THE CIA EXTERNAL ANALYSIS PROGRAM: A RATIONALE AND A REVIEW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 27, 2008
Sequence Number:
28
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 1, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300028-5.pdf | 254.97 KB |
Body:
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A RATIONALE AND A REVIEW
- Executive Surmlary =
August 1983
DDI Planning and
Management Staff
25X1 SECRET
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Executive Summary
This paper presents the results of an in-depth review of the
CIA External Analysis Program. It addresses the rationale for
having this Program and for its apparent growth in recent
.years. It delineates the roles and responsibilities of the many
organizational elements involved and identifies minor problems
associated with administration of the Program. More importantly,
this paper addresses specific aspects of the External Analysis
Program that are in need of some management attention or
procedural changes. Finally, this paper provides a response to
Congressional criticism concerning use of external analysis by
the Intelligence Community, to the extent that it might be
.,applicable to the CIA Program.
Principal Findings
' Based on information acquired from well over 100 personal
interviews with CIA analysts, managers, and staff officers over a
five-month period, we have the following findings to report:
1. There is a sound rationale for the External Analysis
Program. In essence, it complements our internal analytic
capability by providing: expertise in a particular area or
discipline;~access to sources or .capabilities that we do not
have; or additional manpower that happens to be needed for a
certain task or for a short time. "
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2. Contrary to popular perceptions about the funding of
CIA external analysis, the Program is currently in a recovery
mode rather than being in a period of continuing growth. It is
now clear that the Agency actually suffered a significant drop,
in terms of constant dollars, in its external analysis capability
during the FY 1979-82 period. (See Figure 1}
3. heal growth in external analysis over the next two
years appears to be justified because of the need to:
a. Remedy the combined effect of past austerity
programs and high inflation;
b. Meet rising demands from intelligence consumers
for coverage of new topics of concern and for
improved quality and timeliness; and
c. Take advantage of enhanced intelligence
collection capabilities.
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4. An earlier concept--that, as the Agency received and.
filled more analyst positions, the need for external analysis
would gradually diminish--has proved to be a fallacy. Growing
consumer demands and enhanced collection capabilities meanwhile
have magnified the combined workload of our analysts and ?
contractors.
5. The Agency is especially dependent on its Externa l
Analysis Program at the present time because of the time lag in
developing skilled analysts. Approximately 30 percent of our
analysts are still within their three-year probationary period of
employment with CIA.' Indeed, some 50 percent of the DI
analytical corps has five years or less of Agency experience.
6. The more than 100 Contracting Officerfs Technical
Representatives (COTRs) in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI),
as a group, seem to be avidly interested in their external
analysis projects and serious about getting useful results for
the monies invested. But some are inexperienced and many are
uncomfortable with the amount of training they have received.
COTR training needs to be strengthened, regularized, and tailored
to DDI projects. (Recommendation No. 1)
7. The DDI Contract Team has proved to be a highly
effective mechanism for the procurement of~.external analysis; but-
the team will require some augmentation to i