THE CIA EXTERNAL ANALYSIS PROGRAM: A RATIONALE AND A REVIEW

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 27, 2008
Sequence Number: 
28
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 1, 1983
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5.pdf254.97 KB
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Approved For Release 2008/06/27 :CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5 ? - - ---- ? A RATIONALE AND A REVIEW - Executive Surmlary = August 1983 DDI Planning and Management Staff 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/27 :CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5 ? Executive Summary This paper presents the results of an in-depth review of the CIA External Analysis Program. It addresses the rationale for having this Program and for its apparent growth in recent .years. It delineates the roles and responsibilities of the many organizational elements involved and identifies minor problems associated with administration of the Program. More importantly, this paper addresses specific aspects of the External Analysis Program that are in need of some management attention or procedural changes. Finally, this paper provides a response to Congressional criticism concerning use of external analysis by the Intelligence Community, to the extent that it might be .,applicable to the CIA Program. Principal Findings ' Based on information acquired from well over 100 personal interviews with CIA analysts, managers, and staff officers over a five-month period, we have the following findings to report: 1. There is a sound rationale for the External Analysis Program. In essence, it complements our internal analytic capability by providing: expertise in a particular area or discipline;~access to sources or .capabilities that we do not have; or additional manpower that happens to be needed for a certain task or for a short time. " ~; 2. Contrary to popular perceptions about the funding of CIA external analysis, the Program is currently in a recovery mode rather than being in a period of continuing growth. It is now clear that the Agency actually suffered a significant drop, in terms of constant dollars, in its external analysis capability during the FY 1979-82 period. (See Figure 1} 3. heal growth in external analysis over the next two years appears to be justified because of the need to: a. Remedy the combined effect of past austerity programs and high inflation; b. Meet rising demands from intelligence consumers for coverage of new topics of concern and for improved quality and timeliness; and c. Take advantage of enhanced intelligence collection capabilities. ,, Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5 ? o~i,nnt ? 4. An earlier concept--that, as the Agency received and. filled more analyst positions, the need for external analysis would gradually diminish--has proved to be a fallacy. Growing consumer demands and enhanced collection capabilities meanwhile have magnified the combined workload of our analysts and ? contractors. 5. The Agency is especially dependent on its Externa l Analysis Program at the present time because of the time lag in developing skilled analysts. Approximately 30 percent of our analysts are still within their three-year probationary period of employment with CIA.' Indeed, some 50 percent of the DI analytical corps has five years or less of Agency experience. 6. The more than 100 Contracting Officerfs Technical Representatives (COTRs) in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), as a group, seem to be avidly interested in their external analysis projects and serious about getting useful results for the monies invested. But some are inexperienced and many are uncomfortable with the amount of training they have received. COTR training needs to be strengthened, regularized, and tailored to DDI projects. (Recommendation No. 1) 7. The DDI Contract Team has proved to be a highly effective mechanism for the procurement of~.external analysis; but- the team will require some augmentation to i