AGENDA AND PAPERS FOR MARCH 18 CCMA MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R001201450063-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: March 11, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET COUNCIL QN, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
FROM: RALPH BLEDSOE
SUBJECT: Agenda and Papers for March 18 CCMA Meeting
DATE:
March 11, 1983
The options papers for the Friday, March 18, 1983, meeting of the
Cabinet Council on Management and Administration are attached.
This meeting is now scheduled for 4:00 p.m. in the Roosevelt
Room.
No papers are included for the first two agenda items, which are
brief reports on the progress of the CCMA Federal Field Structure
Working Group, and the Executive Order on Workspace Management.
Both were covered at previous CCMA meetings. The working group
began its activities on March 10 at a meeting with Mr. Meese, and
is chaired by Mr. Carmen of GSA. Agency comments on the
Executive Order on work space management have been received by
OMB, and are being incorporated by OMB and GSA.
The third agenda item will include a presentation by OMB of the
first quarter's (FY 1983) results toward Reform 88 Phase I goals.
An advance paper will be provided prior to the meeting.
The fourth agenda item pertains to options regarding reauthor-
ization of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. Authorizing
legislation for OFPP expires September 30, 1983. The attached
options paper was prepared by OMB.
The fifth agenda item will address options for meeting the
President's goal for reducing Federal non-defense FTE work years
by 75,000 by FY 1984. The attached paper contains options
prepared by OMB and OPM for handling the current disparity
between agency requests and the goal.
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CABINET COUNCIL ON MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
Federal Civilian Employment (CM #307)
Options for Meeting the Goal
When the FTE reduction targets for nondefense civilian employment
were set in September 1981, the baseline was 1,163,100 FTE's and
the annual targets and planned reductions were (in thousands):
FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984
Targets ............. 1,137 1,108 1,088
Planned reductions... 26 55 75
Actual FTE employment in FY 1982 was 1,098 thousand, or 39
thousand below the target. In other words, actual FTE employment
was 3.5% below the ceilings assigned to the. agencies.
The FTE ceilings assigned.-to the agencies during the FY 1984
budget process were, in the aggregate, about 9,000 above target
for FY 1983 and about 15,000 above target for FY 1984. The main
sources of the increases were-(in thousands):
FY 1983
FY 1984
Commerce .................
1.6
1.5
Energy ...................
2.2
1.5
Justice ..................
1.5
4.0
Labor ....................
0.4
0.5
State ....................
0.6
0.9'
Treasury ................. 4.2
4.2
USIA o.3
0.7
Railroad Retirement ...... 1.5
1.5
Other ....................
-3.5
0.1
These increases reflect two factors:
the rejection by the Congress of: (a) the proposed
reorganization of Energy, and (b) the proposed
privatization of the railroad retirement system; and
Administration initiatives in other agencies,
specifically:
Commerce: Census, Patent and Trademark;
Justice: Drug initiative, FBI;
Labor: Job Trainina Partnership Act:
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S Passports, consular workload, communications
systems;
Treasury: IRS; and
USIA: VOA, Democracy program.
Failure to meet the FY 1983 and, especially, FY 1984 targets
would, of course, be embarrassing to the Administration. There
are several options for dealing with the problem.
Option 1: Reduce Ceilings Now
The Administration could revise the ceilings downward to the
initial targets. While this will be desirable in time, it would
not be advisable now for several reasons.
-- This would be "giving up" on an important Presidential
goal which would be well received by the Civil Service --
but not elsewhere.
Another budget review would be required, right on the
heels of the one that has just been completed. The
Budget Review Board, and possibly the President, would
have to become involved.
Because there are no new facts to bring to bear on the
decisions, there is every reason to expect that the
process would be a difficult and hard-fought one and that
it would become public.
If additional net savings are claimed as a result of the
lower ceilings,
those for FY 1983 would have to be reported to Con-
gress as proposed rescissions, and those for FY. 1984
would imply budget amendments -- both of which would
give Congress a reason for blaming the Administration
for delays in the appropriations process.
Option 2: Use PPSS Reports as Basis for Reviewing Employment
Cei ings
The reports of the President's Private Sector Survey, which are
scheduled to be made sometime during the spring, are expected to
make a number of recommendations that would, if feasible, permit
the work of the Federal Government to be done with fewer
employees. These reports can be the basis for asking agencies
and OMB to review the FTE needs of the agencies, with the
objective of reducing them.
Depending upon when the reports are received, the reviews can be
planned to be completed in time for the results to be
incorporated into the Mid-Session Review of the FY 1984 Budget
(July 1983) or the FY 1985 Budget (January 1984). The latter is
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preferable and much more probable, since it is unlikely that all
the reviews can be completed by the end of June.
This option has the distinct advantage that the action required
to carry it out would be both logical and expected. The
Administration would be responding to serious recommendations by
a public group, and the reviews could be fitted into the budget
process. For reasons mentioned below, the delay of a few or even
several months relative to the first option does not appear to be
a serious disadvantage.
Option 3: Take the Lapse Route
It is possible that a major part of the 75,000 FTE reduction will
be achieved if a hard line is held against further increases in
the ceilings. As is noted above, the FTE reduction achieved in
FY 1982 was 39,000 more than planned. This is because there was
a lapse rate (a shortfall relative to the ceiling) of :3.5%.
Over the past several years, the lapse rate for nondefense
civilian employment has ranged from about 0.7% to the 3.5% of FY
1982. If the lapse rate in FY 1983 is 0.8% and that in FY 1984
is 1.4%, the initial ceilings for those years -- the 75,000 FTE
reduction -- will be achieved. The experience of the first two
months of FY 1983 indicates a lapse rate of about 2% for the
year. Assuming that neither the Administration nor the Congress
adds significantly to the agency ceilings in FY 1983 or FY 1984,
the chance that the 75,000 FTE reduction will be achieved is
better than 50-50 if we hold the line against any further
increases and try to maintain the lapse rate. We should then
follow the monthly FTE reports very closely to see whether the
present trend holds. To the extent that the Congress adds an
identifiable number of FTE's, the Administration can properly
deny responsibility for a breach of the 75,000 FTE reduction.
Option 4: Joint Review by OMB and OPM
A fourth option is a joint review by OMB and OPM of each agency's
ceiling. The goal would be to freeze employment levels for
certain agencies, and apply partial freezes for most other
non-defense agencies. This review would, to the extent possible,
take into account current lapse experience, agency operating
plans, and potential congressional actions.
Brief Analysis
For now, there appears to be little risk in pursuing Option 3,
but tight monitoring of the lapse rate would be required. Option
2 could be pursued when the-PPSSCC reports are received. Options
1 and 4 would mean taking immediate action, though-Option 1-would
represent "giving up" on the goal. Option 4 would mean remaining
with the goal and negotiating new agency targets as soon as
possible.
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- CABINET COUNCIL ON MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
Procurement Reform (CM #207)
Options on OFPP Reauthorization
I. Issue
What should be the Administration's position on the renewal of
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's (OFPP) statutory
authorization, which expires September 30, 1983.
II. Background
The OFPP was established in 1974 for a period of five years,
following recommendations made by the Congressionally mandated
Commission on Government Procurement. It was reauthorized in
1979 for an additional four years.
Before 1974, many of the procurement activities presently
performed by OFPP, and even broader property management policy
functions, were organizationally represented in OMB's Management
side. The Commission on Government Procurement recommended the
establishment of OFPP as a separate, highly visible office within
OMB, with its own budget authority. It was further recommended
that non-procurement activities should not be assigned to the
office, because the Commission believed that type of arrangement
was necessary for the development of government-wide procurement
policy and implementation of procurement reforms.
III. Alternatives
There are three basic approaches to continuing the activities
currently assigned to OFPP:
o Alternative 1: Reauthorize OFPP in its Present Form
(i.e., as a distinct unit within OMB). This alternative
would seek reauthorization of OFPP as it is presently
constituted, with the exceptions of transferring the
Federal Acquisition Institute to GSA and integrating
OFPP's appropriation- into, the OMB budget. The
reauthorization could be for a specified period of time
(e.g. three or five years), or be "open-ended."
1. Significant organizational and functional stature
and visibility within OMB: a clear signal of
continued Executive Branch emphasis on
procurement reform.
2. Effective mechanism for implementing the
President's procurement reform program.
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3. Facilitates consistent, government-wide reform
for which Reform '88 was established.
4. Least likely to incur opposition of Members of
Congress whose support is useful for Reform '88.
1. Separately authorized office reduces the ability
of the OMB Director to direct the procurement
function and activities.
2. Integration of procurement with other management
concerns, e.g., personnel management, cash
management, is made more difficult by a
separately authorized office.
o Alternative #2: Functional Reauthorization. This
option would specifically authorize OMB to carry out the
activities currently assigned to OFPP, and would provide
funding in the OMB budget. Responsibility for the
activities would be assigned to the Management side of
OMB. The requirement for a separate unit may or may not
be specified in the statute.
1. Would allow for greater integration of
procurement reforms with other management
reforms.
2. Would give the Director of OMB greater
opportunity to direct procurement activities.
3. Can be rationalized by saying that the
development of the Uniform Federal Procurement
System has satisfied a major rationale for the
establishment of OFPP as a separate unit.
4. Consistent with the Reform 188 approach to other
management activities.
5. Forces Congress to react to an Administration
proposal rather than putting us in the position
of fighting a more restrictive Congressional
proposal and thus appearing inconsistent with
Reform '88.
1. Congress may resist not having a statutorily
established office to which it can look for
leadership on procurement matters.
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2. Might be perceived by the agencies as reduced
priority and support for procurement reform.
3. Is inconsistent with the draft legislation
included in the Uniform Procurement System
proposal OMB submitted to Congress in February
1982.
4. OMB Director loses buffer on controversial
procurement matters.
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o Alternative 3: Do not seek reauthorization. Under this
alternative, no authorization would be sought.
Procurement activities would be carried out mainly by
OMB's Management side based on existing OMB statutory
authority.
1. Would allow for better coordination and greater
integration of procurement reforms with other
management reforms.
2. Would give the Director the most opportunity to
direct procurement activities.
3. Can be rationalized by saying that the Uniform
Federal Procurement System has satisfied a major
rationale for the establishment of OFPP as a
separate unit.
4. Least resistance from agencies with substantial
procurement activity. (e.g., DOD, GSA,
Treasury).
1. 0MB would lose specific authority to deal with
procurement and most likely the resources; past
legal opinions have questioned whether OMB's
current statutory authority is sufficient to
carry out the function.
2. Might be perceived by agencies a.s reduced
priority and support for procurement reform.
3. Congress is reported as likely to resist not
having a statutorily established office to which
it can look for leadership on procurement
matters.
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4. Could be viewed as a signal that the
Administration will not stand behind the programs
for consistent government-wide reforms that are
the basis for Reform '88.
Alternative 2: Authorize OMB to carry out the activities
currently assigned to OFPP.
With the submission of the Uniform Procurement System to the
Congress, a major reason -- if not the major reason -- for
statutorily maintaining OFPP as a separate unit has been
satisfied. Accordingly, there is not justification for
reauthorizing OFPP in its present form (Option 1).
Option 2 (functional reauthorization) is consistent. with the
Administration's policy and the Reform '88 program to pursue
management reforms through consistent, government-wide
approaches.
Choosing Option 3 (do not seek reauthorization) would send a
signal that we are not pursuing our management improvement
policy. Also, not seeking reauthorization means that the
interested Congressmen probably will introduce a bill consistent
with option 1, and we will be in the position of fighting
management reform.
The issue can be handled through the standard OMB legislative
clearance process.
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