THIS BACKGROUND PAPER IS TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE SENSE OF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300016-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORT

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This background paper is to provide you with the sense of
frustration felt by many SIS'ers relative to the current issue
of SIS pay levels and to the Agency's management of the system
in general.
PERCEPTIONS BY THE MEMBERSHIP
-- That there is a strong negative perception that the
Agency is being unrealistic and unnecessarily rigid in its
management of the SIS system as compared to other US
Government agencies,
-- that there are significant differences between our
practices and those implemented in the other agencies,
-- that,the Agency currently provides no meaningful "flow
through" within SIS except by a formal promotion ranking/
position grade system, (This latter point is contrary to
OPM guidelines which discuss annual adjustments in SES pay
in addition to October cost of living increases, and appar-
ently flies contrary to the Executive Branch's attempt to
raise executive pay in order to retain high quality
managers.)
-- that the signal being sent to the GS officer aspiring to
SIS membership is that only in this Agency is he held back,
whereas in other agencies he could be paid at a higher
level based on effective performance and added responsibil-
ities in succeeding years without passing through a compet-
etive promotion process. A meaningful addition to the above
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statement is that a statistical breakdown of current Agency SIS
officers indicates that only 12% of these officers will ever
reach the SIS-4 level which, under current pay proposals, is
the GS cap ($63,800). (Less than 1% of the SIS officers will
reach the 5-6 level which represents the SIS cap ($67,200),)
-- that if a "pay freeze" were implemented, there could/
would be no salary movement upward with the possible excep-
tion of limited headroom generated promotions based on an
existing stratified grade structure. Incentive plays no
significant part in our system and the performance/stipend
award program is probably too restrictive to be meaningful.
US AND THEM
In comparison with the rest of the Federal Service, our
percentage of SIS mix is rigidly pyramidic. See chart:
SIS/SES
Gov't %
(OPM Source)
Agency %
1
9%
20.0%
2
9%
45.0%
2/3 of
SIS membership
3
17%
2/3 of
SES membership
22.0%
4
50%
12.0%
100% rounded 100% rounded
From the above presentation it appears:
-- that we are not competitive within the SIS 1 through 4
levels relative to the percentages of people in those
grades elsewhere in government,
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-- that we are fighting a problem internally that not only
does not exist elsewhere, but need not be a problem within
the Agency,
-- that the Agency appears to be ultra conservative (appar-
ently without reason) when dealing with meaningful person-
nel matters and that the SIS pay issue is a vivid case in
point,
-- that there exists an insensitivity to the issues by OP
policymakers.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
If the SES is a flexible system with only the pay cap as
the limiting factor, the driving concept should be that we do
what other agencies (per above chart) have readily done.
Barring this, we should at a minimum modify our structure to
allow maximum SIS salary levels within the pay cap structure.
(The general concensus, based on the above perceptions, is that
the present Agency SIS salary structure acts as a disservice to
the majority of SIS'ers and offers no long range salary incen-
tives to GS-15's opting for the senior service.) This appears
to be at odds with the prevailing practice of other agencies
and the intent of the Congress in establishing the Senior
Executive Service. Note: The Agency finally followed the rest
of the government in permitting unlimited annual leave accummu-
lation - but it started conservatively, eventually reacted to
pressures of the "disadvantaged" SIS population, presumably saw
the issue in different light, and made a change.
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OTHER OBSERVATIONS
The OP paper to EXCOM devotes more effort to stressing the
negative and the status quo than to proposing a long range
positive realignment of our SIS as the best solution. One
question OP raises is cost. And yet, by the comparison chart
above, other old-line agencies obviously do not see this as an
issue. Why is it a problem for us? These agencies allowed for
liberal conversions and also allowed for "floating" upward
adjustments annually, per the OPM guidelines. We should not
play second fiddle to the Foreign Service (see example on chart
attached) or other Civil Service SES practices. One should
bear in mind that there was a cost to any agency/department
that changed to SES. Those organizations have already borne
their costs. We will have our cost to bear when we make mean-
ingful changes to our SIS system. Without the change, and in
unnecessarily keeping SIS similar in many ways to the former GS
supergrade system, we never incurred the costs which will now
face us for the first time.
Lastly, has OP met personally with the Office of Personnel
Management, State Department, OMB and/or other Agencies and
Departments to get any feeling as to the effectiveness (or lack
of effectiveness) of their programs, and to take away any
fresh, creative or innovative approaches? One would think not!
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