OMS RESPONSE TO OP PROPOSALS ON PAY INEQUITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R001001300013-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

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OMS Response to OP Proposals on Pay Inequity
1. Overall the OP presentation of the pros and cons of the
available options to remedy current pay inequities in the SIS
were balanced and constructive. The one notable exception to
this is in the presentation of Option D (retaining the status
quo), the proferred analysis of which is frankly biased and
clearly designed to enhance the probability of this option being
adopted.
2. Option A, instituting a series of "within grade steps,"
is viewed by this Office as the most desirable proposal. It not
only is equitable, but also would provide a more generic
solution that will still be viable after the next pay cap
adjustment. It is important, however, that initial within step
assignments take into consideration the within step which
individuals would have achieved had they not entered the S.I.S.
The "Cons" proposed for this option do not appear to have any
necessary basis in fact. The performance oriented concept, to
the extent that it exists within the S.I.S. need not be lost if
the (infrequent) awards and stipends are continued. The
inversion in pay at the high steps of SIS-1 and SIS-2 would be
minimal when compared to the present inequities, and represent a
gradual phase out of this imbalance with increasing
grade--rather than an accentuation. Previous windfalls, the
last "Con," have'no demonstrable relevance to the present
internal inequities.
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3. Option B is also viewed by OMS as a positive resolution
to present inequities. It is a logical approach to overcoming
the abrupt termination of the GS within step spread as one
enters the SIS. It is not as systematic a solution as option A,
and would have to be defended anew each time another inequitable
pay raise was proposed. The proposed "Cons" to this option are
again overdrawn. The substantial costs of this admittedly
expensive option are given with not one comparative figure from
the other options (excepting the retention of the status quo).
This a very important oversight. Exactly how much more
expensive would it be? More importantly, how much more
expensive would it be than the costs incurred had the Agency
followed the government-wide model of assigning its senior
executives to the equivalent of the SIS-3 rank in the first
place. Is money being saved which was extracted from salaries
in the first place? Two additional cited "Cons" presuppose a
response from Congress and the Administration which forecloses
discussion. OGC proposed that we take our rational argument
forward without assuming an answer. OMS supports this latter
position.
4. Option C is a half-a-loaf solution which solves only
partially and only temporarily the superficial problems, and
then adds in a few new ones. It would nonetheless be preferable
to the status quo.
5. Option D supports a continuation of the status quo with
a series of "Pro" statements which as well could have been
assigned to options A through C, or which are only marginally
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relevant. The distinctness of the S.I.S., and its "senior"
status is not jeopardized by any of the other options. The
second "pro," the historic overlap in the General Schedule, is
noted with no comment about the enormous increase in the
magnitude of this overlap occasioned by the recent changes in
pay scale. A third "pro," the fact that GS-15s will be
equitably treated in the current scale, is irrelevant as the
problem is within the SIS--not with the GS-15 level. Although
the "Con" seems fairly presented, one wonders if the 62% figure
for those of the SIS who are earning less because of their
previous high performance takes into consideration the within
step raises these people would have received had they remained
within the GS system. The figure may well be even higher than
62%.
6. The final option, Option E, allowing a reselection of
the GS schedule on a one time basis, is not viewed as a
preferable resolution to the problem by OMS. The capricious
application of pay scales in the past would force some officers
to gamble that this type of inequity would continue and opt
out. They should not be forced to make their decision based on
the assumption that inequitable decisions would continue to
govern the administration of the SIS program. If Option E is
selected it would be appropriate to offer sufficient data to
allow the most informed decision. This would include a
statement on proposed Agency policy in dealing with
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future SIS/GS pay imbalances as well as an indication of the
average (per SIS member) award or stipend actually awarded each
year, after reductions due to imposed pay limits. Has this
average been as high as $1500 a year? Would the SIS who choses
not to amass leave always stand to receive, on average, more pay
in the GS system for the foreseeable future?
7. The OP recommendation is that SIS principles be
reaffirmed by selecting Option D. As an alternative, OP
proposes Option E, but has not provided sufficient data to allow
an informed decision on the merits of this option.
8. OMS feels that Options A, B, and C are equally effective
in reaffirming SIS principles, and that all are clearly more
equitable than option D, as well as more rational than Option
E. We feel Option A is by far the most reasonable of the
offered options, followed by Option B. Option C would be a
distant third.
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