WHEN COLD WARRIORS MEET TO TALK PEACE

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85B01152R000700990003-2
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 15, 2008
Sequence Number: 
3
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Publication Date: 
September 1, 1983
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OPEN SOURCE
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Approved For Release 2008/01/15: CIA-RDP85BOl152R000700990003-2 Las AtLqAkj Ti -~ Sunday, e wnber M2/Part Id By .t Bwby arvard University plans to show the world how to avoid nuclear war. a mission so extravagant as to be arrogant anywhere except here at Harvard. It does not take a Yale graduate, for example, to ask the obvious first question: What do these people, slouching toward Harvard Square with their Topsiders and book bags, know about nuclear war? If Harvard means to you bricks and Ivy and open-air jugglers and string quartets performing in the square after dark, your answer is short, Not much. There is a better answer inside the John F. Kennedy School of Government. a short walk toward the Charles River from the square, where some of the best teachers at Harvard have been quietly laying a foun- dation for the extravagant mission with something called the Executive Program in National and International Security. Most of these teachers have worked in government-in arms control or non-pro- liferation, as economic or legal advisers, and as top managers. Program director Douglas M. Johnston Jr., for example, spent 10-years in nuclear submarines. Some still divide their time between Harvard classrooms and Washington war rooms, their minds so cluttered with classified information that they often have to stop t,lkft halfway through a sen- t~ce. For the past five mmmers, the faculty has gpasnt two crowded weeks at black- bcants in taa"U as tt eat r lectn*' to and Eng.. in the Socra. c sense. with admirals and generals and their civilian counterparts in the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, Congress and a range of other federal agencies. They are the heart of a unique program that lifts cold warriors out of their world of weapons systems and spy satellites and coaxes them into a second look at the rest of the world and at the stereotypes on which decisions too often depend. Prof. Joseph S. Nye Jr. started one morning class by suggesting that former President Jimmy Carter invented human rights as a cornerstone of American for- eign policy. Right? There was no dissent. "By a vote of 300-1," said Nye, "Congress cut off trade with Russia in 1903 because of the Immigration policies that covered Jews during the pogroms." The silence around the carpeted amphitheater was broken only by the sound of minds bending. Nye did not stop there. The lesson was riot that there are surprises in history but that national character is a crucial factor in shaping foreign policy. Why did Congress act as it did in 1903? "We don't like people sticking sticks in -other peoples' eyes, " said an Army gener- aL "As in Guatemala?" Nye teased. "As in Guatemala," said the general. "You're onto something," said Nye. "For good or bad, we are a moralistic people." How moralistic? Now do you balance morality against other more tangible in- terests--women's rights, for example, about which this nation feels strongly, in dealing with oil-rich Saudi Arabia, where women have no rights? No tidy conclu- sions, just something to think about. Approved For Release 2008/01/15: CIA-RDP85BOl152R000700990003-2 Approved For Release 2008/01/15: CIA-RDP85BO1152R000700990003-2 Later, the class t 90 minutes wres- tling with two questions posed by political scientist Stanley Hoffmann: Is there any room for ethics in international relations? If so, what kind of ethics? Prof. Michael Nacht argued that Ameri- cans are not as good at thinking regionally as they are at thinking head-to-head with the Soviet Union. To cure that, the class was divided, half invited to look at a problem through Israeli eyes, .the other half to think like Palestinians. Ernest R. May. historian and former dean of Harvard College, lured his class into one trap after another to demonstrate the dangers of misinterpreting history as a base for making decisions or, worse, selecting from history only the facts that fit your case. Economist Francis M. Bator gave a positively Shakespearean performance of the dismal adence for an audience not given to thinking about the workings cl the system to whose protection they devote their lives. Archibald Cox, a legend, and Arthur R. Miller, a erratic cobra, both of the Harvard Law School, showed the other aide of journalism to security. conscious people, most of whom arrived thinking that newspapers are. at beat irresponsible and at worst subversive: . The program is more boot camp than summer school. A crimson loose-leaf bind- er, three inches thick, holds required reading that begins at the end of nine-hour days of classes and guest lecturers and might end sometime before midnight. But the students--one-third of them with the rank of general or admiral. a tprlnkling of journalists, executives of corporations in defense work, intelligence analysts, all with work piling up on desks. at home-buckled down like freshmen. By the final session it was clear that the Washington contingent, which included a general who draws the five-year defense plan for the Marine Corps, another who commands an army, a U.S. senator, Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), were giving as much Some of the best teachers at Harvard have been quietly laying a foundation for an extravagant mission: to show the world how to avoid nuclear war. ? as they *ere getting. As historian May emphasized often. the pr;;gr..sr 11 a two-way street. For its part, the faculty was probing the minds of people whom the defense and diplomatic establishments see, by and Iarge, as comers, people with the potential to be chief of naval operations, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the top civil servants in their agencies. What the faculty seemed to find was a group that already knew enough to look both ways before it crossed a street, that needed only reminders to look beyond crises to the future for opportunities for long-term victories In return for short-term draws. Prof. Albert Carnesale, who, along with Graham T. Allison, dean of the Kennedy school, Nye, May and others will conduct Harvard's search for nuclear peace, had a message for the class. after it had tiptoed through a hypothetical case looking for a way to save the anti-ballistic missile treaty with the Soviets. "There's a lesson here on stereotypes. When our regular students are cast in this case as generals, they say, 'Great! Burn up the treaty and let's go." What the class got in return was a demonstration by the faculty of the brand of intense detachment that the nation will need to think rather than feel its way through global shocks like the destruction by the Soviets of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 that, in the end, ripped the academic curtain that Harvard had tried to drape around the class of 1983. The Harvard program has been criti- cized as a merger of elites in education and government who are more interested in managing tensions than in reducing them. The missiles of August made it rather plain that, critics or no, the program has its priorities right. Managing tensions by building better barriers against accidental use of weapons, shaping arms-control proposals to squeeze out all incentives to' be the first to launch missiles and improv- ing communications are, for now and as far ahead as you can see, the names of the game. Topsiders and book bags or not, the Kennedy School program has laid a foun- dation for just ouch an effort, easily the moat important study of our time--how, indeed, to avoid nuclear war. Jack Burby is a istant editor of The Times' ed'ttoric papa. ' Approved For Release 2008/01/15: CIA-RDP85BO1152R000700990003-2