MINUTES OF 18 JULY 1983 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING: (1) REVIEW OF BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING; (2) STATUS OF ALCOHOL PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300047-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: July 21, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DD/A Regists?gr
EXCOM 83-009
21 July 1.983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive
Comm
ittee Members
FROM: Executive
Assi
stant to the Executive Director
SUBJECT: Minutes o
f
1-8
July 1983 Executi
ve Committee
Meeting:
(1)
Review of Beirut
Embassy Bombing;
(2) Statu
s
of
Alcohol Program
.1. The Executive Committee met on 18 July 1983 to review
developments related to the Beirut Embassy bombine.and-to be
25X1 briefed on the-Agenc.y's'alcohol program..-
chaired the session; participants included Messrs. Fitzwater
(DDA): Stein DDO ? Hinem n (DDS&T); Gates (DDI); Taylor (IG);
25X1
2. The meeting began with Mr. Stein providing a status
report on the interrogation of the bombing suspects. He said he
now questions the stories of the two prime suspects in the
bombing and noted that an Iranian or Syrian connection with the
incident is beginning to fade. The suspects may have been
involved but they apparently are from the lower ranks and
whomever was behind them is not known. Consideration was. given
to questioning the suspects outside of Lebanon but it was decided
that the disadvantages of moving them outweigh the advantages.
The investigation is continuing with the FBI's active .
participation.
25X1 3. summarized his report. ("Review of Beirut
Bombing Incident of 18 April 1983," dated 6 July 1983). He noted
that the State Department was aware of the vulnerability of the
Beirut Embassy as late as last February. The Embassy was given
authority then to take corrective measures to prevent a car
25X1 bombing. As for. CIA's performance, said that
after talking to people throughout the Agency, he could find no
indication that CIA had failed to disseminate all information
available relative to a terrorist act against the Embassy. There
were indications, as there have been in Beirut for a number of
years, of hostile action against the Embassy, and certain
precautions were taken, but there was no evidence that a massive
bomb attack would occur. He also found widespread feelings that
the Agency should be more assertive on security issues relative
to the State Department's responsibility for the safety of U.S.
Government employees overseas. It was the general opinion of
people he interviewed that State would not act on its own; and,
without the Agency intervening, no corrective action would be
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taken. This view was so widespread that it lead to recommenda-
tion a. (that the DCI discuss overseas security with the
Secretary' of State) and to recommendation b. (that the DCI
reassure Agency employees that he is working on overseas security
25X1 IMr. Taylor observed. that the IG staff had heard
similar comments about State. Department security practices and
had commented on them. in the NE Division survey. He noted. that
the Agency is not very assertive ity issues in a number
25X1 of areas, among them He said that the EA
Division inspection report recommended that one senior Agency
official have the responsibility for dealing with State on
security matters. He closed by observing that the EXCOM may be
worrying about a truck bomb when the next. attack may be a rocket
through an Embassy window.
4. Mr. Fitzwater said that the State Department security
enhancement program, which was started in 1980, covers 60
posts. Work at four posts has been completed and. 24 additional
posts will be completed in the near term. Of the $135 million
authorized for security enhancement, it is believed much of the
money went for communications facilities and for improving
information security. He noted that both State and the Agency
have to work through the Federal Building Operations (FBO)
Office, which is concerned foremost with 'design and
construction. As architects control State Department's building
program, aesthetics and function are the principal design
factors; State Department Security's (SY) hands are tied.
25X1 asked whether, if the Secretary of State were
approached with this problem, he would do anything more than t
turn it over to. Tom Tracy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
'Administration. Mr. Gates interjected that the Agency is4.dealing'
with a State culture which sees security as a problem. Security
at the White House is the same. People from both organizations
do not come from a culture, such as the Agency, where everyone
feels security is their personal responsibility. Mr. Briggs
asked whether the group was talking about personal safety as well
as document protection. It was the EXCOM's general view that
just as the Secretary of State won't let his people be
polygraphed, there is a cultural phenomenon
25X1 all forms of.securit .
25X1 ecause w en a assy burldrng or
25X1 as esigne , anyone could walk without restriction
to the rob . The DA had even loaned the State Department two
security officers but when he discussed the IG report of
weaknesses in security in Africa with Tracy, the FBO people, who
were present, in effect ignored him. He agreed that the DCI
should talk to Shultz and emphasized. the necessity of giving
State security the security enhancement authority that it
needed. Security, he noted, should be based on the vulnerability
25X1 of the installation not merely the country:
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?- a .
25X1
LORI
observed that a post cannot be protected if the terrorists are
willing to risk their lives. He concluded by stating that the
Agency needs to establish more of a paper trail to keep the DCI
informed of problems encountered with State. From time to time
the Agency's responsibilities in security issues need to be
defined; for example, the DDCI has instructed both the DDA and
DDS&T to Dlav a secondary role with regard to security
up on the question of the Agency's role in the security of
embassies overseas.
Mr. Fitzwater acknowledged that.he should follow
5. Mr. Fitzwater suggested that the IG discuss IG reports
with the State. Department IG. Mr. Taylor agreed it would be
useful for both him and the DDA to talk with State. It was his
impression that a great deal of the $135 million authorized for
security improvement went for the TERPS. John Stein noted that
Agency people definitely earn their special pay overseas. For
example, when an ambassador is told one of his local employees is
involved in terrorism, ambassadors often are reluctant to act and
say they can't upset the system. When told that someone is
probably a spy for the Soviets, they don't fire the employee,
is moved. SY has no power to make the State security system
work. CIA has pointed out deficiencies in the past but nothing
changes. The only way to get action is to take away the
ambassador's power and force the bureaucracy to change its
ways. There has to be a trade-off between security and day-to-
da.y_.__embassy operations and it needs to be made intelligently.
The group discussed ways to galvanize the State Department,
including encouraging the DCI to surface with the Secretary of
State the Department's "scandalous" inaction. Mr. Stein noted
that he did not agree with recommendation f (for a study to
establish a legal basis for reprisal or retaliation). In the
general discussion that ensued, the obvious flap-potential in any'
suggestion of re risal was reco nized, as were constraints on
25X1 Agency actions. noted that the recommendation was
meant to serve as a catalyst; he was not necessarily suggesting
Agency action but rather some form of U.S. Government response.
Mr. Gates noted that he felt that (with reference to.
recommendation e--on over compartmentation) there is complete
sharing of information between the DO and the DI but less with
the Office of Security. Although the Office of Security does not
have an evaluative function, he noted that they need raw
reports. Mr. Fitzwater indicated ' y did
25X1 not receive the The
EXCOM agreed tha the dissemination o a pertinent terrorist
threat information to all components can be easily arranged.
6. Mr. Hineman said that the Agency lost some good evidence
He and Mr. Fitzwater agreed
that OTS, security, logistics, medics, and possibly the FBI,
should have a team ready to respond rapidly to future terrorist
incidents. Mr. Gates reiterated that it was time to have the DCI
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tell the Secretary of State that the Agency has had it. Also, he
suggested, the Agency may have to use leverage in Congress and
NSC with regard to where the State Department's $135 million
went. Mr. Stein noted that he was opposed to having the DCI act
on recommendation b (that he reassure Agency employees that
action is being taken to improve their security overseas) until
there is some demonstrable success with the Department.
Mr. Stein noted that if employees are led to believe improvements
in overseas security are being made and nothing occurs, there
will be a backlash. He concluded by saying that he felt that the
EXCOM's discussion of t.he.bombing had been a_worthwhile
25X1 exercise. closed the discussion about the bombing and
said he would prepare a summary for the DCI.
25X1 7. then introduced Bob Ingram, Director, OMS,
25X1 and Alcohol Program Coordinator, and said
they would provide a status report to the EXCOM. He noted that
the DDC.I is particularly interested in having the Agency conduct
25X1 an effective alcohol program. -noted that the Agency
alcohol program was started in 1978 and that last spring OMB
examiners assessed the Agency program as the best they had ever
seen.
25X1 8. then observed that nationwide 10% of any
working force has employees in either the early, middle or late
stages of alcoholism. The Agency has a program because alcohol
can-reduce an employee's productivity by 50% or mor ring the
25X1 withdrawal stages. OMS has a current case load of employees
25X1 and family members, of which D are employees. The length of
service of employees who, on their own initiative, contact the
program is 15 years. The highest incidence of alcoholism appears
to be in the DO and DA, but cases are probably more evident. in
these components because OMS has more frequent access to DO and
DA staffers who are officially. referred to OMS for overseas
processing.
25X1 9. tasked whether employees who go through the
25X1 program feel penalized subsequently. said there
have been cases when people who were about to be fired
subsequently received three promotions after entering the
program. About 3% of the employees who are identified as
25X1 alcoholics leave the Agency. added that there are
people who recognize they have.a problem and do nothing about it;
by the time OMS has clinical evidence of alcoholism the employee
is in a late stage of the disease. Discovering employees in the
early stages requires managerial help. A training program for DI
and DS&T managers has been completed and the DA program begins in
December. Training for DO managers will follow. The purpose of
the training is to make more supervisors sensi-tive to behavioral
patterns indicating a need for medical assistance.
25X1 10. I tasked whether OMS alerts supervisors when it
discovers a problem. Dr. Ingram said that if alcoholism is
discovered as part of an official fitness for.duty review, it is
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reported to supervisors. If discovered as the result of the
person walking into OMS, it is not routinely reported. If the
employee volunteers for the program, OMS will place the employee
under a standard medical hold and. not specifically advise his
supervisor that the employee has an alcohol problem.
25X1 11. passed out posters and brochures and
advised that she believed OIVIS had successfully publicized its
alcohol and consultative services program. Supervisors can refer
employees to OMS without saying they are concerned about
alcoholism. Mr. Gates observed that he was aware that one
program staffer wanted the alcohol program combined with other
family services to take away the stigma. He said he was not
proposing anything at the moment but believed there is a high
level of unawareness. Mr. Taylor agreed that people do not know
about the 'program; he said State has a monthly column in its
newsletter. Dr. Ingram said in response that OMS is doing a
brochure describing all of the services OMS provides, among them
the bi-annual physical, social and psychological services
consulting.
12. The meeting was adjourned.
ExDir (ExCom Subject)
DDI
DDO
DDS&T
DDA
IG
EA/DDCI
ER
EXCOM Minutes
5
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