T the emergency use so that situational stress ~tiill not be a
ch-s,is vi
The electronic component memories will likely be
di.sbursed,throughoutcr and
orsasshor a ort notice emergencd be
considered inaccessible
destruction event. A scheme for purging these devices,
possibly a recommendation on their location within a given
-.ro PC~Pntlal_ ~~
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Policy Basis/d'-=stification:
The Office of Security is charged with providing terminal
t for the classifiedraterial
destruction eetiipment appropl 25X1
at all Agency facilities.
Contact :
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OFFICE: OC
TITLE: Device Security Profiles
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:
Data terminal and III system populations are growing and,
consequently, the physical and communications security
overhead to protect them is increasing. The proliferation
of these devices/ systems to domestic sites (Agency and
contractor) and. overseas posts places new demands on our
traditional security approaches.
It is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to
establish and maintain adequate security (physical and
COMSEC) profiles for these systems.
-- Parent room. renovations and alarm systems are costly.
Maintenance and periodic inspections will remain a .
resource burden. A new, innovative approach to provide
and ensure adequate physical security for our IH
devices/systems during and after normal duty hours is
required. Methods to reduce the risk of tampering need
to be developed along with methods that can alert a user
that his or her system has been tampered with. We also
need methods that will permit us to use IH devices
securely in a signal flooded environment.
-- Current methodology to test for compromising emanations
requires highly skilled, scarce engineering and tech-
nical talent and is very time-consuming.' New measure-,
ment and analysis techniques are needed for use in the
field and the engineering laboratory.
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Ii4EOR1ATION/COMMUf4ICATIONNNS SYSTEMS SECURITY .(ONGOING)
Research to improve information systems security must lead.
to effective protection of data: (1) as it is being processed
on a system or device, (Z) as it is stored on a variety of
media, and (3) as it is being transferred electrically within.
ne tcyorks . There must be irprovmer_ts in the sanitization of
storage media that have contained classified information_ More
secure data. processor designs should be a: goal- ? And., the
prevention or detection. of tampering with systeB hardware -
should.be. inproved? The user interface -to the system should be
e
m prov t-"-- authentication of, users ar_d th
i
e ermined ' t'a
.
~
conpartinentation of date.
Candidate Topics or Projects in prior Fty order.
Sam; t i,atT oand. destruction of data storage media
(ONGOING )
Tamper detecti on for office ADP equipment ( ONGOING )
Data base encryption ( ONGOING)
User out enticaLion ( ONGOING )
Develop?-_A-_t or a device to detect and. prevent the
Unauthorized. transmission of data. ( ONGOING )
Computer firmware verification (ONGOING),,
3e;ecomim.in ca cns Security (ONGOINIG)
Deve.op er:t oF secure netlor?ks (ONGOING)
Con taca'-
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Problem Number:
Office: OS/ISSG
Title: Sanitization and Destruction of Data Storage Media
Problem Description:
The Information Systems Security Group (ISSG) has given
top priority to research leading to ways to deal.. with erasure
of data from memory devices and the ultimate destruction of the
devices when the need exists. These twin problems,
sanitization_ and destruction, have been of concern for a long
time, but they have been treated separately. This problem
statement generalizes the requirement to eliminate stored
data. ISSG believes that appropriate research into-the
physical processes of data storage will lead to methods and '
devices that are effective in sanitizing various storage/memory
devices. This category of research-is expected to continue in
order to respond to new developments. Magnetic disks. are
examples of evolutionary design. Each new process or material
will need to be considered. Higher coercivity materials cannot
necessarily be erased magnetically by the same processes used
on present disks. Plated disks, thin films and perpendicular
recordi-ng will require new sanitization techniques that are
based on specific research and testing.
Time Requirements:
There is an immediate need to determine the effectiveness of
sanitization methods that are used on today's media.,
Continuing research will be required for new media.
Background:
Storage media for data processing routinely require
sanitization and reuse and some types must be subjected to
destruction under conditions ranging from routine to
emergency. Some of the media that are based on present
technology are: semiconductor memory and buffers, magnetic
storage devices, and optical disks and strips. Developing
technologies are likely to add new devices. Magnetic storage
devices exist in a family that is represented primarily by
rigid and flexible disks, bubble memories, rewriteable
magneto-optical disks, ferrite cores, and tapes. Remanenceir.
magnetic disks that have ostensibly been erased is a present
concern.
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Benefits:
A measure of effectiveness will be established for
sanitization methods. There will be greater assurance that
media do not retain latent data that could be exploited by a
hostile intelligence service.
Policy:
DCID 1/16.
Contact:
Off. Desi;nator/Location: C/ISSG/OS,
Telephone:
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Problem Wuriber
Off ice: OS/ISSG
Title: Tam Der Proof Detection Design for Computer Peripheral
Devices e.g., WANG OIS 250 System New
Problem Description:
Wang 0I$ 250 system hardware is being placed. in domestic ands
overseas locations as part of the CRAFT program. - Although the
CPUs will norms ly be placed in vaulted-and alarmed areas, peri-
pheral devices (e g. printers and terminals) will be -'scattered :_
bjective in designing a tamper proof
the
o
throughout worms areas.:
" ._ .
device is to. reduce the -risk of. hardware nompromise in hostile
rovide
t wi171
ff
p
or
environatexta.. -Successful cepletion of this e
an additional option -to the- current ?reuirement for volutric.:.
alarms .in overseas facilities, with vost savings. The developed
device'should not interfere with normal functions or Cause-
endor
t be
d
v
--no
service, pt?oblems. Further, this device shoul
dependent,. but should be mul ti-functional.
.Time. Requirement:
_Ia
Since the first C:IA. overseas instal tion- of the Wag_.OIS
~
ror
er
t
~
- p
amp
250 system is expected in January 1 ;83,. s ~^Qde3 _-
ibl
e.
device should be developed as soon as poss
Background
Qnts ADP peripheral devices are an--
^
.
mainteace. yL ,",;;Y
devices for alarms at some overseas locations, which would result
in cost savings. it may be advisable to use both tamper proof
devices and volumetric alarm at some overseas. locations. Me
tamper proof devices would be an excellent backup to the
volumetric alarm system in high threat areas.
T- 3e ossible'to substitute tamper proof
z
housing the periphral devices. Thl. w=1. r
-t ~.. 7 ..woaa LA7~A
in
Luc y - -
devices" is i.nstal? ation of volumetric. alarms in the work-. areas -
3 t in a si ;ai
d ~
a
b
large quantities of data which could be captured. Y c
~.II .-. ,
:In. hostile ex
attractive target for other. intelligence _?ser-vices because-- of :the
7 -
t~hni
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Policy:
DCID 1/16.
Contact-
4
Off. Designator/Location: C/ISSG/OS,
Telephone:
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Problem Number:
Office: OS/ISSG.
Title: Computer Firmware Verification
Problem Description:
A major area of concern is the integrity of electronic
components used in the computer systems and networks of the
Agency. Any compromise of system firmware can nullify any
protection provided by software security utilities. The advent
of Large Scale Integrated (LSI) circuits and Very Large Scale
Integrated (VLSI) circuits have permitted powerful computer
systems to be concentrated in single printed boards. Methods
must be developed to verify the integrity of firmware prior to
bringing up classified Agency systems, after maintenance
activities-, and after the installation of new or replacement
components. The methods must be capable, of identifying
unauthorized alteration (i.e., bugs, implants) of circuit
components.
Time Requirements:
This vulnerability potentially exists now and adequate
means of verifying firmware must be developed as soon as
possible.
Background:
LSI and VLSI technologies have facilitated the spread of
powerful distributed computer systems and network. These
technologies could also. provide for the verification of the
physical separation of the respective levels of multilevel
systems-
Firmware verification will increase Office of Security
confidence in trusted computer systems.
Policy: _
DCID 1/16
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OFFICE: OC
TITLE: Telecommunications Security
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:
Comprehensive software and firmware design and main-
tenance techniques are needed to prevent unauthorized access
to networks and terminals and to detect unauthorized modifi-
cations. COISEC profiles of new communications systems are
often determined after procurement. This leads to costly
changes to software or firmware and delays in systems
deployment. Solution to this problem would radically reduce
costs of software changes and eliminate delays in system
deployment. Low cost techniques for end-to-end encryption
warrant particular consideration.
COidTACT: - 25X1
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Problem Number:
Office: OS/ISSG
Title: Development of Secure Networks (New)
Problem Description:
With the proliferation of major Intelligence Community
networks and Agency Local Area Networks (LAN) the potential, for
accidental misuse and purposeful abuse of computer services are
increased. Clearance and need-to-know security issues are
.exacerbated with the connecting of various systems and net-
works.. In order to provide sufficiently secure networks, the
following research-and development efforts are recommended:
1. Development of Secure Gateways: Gateway systems of r
varying size-and complexity will be required at nodes on
Intelligence Community networks to serve as security control
monitors. The requirements for a network gateway must be
defined.. At a minimum, the gateways must provide network.
access control, data and service authorization checking, flow
control, and auditing. The design specifications for a gateway
must be provided for a packet. switched environment.
2. Development of Security. Filters. for Local Area
Networks: Similar to gateways, security filters provide a
checking mechanism that authorizes access between subjects
(i.e., users) and objects (i.e., data files) in LANS. The
security filter should contain a data base rules access list
which mediates all access to system resources on LANS.' The
design specification should be compatible with Ethernet-type
networks and other planned LANS in the Agency.
3. ISO 'Mode-1 Development: The International Standards
Organization has developed a seven layered Open Systems Inter-
connection -(OSI) model for communications protocols in computer
networks. The OSI is now an informal standard and provides
guidance to computer vendors and network designees. Research
is needed to determined at which levels security features
(e.g.,access control) should be incorporated into the seven
layer model. - -
Time Requirements:
The development of secure networks. will become increas-
ingly more significant as projects such as the NPIC Development
Program and Mercury progress.
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Background:
Computer network design projects are now underway and
involve increased involvement of Agency computer systems.
Policy:
DCID 1/16, OMB Circular A-71
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~b.s a'A t~.s
PHYSICAL SECURITY ( ONGOING )
The physical protection of Agency facilities, personnel and
material is achieved through maintenance of "concentric rings
of defense." Every layer of physical security must be based on
a well established need and implemented with the highest regard
for the user. A major concern that does not appear to have an
immediate comprehensive solution is the prevention of
unauthorized removal of classified material. from Agency
facilities. The problem is far-reaching :in that the material
may be paper(original or a copy), film or magnetic media.
Another physical security issue is pouch protection. Even
though acceptable systems are available now, the possibility of
compromise of these systems dictates that backup systems be
developed for future use.
Candidate' Topics or Projects in priority order
Secure Pouch ( ONGOING )
Document Control / Protection ( ONGOING )
Physical Security General Support C ONGOING )
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i'rOD1er ?Nursber DD-11 OS e . 1 SD
P01ng
Prcbier Description.
are needed a ~ C_ es ~s_ retie=c_
sup or: of phN'sica_ securit 2-C'' ams. LZ"cliia~iOrc o
`OT7! PG7'C.G.L s)rs,-e`1 s Gre also it~~~=: G 17. ~1t: i. _?.: .G. L C'' L -
L F
- G rea tliremeA} .. .
-Lm
This is a needed ongoing
J2 CI.4.,1.012_T?C!?/R
past Drogrars have included a i~,arl.e t survey cC
COi. 1 al'a~_ ._ 1 docu? eft, : a